Tractatus 3

3.01. The totality of true thoughts is a picture of the world.


a thought is a picture - let us say

all pictures are pictures of the world?

(everything pictured is in the world)

the notion of the totality of thoughts is not sensible

for the idea of the totality - is a thought that is outside of it

therefore the totality is always incomplete

let us say a true picture is a picture of the world

in so far as there is no comprehensive view

that is you can't step out and hold the world as object

then a thought is a picture - is as good as it gets


3.02. A thought contains the possibility of the situation of which it
is the thought. What is thinkable is possible too.


in the first place a thought as a reflection of what is outside itself

in the second place the initial thought can be the subject of thought -
of further reflection

so in the first case - a thought reflects what is -

what is possible is a further reflection on what is

it is to think outside of what is actual - to go beyond it - to imagine a
thought in the first place contains the actuality of the situation of which
it is the thought
what I suggest is that what is possible in thought depends on what is actual

possibility does not begin from nothing

what is thinkable is possible too - because what is thinkable has its basis
in actuality

possibility is a reflection of actuality


3.03. Thought can never be of anything illogical, since, if it were, we
should have to think illogically.


thought as reflection

is neither logical or illogical -

these notions are decisions - reflections on the functioning of thought

i.e. how it is to function - square circles is a dead end - not a road
forward

thought in itself has no defining characteristics - but for those
characteristics thought gives itself on reflection

remember - a reflection is a reflection of - it is not without bounds

(logic is not some sacred site of eternal significance and truth - it is -
itself a thought - a thought about how and when thought - fits

therefore - it is open to review - can be reflected upon - )


3.031. It used to be said that God could create anything except what would
be contrary to the laws of logic. - The truth is that we could not say what an 'illogical' world would look like.


it would be like this world - unknown


3.032. It is impossible to represent in language anything that 'contradicts
logic' as it is in geometry to represent by its co-ordinates a figure that contradicts the laws of space, or to give the co-ordinates of a point that
does not exist.


language is the point of contact of consciousness and the non-conscious
articulated

it is the space of articulation

an articulation that is only possible given how the world is - a two
dimensional reality (consciousness and non-consciousness - the inside
the outside)

language is thus the articulation of the unity

what this unity is - amounts to - is always open to question - it is the
project of consciousness - it is the point at which language is speechless

language does represent

what is represented though is always a question to be answered

logic is a theory of the limit to sense

for the limit to be drawn - the other side of sense must have significance

that is that which does not make sense - must be conceivable

and if conceivable it is already represented

the important thing to see here is that sense is never in question

any limit - theory of sense - is made - sensibly -

therefore it is a case of sense defining itself - or more to the point -
defining itself for a specific task

given consciousness there is sense

logic is thus a template applied and reapplied - wherever required for
whatever purpose - within sensibility - it is a conceptual tool


3.0321.Though a state of affairs that would contravene the laws of physics
can be represented by us spatially, one that would contravene the laws of
geometry cannot.


geometry is the theory of spatial form - it is revisable


3.04. If a thought were correct a priori, it would be a thought whose
possibility ensured its truth.


experience is the ground of contact of the conscious and the non-conscious

it is the real world - it is the domain of thought - there is no thought
outside of this -


3.05. A priori knowledge that a thought was true would be possible only if
its truth were recognizable from the thought itself (without anything to
compare it with).


every thought is true a priori - in that every thought is a reflection of

the question - what? - is resolved by correct placement - it is a question of location

therefore a thought is true a priori and it is true a posteriori

it is a matter of where you look -

a thought in itself can never be false


3.1. In a proposition a thought finds an expression that can be perceived by
the senses.


this is true on the level of non-reflective awareness

reflective knowledge puts the senses in question

there are propositions in which a thought does not even look for an
expression that can be perceived by the senses - i.e. this proposition


3.11. We use the perceptible sign of the proposition (spoken or written, etc.)
as a projection of a possible situation.

The method of projection is to think of the sense of the proposition.


the perceptible sign of the proposition is no more than what the proposition
reflects

it is the sign of that reflected

the issue is reflection not projection

in so far as a proposition is an act - yes it is a projection - but this
is just to say it is an act in the world

the sense of a well formed proposition - i.e. a linguistic statement -
a non-linguistic expression - i.e. - painting - dance - music - is given
if it is well formed within its type

we do not have to think of the sense of a proposition - except where we may
not immediately see where it is placed - where it fits - this is really
just a matter of organizing the shop


3.12. I call the sign with which we express a thought a propositional sign.
- And a proposition is a propositional sign in its projective relation to
the world.


this is only to say a proposition has a relation to the world - but even
this is imprecise

in fact a proposition is a relation of the conscious and non-conscious
dimensions - expressed -

it is thus the world expressed


3.13. A proposition includes all that the projection includes, but not what
is projected.

Therefore, though what is projected is not itself included, its possibility
is.

