Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit:
126.
ARGUMENT:
the Thing is posited as being for itself - or as the absolute negation of all otherness -
this is self-related negation
but the negation that is self-related is the suspension of itself - and so the thing has its
essential being in another Thing
COMMENTARY:
the thing as being for itself - what can we make of this?
'being for itself' must be being outside of consciousness -
of course we have no knowledge of this -
such being - for consciousness - is no more than a logical possibility
it is to say yes the world could be without consciousness -
and that such a world would exist not for consciousness - rather for itself
for 'being in consciousness' it is fair to say is being for consciousness
that is from consciousness' point of view
bearing in mind there is no other 'point of view'
in the sense that consciousness is the focus - brings a focus to being - that which is the
object of the focus - from the point of view of that focus - exists for that focus
OK - this though is what you have to call a consciousness-centric view
and yes - this is not a criticism per se - for indeed the practical reality of consciousness
in the world is that consciousness is metaphysically central
however we can think beyond such - or outside of such a conception
we can imagine a world without consciousness
and if we do this we are imagining a world without self
and in such a world the categories of being for itself and being for another - do not
apply
all you have is being -
now you can call this pure being if you like - or give it some other poetic
characterization
the fact is that we are only speaking - and quite precisely - of what we cannot know
this is the result when consciousness imagines its non-existence you come squarely to
the unknown
