Tractatus 4

4. A thought is a proposition with sense.


sense is given in propositions - a proposition is sense proposed -

do we need to mention sense here at all?

which is to say a thought is a proposition?

this would be to say a thought just is a proposition

and that a thought to be a thought must be propositional

yes - I think so

this however is not to put that thought (as distinct from a thought) is a
proposition

a proposition as a proposal of thought

thought proposed

and I think this is kind of theoretical - the thought / a thought distinction

that is what can we say of thought per se - outside of propositional logic?

it's an unformed resource - an unknown

a thought brings thought into being for all intents and purposes


4.001. The totality of propositions is language.


the totality of propositions is the totality of thought - is thought


4.002. Man possesses the ability to construct languages capable of expressing
every sense, without having any idea how each word has meaning or what its
meaning is - just as people speak without knowing how the individual sounds
are produced.

Everyday language is a part of the human organism and is no less complicated
than it.

It is not humanly possible to gather immediately from it what the logic of
language is.

Language disguises thought. So much so, that from the outward form of the
clothing it is impossible to infer the form of the thought beneath it; because
the outward form of the clothing is not designed to reveal the form of the
body, but for entirely different
purposes.

The tacit conventions on which the understanding of everyday language depends
are enormously complicated.


(a)


the logic of language is a reflective question - that is language becomes
an object of reflection - it can for this reason never be resolved in a final manner - (there is no natural end to reflection - or reflective possibilities) -


the logic of language - one's theory - like language itself - is a matter
of design for purpose -

as purpose - is a fluid concept - so one's language - or one's theory of
language - is not a fixed affair

but if - purposes - tasks are decided - one's logic can obtain a pragmatic stability -


(b) language is a means of expression - what do we express if not thought?


language does not disguise thought

thought as expressed in natural languages is a raw immediate response to
the world

when put to specific tasks natural language (natural thought) requires
refinement and reflection -

this ultimately entails a metaphysical framework

so language reveals thought


(c) it is not that we infer from language the form of the thought beneath it


language reveals it

that we may not know what it is (i.e. its form) that is revealed - takes
nothing away from the revelation

it may be a revelation of clarity but mostly it is a revelation of intrigue

so much so that it is normal to inquire further -

and to think about it

language is hard to explain - just because it is the thing to be explained

it is the unity of the conscious and non-conscious dimensions

it is the unity

we begin to explain when we divide the unity - see it as a whole with parts -

and the natural division is the dimensional one - internal (consciousness) -
external (non-conscious) - subject / object

so I would say it is not that thought reveals - what is underneath

rather what is revealed is the unity of the inside and the outside

it is the known world

the known world in representation

now you can go one of two ways here

you can with Kant say the world as such - beyond what is known - is unknown

or say what is - is what is - language is the world in representation

and there is nothing beyond this

the result oddly enough is the same

for in the latter view - what we have is not in fact known

the nature of language - the logic of language is a question for reflection

and here too there is no certainty - only strategies

(there is a view of things which follows from what I have said which is at
least worth stating - if the world is language - if we begin as it were on
this platform - then one could argue that consciousness and the non-conscious
are simply categories of explanation of this reality - that the inner world
and the outer world are theoretical posits that are useful in the explanation
of the unity - that the expressed reality is all there is - beyond this the
unknown


4.003. Most of the propositions and questions to be found in philosophical
works are not false but nonsensical. Consequently we cannot give any answer
to questions of this kind, but can only point out that they are nonsensical.
Most of the propositions and questions of philosophers arise from our failure
to understand the logic of our language.

(They belong to the same class of question whether the good is more or less
identical than the beautiful.)

And it is not surprising that the deepest problems are not in fact not
problems at all.


a philosophical proposition is a stance -

to assert a philosophical proposition is to make a stand in the unknown

philosophical propositions are foundational statements

their function is to provide a basis for thought

thought asserting its basis - in a proposition - of thought

the logic of this does not bear too much scrutiny

to appreciate the value of such propositions you need to see the point
of them

the purpose - the need they satisfy - or at least address

and it is in its most general sense the need for security -

that is it is designed to satisfy an emotional need

in my terms it is when consciousness asserts an end to itself - an end to
reflection

now such an assertion is without logical foundation - but it is necessary
for action

its basis in this sense is pragmatic

a proposition such as 'the world is all that is the case' - actually is -
I would argue without content

it is a proposition that asserts the unknown - and is held as a foundation
statement

it is an empty statement

it is the end of all propositions

its point is not its content - if it appears to have content - this is
illusory - a temporary illusion - its point is rather the assertion of
end point

this is emotional and pragmatic

but I would argue - all such propositions - propositions of this class -
are assertions of the unknown
assertions of the empty proposition

what else can everything else be based on - but that which has no basis
itself?

the various and different formulations of such propositions - point
to the rich character of possibility

the different colours of the world -

the different ways it may be seen


4.0031. All philosophy is a 'critique of language' (though not in
Mauthner's sense). It was Russell who performed the service of showing
that the apparent logical form of a proposition need not be its real one.


Mauthner argued there can be no knowledge without language but also
that language is a veil which presents access to reality - so genuine
knowledge cannot be gained through language

his idea is that language can only reflect our subjective experiences -
and that it is determined by social function

therefore linguistic structures do not reflect ontological structures -
although they appear to

he went on to combine his scepticism with a theory of mystical intuition

there is much of interest in Mautner's perspective

language expresses the possibility of knowledge

and within this possibility we make choices and decisions

language is then used as a means of delivering these decisions - this
is where propositions come into their own - where assertions are made

language reflects theories - conceptions of ontological structure -
it is the marketplace - and it is an open market

what the world is made up of is always an open question

we have possibilities - this is life

(the end of these possibilities is the end of life)

Mauthner argues that language reflects subjective experience and is
determined by social function

against this I would put that language reflects not just subjective
experience but objective reality

that language is the reflection of this unity

language practice is indeed governed by social practice - this though
is not a complete theory of language

Mauthner's scepticism is on the right track

it is just that it was not comprehensive enough

as with Descartes Mauthner holds that there is genuine knowledge

(his scepticism is about how to find this knowledge)

and what is to count as 'genuine' knowledge?

surely any such proposal is the just the attempt to give a particular
form to thought (presumably for a particular end)

and to argue that such a form is superior?

all such claims have been shown to be groundless

invariably they cannot satisfy their own criteria for genuineness

knowledge is just the description of what we do and the world we operate in

there can be no 'genuine description' -

only various accounts

Russell's showing that the apparent logical form of a proposition need
not be its real one points to the question of logical form - and whether
it can ever really be settled

logical form is an open question - and decisions need to be made - as Russell
showed decisions though are just that


4.01. A proposition is a picture of reality.

A proposition is a model of reality as we imagine it.


(a)


a proposition is a picture of reality -

a proposition is a definition - the picture is already there - it requires
form

the proposition gives the picture form

why not just say the proposition gives reality form?

yes - I don't really see the necessity of the picture here -

the proposition as a frame - but really the question what is in it?

and the true answer to this is - that in a final sense we don't know

the picture in essence is without (any fixed) content

the actual content of the picture depends where the frame is put

and given that the frame is never stable - the content is never stable

so if the proposition is a picture - it is an empty picture


(b)


a proposition is a model of reality as we imagine it.

this does sound a bit like Mauthner's argument - or indeed Kant's

that reality is beyond language -

look reality is an undefined - it is in itself if you like unknown

this might sound like the Kantian view -

my view is different and is that the unity is unknown but its dimensions
are not

so yes we can speak of conscious and non-conscious dimensions

and as to the character of the whole we cannot say

a proposition is the meeting of dimensions - or an expression of the unity

so the proposition functions as reality - not as a model of reality

reality if you like is a propositional function

reality is what is expressed in all propositions

so for all intents and purposes reality is the proposition

a proposition is always a proposal within a domain

the domain is possibility

reality is a definition of this possibility


(c)


imagination

a proposition asserts a state of affairs

imagination as the conscious ground of possibility is the basis for any
proposal

a proposal is not what is given - it is what is proposed

given that what is given is unknown - any proposal by its nature will be
a posit

you can call this a product of the imagination

it is really just a propositional assertion based on reflection

and reflection is the conscious exercise of possibility

possibility is given in the fact of reflection

in the fact of consciousness


4.011. At first sight a proposition - one set out on the printed page,
for example - does not seem to be a picture of the reality with which it is concerned. But neither do written notes seem at first sight to be a picture
of a piece of music, nor our phonetic notation (the alphabet) to be a picture
of our speech.

And yet these sign-languages prove to be pictures, even in the ordinary
sense, of what they represent.


if you distinguish between a proposition and a propositional sign - and this
is not a straightforward matter - i.e. - what is a proposition but the
propositional sign? - but if you make this distinction - it by no means
follows that we are talking about the same picture - that is the picture
of the proposition and the picture of the propositional sign

yes you can say a propositional sign is a picture in the ordinary sense

but what is it a picture of ?

the proposition or the object of the proposition?

this is a fair question

my answer is that if you are going down this path - the propositional sign
is a picture of the propositional reality - the proposal and that proposed -
it is to use a technical ontological term - smack in the middle

it represents both and you might ask what is it that is thus represented
in this propositional reality -

outside of the proposition / propositional sign - there is no answer

the propositional sign is the answer - it is all we can say of the
proposition - it is the only reality / representation

one can speculate as much as one likes beyond this - but that is the point
of the propositional sign

yes it is a picture and it is a picture of the unknown


4.012. It is obvious that a proposition of the form 'aRb' strikes us as a
picture. In this case the sign is obviously a likeness of what is signified.


would it matter if the sign was not a likeness of what is signified?

that is how relevant is the notion of picture?

it seems that really the only sense of picture that is relevant is the
naive argument that a propositional sign can be regarded as a picture

you could ask is any sign therefore a proposition?

if all signs have sense - then what distinguishes a proposition from any
marking of any kind?

and it might sound a little out there - far fetched - but is the impression
of the wind or water on a rock face - a picture?

certainly to some indigenous people the answer could be yes

if so do we then say nature is a complex of propositions?

and thus that propositions do not necessarily have anything to with human kind

a dreamtime argument


4.013. And if we penetrate to the essence of this pictorial character,
we see that it is not impaired by apparent irregularities (such as the
use of # and b in musical notation).

For even these irregularities depict what they are intended to express;
only they do it in a particular way.


the point is isn't it that the propositional sign is arbitrary

once signed the proposition is expressed and expressed in physical form -
that is in a public manner

it my terms it has an external dimension

that is the proposition then has a physical form

can we speak of the proposition independently of its signage?

if not how are different signs substituted?

i.e. there must be a basis other than the sign for deciding substitution

if not - if the proposition just is the propositional sign - and this
has the advantage of not presupposing another reality to the proposition -
how do we explain equivalence in propositional signs?

could it be that the propositional sign gives a meaning - which is then
approximated by other signs - other sign languages

that is to say meaning is an outcome of the sign an effect if you like -
not a presupposition to it

the approximation by other signs -

or is it indeed that a different sign is a different proposition -
one based as it happens on the original propositional sign?

the advantage of this view is that we do away with synonymy


4.014. A gramophone record, the musical idea, the written notes, and
the soundwaves, all stand to one another in the same internal relation
of depicting that holds between language and the world.