A proposition therefore, does not actually contain its sense, but does
contain the possibility of expressing it.

('The content of the proposition' means the contents of a proposition that has sense).

A proposition contains the form, but not the content, of its sense.

sense is given form and practice in a proposition - it is defined - for reason (purpose)

and with a view to practice

in this sense a proposition contains sense - encircles it - embraces it

the world of sense is the domain of the proposition - propositions are the
templates (flexible) hanging in the shed

a proposition is expression

without sense (not that this is possible) a proposition is empty - it is
just a form without content - and in that case - it doesn't express

this though is never the case

there is no content to sense -

a proposition is the form of sense


3.14. What constitutes a propositional sign is that in it its elements
(the words) stand in a determinate relation to one another.

A propositional sign is a fact.


the propositional sign here is broken down to elements

it is put that the determinate relation of the elements - of the words -
to one another is what makes a propositional sign - presumably what it is -

in what does the determinate relation of elements amount to?

where is the determination - words can be placed relative to one another -
is this then determination?

one would think not

the determination - that gives significance - does so because it makes sense

you see we begin with this - and can then go to some explanation of it -
a theory of sense - and to this end is developed theories of grammar -
and even theories of use

theories of determination

the real determination any theory attempts to account for is just the fact
of sense put in a particular form

in a proposal - that is in a proposition

we can understand sense metaphysically - as that which is the point of
contact of the conscious and the unconscious - consciousness in relation to

consciousness makes sense

awareness is sensibility

a propositional sign is a fact - yes - this though leaves the matter open

to say of anything that it is a fact is to propose it as worthy of
particular attention or focus - it has to do with advertising


3.141. A proposition is not a blend of words. - (Just as a theme in music
is not a blend of notes).

A proposition is articulate.


a proposition in a sense has nothing to do with words

words are - language is - a means of delivery

a proposition articulates - when it is articulated


3.142. Only facts can express a sense, a set of names cannot.


facts are constructions - constructions of sense

if I say 'Michael, Lisa, Judy, Molly' - pointing at these people and a cat -
this set of names express a sense

sense is not contained by language - sense is identified by it


3.143. Although a propositional sign is a fact, this is obstructed by the
usual form of expression in writing or print.

For in a printed proposition, for example, no essential difference is
apparent between a propositional sign and a word.

(That is what made for Frege to call a proposition a composite name).


yes in that every proposition refers - it may do more than this but at
least this -


3.1431. The essence of a propositional sign is very clearly seen if we
imagine one composed of spatial objects (such as tables, chairs, and books)
instead of written signs

The spatial arrangements of these things will express the sense of a
proposition


yes - a spatial arrangement of objects - can be (always is?) a proposal?

what is being said here though will not be expressed by the arrangement - the
arrangement points to it - suggests

the reality may be that there has been no proposal made - that the physical
arrangement is quite accidental - and has no significance in itself -

nevertheless - the arrangement will suggest if identified as an arrangement

significance here is clearly given prior to the proposition's statement

sense is a room - a proposition walks in


3.1432. Instead of, the complex sign "aRb" says a stands in relation to b
in the relation R', we ought to put, 'That "a" stands to "b" in a certain
relation says that aRb'.


the difference is between a complex sign and a proposition

between representation and assertion

there is nothing in a proposition that decides if it is an expression or
an assertion

a proposition is given its form in its act -

its act is identified (rightly or wrongly) by an actor


3.144. Situations can be described but not given names.

(Names are like points; propositions like arrows - they have sense.)


a proposition may function as an arrow - it may also be the drawing of the bow

it is not that anything can or cannot be done - it's rather a matter of
practice - and practice recognized by a community of practitioners

language is like geology - the crevices on a mountain side - are made by
the constant impact of the elements -

what happens is what we then theorize about

what happens though has no deeper meaning than its occurrence

its explanation - any explanation per se - has no reality - that is it adds
nothing to the real event - it is just a way of seeing that gives the illusion
of reason - of foundation -

explanation is just one response to fear


3.2. In a proposition a thought can be expressed in such a way that elements
of the propositional sign correspond to the objects of thought.


a proposition just is the unity of thought and object expressed

the event of the proposition - or the action of it - is in the act -
without epistemological value

it is only on reflection - in reflection that value is found - is given -


3.201. I call such elements 'simple signs', and such a proposition
'completely analyzed'.


a complete analysis of anything is just a matter of definition -
what is complete?

if you think this question can be answered - away you go

if you have doubt regarding complete analysis - you will either drop the
whole project - or suspend judgement
a proposition is a proposal - its analysis is a proposal - the analysis of
the analysis etc.

do you ever get to the proposition as a subject of analysis -

perhaps it is not this kind of thing

we need to ask to what purpose this idea of analysis - simple signs -
completely analyzed?


