Hegel's Phenomenolgy of Spirit:
115.
ARGUMENT:
the Thing as the truth of perception is:
(a) a indifferent passive universality - the also of many properties
(b) negation or the ONE which exclude opposite properties
(c) the many properties themselves - the relation of the first two moments or negation
as it relates to the indifferent element and expands into a host of differences - the
point of singular individuality in the medium of subsistence radiating forth into
plurality
in so far as these differences belong to the indifferent medium they are universal
they are related to themselves and do not affect one another
but in so far as they belong to the negative unity they are exclusive of other properties
they necessarily have this relationship of opposition to properties remote from their
Also
the sensuous universality - or the immediate unity of being and the negative is a
property only when the One and pure universality are developed from it - and
differentiated from each other - and when the sensuous universality unites them
it is this relation of the universality to the pure essential moments which at last
completes the thing
so in summary:
the thing is a passive universality of many properties - it is also the one which
excludes opposite properties and the point of singular universality that expresses
plurality
we can distinguish pure universality and the one - sensuous universality (sensuality)
unites them
the relation of universality to the essential moments (universalities) completes the
thing
COMMENTARY:
yes - 'the thing' presents as a singularity that expresses many properties -
the 'properties' are descriptions given of the thing
'the thing' is a description that functions as the reference for the descriptions (of the
properties)
that is it becomes the reference - the term itself I am saying is the reference for the
descriptions given to it -
the terms 'the thing' or 'the entity' - 'the object' etc. are base descriptions of the
unknown that is the subject of focus
they are good descriptions in that they are clearly content free
they are simple recognitions that the unknown is in play -
they announce the unknown and are true to it
description here is the defining of a domain - or should I say the assertion that a
domain is established - for the purpose of description
secondary descriptions - what Hegel would call properties - give the base description
character - give the domain content
at this point for all practical purposes the thing is known -
what acts are performed in relation to it are dependent on the secondary descriptions
put forward
that is its capacity is directly related to its description -
there is no necessity in relation to description
entities are transformed by being variously described
the thing in itself - what Hegel would refer to as a universal - is the unknown - in
focus - an unknown
when Hegel says the thing is a negation of the one that excludes opposite properties -
he is suggesting that the thing is fixed -
which in my terms would be to say there is one set of descriptions that apply to the
entity - and that is that -
rather I would suggest that the point about the thing as unknown is just that it is not bound by any description
true we will define a thing which means we will go with or run with a set of
descriptions - this is just a decision to utilize
what descriptions are used will depend on what purposes are in play - and how the
thing is to be utilized -
again there is no necessity in this
under different circumstance - inevitably different descriptions will be operative -
we can say it is the same thing because - whatever description - at heart the thing -the
object etc. - is unknown
description does not alter this fact - and this fact - the fact of the unknown - allows for
various descriptions and is indeed the source of the possibility of description
the thing is never fixed - it is though a focus of possible description
one's circumstances - and I mean this in the broadest possible terms - will suggest
appropriate description of that which is the subject of conscious focus