They are all constructed according to a common logical pattern.

Like the two youths in the fairy tale, their two horses, and their lilies.
They are in a certain sense one.


here again the idea of the proposition as an underlying unity that
propositional signs represent perhaps reflect

the proposition as something other than its signs

this is OK here - but is the position being put a radical scepticism?

i.e. that the proposition is unknown -

that it is real - independent of its signs - and unknown?

I don't see how this position can be avoided

except to say that there is no distinction between a proposition and
its sign

the sign is the proposition

the argument is that the record the musical idea the sound waves the
written notes stand to one another in the same internal relation of
depicting that holds between language and the world

the musical event is just all the elements given - these elements make
the event

and so the logical elements of a proposition make up the picture of
the world given in the proposition

'They are all in a certain sense one'


you can argue that any multiplicity is in a certain sense one if you
assume what you are talking about - the series you are considering is
an expression of a deeper unity

it is the argument for essence

and of course it follows once essence is assumed

Wittgenstein I think wants to say here there is an essence to propositions

the problem with such an idea is that it means nothing unless you can
say what this essence is

in this context you need to propose a propositional form that is essential
to any proposition

the proposal of such amounts to what?

a proposition

is this proposition this essential proposition an instance of itself?

what could we make of such an idea?

that a proposition can make a statement about itself?

re: 3.332


4.0141. There is a general rule by means of which the musician can
obtain the symphony from the score, and which makes it possible to
derive the symphony from the groove on the gramophone record, and,
using the first rule, to derive the score again. That is what constitutes
the inner similarity between these things which seem to be constructed in
such entirely different ways. And that law is the law of projection which
projects the symphony into the language of musical notation. It is the
rule for translating this language into the language of gramophone records.


what is the symphony here?

the law of projection enables us to project the symphony into the
language of musical notation and to translate this language into the
language of gramophone records

the symphony can be described in various ways

and the different languages - i.e. the notation of the score or the
notation of the physics of the gramophone recording
there are other possibilities here i.e. could not the symphony be described
in terms of the neutral patterns of those hearing it - perhaps so -

these are interchangeable languages - one can be translated into the other

again it seems as if the idea of an essence is at the back of this

that essence is what is being translated

anyway the point is really isn't that any language will be in its own
terms complete

but no language will completely describe the phenomenon

that no phenomenon is ever exhausted by description or even multiple
descriptions

even if we drop talk of essence - we still face the fact that what is
being described is in a final sense - unknown

this is not to say it is unreal - just that it can never be uniquely
determined by description - by language

whatever picture we have is only a picture - not the picture

the individual picture may well be adequate within its own terms -

but this is to say adequacy is particular and not universal

the law of projectibility is a bit of a stretch

the symphony is not projected by this law into musical notation

the symphony is described - it is what humans do

the symphony itself we can say is a description in music

we then reflect on this and give further account

again the phenomenon is never exhausted by reflection

we never reach an end point - an essence

the symphony finally is beyond description


4.015. The possibility of all imagery, of all our pictorial modes of
expression, is contained in the logic of depiction.


the logic of depiction is just another description - another language

the possibility of imagery can be so described

the possibility of imagery though is not the only description


4.016. In order to understand the essential nature of a proposition,
we should consider the hieroglyphic script, which depicts the facts
that it describes.

And alphabetic script developed out of it without losing what was
essential to depiction.


what is it to depict?

well it is to reflect upon and to propose on the basis of the reflection -
it is to propose the reflection in a sensible form (a form that can be
made sense of)


4.02. We can see this from the fact that we understand the sense of a
propositional sign without its having been explained to us.


the capacity to understand is given in the relation of consciousness
to the non-conscious reality

a propositional sign represents this relation

why this should be the case is not something we can determine - it is
simply the fact of it - the reality of consciousness in the world.

consciousness expresses itself in the non-conscious dimension

this expression is language

sense is identified in markings

the possible range of propositional sign language is defined by the
action of the organism


4.021. A proposition is a picture of reality: for if I understand a
proposition, I know the situation that it represents. And I understand the proposition without having had its sense explained to me.


sense is not explained - sense is identified

the explanation of the meaning of a proposition is a matter of placing
it in a propositional context

what is known is the propositional fact

the propositional fact is a proposal for knowledge

as such it is open to question - further reflection - propositional
refinement

knowledge is the imagined end point of propositional endeavour

knowledge as a basis for action is decided by need and circumstance


4.022. A proposition shows its sense.

A proposition shows how things stand if it is true. And it says that
they do so stand.


A proposition represents the relation of the consciousness and the
non-conscious

it represents it specifically

a proposition does not show this relation

on an apparent level - the proposition shows how things stand and says
that they do so
stand

this however is the appearance of the proposition - it is what is seen

the nature of the proposition is deeper than it appears


4.023. A proposition must restrict reality to two alternatives: yes or no.

In order to do that, it must describe reality completely.

A proposition is a description of a state of affairs.

Just as a description of an object describes it by giving its external
properties, so a proposition describes reality by its internal properties.

A proposition constructs a world with the help of a logical scaffolding,
so that one can actually see from the proposition how everything stands
logically if it is true.

One can draw inferences from a false proposition.


a proposition has an internal an external dimension

the internal dimension is its logic - the external its sign

just as we can analyze the world dimensionally - i.e. conscious and
non-conscious - internal and external

so too the proposition is analyzable in terms of its dimensions

the proposition as such is the world represented

the world here as the unity of dimensions - as a unity

the sign of a proposition is its physicality

the logic of a proposition is its consciousness


NB.


I think the position I am coming to is that we need to drop talk
of 'the' proposition in the sense of something that exists
independently of its signs

the proposition just is the propositional sign

as a consequence of this view there is no translation

a so called translated proposition is a separate proposition

it comes about as a result of reflection on the initial propositional
sign

the fact of different languages is a reflection of the indeterminacy
of consciousness

we speak with many tongues

different languages serve different purposes

a proposition (propositional sign) can become an object for consciousness

it's interpretation - if that is needed - is a question of utility -
the need to use it in a different context

that context determines that another proposition - based on the initial
proposition is needed -

in short the context - the task - determines the language to be used

the relation between the two propositions will be the subject of a third
proposition

the two may be seen to be connected in any number of ways - as indeed any two
things can be if so conceived

the issue then even here at this level of the argument is not one of synonymy

it is the issue of connectedness - if it is an issue at all


p.s.


logic is the theory of sign patterns in languages

a logical language - a theory of logical signs - is a notation that displays
any such theory

and the general point is that logic - like any other language is a response
to whatever need - it has no special status at all

where logic is the response to the need for patterns that relate different
sign languages - logic functions as a meta language

there is no fundamental language - out of which all languages come

the capacity to generate languages is an open capacity

it is a direct consequence of consciousness' indeterminacy -

different languages for different purposes


4.024. To understand the proposition means to know what is the case
if it is true.

(One can understand it, therefore, without knowing whether it is true.)

It is understood by anyone who understands its constituents.


(a)


to understand the proposition is to see the possibility of its truth

a proposition can never be finally known to be true

its truth is always a matter of speculation

we have established modes of speculation i.e. - science - in which truth
is decided as a matter of necessity for action - and so the decision to
proceed is made - truth is assumed

this is action in the absence of knowledge -

in the context of the proposition and whatever understandings have been
decided on


(b)


a proposition proposes a state of affairs or indeed what is not a state
of affairs

the truth or falsity of it depends on how the world is and whether we
can in fact determine how the world is relative to the proposition

the proposal of the proposition is based on reflective consciousness -
that is the proposition is (before its proposal) a reflection -

the understanding is given at this level - the level of reflection

the putting of the reflection in a public form - a physical form is to
reflect back to the world

understanding on a basic level is consciousness active

analysis of the constituents of the proposition is the breaking down of
the proposition to it components
the proposition as a whole is what is understood - if you then analyze
it into its parts - what you will see is your understanding in parts

the proposition gives meaning to its constituents

the correct relation is deductive not inductive


4.025. When translating one language into another, we do not proceed by
translating each proposition of the one into the other, but merely by
translating the constituents of propositions.

(And the dictionary translates not only substantives, but also verbs,
adjectives and conjunctions, etc.; and it treats then all the same way.)


yes the business of translation does require that one understand what
each constituent of a proposition means - this is presumed

how one translates really depends on one's facility with the languages
in question - that is a fluent user may well translate proposition to
proposition


4.026. The meanings of simple signs (words) must be explained to us if we
are to understand them.

With propositions, however, we make ourselves understood.


a proposition is a constructed expression

it cannot be assumed that we make ourselves understood with propositions

a proposition can present a possibility for understanding

understanding is not the only use of propositions i.e. a proposition may
be deigned to confuse or deceive

the purpose a proposition is not necessarily revealed

we infer from propositions to intentions


4.027. It belongs to the essence of a proposition that it should be able to communicate a new sense to us.


a new sense comes with a new propositional presentation

that is the new sense is relative to whatever the old sense was - relative
to other propositional presentations - presentations that have preceded it

sense is thus here - propositional relative


4.03. A proposition must use old expressions to communicate a new sense.

A proposition communicates a sense to us, and so it must be essentially
connected with the situation.

And connection is precisely that it is its logical picture.

A proposition states something only in so far as it is a picture.


(a)


what is put in a proposition is a logical picture and the proposal of
the picture (i.e. that it represents a situation)

therefore the proposition is more than a logical picture - it is also
a proposal of relation

the connection is the proposal of relation - the connection is said to
exist if the relation proposed actually holds - otherwise no connection

the relation is not essential it is contingent

so there are two elements to a proposition - its picture and its proposal

the adequacy of it's picture is tied up with whether or not its proposal
is correct

the question of relation of the picture to the situation is rarely clear
cut and is therefore usually the subject of supplementary propositions

truth or falsity here has to do with adequacy

adequacy in turn is tied to practice - the use of the proposition

a proposition may be adequate on one level of view - and not on others

again it depends on what purpose it is put to

also the idea of a proposition's use - the task it is to be put to the
service of - is not always as clear as one may initially think -

e.g. - we may begin with a vague notion and in light of the proposition
and the question of its relation realize that the initial idea needs to
be clarified

the proposal of a proposition depends on the adequacy of the picture for its truth


(b)


what a proposition states is actually a proposal of relation - it is
that a relation exists between its picture and a situation

are we then to say the proposal of the proposition includes itself
(its picture)?

yes

the proposition proposes a relation between itself and a situation

if so a proposition is thus not simply a statement

Wittgenstein I think wants to say the picture of the proposition is
both its simple picture and the picture of the relation between the
simple picture and that pictured

so a picture of a state of affairs and a picture of the relation of
that picture and the state of affairs

clearly if the proposition is to relate to the world - it must be related

now is this done by the proposition itself - i.e. - it relates itself?

or might it be that the relation of picture to situation is in fact
a separate proposition that has as its relata the initial proposition
and the situation?

if so this would mean that any bone fide proposition is not just a
simple statement - but is rather a complex of propositions

the complex proposition is one that relates the simple proposition
to the world -

and a relational proposition must contain the basic proposition to be related?

so what do we say here?

that a proposition is a function -

and that the function is that it relates a basic statement to a state
of affairs?