3.202. The simple signs employed in propositions are called names.


OK - name here - a description of - an act - the act of naming - and this
is what?

the act of language - and then its archiving of the event in another form
- i.e. - a written form

in a written form - e.g. - it can then become an object - and its parts
if you will - are given - names

in this case the parts are refereed to as names

so the act of naming is translated to a form - and then described as naming

it seems as though strictly speaking - naming cannot be analyzed

it is a blind act?


3.203. A name means an object. The object is its meaning. ('A' is the same
sign as 'A'.)


the act of naming - the event of it has meaning - but we say this after
the act - on reflection - that is meaning is not shown - in the event -
meaning is known

the object is its meaning - rather I think the object is given meaning in
the act of naming - and really the giving of meaning is really just an act
(as in on the stage) - but necessary really - given that's where we are


3.21. The configuration of objects in a situation corresponds to the
configuration of simple signs in the propositional sign.


this is an arrangement that is designed to cover anxiety -

it is to say - everything is as it should be - there is no gulf

this is the given state of affairs anyway

it is only on reflection that there seems no basis to it - and to the theory

this is anxiety


3.22. In a proposition a name is the representative of an object.


in a proposition the name and the object are one in the same

name and object are divisions of the unity - into conscious and non-conscious
dimensions

the unity - and here I mean the whole proposition is undivided

it is without definition as it is

(if you were to see it from the outside - you would not know what it is -
though you would recognize that it is)

the relation subject to object

is a description of the unity

the unity is what subject and object come out of

the relation of the conscious and non-conscious we can say is beneath the
reality - we can conceive it this way -

what this means is that substance is above - not below


3.221. Objects can only be named. Signs are their representatives. I can only
speak about them: I cannot put them into words. Propositions can only say how
things are, not what they are.


objects can be thought out - apart from straight recognition - this is the
point of objects - to be reflectively discussed -

in this sense they are only held to be what they appear as - for the purpose
of reflection - the nature of objects is an open question

the sign and that signified are distinguishable only in analysis -
the point of analysis is to provide space for theories of action -
that is ways to proceed

an object is that - what it is - is a question of substance theory

substance theory has no foundation it is simply a way of unifying -
after analysis has diversified

the state of affairs remains impervious to these workings

it is always above the fray - and is in fact never touched - and despite
all such theoretical thrashings about stays as it was to begin - unknown

this is not despair it is rather to give blood reason to flow - the
beat to the heart


3.23. The requirement that simple signs be possible is the requirement
that sense be determinate.


yes it is a requirement - a requirement of use - of action - action is
determinate - action determines -

sense is essentially indeterminate - just as awareness has no given limit

it is the distinction between essence and act


3.24. A proposition about a complex stands in an internal relation to a
proposition about a constituent of the complex.

A complex can be given by its description, which will be right or wrong. A
proposition that mentions a complex will not be non-sensical if the complex
does not exist, but simply false.

When a propositional element signifies a complex, this can be seen from an
indeterminateness in the propositions in which it occurs. In such case we
know that the proposition leaves something undetermined. (In fact the notation
for generality contains a prototype.)

The contraction of a symbol for a complex into a simple symbol can be
expressed in a definition.


a proposition determines nothing - it is proposal for consideration

its truth is a decision about the world - which can never be determined

therefore we decide - if needs be - and justify (argue) afterwards - this
can be the origin of creative metaphysics - or indeed the refuge of a closed
mind - if the former we can have true rationality - if the latter the result
is war on one scale or another

it is in any case the origin of excuse


3.25. A proposition has one and only one complete analysis.


to think like this is to be deceived by the form of a proposition -

it is to think that a definite proposal can only have a definite analysis

a proposition sets up a space for discussion

it is a diamond of possibility - in which you can find possible worlds -
including the best of


3.251. What a proposition expresses it expresses in a determinate manner,
which can be set out clearly: a proposition is articulate.


we can say of anything that it expresses - the point of expression is
the fact - the existence of consciousness

it is not that the world expresses -

it is that given consciousness - the world expresses to - consciousness

to bring it all together - that is not to imagine one without the other -
which is indeed the human reality

yes - a proposition which is an expression of the unity of the conscious
and non-conscious dimensions - and always expresses the world - as is -
i.e. not deconstructed

(deconstructing a matter is just tinkering with ideas of how it functions -
it will function regardless of theory - analysis is always outside of action)

what we make of the proposition - is the same question - what do we make
of the world?

the issue of knowledge is never resolved

the proposition becomes the subject of reflection

(the end point is never reached)

a statement of reflection is a proposition

it too can be the subject of reflection

the necessity of action - a very practical necessity - which is always a
cutting off of reason - determines the status of whatever proposition -
i.e. - that it is to be a foundation of others - this is just a denial of
logic - a decision for action

man is therefore never rational in action only in reflection

and therefore rationality has only contemplative value


3.26. A name cannot be dissected any further by means of a definition: it is a primitive sign.


the point of naming is to make a primitive sign


3.261. Every sign that has a definition signifies via the signs that serve
to define it; and the definitions point the way.

