23.1.08

Hegel 116

Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit:


116.


ARGUMENT:


consciousness is determined as percipient in so far as the Thing is its object

it has only to take it - to confine itself to a pure apprehension of it - and what is thus
yielded is the True

if consciousness did anything in taking what is given - it would by such adding or
subtracting alter the truth

since the object is the True and universal - the self-identical - while consciousness is
alterable and unessential - it can happen that consciousness apprehends the object
incorrectly and deceives itself

the percipient is aware of the possibility of deception - for in the universality which is
the principle - otherness itself is immediately present for him - though present as what
is null and superseded

his criterion for truth is self-identity - and his behaviour consists in apprehending the
object as self-identical

since diversity is explicitly there - it is a conception of the diverse moments of his
apprehension to one another

if a dissimilarity is felt in the course of this comparison - then this is not an untruth -
but an untruth in perceiving it


COMMENTARY:


consciousness is never determined - the essence of consciousness is indeterminacy

the object apprehended in the apprehension is made indeterminate

truth is a reflective argument of consciousness - in regard to its descriptions of that
apprehended

the 'object' apprehended is in itself neither true nor false

truth is a decision regarding propositions - their utility or not -

propositions are descriptions of what is presented to consciousness

to say a thing is self-identical - is simply to say it is a thing

identity per se is an illusion in this world - it is a mistaken concept -

every 'thing' that exists - exists as non-identical to any other thing

the object outside of consciousness is unknown - the object in consciousness is known
- as knowledge it exists as an indeterminate - this is the essence of its utility - its
indeterminateness -

the point is that our knowledge of the object is always an open question - that is it is
never finally resolved-

in practice we always run with some conception of the object of consciousness - but
no conception is fixed - the conception of the object - which is the object - holds only
in terms of its utility - conceptions change radically or ever so slightly depending on
how the knowledge functions

and the question of function is never determined - it simply just how we act - and
there are no absolutes in human action

there can be no incorrect apprehension - consciousness simply internalizes the outside
world -

what it does with this internalization - how the internalization is utilized - depends
entirely on the circumstance of the percipient - and here we include the state of the
body - the state of the immediate external -

all we can offer here is the possibility of different perspectives - different perspectives
determined by differing circumstances

what Hegel calls the awareness of the possibility of deception - is really only the
awareness of the indeterminacy of consciousness

there is no deception as there is no determinateness -

there is only indeterminacy and thus the possibility of differing perspectives

you never deceive yourself -

therefore the question of the truth of the apprehension is a meaningless question


NB.

consciousness and self-consciounsess

just a note here -

we do not have from Hegel as yet any real definition of consciousness -

and there has been to date no account of the nature of self-consciousness

I want to preempt here and put that all consciousness - is self-consciousness

that any distinction between consciousness and self-consciousness cannot be
maintained

my point is that all consciousness is aware of itself -

that is consciousness is aware of consciousness -

that it makes no sense to speak of consciousness as just aware of that which is outside
itself
for the awareness of the outside is just internalization

the object becomes consciousness

as such it is still the object of consciousness

but at the same time it is consciousness

it is subject and object

all consciousness is self-consciousness

consciousness by its nature is aware of itself

'itself' here is awareness

'awareness' thus by its nature is self-referring

this characteristic - self-reference - is what makes it awareness

it is what distinguishes consciousness from the non-consciousness

the non-conscious is not self-referring

it is simply what is - it is one dimensional

in relation to consciousness - it becomes the object of consciousness

further -

what are we to make of self-reference?

how can a subject refer to a subject?

we know this happens but how does it happen?

what is the logic of it?

the point is reference is based on the distinction of referee and referent

clearly if consciousness refers to itself - what you have is the identity of referee and
referent

on the face of it - this is not possible - if what we understand as reference is to occur

so sticking with this idea of reference - what is possible here?

that consciousness reflects itself

and that the reflection becomes the referent -

still the question - how does this happen?

perhaps we have no way of saying how this happens

but is it fair to say it must if self-reference is to occur?


p.s.


consciousness is internality

if it relects - it reflects out

its reflection that is - is its relation with the world outside itself

its reflection is this relation - inter-internal /external

the 'self' that consciousness knows is this relation