4.031. In a proposition a situation is, as it were, constructed by way of
experiment.

Instead of, 'This proposition has such and such a sense', we can say simply,
'This proposition represents such and such a situation'.


if a proposition is a function that relates a basic statement and a situation
- then the proposition does more than represent such and such a situation

(such and such a situation here may be a trap - it could mean anything)

what I am getting at is the proposition represents the relation between
the basic statement and the situation

in this sense what it represents is over and above either the basic
statement or the situation

it represents a third reality - that which is the relation between


4.0311. One name stands for one thing, another for another thing, and they
are combined with one another. In this way the whole group - like a tableau
vivant - presents a state of affairs.


yes we can analyze a proposition into signs and that signified - but the
proposition is more than this - it is to propose a relation between the
statement and that signified

the state of affairs is not just a simple picture of that pictured

the state of affairs - if we are to still use this phrase is the relation
between sign and signified

the fact of the proposition is this proposal - proposal of relation

if the proposition is true - we say that the relation holds

and this relation is like the relation of the conscious and the
non-conscious - a state of affairs that is over and above both dimensions

it is to acknowledge the fact of unity

we do not there by describe the unity

we can only point to it

it is that which transcends both the subjective and objective dimensions

it is not thereby out of this world

to think so is to make the mistake that leads to non-natural realities

it is an easy mistake to make

a slip on the ice

and with a fall into spiritualism

any fall of this nature really comes from holding too tight to the rails

strictly speaking reality has no definition - if you imagine it does and
invest fully in this idea you are likely to come unstuck

best to regard whatever it is as all that it is

to start proposing alternative realities solves no problems - it just
clutters up the room

it's like having to do whatever you have to do - again and again and again

Oakum could be said to have seen the futility of this


4.0312 The possibility of propositions is based on the principle that
objects have signs as their representatives.

My fundamental idea is that the 'logical constants' are not representatives;
that there can be no representatives of the logic of facts.


in the unified as distinct from the analyzed reality yes objects have signs
as their representative

(in a non-conscious world this would not be so)

in the external reality there is no possibility

possibility is given to it in consciousness

the unified field of the conscious and non conscious is logical space

it is where possibility engages with the actual (the non-possible)

it is the space that allows for negation - conjunction - disjunction -
particularity and universality -

these possibilities are possibilities in the unified field

this is the reason why there is no representatives of logical facts

in the unified reality there is nothing to be represented

it is not representational

it is strictly speaking purely a logical construct

this is not to say that it is not real - it is very real

but it cannot be represented as such -

therefore not known representationally

it can be analyzed - and its dimensions represented - but not the unified
field

we have to understand the unified field as essentially functional

logical constants are as it were the inhabitants of this world

the action of this world is their function


4.032. It is only in so far as a proposition is logically articulated that
it is a picture of a situation.

(Even the proposition, 'Ambulo', is composite: for its stem with a different
ending yields a different sense, and so does its ending with a different stem)


to understand the possibilities of the proposition 'Ambulo' is to articulate
its logic

the picture of a situation is its logic

this suggests that a logical picture is not a picture at all - in the
sense of a representation - that it is rather something like a statement
of possibility - or possibilities - given in a proposition

image I think would be irrelevant to such a picture - it would be like the
colouring in of a figure in a colouring book

or do we say the image is there in outline - as what is not in the logical
picture?


4.04 In a proposition there must be exactly as many distinguishable parts
as in the situation it represents.

The two must possess the same logical (mathematical) multiplicity. (Compare
Hertz's Mechanics on dynamical models.)


is it that there are these parts and a correlation or that on reflection
we view the situation in this way - we make it like this - i.e. we create
a grammar - a logic - that reflects this principle - makes it so?


4.041. This mathematical multiplicity, of course, cannot itself be the
subject of depiction. One cannot get away from it when depicting.


what we depict is already defined mathematically - the mathematics
underlies the depiction


4.0411. If, for example, we wanted to express what we now write as '(x).fx'
by putting an affix in front of 'fx' - for instance by writing 'Gen. fx' -
it would not be adequate: we should not know what was being generalized.
If we wanted to signalize it with an affix 'g' - for instance by writing
'f(xg)' - that would not be adequate either: we should not know the scope
of the generality sign.

If we were to try to do it by introducing a mark into the argument places -
for instance by writing

'G, G). F(G,G)'

- it would not be adequate: we should not be able to establish the
identity of variables.

And so on.

All these modes of signifying are inadequate because they lack the necessary
mathematical multiplicity.

OK the point is that a notation without the capacity to represent mathematical
multiplicity is not adequate to the task of signifying


4.0412. For the same reason the idealist's appeal to 'spatial spectacles'
is inadequate to explain the seeing of spatial relations, because it
cannot explain the multiplicity of these relations


a one dimensional sign language will not recognize the multiplicity of
relations


4.05. Reality is compared with propositions.


the idea that we compare reality with propositions in the way you might
put a picture of a bowl of fruit beside a bowl of fruit is quite naive

a proposition is a construction of reality as well as a representation
of it

the reality of the proposition defines what you look for outside of the
proposition

the proposition is true if what it pictures is what is pictured

the 'what is pictured' I suggest is a function of the proposition -
that is it is determined by the proposition

the point being a proposition relates - the basic statement and the
situation

it states that one reflects the other

how are we to decide if this is so?

it is finally a question of looking

of looking to see if the proposition adequately states what is observed

it is not the event that is in question it is the proposition -
its adequacy

this is to take up a position of judgement

it is as it were to step outside -

to review the proposition and the event - and the proposed relation

the question of the relation is thus the subject of a further propositional
analysis

the initial proposition - is only resolved in subsequent propositions

where you stop this project is not a matter of logic - rather practice


4.06. A proposition can be true or false only in virtue of being a picture of reality.


any valid (well formed) proposition will be a picture of reality.

any proposition can be true - it's a question of fit

it is a question of where and when the proposition is put

a proposition can be true in one set of circumstances and false one step
latter

so to get your proposition right you need to have the world organized first


4.061. It must not be overlooked that a proposition has a sense that is
independent of the facts: otherwise one can easily suppose that true and
false are relations of equal status between signs and what they signify.

In that case one could say, for example, that 'p' signified in the true
way what '~p' signified in a false way, etc.


the sense of a proposition is just the possibility of its truth or falsity

that is 'p' and can be affirmed or denied - it is the case that 'p' -
it is not the case that 'p'

~p is the denial of p - it is not to assert a false state of affairs


4.062. Can we not make ourselves understood with false propositions
just as we have done up to now with true ones? - So long as it is known
that they are meant to be false. - No! For a proposition is true if we
use it to say that things stand in a certain way, and they do; and if by
'p' we mean ~p and things stand as we mean that they do, then, constructed
in the new way, 'p' is true and not false.


if p = ~p then p is true and not false


4.0621. But it is important that the signs 'p' and '~p' can say the same
thing. For it shows that nothing in reality corresponds to the sign '~'.

The occurrence of negation in a proposition is not enough to characterize
its sense (~~p = p).

The propositions 'p' and '~p' have opposite sense, but there corresponds
to them one and the same reality.


p asserts that 'p' '~p' denies 'p'

p asserts a state of affairs ~p assets that p is false

-p does not assert that the state of affairs asserted by 'p' does not exist

so yes the propositions 'p' and '~p' have opposite sense, but there
corresponds to them one and the same reality


4.063. An analogy to illustrate the concept of truth: imagine a black
spot on white paper: you can describe the shape of the spot by saying,
for each point on the sheet, whether it is black or white. To the fact
that a point is black there corresponds a positive fact, and to the fact
that a point is white (not black), a negative fact. If I designate a
point on a sheet (a truth value according to Frege) then this
corresponds to the supposition that is put forward for judgement,
etc. etc.

But in order to be able to say a point is black or white, I must first
know when a point is called black, when white: in order to be able to say.
"'p" is true (or false)', I must have determined in what circumstances
I call 'p' true, and in so doing I determine the sense of the proposition.

Now the point where the simile breaks down is this: we can indicate
a point on the paper even if we do not know what black or white are,
but if a proposition has no sense, nothing corresponds to it, since
it does not designate a thing (a truth value) which might have properties called 'false' or 'true'. The verb of a proposition is not 'is true' or
'is false', as Frege thought: rather that which 'is true' must already
contain the verb.


a black spot on a white paper - you can't actually refer to white spots -
so there is no basis to the idea of a negative fact

to say 'p' is true is not to make an ontological claim - it is to decide
whether a proposition is to function as a basis for going forward either
in thought or action

a false proposition is a dead end to thought and action

there is the view that - knowing 'when the point is called black' - that
is when the proposition applies - and thus when you may call the
proposition true - determines its sense

this is to confuse sense with truth value

the conditions under which a proposition applies or is true or false say
nothing about its sense

the proposition must have sense to begin with in order to be true or false

the second point is 'is true' is not the verb of a proposition as Frege
argued but rather that the assertion of the proposition is the assertion
of its truth


4.064. Every proposition must already have a sense: it cannot be given
a sense by affirmation. Indeed its sense is just what is affirmed. And
the same applies to negation. etc.

yes - there is no bedrock of truth or abyss of falsity - that a
proposition refers to

the world is neither true nor false -

we make assertions and we have to decide whether these assertion have value

(how we decide that is up for grabs really)

if we decide yes - then the assertion is held to be true - if no - false

if yes - it is usable - if no - it is not of use


4.0641. One could say that negation must be related to the logical place
determined by the negated proposition.

The negating proposition determines a logical place different from that
of the negated proposition.

The negating proposition determines a logical place with the help of
the logical place of the negated proposition. For it describes it as
lying outside the latter's logical place.

The negated proposition can be negated again, and this in itself shows
that what is negated is already a proposition, and not merely something
that is preliminary to a proposition.


negation is an action (performed on propositions) - not the name of a
logical place

that is negation - does not refer


4.1. Propositions represent the existence and non-existence of states
of affairs.


in a general sense the proposition is any proposal about how the world is -
this can include proposals about the relation of propositions to propositions

it can also include statements about the nature of propositions

the status we give to our intellectual endeavours is as much a part of how
the world is as the laws of physics

the fact that we reflect is a fact of the world -

propositions are our most robust form of reflection

they are and can be subjects of this reflective capacity -

this is to give an open definition of 'states of affairs' - to include
what ever occurs and wherever it occurs

a proposition can indeed be a reflection of the existence or non-existence
of a state of affairs

this is the simplest form of proposition


4.11. The totality of true propositions is the whole of natural science
(or the whole corpus of the natural sciences).


the propositions of natural science are propositions that reflect the
non-conscious dimension of reality

truth is not a one dimensional issue

that is it is not just an issue of observable reality

the question of truth also applies in the domain of the non-observable

meta propositions or propositions designed to form the basis of our
thinking about the empirical world - are also subject to the question of truth

truth needs to understood for what it is - the decision to proceed

we make this decision not only in regard to empirical propositions

but also in relation to non-empirical propositions


4.111. Philosophy is not one of the natural sciences.

(The word 'philosophy' must mean something whose place is above or below the
natural sciences, not beside them)


it is a question really of where you draw the line between natural and
non-natural

if by natural you mean only that which can be observed - you have a one
dimensional view of nature

this is to equate natural with observable

does it not make more sense to say everything that occurs - observable
and non-observable alike falls within the parameters of the natural world?

if so then the issue is not that philosophy is not within the parameters
of the natural - it is rather how does the activity of philosophy relates
to the activity of so called natural science?

the answer is simple - wherever there is critical thinking there is
philosophy

philosophy would thus be seen to be at the heart of science - as it is
at the heart of any human endeavour

those who engage in philosophy as a separate study - are just intensively
engaged in the activity

the conceptions that they put forward - the metaphysical systems - are
developed and comprehensive visions of the world

everyone inherits this wealth


4.112. Philosophy aims at the logical clarification of thoughts.


Philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity.