Two signs cannot signify in the same manner if one is primitive and the other
is defined by means of primitive signs. Names cannot be anatomized by means of
definitions.

(Nor can any sign that has a meaning independently and on its own.)


the question really is what is primitive?

we say a name is primitive - that this means it cannot be further analyzed - anatomized

OK - but this is metaphysics by fiat -

I would put that there is no primitive - or rather that we do not know what primitive is
- or is to amount to - except pragmatically - and so there is no sign of it -

the idea of the primitive is perhaps all that is primitive

it underlies human behaviour

it is the reaching to I would suggest and not the point arrived at -

it is a heuristic endeavour

and it may indeed have a biological basis

nevertheless metaphysically speaking it is not to be found

though I grant a primitive - a fundamental is assumed - in any human endeavour

the point I guess is that we operate always in self deception

the truth is indeed possible and conceivable but not endurable


3.262. What signs fail to express, their application shows. What signs slur
over, their application says clearly.


what a sign refers to is always indeterminate

what a sign refers to is a question of definition

the matter is really never settled

we assume a meaning - without ever knowing what that is

application becomes significant - because of application

we are always insisting on meaning

it is the insistence that for all intents and purposes becomes the meaning

language is a means

theories of its structure (grammar) are arguments for significance

structure can give the illusion of substance


3.263. The meanings of primitive signs can be explained by means of
elucidations. Elucidations are propositions that contain primitive signs.
So they can only be understood if the meanings of those signs are already
known.


a primitive sign if it is such - has meaning - that is if it is a sign

(a sign if it is a sign - is a sign of)

what that meaning is though - is a matter independent of the sign

we sometimes embrace the unknown in order to explain - surround it - give
it place
within

this connects a sign to other signs - it gives the impression of elucidation

impression is what we run with

and everyone knows this is not something that bears too much looking into

everyone has a go

propositions - arrows are shot at meaning

illusions connect or they don't

what is already known is just firmly held belief

this is the epistemological basis of prejudice

language is competing prejudices

to speak is to covet


3.3. Only propositions have sense; only in the nexus of a proposition does a
name have meaning.


meaning is the ground of propositions

any proposition has meaning

(otherwise there would be no reason for the proposal)


a proposition - is not all propositions - therefore the proposition is
defined by what it does not propose - this is just what the meaning of a proposition amounts to

a proposition is thus a definition of meaning - a specifying of reality for
attention


3.31. I call any part of the proposition that characterizes its sense an
expression (a symbol).

(A proposition is itself an expression.)

Everything essential to their sense that propositions can have in common
with one another is an expression.

An expression is the mark of form and content.


a symbol identifies the act of meaning

an expression shows

an expression shows that meaning is in definition - that it is in a
specific play

it is like cutting out - or drawing a figure on a piece of paper

meaning is both sides of the line

the focus though is that space contained by the line

propositions focus

so it is not so much that a proposition expresses - it is rather that it focuses

form and content are what is being proposed

so yes form and content are the mark of a proposition

a proposition though is more than just an expression

a proposition is a focus - within focus


3.311. An expression presupposes the forms of all the propositions in which
it can occur. It is the common characteristic mark of a class of propositions.


do we need to speak of an expression at all?

an expression as the basis for a proposition -

that which is common to propositions may well be that which is expressed

but that which is expressed is surely a proposition?


3.312. It is therefore presented by means of the general form of the
propositions that it characterizes.

In fact, in this form the expression will be constant and everything else
variable.


A proposition is the making of an expression

the focus of a proposition is its definitiveness

a proposition is not so much a proposal to halt variability

it is more that it is a decision to hold


3.313. Thus an expression is presented by means of a variable whose values
are the propositions that contain the expression.

(in the limiting case the variable becomes a constant, the expression becomes a
proposition.)

