what I was going to say is -
the conception of that which does not require the conception of anything else just is a
conception of singularity
it is thus the concept of one -
it is for Spinoza the view that there is one concept that explains - explains all diversity
- it is an explanatory concept - and the explanation is singularity
is oneness
if the conception does not require any other conceptions to be formed - then by
definition it is a concept of singularity
for we are here told no other concepts apply -
if you then assume a well formed concept is a conception of something -
then what it applies to - is a singularity
is a matter of logic
therefore what it refers to is one - is substance
and again by definition if the concept applies - then what exists is one substance
so the steps of the argument are:
(1) propose a concept of singularity
(2) assume it applies
alright
it is clear that we can do (1)
but do we the go to (2)?
generally not
why not?
because the fact that we might be able to conceive x is one thing -
whether x applies is quite another matter
in a way Spinoza is proposing in his definition of substance the ontological argument -
how do we know if a concept applies?
say the concept of a golden mountain
if it is meant to be an actually existing mountain of gold
we test the assertion - by looking for that which is asserted -
OK
what though of a concept of metaphysical unity -
everything is one
can this be tested?
no -
the reason being it has no empirical content -
it just cannot be tested - it cannot be falsified
it is not an empirical proposition
it is non-empirical
it is metaphysical
which is to say
what?
not that it is meaningless -
it is meaningful - but not empirical
again it is to say what?
it is to say
we have a view of the world that we hold - regardless of the facts of the world
it is a background view
that functions to - explain - give account for what we cannot know
the human understanding that needs to give some description of the unknown
for deep psychological reasons -
it is an account of the unknown
therefore such conceptions are descriptions of what cannot be known
they are strictly speaking imaginative
this is the category Spinoza's concept of substance falls into -
which is all very well
but it does not apply to the known world - or the knowable world
it cannot be regarded as a true account of what we know
or for that matter a false account
it is a fictional account
the mistake is to assume that all conception relates to the knowable world
this is not so
it is in Ryle's terms a category mistake -
it is to mistake the known for the unknown
and to assume that concepts that properly apply to one -
in fact apply to the other
which is wrong - and big time