A philosophical work consists of elucidations.

Philosophy does not result in 'philosophical propositions', but rather in the
clarification of propositions.

Without philosophy thoughts are, as it were cloudy and indistinct; its task
is to make them clear and to give them sharp boundaries.


philosophy is not a body of doctrine - nor for that matter is science -
doctrine is the standard for non-critical forms of thought

when is an elucidation a verb and when is it a noun - and does it matter?

philosophical theories are generally the results of critical analyses

philosophical propositions are proposals for rational thought in whatever
area of human endeavour is being examined

the clarification that philosophy offers human activities is never value
free - that is it comes from within metaphysical systems - and these
clarifications are never without question - they too may be the subject of clarifications

a thought does not exist in some meta vacuum - philosophical analysis -
is about the nature scope and foundation of thought

all this is brought to bear when a proposition is as it were made clear
and given sharp boundaries -

philosophy is not a surface activity - it is not like cleaning a window -
it is rather like understanding the structure substance and foundation
of the whole building -

the desire to see philosophy as a surface activity - to present it as a
study of the surface of things is metaphysically perverse

it is based on the false assumption that the surface is epistemologically
clear - and also it comes from a failure of nerve in regard to the problem
of consciousness

ultimately it has to do with the fear of scepticism


4.121. Psychology is no more closely related to philosophy than any other
natural science.

Theory of knowledge is the philosophy of psychology.

Does not my study of sign language correspond to the study of thought
process, which philosophers used to consider so essential to the philosophy
of logic? Only in most cases they got entangled in unessential psychological investigations, and with my method too there is an analogous risk.


the question of the nature of knowledge - is central to any claim to
knowledge

epistemology is not the study of thought processes

epistemology is the inquiry into the nature of any claim to knowledge

an epistemological claim can be discussed without any reference to thought
processes


4.1122. Darwin's theory has no more to do with philosophy than any other
hypothesis in natural science.


it has been argued by Popper that Darwin's theory is not an empirical theory -
therefore not an hypothesis in natural science

be that as it may it is clear that given such a dispute philosophical
analysis has a crucial bearing on just how we are to regard Darwin's theory
i.e. is it a theory of science - or rather a non-empirical theory masquerading
as science - is it science or is it myth?


4.113. Philosophy sets limits to the much disputed sphere of the natural
science.


in philosophy we have various proposals - various propositions - if you will -
for how to view the world - these are designed to be comprehensive world views

this is the idea central to metaphysics

the very fact of this diversity suggests that no one view decides the issue
(if indeed the issue can be stated uncontraversially in the first place)

what philosophical work illustrates is the possibility of different views
of the one reality

that there is no one view of reality entitles us to question the basis of any proposal

we can regard this state of affairs as reason for despair - but only if
we hold to the idea that there is one resolution to the problem of reality

to accept in a positive manner the sceptical conclusion is to understand
and embrace a metaphysical freedom

this is the origin of courage


4.114. It must set limits to what can be thought; and in doing so, what
cannot be thought.

It must set limits to what cannot be thought by working outwards through
what can be thought.


what cannot be thought is what is not thought

as to the status of what is thought (whatever that is) that is a matter
for thought

thought thinking itself

this is thought working inwards through what is thought


4.115. It will signify what cannot be said, by presenting clearly what
can be said.


what can be said is what is said - what cannot be said is what is not said

philosophy does not signify either

philosophical analysis may provide any number of theories about what is said

i.e. it may put forward a theory of the logic of what is said or indeed
a theory of the epistemology of what is said - or many such theories -

philosophers may categorize what is said and try to argue that some things
said make no sense - and that indeed some forms of saying are meaningless

the point of such theories is to be found in their history

4.116. Everything that can be thought at all can be thought clearly.
Everything that can
be put into words can be put clearly.


if this was so there would be no philosophy

and secondly who has a clear incontrovertible theory of clarity?

surely we must be clear about clarity if we are to assume it is universally applicable?

thirdly who is to say that clarity is always desirable?


4.12. Propositions can represent the whole of reality, but they cannot
represent what they must have is common with reality in order to able to
represent it - logical form.

In order to be able to represent logical form, we should have to be able
to station ourselves with propositions somewhere outside logic, that is to
say outside the world.


what propositions have in common with reality is reality

propositions express reality - reality is expressed by propositions

expression is not something separate from reality

expression is reality reflected - therefore a mode of reality

(what we are talking about here is human reality)

if you like reality reflected in consciousness

and this same reality reflected in a propositional form

we can describe the proposition in terms of logical form -

logical form is a way of expressing the proposition - it is a theory of the proposition

what is common to reality and its modes?

this is to ask a question like what is common to a man and his actions?

whatever we say here is manufactured - some kind of essentialist argument

what you need to ask is - is there any need to ask such a question?


4.121. Propositions cannot represent logical form; it is mirrored in them.

What finds its reflection in language, language cannot represent.

What expresses itself in language, we cannot express by means of language.

Propositions show the logical form of reality.

They display it.


what is the difference between a mirror image and a representation?

what language reflects is what it represents - what this is may well be
finally unknown

what is in language just is what is expressed by it

propositions express logical form

how logical form is further described is another matter

the external dimension of reality is reality displayed - displayed to
consciousness


4.1211. Thus one proposition 'fa' shows that the object a occupies in
its sense, two propositions 'fa' and 'ga' show that the same object is
mentioned in both of them.

If two propositions contradict one another, then their structure shows it;
the same is true if one of them follows from the other. And so on.


the signs of propositional logic show the structure of propositions


4.1212. What can be shown, cannot be said.


what is at stake here is the limits of language - the limits of saying

no a priori argument will settle it - what can be said is what is said -

and furthermore saying is indeed a form of showing - so the contradistinction
fails


4.1213. Now, too, we understand our feeling that once we have a sign-language
in which everything is all right, we already have a correct logical point of
view.


in the end a correct logical point of view may just be a decision to take a particular
view and hold to it

it is finally really a question of the point of the sign language - what
services it will perform


4.122. In a certain sense we can talk about formal properties of objects and
states of affairs, or in the case of facts, about structural properties: and
in the same sense about formal relations and structural relations.

(Instead of 'structural property' I also say 'internal property'; instead of 'structural
relation', 'internal relation'.

I introduce these expressions in order to indicate the source of the confusion between
internal relations and relations proper (external relations), which is very widespread
among philosophers.)

It is impossible, however, to assert by means of propositions that such
internal properties and relations obtain; rather, this makes itself manifest
in the propositions that represent the relevant states of affairs and are
concerned with the relevant objects.


propositions only assert external properties and relations - that is they
only refer to thesurface characteristics of states of affairs and objects

internal relations are manifest in the propositions that represent the
external features

internal relations are characteristics of propositions - the internal characteristics of
propositions

another way of putting this is to say what is essential to a thing is not
asserted in a proposition about that thing (only its external properties
and relations are asserted) however its essential properties and relations
(internal properties and relations) can be shown or displayed in the logic
of any proposition about that thing

the assertion of a proposition refers to its external dimensions - it's
logic refers to in internal dimension

the proposition is in this sense what I would call two dimensional

and so a proposition can be said to represent the world -

and by this is meant the unified field of the conscious and the non-conscious -
the internal reality and the external reality

the proposition reflects this unity


4.1221. An internal property of a fact can also be called a feature of that
fact (in the sense in which we speak of facial features, for example).


a characteristic that is of the nature of an object - one you might say
is suggested by what is observed as being in the object


4.123. A property is internal if it is unthinkable that its object should not possess it.

(This shade of blue and that one stand, eo ipso, in the internal relation
of lighter to darker. It is unthinkable that these two should not stand in
this relation)

(Here the shifting use of the word 'object' corresponds to the shifting use
of the words 'property' and 'relation'.)


it is clear here that 'internal property' is meant to be an essential
characteristic of a thing

this is all very well but such an idea depends on the notion of an essential
view of the thing - and this in turn on the view that we can or do view from an essential position

isn't the point of science just that no such position can be held?

that the characteristics of an object are never finally determined -
that all characteristics are non-essential - that what an object is -
that what we ascribe to it is determined by i.e. what place it has in
what conceptual scheme and by what we are doing with it - that is how
it is to function - given how it is conceived?

we can extract properties from objects and speak of them in absolute terms -
but this is not to say anything about how things actually are


NB.


my basic idea is that the world can be understood in terms of its dimensions -
theinternal dimension of consciousness the external dimension of the non-
conscious - the physical - and that the unity of these dimensions the unified
field - is unknown as I have interpreted Wittgenstein idea of the proposition -
the proposition can be said to represent the world - the unified field - and
yes the proposition like the world it represents can be seen to have an external
and an internal dimension - that which is
asserted is the proposition's external dimension - its internal dimension
as that which is shown - these descriptions - assertion and display are Wittgenstein's terms - this all fits rather well - but the crucial point
that I wish to make is that the proposition as such is like the world (the
unified field) it represents and is an expression of - it is an unknown -
what we are talking about when we refer to the assertion of the proposition
and the display or showing of the proposition are dimensional characteristics
- the proposition as a unified entity is not characterizable - in this
connection I would with apologies to Wittgenstein - rewrite the second
paragraph of 4.12. as - 'Inorder to know - to see the proposition as a
unified entity, we should have to be able to station ourselves outside
the world.'


4.124. the existence of an internal property of a possible situation is
not expressed by means of a proposition: rather it expresses itself in the proposition representing the situation, by means of an internal property
of that proposition.

It would be just as non-sensical to assert that a proposition had a formal
property as to deny it.


the internal property of a situation is expressed by means of an internal
property of the proposition -

OK - what is internal to a situation in a logical sense is expressed
internally

the internal property - that expresses itself?

is it put this way because the argument is that the proposition doesn't
express the internal property?

the question being then - how is the internal property expressed? -

an internal property expressing itself - isn't this really to say the
property is not expressed -

perhaps it is shown to be there - or is it that it can be seen to be there?

expressing itself -


and then the view that to assert that a proposition has a formal property
is as non-sensical as to claim it doesn't - the point being propositions
are not the kind of things that the notion of formal property applies to -

propositions express formal properties but they do not have them?

again - formal properties 'express themselves' in propositions - I wonder
if there is anything else they express themselves in?