I call such a variable a 'propositional variable'.


the idea that what is expressed in a proposition is a constant and the
propositions in which it is expressed are the variables

the variable in this case then is the actual proposition - this is
the propositional variable

propositions on this view are casings

and the expression is what - substance?

what is expressed - content - the proposition - form?

is this not 'a ghost in the proposition' theory?

either that or - we say a proposition - is always the subject of further
propositions

that the question of content is not resolved - only reflected upon -

and that this is not an exercise in a form of infinite regress - but rather
a study of possibility?

a proposition as a focus - but the focus itself is variable - it is not fixed


3.314. An expression has meaning only in a proposition. All variables can be
constructed as propositional variables.

(Even variable names)


an expression here is what - does it have any substance to it - or is it
an open concept - that expressed - as in an event - an action?

and what is a proposition as distinct from an expression?

is it being suggested that there are such things as propositions that are
empty - waiting to be loaded up - with an expression?

a proposition as a shell - an expression as the powder

(they say Wittgenstein wrote the Tractatus while on the front in the war)


3.315. If we turn a constituent of a proposition into a variable, there is
a class of propositions all of which are values of the resulting variable proposition. In general, this class too will be dependent on the meaning
that our arbitrary conventions have given to parts of the original proposition.
But if all the signs in it that have arbitrarily determined meanings are
turned into variables, we shall still get a class of this kind. This one,
however, is not dependent on any convention, but solely on the nature of the
proposition. It corresponds to a logical form - logical prototype.


the meaning of a variable proposition - the signs of which are all variables -
is dependent not on convention - but on form

this is to make the point that conventional meaning is not arbitrary but
finally founded in logical form

it is to say that logical form is at the basis of the generation of variables

yes this sounds good

the question though is to do with logical form - logical prototype -

do we have such - or is it rather an assumption made after the fact -
to explain the fact?

could it be that the logical form of the proposition just is the proposition?

that each proposition displays form -

as a shadow is reflected in light?


3.316. What values a propositional variable may take is something that
is stipulated.

The stipulation of values is the variable.


the variable is just the stipulation of values

stipulation?

isn't it rather that values are created in a propositional variable -
not I suggest from nothing - but rather from looking in a different place -
which is just what a variable does

the form of the variable (as variable) is direction


3.317. To stipulate values for a propositional variable is to give the
propositions whose common characteristic the variable is.

The stipulation is the description of those propositions.

The stipulation will therefore be concerned only with symbols, not with their
meaning.

And the only thing essential to the stipulation is that it is merely a
description of symbols and states nothing about what is signified.

How the description of propositions is produced is not essential.


(a)


this is to say that to stipulate values is to show - display the variable -
in propositions that are instances of it

this is a definition of stipulation

and this showing (stipulation) is the description of the propositions -

so the display is the description?

the point being a display is self explanatory - and thus complete?

you can of course define description in such a way

the world - as is - as displayed - is (its) description

this works I think as it were from the point of view of the world - without
consciousness

consciousness reflects - this is what it does - just as the rain falls
and the sun shines

display is just the object of reflection

presentation is not enough for consciousness - it is just the beginning

the idea that we can see things - one dimensional - i.e. Neurath 'everything
is surface' - I understand as quite a brilliant solution to the problem of metaphysics - the problem that is that we have metaphysics -

the point is it doesn't work - its very formulation requires what it denies - reflection


(b)


the description will be concerned only with symbols - not their meaning

yes you can focus just on symbols - and not on what is signified

so the question then has to do with the relations - thus logical relations of symbols

OK -

however for a symbol to have sense it need be distinguishable from other
symbols - how is this to be if what is signified is not in question?

without some basis for the symbol - other than its presentation - it has no significance

you cannot separate a sign from meaning

always the question is one of meaning - symbolism - is a merely a
propositional variation with hidden values

in art the artist constructs and organizes symbols

logicians do just this

propositional logic is the basis of art


3.318. Like Frege and Russell I construe a proposition as a function of the expressions contained in it.


yes a bottom up approach - (very British I would think)

the top down idea is that the expressions have significance in so far as
they are propositioned -

that is their inclusion in a proposition is the what makes for their value

it is always a question isn't it of where you begin - do you start with a
stone or begin with a mountain?


3.32. A sign is what can be perceived of a symbol.


a sign is thus syntax


3.321. So the one and the same sign (written or spoken, etc.) can be common
to two different symbols - in which case they will signify in different ways.


the same syntax common to two different - propositions e.g.

if the symbols are unique - separate - they have different signification
(though the same signage)


3.322. Our use of the same sign to signify two different objects can never
indicate a common characteristic of the two, if we use it with two different
modes of signification. For the sign, of course is arbitrary. So we could
choose two different signs in stead, and then what would be left in common
on the signifying side?


signs do not determine substance


3.323. In every day language it very frequently happens that the same word has
different modes of signification - and so belongs to different symbols - or
that two words that have different modes of signification are employed in propositions in what is superficially the same way.

Thus the word 'is' figures as the copula, as a sign for identity, and as an expression for existence; 'exist' figures as an intransitive verb like 'go', and 'identical' as an adjective; we speak of something, but also of something's happening.

(In the proposition, 'Green is green' - where the first word is the proper
name of a person and the last an adjective - these words do not merely have different meanings: they are different symbols)


the point is isn't that appearance demands scrutiny -

or that language as practiced on let us say a veridical level challenges
us to think?


3.324. In this way the most fundamental confusions are easily produced
(the whole of philosophy is full of them).


perhaps there is no pristine surface to begin with

that to think this is the mistake

the fact of different symbols for identical signs - is the fact of beauty

and the world is such an intrigue

here is the struggle of art

the origin of delight


3.325. In order to avoid such errors we must make use of a sign-language that
excludes them by not using the same sign for different symbols and by not using
in a superficially similar way signs that have different modes of signification: that is to say a sign-language that is governed by logical grammar - by logical syntax.

(The conceptual notation of Frege and Russell is such a language, though
it is true, it fails to exclude all mistakes.)


it is the assumption of error that bothers me here

indeed we can think more clearly when this is required

the way the world is - is not an error though - unless you are of a
Platonic bent

the notation of logical syntax - if adopted as the language of thought will
knock out - in one foul swoop the dramas of semantics

and there is indeed a clarity in syntax - ask any artist

the point always with clarity though is what is left out?

what is left out is the world


3.326. In order to recognize a symbol with its sign we must observe how it is
used with a sense.


is this anymore than acknowledging that we can't really speak of a sign
outside of a working knowledge of its actual application -

that it is the application that gives a sign its meaning -

that the matter is not decided in some quasi a priori way?

the fact is we understand the indeterminateness of signs from practice -
we can indeed - develop variations in the syntax - but by why - if the
semantics in practice is clear enough?


3.327. A sign does not determine a logical form unless it is taken together
with its logico-syntactical employment.


true - it is a question of use


3.328. If a sign is useless, it is meaningless. That is the point of Oakam's
maxim.

(If everything behaves as if a sign had meaning, then it does have meaning.)


yes there is a test of utility - but it is never finished - we create new signs
for new pathways

(once a sign has been used it is useful - even if the original use is forgotten
or lost)


3.33. In logical syntax the meaning of a sign should never play a role.
It must be possible to establish a logical syntax without mentioning the
meaning of a sign: only the description of expressions may be presupposed.


this is to ask too much and for why?

either a sign has meaning or it does not - if not - we are saying it cannot
be used -

if it does - then it may be used - where is the problem?

just as the meaning of a word is not a syntactical issue - nevertheless the
presence of syntax is acknowledged -

so too with syntax - though the issue of meaning is not being worked - it is
nevertheless in the yard -

it is really just a question of what is being done - and effectiveness usually
presupposes a division of labour


3.331. From this observation we turn to Russell's 'theory of types'. It can
be seen that Russell must be wrong, because he had to mention the meaning
of signs when establishing the rules for them.


the meaning of sign is its use - a rule stipulates correct use

3.332. No proposition can make a statement about itself, because a propositional
sign cannot be contained in itself.


my argument here would be that in a proposition there is nothing to refer to
as the proposition itself has no content - it is a pointing to


3.333. The reason why a function cannot be its own argument is that the sign
for a function already contains the prototype of its argument, and it cannot
contain itself.

For let us suppose that the function F(fx) could be its own argument: in that
case there would be a proposition 'F(F(fx))', in which the outer function F
and the inner function F must have different meanings, since the inner one
has the form f(fx) and the outer one has the form ø(f(fx)). Only the letter
'F' is common to the two functions, but the letter by itself signifies nothing.

This immediately becomes clear if instead of 'F(Fu)' we write
'($f):F(fu).fu = Fu'.

That disposes of Russell's paradox.


a proposition that refers to itself must contain itself - thus another
proposition - same proposition? - how can this be? - anyway - the second
proposition presumably points to the first - and the first points wherever

clearly two different propositions - they do not have - cannot have the
same referent

Russell's paradox can occur if you regard a proposition as the same kind
of thing that it points to - as Russell correctly saw

a proposition points to - picks out - cuts out - what it refers to -
(if we want to keep using the idea of reference) - ideally

the domain of a proposition is not the proposition

a proposition can never be in the domain of a proposition

just as the domain of consciousness - that outside of consciousness is not
consciousness

consciousness can never be in its domain

(and yes - something of an argument against the mind-brain identity theory)


ps.

self reference -

the self?

a proposition can refer to the referent or that which refers

it can refer both ways -

so the self as a propositional function?