4.1241. It is impossible to distinguish forms from one another by saying
that one has this property an another that property: for this presupposes
that it makes sense to ascribe either property to either form.


all properties per se are external


4.125. The existence of an internal relation between possible situations
expresses itself in language by means of an internal relation between the propositions representing them.


internal relations between situations expresses themselves by means of
the internal relations of propositions


4.1251. Here we have the answer to the vexed question 'whether all relations
are internal or external'.


external relations are expressed by propositions

internal relations are expressed by means of the internal relations between
propositions

it is a distinction between what a proposition expresses - and what can be
demonstrated when a proposition's logic is displayed

internal relations are as it were hidden in the propositional form -

in the assertion of the proposition - all that is asserted are external
relations

OK this is neat and essentially realistic -

putting it roughly - what is internal to a thing is internal to the proposition
that asserts that thing -

now this is really an argument about how things are expressed

the fact is they are - one way or another

does it still makes sense to say an internal property is not expressed by
means of the proposition?

isn't this really too narrow a definition of expression?

could we say instead that the proposition is not fully revealed in its ordinary
expression - in its statement

we can in fact go deeper than this -

perhaps what is expressed externally and internally - is despite the
definitiveness of the signs that express it - and the logical signs that
can be displayed in its logical analysis - really epistemologically never
fully determined

do we ever know - apart from a decision to know - what the signs signify?

the propositional sign is never anything more than a proposal to operate
in a certain way - which is to see in a certain way - be that what we might
term veridical - or from some other stand point - metaphysical standpoint -

so - a proposition represents what?

a proposal for reality -

a proposal for what is ultimately unknown -

the point is that to deal with it - the unknown - we need to propose - it -
as known

propositions propose a state of affairs - propose that reality is known -
this way they form a basis for other propositions - for actions

the final truth though is what a proposition represents is the unknown


4.1252. I call a series that is ordered by means of internal relation a
series of forms.

The order of the number series is not governed by an external relation.

The same is true of the series of propositions

'aRb'
'($x):aRx.xRb'

'($x,y):aRx.xRy.yRb'
and so forth.

(If b stands in one of these relations to a, I call b a successor of a.)


any series ordered purely by logic (an internal relation) is a series of forms
the ordering by the internal relation is what determines forms - forms are
what is ordered -


4.126. We can now talk about formal concepts, in the same sense that we
can speak of formal properties.

(I introduce this expression in order to exhibit the source of the confusion
between formal concepts and concepts proper, which pervades the whole of
traditional logic.)

When something falls under a formal concept as one of its objects, this cannot
be expressed by means of a proposition. Instead it is shown in the very sign
for this proposition. (A name shows that it signifies an object, a sign for
a number that it signifies a number, etc.)

Formal concepts cannot, in fact, be represented by means of a function,
as concepts proper can.

For their characteristics, formal properties, are not expressed by means of functions.

The expression for a formal property is a feature of certain symbols.

So the sign for the characteristics of a formal concept is a distinctive
feature of all symbols whose meanings fall under the concept.

So the expression for a formal concept is a propositional variable in which
this distinctive feature alone is a constant.


when something falls under a formal concept - this is not expressed
by a proposition - it is shown by the sign for the proposition - a sign
for a number signifies the number
a formal concept - i.e. the concept of number is not represented by a function -
however that which falls under it - a concept proper i.e. - a number ('1')
can be -

formal properties are not represented by functions - formal properties are
expressed symbolically - that is they are shown

the sign for a formal concept is characteristic of all symbols (i.e. words)
whose meanings fall under that concept - i.e. it represents that concept -

a propositional variable (i.e. 'p') expresses the formal concept -


4.127. The propositional variable signifies the formal concept, and its
values signify the objects that fall under the concept.


i.e. - 'p' signifies the formal concept and the values of 'p' (that is
its possible representations) signify the objects that fall under the concept


4.1271. Every variable is a sign for a formal concept.

For every variable represents a constant form that all its values posses,
and this can be regarded as a formal property of those values.


in logic a variable stands for a formal concept - thus 'p' stands for a formal concept

'p' represents the constant form of all its possible formations (values)
and as such is regarded as the formal property of those representations
(values)


4.1272. Thus the variable name 'x' is the proper sign for the pseudo-concept
object.

Wherever the 'object' ('thing', etc.) is correctly used, it is expressed
in conceptual notation by a variable name.

For example, in the proposition, 'There are 2 objects which.....', it is
expressed by '($x,y).....'.

Wherever it is used in a different way, that is as a proper concept-word, nonsensical, pseudo-propositions are the result.

So one cannot say, for example, 'There are objects' as one might say,
'There are books'. And it is just as impossible to say, 'There are 100 objects', or, 'There are no objects', or 'There are No objects'.

And it is nonsensical to speak of the total number of objects.

The same applies to the words 'complex', 'fact' 'function', 'number' etc.

They all signify formal concepts, and are represented in conceptual notation by
variables, not by functions or classes (as Frege and Russell believed).

'I is a number', 'there is only one zero', and all similar expressions are nonsensical.

(It is just nonsensical to say, 'There is only one 1' as it would be to say,
'2+2 at 3 0'clock equals 4').


formal concepts are not expressed in a proposition - they are shown - signed by
variable names (i.e. 'x')


NB.


a formal concept is of the internal dimension of a proposition - it is shown
via a sign

propositions only refer to that which is external -

reference to such things a beauty or goodness is not possible - for these are
pseudo formal concepts - that is they do not signify external objects

to question this perspective - you need to query the notion of proposition that
underlies it -

is a proposition only that which pictures - the given - the external world?

it might be put that this is indeed a function of propositions - and that thus
propositions can be formed to fulfill that function -

the question is though - is this the only function of a proposition - and thus
the only type of a proposition?

the world is all that is the case

but what the case is - is not necessarily just what appears

if the question of the world is open - then the question of the proposition is
not decided

I don't know that we can say there is one type of proposition

what we can say is propositions reflect how we in fact think about the world
and how we act in relation to it - that is the many and varied responses to
reality

a theory of propositions would reflect this diversity

OK - but could we still stick with a picture theory of propositions?

in this connection I have suggested that a proposition proposes

the idea of this view is that there is a type of proposition that proposes a
reality

i.e. 'that flower is beautiful' - proposes beauty as a feature of the world -
as a way of speaking about the external world

beauty is proposed as an external - when in fact we really don't know what
it is -

the thing is - it can and does function as an external

any picture here - therefore would be 'propositional' - that is proposed

it is to say a picture to be a picture must be proposed

and therefore that the 'picture' characterization of the proposition is a
secondary characterization

the proposition is primarily a proposal


4.12721. A formal concept is given immediately any object falls under it is
given. It is not possible therefore, to introduce as primitive ideas objects belonging to a formal concept and the formal concept itself. So it is impossible
for example, to introduce as primitive ideas both the concept of a function and specific functions, as Russell does; or the concept of a number and particular numbers.


a formal concept is given when an object that falls under it is given

yes I agree with this - though I would leave open the question of object -
that is what is to count as an object

it is the given-ness Wittgenstein suggests which makes it impossible to
introduce primitive ideas -

it is as if once the object appears the metaphysics is locked in

clearly Russell took a less claustrophobic view of the matter


4.1273. If we want to express in conceptual notation the general proposition,
'b is a successor of a', then we require an expression for the general term
of the series of forms

aRb,
($x):aRx.xRb,
($x,y):aRx.aRy.yRb.
.... .

In order to express the general term of a series of forms, we must use a
variable, because the concept 'term of that series of forms' is a formal concept. (This is what Frege and Russell overlooked: consequently the way in which they
want to express general propositions like the one above is incorrect; it contains
a vicious circle.)

We determine the general term of a series of forms by giving its first term and
the general form of the operation that produces the next term out of the
proposition that precedes it.


yes the general term of the series of forms is a variable ('x') and we determine
the series suggested

'term of that series' - ('x') - is the underlying concept that defines the
series - and is therefore - a formal concept - a concept of the forms

succession is defined as the relation of 'a' and 'b' as terms of that series

'the series of forms' is a depiction of the proposition in logical sign


4.1274. To ask whether a formal concept exists is nonsensical. For no proposition
can be the answer to such a question.

(So, for example, the question, 'Are there unanalysable subject-predicate
propositions?' cannot be asked.)


the formal concept in Wittgenstein's scheme it seems to me is the means by
which we can refer to what cannot be said - cannot that is be referred to

he puts that the inner life - (that which is not outside) can only be shown

language cannot refer to what is inside

we can depict it - in language - we cannot refer to it

still it seems to be overstating the matter to say we cannot ask if the formal concept
exists -

if it can be depicted it exists in some sense - (a depicted sense -)

what I don't get is why you can't say - OK - once depicted - the depiction can
be referred to

once depicted that is we have a public fact (the depiction)

therefore one calls into question this distinction - and its seems fundamental
to his argument between expression and depiction

what I have argued as a solution to this matter is that the proposition is
neither an external or for that matter internal form - that it represents
the unity that is the world - of which internality and externality are
dimensions

so strictly speaking the proposition 'in itself' is not characterized -

(in Wittgenstein it is pinned to the external world - and I really doubt that
there is any true sense of internality in his concept - depiction - is really
just another outward expression)

on this view the proposition can be said to refer to the internal and external
dimensions of the unity it represents


NB.

some thoughts on the run -


(a) logical form


a proposition is a picture

what is common to the picture and the world it represents - is logical form

logical form we cannot say

it is the unknown

logical form cannot be expressed but it can be shown -

how can this be known?

how do we go from a logical analysis of proposition to logical form - that
which the proposition and the world have in common?

why should the logical analysis of proposition be - a display of logical form?