just a thought


3.334. The rules of logical syntax must go without saying, once we know how
each individual sign signifies.


how a sign signifies is not without question


3.34. A proposition possess essential and accidental features.

Accidental features are those that result from the particular way in which the
propositional sign is produced. Essential features are those without which the
proposition could not express its sense.


a proposition does not express anything

a proposition is that which is expressed

a proposition is a tool of awareness

consciousness proposes a view of the world

the view - the proposition - defines focus

the propositional sign has objective status

therefore it can be referred to

it can be the subject of other propositions

secondary propositions are reflective


3.341. So what is essential in a proposition is what all propositions that
can express the same sense have in common.

And similarly, in general, what is essential in a symbol is what all symbols
that can serve the same purpose have in common


there is nothing essential in a proposition

the natural history of a language creates structure - use creates structure

this is not essence -

how would you ever identify essence?

what is it supposed to be?

sense as I think of it is logical space

it is a function of awareness

that a proposition opens up and gives form to logical space is we can say what
a proposition does

the form of logical space here is the domain of possibility

the propositional sign defines the domain

to say this is to reflect on the fact of propositions

it is to offer a theory of reason and structure

such a proposal is we shall say a meta proposition

bear in mind this too is not immune from discussion and focus

finally we only ever have a working theory

in this case - of propositions

there is no essential definition

every definition is open


3.3411. So one could say that the real name of an object was what all symbols
that signified it have in common. Thus, one by one, all kinds of composition
would prove to be unessential to a name.


names are empty forms - they are given content in application

there is of course a history of application - that is common usage

yes you can match symbols with objects - this is linguistics

saying what symbols have in common is an exercise in contingency

it can be of interest for a specific purpose -

it is about usage patterns


3.342. Although there is something arbitrary in our notations, this much is not
arbitrary - that when we have determined one thing arbitrarily, something else
is necessarily the case. (This derives from the essence of notation.)


it can be that one thing so defined entails something else - this is a
matter of definition and definition is always a matter of argument

there is no essence to notation - to think this is to dream a language that
would by definition have no application - would not thus be a language


3.3421. A particular mode of signifying may be unimportant but it is always
important that it is a possible mode of signifying. And it is generally so in philosophy: again and again the individual case turns out to be unimportant,
but the possibility of each case discloses something about the essence
of the world.


anything can be of significance depending on how you look

essence is an argument - the idea of a base that is common to all

it can be a useful notion given certain purposes

mainly it has to do with conception to the service of unity - and the point
of this?

metaphysical security - intellectual and finally emotional

circumstance can lead us to seek out conceptions of this kind

circumstances though can just as easily lead us to throw it off and seek
out the non-essential


3.343. Definitions are rules for translating from one language into another.
Any correct sign-language must be translatable into any other in accordance
with such rules; it is this they all have in common.


natural languages are existing languages -

translation is the establishing of correspondence rules

the assumption therefore is that there is correspondence

which is to say - the assumption is - common meaning

artificial languages are created in response to perceived functional
deficiencies of natural languages

the meaning of terms in an artificial language is thus not a matter of
correspondence but revision

artificial languages may also have terms that are unique to that language and
thus defined by it

the meaning of an artificial language is determined by the task it is being
designed to fulfill

translatability of natural to artificial and artificial to artificial is not determinate

translatability is not determinate

it is this that they all have in common -

the indeterminacy of translation

(for determinate translation - you would need to assume the existence of a set
of fixed meanings that all languages express - that they all refer to -

you would then have the question - why not just one language?

different languages have different histories - they come form different points
in space and time - the common feature of all is that they are a means of
expression

the need to express is at the core of it

the meaning of a term is the history of its use)


3.344. What signifies a symbol is what is common to all the symbols that the
rules of logical syntax allow us to substitute for it.


what is common to a symbol is what is common to all symbols - and that is the
rules of logical syntax - for they allow us to substitute symbols - without
changing what is signified


3.3441. For instance, we can express what is common to all notations for truth
functions in the following way: they have in common that, for example, the
notation that uses '~p' ('not p') and 'pvq' ('p or q') can be substitutes for
any of them.