(b) the proposition


a proposition as an expression of the world

of the unity of the conscious and the non-conscious

any proposition expresses - this unity

therefore any proposition reflects this unity -

a proposition thus has an internal and external dimension

what does this mean?

the external - signs
the internal - sense

the relation between sign and sense

sign the outside expression of sense

sense the inside of sign

the relation between the proposition and the world -

what the proposition expresses is the world - expressed in the proposition

(and what this is - is the subject of other - subsequent propositions)

if so - anything expressed reflects the world

the world is an open question - and is only given definition (form and content)
in propositions

propositions reveal the unknown


4.128. Logical forms are without number.


Hence there are no pre-eminent numbers in logic, and hence there is no
possibility of philosophical monism or dualism, etc.


number (as a noun) is the objectification of a term in an ordered series

outside of that series it has no meaning - that is the ordered series is always presumed

any talk of a number outside of such an ordered series is at best poetic

numbering is an operation of ordering - there are no numbers independent of this
operation

Liebnitz's notion of possible worlds suggests that worlds like any other series
can be numbered

again 'one' only has sense as the first member of an ordered series

'one' cannot have significance outside of a series

in so far as monism is just the view that there is no series - in so far as it involves number - it is unstatable

we cannot speak of 'one' as independent of an ordered series

'one' can however apply given a theory of multiplicity

it might therefore be the resolution of such an argument - i.e. - there is no multiplicity

even so here we stop using number

the concept of number only applies - if you like given a series

or the possibility of ordering as a series

one might argue that monism and dualism are not are not theories of what is
ordered

they are theories of substance

strictly speaking a theory of ordering (as number theory is) only applies given
something to order

if so theories of substance are theories of what there is to order

the question of the nature of that substance is not a question of number -
it is a different question

even so I think Wittgenstein has made a devastating argument here

if number theory does not apply to the question of substance - we cannot
state any such theory in terms of it

in so far as this is how such theories are stated - they are not possible
theories

I like this argument

it is hard and comprehensive skepticism in relation to the question of
substance

if we cannot state a theory of substance - we cannot know that there is
substance - let alone what it is

we cannot know


p.s.


monism and dualism (or pluralism) and indeed any other formulation of
metaphysical opposites - is the logic of consciousness (essentially x and ~x) reflected on - applied to the world - the world as unknown - as the object of consciousness

what we have here is the argument of opposites

this is the argument of life

(its resolution is the unknown - the very point of its focus)


4.2. The sense of a proposition is its agreement and disagreement with
possibilities of existence and non-existence of states of affairs.


a proposition is the logical space of a proposal

sense is what occupies that space

a proposed state of affairs characterizes the sense of a proposition

the proposition's sense is coloured by its agreement or disagreement with
the existence or non-existence of the proposed state of affairs

a proposal rendered false under the circumstances is withdrawn from action

agreement confirms - the proposal is reflected in the world outside itself

the world is enlightened by the proposition


4.21. The simplest kind of proposition, an elementary proposition asserts
the existence of a state of affairs.


yes - but what 'a state of affairs' is here is always a matter beyond the
proposition asserted

that is - it is logically more correct to say a proposition asserts

if we are to call what it asserts 'a state of affairs' that is another matter - dependent on
considerations that go way beyond the proposition asserted

to say - 'an elementary proposition asserts the existence of a state of affairs'
is to offer a theory of the proposition

but as put here by Wittgenstein it appears as a definition


4.211. It is a sign of a proposition's being elementary that there can be
no elementary proposition contradicting it.


if so - an elementary proposition is always true - therefore it asserts nothing


4.22. An elementary proposition consists of names. It is a nexus, a
concatenation, of names.


yes if the business of propositions is just the business of naming

this name theory of propositions suggests a straightforward one to one
correspondence of sign (name ) to object -

what is elementary is the way the matter is conceived

if it is assumed that the issue is like labeling - then yes it seems elementary

the real question is though - what in fact the name does?

does it somehow just reflect the object - or isn't it rather a making of - the giving of
content and form to the object -

if so naming is essentially problematic rather than elemental


4.221. It is obvious that the analysis of propositions must bring us to
elementary propositions which consist of names in immediate combination.

This raises the question of how such combinations into propositions comes about.


indeed a proposition can be viewed in this way - we can decide to analyze it
in such a way

why you would proceed in this way depends on other considerations -
philosophical considerations - essentially about the nature of the world

hidden in any proposition - or waiting to be revealed is a complete (as far
as this is possible) picture of the world

a proposition cannot be fully appreciated unless its metaphysics is revealed

the fact of it is though - there is no unique metaphysical interpretation
of the proposition

the proposition lays itself open to the possibilities of thought

the proposition - in itself - if we can speak of it as an abstract - is empty

it is simply - elementally - a form - a proposal for logical space


4.2211. Even if the world is infinitely complex, so that every fact consists
of infinitely many states of affairs and every state of affairs is composed of infinitely many objects, there would still have to be objects and states of
affairs.


the argument being that the world consists of objects and states of affairs regardless of its dimensions

the real truth here is that outside of consciousness we have nothing to say
about the world - it is ontologically unknown

but the thing is we are when we speak of the world - speaking of the human
world - consciousness in the world

it is clear that consciousness imposes categories of understanding

i.e.. consciousness objectifies

but you see what all this means is not without dispute

what categories we use to describe the world - i.e. 'object' 'state of
affairs' - is finally based on decision

decision to proceed - within some framework - and the framework used may be
based on whatever - its value is in terms of its utility - and even here we
have no finality


4.23. It is only in the nexus of an elementary proposition that a name occurs
in a proposition.


this proposition raises some fundamental questions about the nature and the
theory of proposition

if I point and say 'red' - you would say 'red' is not occurring in a
proposition - unless a name by itself qualifies as a proposition

if my response to a question - 'what colour is that? - is the same as the
first except that it is non-verbal - is my pointing - propositional?

it raises the question - are we going to say that all propositions are verbal?

my gut feeling is no

that a logical space of sense can be made outside of language

the pointing in this case is the signing

so I guess I would argue all propositions - as in proposals - for this is
my idea of the proposition - are signed - verbally or non-verbally -

the Mona Lisa is I would argue is - logically speaking - a proposition

as is Mozart's Don Giovanni


4.24. Names are the simple symbols: I indicate them by single letters
('x','y','z').

I write elementary propositions as functions of names so that they have the form 'fx', 'f(x,y)', etc.

Or I indicate them by the letters 'p', 'q', 'r'.


an elementary proposition as a function of names - as in e.g.
'that book is red'

a name is what - or as more famously put - what's in a name?

really only a mark - syntax - and decision to have that sign function
in a certain manner

so is there any analysis here - or is it really just description in
another language - i.e. symbolic logic?

so what I am getting at here is that you could well just drop the term
name - it really has no significance - or its significance is not explained
by it application?

the argument that it is just the elemental use of signs - yes perhaps

we decide to call such a sign a name - that's it

yes a 'rose' by any other name - would be any other name


4.241.When I use two signs with the same meaning, I express this by putting
the sign' = ' between them.

So 'a = b' means that sign 'b' can be substituted for the sign 'a'.

(If I use an equation to introduce a new sign 'b', laying down that it shall
serve as a substitute for a sign 'a' that is already known, then, like Russell,
I write the equation - definition - in the form 'a = b Def.' A definition is
a rule dealing with signs.)


(a)


Wittgenstein thinks that the use of syntax avoids all the problems of
semantics

the fact is once a sign is introduced synonymy is always finally a decision of
equivalence

that is equivalence of signs - meaning is always finally - regardless of sign equations - irresolvable -

that is again - except by decision - by fiat - of one kind or another


(b)


signifying is an act of consciousness -

for all intents and purposes this is all we can say about it

language signifies the act - marks it

complex signs have an internal logic - they must have - that is in order
to work as a whole - as a proposition

(or perhaps this is how we must think about it)

the individual signs that make up a complex - a proposition - must if they
are to function relate or be related to each other

choice of language - and choice within language is pragmatic

if there are reasons to modify or even replace a sign - this can be done


(c)


the question of a logic to all languages - a common logic that is - is quite fascinating

on the face of it yes - if a language has an internal logic - then all
language likewise (it is the nature of the beast) - therefore the question -
perhaps one underlying logic to all languages?

yes and no

yes it does indeed make sense to see it this way

however we could never state any such logic

that is any proposal of this kind would be stated in a language -

if that language refers to itself - the theory of logic proposed can
only apply to itself

a question - can language refer to itself - and still be a language?

only I think in Wonderland

if the theory of universal logic - being proposed - does apply to other
languages - it cannot be said to apply to the language it is proposed in

the point is we cannot step outside of language - any theory of language
will be internal

we have no way of knowing if a theory of logic applies to itself

we are best to see logic as a theory about how language works

to develop a theory about how logic works - we need another theory - another
description of signs - another language in effect - and so it goes on -
languages defining languages
the question of logic is only ever settled by fiat - a decision to stop -
there is no natural end to this process

this fact more than anything else gives us an insight into the essence of
language - and of consciousness

logic is without foundation


4.242. Expressions of the form 'a = b' are, therefore, mere representational
devises. They state nothing about the meaning of the signs 'a' and 'b'.


'a = b' if it is a 'mere representational' devise that states nothing about
the meaning of the signs a and b - the a and b represent what?

equivalence?

equivalence of what?

has to be meaning - otherwise there just isn't anything to represent

a representational devise - if it is such represents something

'the equivalence of'

the sign ' = ' signifies the synonymy of meaning of the signs either side of it

otherwise it means nothing

my general point is you cannot separate out representation from meaning

meaning (whatever you say this is) just is what is represented

otherwise the signs do not represent

and once put this way - it becomes clear - signs - just do represent

and so the question is always what?

and what that is - is perhaps never settled - hence different - even
specialized languages -

designed to come at the question of what - or substance if you like from
different angles

what signs represent is that we don't know

but this is not where we start - the process of understanding - or should
I say awareness -

it is rather where we end

and I should also say it is just where the natural and the mystic can be seen
to be equivalent

a logician is a Brahman in training


4.243. Can we understand two names without knowing whether they signify the
same thing or two different things? - Can we understand a proposition in which
two names occur without knowing whether their meaning is the same or different?

Suppose I know the meaning of the English word and of a German word that means
the same: then it is impossible for me to be unaware that they do mean the same;
I must be capable of translating each into the other.

Expressions like 'a = a' and those derived from them are neither elementary
propositions nor is there any other way in which they have sense. (This will
become evident later).


(a)


we can understand the function of two names - if they are given in a function

we can understand that the proposition's structure indicates reference

if I know two symbols mean the same - the translation is given in the statement
of this knowledge

translation here is really just substitution -

I don't think it can be any deeper than this - or have any real epistemological status -

it is really no more than placement - like a token on a board game


(b)


the expression 'a = a' can be regarded as a definition of equivalence

underlying this is of course the presupposition - unanalyzed - that equivalence
is a genuine concept - that can be deployed in our conceptual arrangements
of the world

and what of equivalence itself?

if x = y then in some regard x is y

so a statement of equivalence is an existential statement in the broadest sense of this

if x = y then x and y are expressions of a unity that underlies even contradicts their diversity

the nature of that unity is finally a question of the nature of existence

its essence if you like -

the answer to this (may I be so bold) is there is no essence

that existence - if you like simply is - 'its own' essence

we cannot go beyond existence in order to explain it

the best we can do is point to its manifestations - and assert equivalence
but it is an empty assertion

the sign ' =' may be held to represent everything

but it is a sign without content


(c)


in practice (as distinct from metaphysics) the expression 'a = b' asserts that a relation that we use in our dealings with the world is equivalence

and really I suppose the logical definition of it - substitution - for practical purposes is what it means

it's clear that if you have difference - you have equivalence - we use these concepts to negotiate the world - nothing else really needs to be said than
this (otherwise you end up in the metaphysical dimension of my previous point)

we operate with these notions - and that may be all there is to logic


4.25. If an elementary proposition is true, the state of affairs exists; if an elementary proposition is false, the state of affairs does not exist.


(a)


a state of affairs - is what?

a state of affairs is itself a description

the point being a state of affairs may be described variously - e.g. a
physicist's perspective of a table in a room - and his description in terms of atomic theory - will be a different description to that of the visual artist -
and that of the poet shall we say - and all these different to what we would
call a veridical account -

the point being any assertion will be judged against a perspective

therefore 'the state of affairs' is actually an open concept

description 1 we will say is true if it is consistent with perspective 1

2 with 2 and so forth

therefore any elementary proposition can in fact be true - if it is asserted
within a
framework in which it is consistent

truth here is a matter of consistency within a theoretical framework

'the elementary proposition' like 'the state of affairs' is a question of
perspective

how one views -

elementary propositions are not without possibilities - in fact an elementary
proposition is a point of possibility

a state of affairs is never determined - it can only be decided -

and strictly speaking the possibilities here are endless - hence the need
simply to see in a certain way - for whatever reason


(b)


I guess I want to say 'a state of affairs' is not beyond its description

there is nothing beyond what is described

any state of affairs can be described variously

a state of affairs really I suppose is the sum total of all possible
descriptions

the world as the exhaustion of possibility


4.26. If all elementary propositions are given, the result is a complete
description of the world. The world is completely described by giving all
elementary propositions, and adding which of them are true and which are
false.


the argument here is that an elementary proposition corresponds to a state of
affairs

stating all true elementary propositions would on this view give a complete
picture of the world

the argument works if you accept that a state of affairs can be uniquely
identified by one and only one elementary proposition
this depends on the view that 'a state of affairs ' is a objectively
determined - that is that it can be described without any perspective - that
is without any possibility of it being viewed differently - that a state of
affairs is in some sense fixed - and independent of the observer

it also assumes that the place of the observer is fixed in eternity -

this must be rejected immediately - any 'complete description' can only be
made at a particular point of space and time

the argument would work if it made sense to speak of - all possible
descriptions at all times and at all places

even so we could still ask - what is being described?

that is we can always ask the objective question?

at this point it becomes clear that the answer is we do not know

what we can know at any point of time and place is that our description of 'x'
- the state of affairs - is valid given the terms of the perspective we bring
to it

one way of seeing this is to say that the state of affairs does not determine
the description - rather the description determines the state of affairs -
(in so far as anything is determined) - and the description itself is never
finally determined

(metaphysically speaking everything is in suspension)

that is the description of the state of affairs is one of a possible number

therefore 'the state of affairs' cannot be given outside of a description

if so the state of affairs just is the possibility of description

and by 'state of affairs' I mean here that which is known

if your idea of 'state of affairs' is that which is independent of knowledge -
you are not talking about anything that can be described

n n
4.27. For n state of affairs, there are Kn = S ( ) possibilities of existence and
v=0 v
non-existence.


Of these states of affairs any combination can exist and the remainder not exist.

what we can say is that what is described - defines what is not described
i.e. that which is outside of the terms or domain of the description

any description is a defining of reality - definition must determine what is
and is not included

the positive dimension of a definition is what our focus is directed to - it determines what is

the negative is at least initially left inarticulate - it is the domain of
what is not the case

any proposition - a proposal for how to see the world - is a definition


4.28. There correspond to these combinations the same number of possibilities of
truth - and falsity - for n elementary propositions.


any elementary proposition is true or false relative to the description of the
state affairs it is placed against


4.3. Truth possibilities of elementary propositions mean possibilities of
existence and non-existence of states of affairs.


'states of affairs' I understand here as descriptions - on this view we are
talking about the proposal and use of descriptions


4.31. We can represent truth-possibilities by schemata of the following kind
('T' means 'true', 'F' means false; the rows of 'T's' and 'F's' under the row
of elementary propositions symbolize their truth-possibilities in a way that
can be easilyunderstood):

p q r

T T T
F T T p q
T F T T T p
T T F ' F T' T .
F F T T F F
F T F F F
T F F
F F F


the above schemata does set out the truth possibilities -

the truth possibilities of combinations of elementary propositions

and this analysis is indeed useful for propositions of this kind - that is
atomic propositions


4.4. A proposition is an expression of agreement and disagreement with truth-
possibilities of elementary propositions


yes it can of course be analyzed this way - you can break it down in such a
fashion

but really isn't it more to the point to say a proposition is a
representational proposal - a way of seeing the world

if it expresses anything it expresses a view of the world

its internal logic - the status of its elementary propositions - is not what is expressed

the truth of a proposition is not what the proposition expresses

its truth or falsity is the decision to use or not use the proposition


4.41. Truth possibilities of elementary propositions are the conditions of
the truth or falsity of propositions.


analyzing a proposition into its elements and assessing the truth or falsity
of those elements is a method for determining the truth or falsity of a
proposition

the truth or falsity of a proposition is the decision to operate with it or not

a false proposition may of course have a utility - mistakes can be made -
and indeed intentions can be evil

here is the origin of man made suffering


4.411. It immediately strikes one as probable that the introduction of
elementary propositions provides the basis for understanding all other kinds
of proposition. Indeed the understanding of general proposition palpably
depends on the understanding of elementary propositions.


is it not possible that a proposition could be true or false - quite
independently of its logical (grammatical) structure?

look I accept that at the end of the day we decide this issue - and the
idea of the logic of a proposition is an excellent proposal in this regard -
but again there are no guarantees

is the structure of a painting the structure of the piece of reality it
depicts - we can argue so - but how could this be settled?

Wittgenstein's answer is his theory of logical form - (4.12.) '...what
they must have in common with reality in order to represent it...'

and it is no more than the assertion that there is or must be something
in common

his argument that this commonality is displayed in propositions - is rather
ingenious

nevertheless it is no more than an assertion

why should logical syntax be representative of the structure of reality?

the structure of language yes - there is an argument here

however reality -

can we say that language enables human beings to operate effectively
(that is within the limits of their nature) in the world?

it may indeed be a useful presupposition to human behavior to assume that
human activity has the same logic as reality itself (whatever all this means) -
but the fact is we have no way of knowing whether such is true or false -

there is no way of seeing what the relationship between language and reality is

therefore the notion of logical form as that which is common to language and the
world - is an empty concept
Kn Kn
4.42. For n elementary propositions there are S ( ) = Ln
k=0 k

ways in which a proposition can agree and disagree with their truth-possibilities


what is being put here is that the proposition - as a whole agrees or disagrees
with its elementary propositions

there is something not quite right with this -

is it not like saying the door of the house agrees of disagrees with the house -
or that a room agrees or disagrees with the house?

the house stands - it's either in the wrong position or not


4.43. We can express agreement with truth possibilities by correlating the mark
'T' (true) with them in the schema.

The absence of this mark means disagreement.


either the proposition is true or it is false

its elements are either true or false

this idea of the proposition as an expression of the agreement or disagreement
of its elements -

a proposition as an expression of agreement or disagreement with itself?

we have two senses of proposition here -

the proposition as a singularity - as a unity

and the proposition as - the consequence of its parts

so a proposition is what - simply a way of representing sentences?

does not this amount to the view that we have elementary propositions and
that's it - the rest is just packaging?

the question then of the sense of a proposition

a complex proposition has a sense - or senses?

the answer I think will be sense

but what is this - how is it a result of the relation of elements?

are we saying a proposition's sense is something other than the conjunction
of the senses of its elements? - yes

the question is what is this?

perhaps it's the difference between sense and truth conditions

that is the idea that the sense of a proposition is a singularity -
and a different issue to the question of its truth conditions

the truth conditions of a complex proposition will depend on the status of the elements


4.431. The expression of agreement and disagreement with the truth
possibilities of elementary propositions expresses the truth conditions of a proposition.

A proposition is the expression of its truth conditions.

(Thus Frege was right to use the term as a starting point when he explained
the signs of his conceptual notation. But the explanation of the concept of truth that Frege gives is mistaken: if 'the true' and 'the false' were really objects,
and were the arguments in ~p etc., then Frege's method of determining the sense of '~p' would leave it absolutely undetermined.)


yes - if 'the false' (an object) is the resolution of '~p' - then it may be
so that '~p' is false - but the sense of the negation of 'p' is not given -
and therefore as Wittgenstein
says '~p' is not in any way determined


4.44. The sign that results from correlating the mark 'T' with truth-
possibilities is a propositional sign.


the sign 'T' correlated with truth possibilities is the sign of the status
of the proposition

that is the proposition has legs


4.441. It is clear that a complex of the signs 'F' and 'T' has no object
(or complex of objects) corresponding to it, just as there is none corresponding
to the horizontal and vertical lines or to the brackets. - There are no 'logical objects'.

Of course the same applies to all signs that express what the schemata of 'T's' and 'F's' express.


there are no logical objects -

the 'T's' and the 'F's'?

what do they signify?

the possibilities of response -

assent - dissent

and their pragmatic expressions -

assertion - denial

to operate with - to operate without

so

what we have here - is the logic of response

propositional response

perhaps this points to a deeper logic

to the nature of consciousness

the fact that it is essentially binary

it is just here that the metaphysical poverty of Wittgenstein's argument is
apparent

granted logical syntax does not signify logical objects

this is indeed important to understand -

however - these signs to not appear out of no where for no reason

my argument - if they are signs they signify

now the question here is no different to the question of what any sign
signifies -

and it is here we need as a matter of philosophical health - a rule of no
exclusion

the possibilities - all possibilities need to be regarded as valid

and as matter of fact - we never have all possibilities on the table -
only the possibility of this

signs signify - just how and what and how deep is the challenge of thought

and it is out of this challenge possible understandings emerge

you see at base what any sign signifies is unknown

that is it points to the unknown

it's signification is a matter of decision
and any decision will be an endorsement of a conceptual scheme - a view of the
world
actually held or at least implied

and even this is never finalized

there are no closed systems in thought


p.s.


(1)


possibility is a fact of the world but it is a fact of consciousness - of consciousness in the world

the world has possibility - given consciousness

in a reality that is non-conscious there is no possibility

such a reality is necessary

necessity implies the absence of possibility

my view is that reality has two dimensions - internal and external

the internality of the world is consciousness

the key characteristic of this dimension is possibility

the external dimension is the non-conscious

its key characteristic is necessity

the world as given in human experience is the unity of the two dimensions

this one reality is the meeting of possibility and necessity

the interaction if you will -

the product of this relationship is the world as we know it

the world as a singularity is unknown

that is the meeting of possibility and necessity is the unknown


(2)


we can dispense with the dichotomy consciousness and the world

there is the world

consciousness is an attribute of the world

the non-conscious is an attribute

when we speak of the world this is what we usually mean

however the truth is the world is the logical space of the attributes

for all intents and purposes all we need to speak about is attributes

there is no underlying substance

beyond attributes is just what we do not know - cannot know


4.442. For example, the following is a propositional sign:

'p q '

T T T
F T T
T F
F F T.

(Frege's 'judgement-stroke' '/-' is logically quite meaningless: in the works
of Frege (and Russell) it simply indicates that these authors hold the
propositions marked with this sign to be true. Thus '/-' is no more a component
part of a proposition than is, for instance, the proposition's number. It is
quite impossible for a proposition to state that it itself is true.)

If the order of the truth-possibilities in a schema is fixed once and for all
by a combinatory rule, then the last column by itself will be an expression of
the truth-conditions. If we now write this column as a row, the propositional
sign will become

'(TT-T) (p,q)'

or more explicitly

'(TTFT) (p,q)'.

(The number of places in the left hand pair of brackets is determined by the
number of terms in the right-hand pair).


a proposition is (in my view) a proposal to view the world

it has no truth value beyond what it is given

the proposition in itself is simply a way of seeing - it is therefore as such
empty of value

the decision that gives it (truth) value is (in the broadest sense) the
decision to act or not - on the basis of its assertion

and the decision to press forward may in fact be made on the basis that the proposition does not reflect the world as given - i.e. it's terms do not
correspond - nevertheless it may be true (as in useful - or have heuristic value) despite this - that is its assertion may be regarded as worthy of assent given theoretical considerations beyond the obvious

truth here has to do with the consistency and the heuristic value of a
proposition within a web of belief - or a larger theoretical picture

facts are made - and those that aren't are unknown - and the subject of
proposal


4.45. For n elementary propositions there are Ln possible groups of truth
conditions.

The groups of truth-conditions that are obtainable from the truth possibilities
of a given number of elementary propositions can be arranged in a series.


so what do we say of the proposition here - that it is the possibility of
the truth conditions of the elementary propositions that make it up?

so on this view are we talking really about a proposition -

or simply the possibilities of elementary propositions?

and so does it still make sense to speak of 'the' sense of 'the' proposition?

'the' proposition here - once analyzed into its elements is what?

a possible combination of truth values -

and is there any substance at all to this?


4.46. Among the possible groups of truth conditions there are two extreme cases.

In one of these cases the proposition is true for all the truth possibilities
of the elementary propositions. We say that the truth conditions are
tautological.

In the second case the proposition is false for all the truth-possibilities;
the truth conditions are contradictory.

In the first case we call the proposition a tautology; in the second, a contradiction.


Wittgenstein said in regard to Frege and Russell's judgement stroke that it
is quite impossible for a proposition to state that it itself is true

yes though with tautologies and contradictions this is just what seems to happen

the proposition asserts its truth or its falseness

if so what does this tell us?

it makes me wonder whether we should speak of tautologies and contradictions as
propositions

could it be that they just have the appearance of propositions - but are in fact logical atrocities?

if we break down the proposition to its elements - what then is the proposition?

really it is nothing but the sum of its elements -

so the original proposition is really an unanalyzed set of propositions?

what I wanted to get at here is that so called complex propositions are really concealed arguments - that logical analysis can reveal

tautologies and contradictions - have the appearance of such - but in fact they
are in my sense here - non-arguments

but they are as it were quick demonstrations of - what?

the misuse of propositional logic -

and the making of what I would call useless propositional strings?

yes much to think about here -


4.461. Propositions show what they say: tautologies and contradictions show
that they say nothing.

A tautology has no truth conditions, since it is unconditionally true: and a
contradiction is true on no condition.

Tautologies and contradictions lack sense.

(Like a point from which two arrows go out in opposite directions to one another.)

(For example, I know nothing about the weather when I know it is either raining or
not raining.)


my idea is that a contradiction is not a property of the proposition - but rather that it is a propositional act -

as is a tautology - the act of asserting - what is - is asserted and a
conclusion drawn - that what is asserted is asserted

what I am getting at here is that what we are talking about is a propositional
act -

that is an act in relation to propositions - plural

a contradiction is not a proposition - a property of a proposition -

it is an act in relation to a set of propositions

the key here is to give up the idea of a proposition as tautologous or
contradictory

and to see you are talking about acts - not propositions

is also to understand that combining elementary propositions does not result in
anything but a string of elementary propositions

so tautology or contradiction - are not properties of - a proposition

they are acts in relation to propositions -

decisions about propositions

so propositions - do not contradict and they are not tautologous -

propositions - cannot be contradictions or tautologies

interesting


4.4611. Tautologies and contradictions are not, however, nonsensical.
They are part of the symbolism, much as '0' is part of the symbolism of
arithmetic.


well if what I say above holds up - we have to re-think the notions of
contradiction and tautology -

we are not I say talking about propositions

we are talking about recognizing useless formations

take for example 'it is raining and it is raining' -

now I have argued this is not a proposition at all

elementary propositions are propositions

the above statement is a string - a conjunction of propositions

now a conjunction makes sense - is useful - if what is conjoined to one
element is something else -

why would you bother to repeat an elementary proposition?

in the case of a tautology this is just what happens -

yes the result is a propositional string

but one that is of no use

this same argument can be applied to the contradiction -

'it is raining and it is not raining'

recognizing uselessness is useful


4.462. Tautologies and contradictions are not pictures of reality. They do not represent any possible situations. For the former admit all possible situations
and the latter none.

In a tautology the conditions of agreement with the world - the representational
relations - cancel one another, so that it does not stand in any representational relation to reality.


Tautologies and contradiction have the form of propositions - and even a hint of sense - but they are in fact not propositions

this is my point - Wittgenstein wants to hold that they are propositions

I agree they do not represent possible situations

and I would say therefore they are not propositions

in a tautology or contradiction we do not in fact have from a logical point of view
complex propositions

that is we have strings of elemental propositions

and useless strings at that


4.463. The truth conditions of a proposition determine the range that it leaves
open to the facts.

(A proposition, a picture, or a model is, in the negative sense, like a solid
body that restricts the freedom of movement of others, and, in the positive
sense, like a space bounded by solid substance in which there is room for a body.)

A tautology leaves open to reality the whole - the infinite whole - of logical space: a contradiction fills the whole of logical space leaving no point of it
for reality. Thus neither of them can determine reality in any way.


what I say here is that what is called a tautology or a contradiction is an empty
proposal - it is a misuse of the propositional form


464. A tautology's truth is certain, a proposition's possible, a contradiction's
impossible.

(Certain, possible, impossible: here we have the first indication of the scale
that we need in the theory of probability.)


what I would argue here is that propositional arguments 'p and p' or 'p and -p'
are not genuine arguments

therefore truth conditions do not apply

and if so - it is not correct to say that the tautology is true - let alone
certain (if that is some higher grade of truth) - and it is not the case that a contradiction is false - let alone impossible

the concepts of certainty and impossibility cannot be derived from tautologies or
contradictions - or more correctly - cannot be derived from apparent / false
propositional arguments that in fact have no conclusions - that is no truth values


4.465. The logical product of a tautology and a proposition says the same
thing as the proposition. This product therefore is identical with the proposition. For it is impossible to alter what is essential to a symbol without altering its sense.

the fact is though the tautology has only the appearance of sense - it is
therefore not the same thing as the proposition - the proposition you might
say that could be extracted from it

4.466. What corresponds to a determinate logical combination of signs is a
determinate logical combination of their meanings. It is only to the uncombined
signs that absolutely any combination corresponds.

In other words, propositions that are true for every situation cannot be
combinations of signs at all, since if they were, only determinate combinations
of objects could correspond to them.

(And what is not a logical combination has no combination of objects
corresponding to it.)

Tautology and contradiction are limiting cases - indeed the disintegration -
of the combination of signs.


yes all this is so - and it is clear that Wittgenstein still wants to hold that
the tautology and the contradiction have some significance albeit place in the logical framework

at this point he should have tossed them


4.4661. Admittedly the signs are all still combined with one another even in
tautologies and contradictions - i.e. - they stand in a certain relation to
one another: but these relations have no meaning, the are not essential to
the symbol


what this suggests is the argument of the 'determinate relation of signs' -
is hollow

determinate relation can clearly exist in meaningless combinations

therefore it cannot be a criterion of sense or meaning

the question is really can a combination of signs be utilized?

what then are the grounds of utility?

we can say practice - but the question - what governs this practice?

apart from say that we cannot know the answer here -

my suggestion would be that it points to a natural correspondence between
propositions and possibilities of action

a sensible proposition is one that enables action

the fact of this possibility is just how we know that the combination of signs is
sensible

the relation here is symbiotic

in short we can recognize useful propositions - as those which are a valid
propositional arguments - and have truth value

this though is - metaphysically speaking - short hand -

a short hand that is the expression of an underlying natural state of affairs

genuine propositions have a path

ill-formed propositions have no path

possibility is there - but it is not without constraints


p.s.


this brings us back to the question of logical form

Wittgenstein argues that logical form is displayed in propositional syntax

this is a neat idea -

but really it is no different from saying propositional form is shown in the unanalyzed proposition

the question is - is there such a thing?

we presume so because we say we make sense

sense it seems goes beyond the proposition -

reaches out - to the world - and we like to think is given back via the
proposition

what if it was the case that there is no such form?

rather language is a hit and miss affair

a hit means the proposition has been of use

a miss that it has not

and with this a history of use -

what you would in this context call a 'praxis'

a praxis that we refer to and rely on - that we continue to modify - and add to

all within some kind of community of discourse

of which there are a multitude


4.5. It now seems possible to give the most general propositional form: that is,
to give a description of the propositions of any sign language whatsoever in
such a way that every possible sense can be expressed by a symbol satisfying the description, and every symbol satisfying the description can express a sense, provided that the meaning of the names is suitably chosen.

It is clear that only what is essential to the most general propositional form
may be included in its description - for otherwise it would not be the most general
propositional form.

The existence of a general propositional form is proved by the fact that there
cannot be a proposition whose form could not have been foreseen (i.e. constructed). The general form of the proposition is: This is how things stand.


this is the idea that a proposition reflects reality

this argument though relies on the proposition that things in fact stand

that is to say that there is a foundation to things - a foundation on which they stand

it assumes too that we can know this - that things stand - that they - stand on
something (for how else would they stand?)

I guess I would say in relation to this matter a proposition proposes

that a proposition is a proposal for how things stand

that the presumption of the proposition (that is any proposition) is that things stand

how they stand or whether in fact they do stand is not a question for the proposition - it is its presumption

given such a presumption - the proposal is made

the proposal carries with it this presumption

this idea of the proposition as proposal as such does not state this is how
things stand

it uses this presumption as a basis for itself

on this view how things stand is not settled - it is not even delved into -
it is just assumed

if the proposition functions - we might be tempted to temporally believe
'this is how things stand' - but only because the use of proposition has been successful - successful within the terms of its use

what I am saying is how things stand is how they are proposed

a stand is a proposal


4.51. Suppose that I am given all elementary propositions: Then I can ask what
propositions I can construct out of them. And there I have all propositions,
and that fixes the limits.


this argument again rests on the assumption of the world as a fixed state

for in a fixed state everything can be revealed

for such an argument to work we would have to be able to draw a limit - that is to
speak of the outside of the fixed state - of the world

only Leibnitz's metaphysics I think allows for such

in fact his possible worlds is the only solution to this problem

such a shame it has no currency

the big bang theorists wouldn't be in the logical mess they are in - if they had read and understood some Liebnitz

the notion of a defined totality - is the metaphysical source of exclusiveness

a logically ridiculous notion - though nevertheless at the heart of dominant thought
systems and the source of irresolvable human conflict


4.52. Propositions comprise all that follows from the totality of all elementary
propositions (and, of course, from its being the totality of them all). (Thus,
in a certain sense, it could be said that all propositions are generalizations of elementary propositions.)


a proposition is a proposal - verbal or non-verbal

the elementary propositions that Wittgenstein argues for are the results of
analyses of propositions

that is they are really a theory of a certain type of propositions

you can generalize the elementary argument but nothing is really added in so doing
- the point is just missed - in general


4.53. The general propositional form is a variable.


OK