(This serves to characterize the way in which something general can be disclosed
by the possibility of a specific notion.)


all notations for truth functions have in common the rules of logical syntax


3.3442. Nor does analysis resolve the sign for a complex in an arbitrary way,
so that it would have a different resolution every time that it was
incorporated in a different proposition.


the sign for a complex is resolved definitively regardless of the proposition
it is incorporated in


3.4. A proposition determines a place in logical space. The existence of this
logical space is guaranteed by the mere existence of the constituents -
by the existence of the proposition with sense.


logical space is revealed by the proposition - and logical space is determined
by the proposition

logical space is thus contained by the proposition and at the same time the proposition
is contained in logical space

it is like a proposition brackets logical space - ( )

it is this bracketing (the proposition) that brings logical space into
focus - what is inside the bracket (of the proposition) and therefore -
what is outside

the act of the proposition reveals logical space


3.41 The propositional sign with logical co-ordinates - that is the logical
place.


yes this is what I mean by the bracketing - the making of logical place


3.411. In geometry and logic alike a place is a possibility; something can
exist in it.


yes - logical space is conceived

it is a particular conception - the conception as it were without an object of conception

in this sense - a meta conception - in that it is the ground of conception

it is to conceive the space of all conception

logical place is the space of a particular proposition


3.42. A proposition can determine only one place in logical space: nevertheless
the whole of logical space must already be given by it.

(Otherwise negation, logical sum, logical product, etc., would introduce more
and more elements - in co-ordination.)

(The logical scaffolding surrounding a picture determines logical space.
The force of a proposition reaches through logical space.)


yes a proposition determines only one place in logical space

the implication of logical space in the determination of place tells us what?

I said above that logical space is revealed -

it is revealed - that is as a matter of logic - it is a logical function

it is the space not determined by the proposition

if so it is a function inherent in all propositions

logical space a first order function - of a proposition?


3.5. A propositional sign, applied and thought out, is a thought.


do we think only in propositions?

a proposition - in its least technical form is a proposal

the proposal comes out of what?

thought

thought here as the origin of the proposition

the thing is - if this is so - the proposition makes the thought out of which it comes

that is prior to the proposal thought is unknown - unrevealed - it is
characterless

the proposition as it were - a light turned on in the darkness

thought is both the darkness and the light

the proposition is thus the possibility of thought revealed

Tractatus 2

2. What is the case - a fact - is the existence of states of affairs.


a fact is a description of what is

a fact is not a state

a state is a description of a fact


2.01. A state of affairs (a state of things) is a combination of objects (things).


a combination of objects is a conception of what is

a state of affairs may or may not be a conception of objects


2.011. It is essential to things that they should be possible constituents of
states of affairs.


there is nothing essential to things

(essence is a description
there are no necessary descriptions
only possible descriptions)

a thing may or may not be a constituent of a state of affairs

that is a thing may or may not be described

(may or may not be an element of an explanation)


2.012. In logic nothing is accidental; if a thing can occur in a state of
affairs, the possibility of the state of affairs must be written into the thing.


a state of affairs is a description

a description of a thing is not the thing

a thing is not necessarily described

a thing can exist without description


2.0121. It would seem to be a sort of accident, that a situation would fit
a thing that could already exist entirely on its own.

If things can occur in states of affairs, the possibility must be in them from the
beginning.

(Nothing in the province of logic can be merely possible and all possibilities
are its facts.)


Just as we are quite unable to imagine spatial objects outside of space or
temporal objects outside of time, so too there is no object that we can imagine excluded from the possibility of combining with others.

If I can imagine objects combined in states of affairs, I cannot imagine
them excluded from the possibility of such combinations.


(a) It would seem to be a sort of accident, that a situation would fit a thing
that could already exist entirely on its own.


a thing is a conception

a situation is a conception of a thing in relation to other things

a conception is always within a conception

no thing exists on its own

there is no necessity in things


(b) If things can occur in states of affairs, the possibility must be in them
from the beginning.


it is a question of conception and depth and range of conception

possible descriptions define a thing

a thing can be defined as the totality of possible descriptions

this is to say nothing of a thing

(a thing is a description)

beyond description there is nothing to say

there is no beginning


(c) Nothing in the province of logic can be merely possible and all possibilities are its facts

logic is the theory of possibility

every possibility is not conceivable

possibility is not restricted

facts are possible descriptions

logic is the ground of description


(d) Just as we are quite unable to imagine spatial objects outside of space
or temporal objects outside of time, so too there is no object that we can imagine excluded from the possibility of combining with others.


descriptions (objects) can be conjoined with descriptions

this is to say nothing about that which is described


(e) If I can imagine objects combined in states of affairs, I cannot imagine
them excluded from the possibility of such combinations.


descriptions can be included in descriptions or not

the point of any description simple or complex is action

descriptions provide a basis (to the baseless) in order to facilitate action

description is the only base to action


2.0122. Things are independent in so far as they can occur in all possible situations, but this form of independence is a form of connection with states of affairs, a form of dependence. (It is impossible for words to appear in two different roles: by themselves and in propositions.)


all possible situations cannot be conceived

a thing can be conceived as independent - it can be conceived in relation to

a thing in itself is indeterminate

we cannot know what is independent of conception

conception defines

definition is decision

all decisions are finally arbitrary

a word is not an appearance

a word can be used in an ostensive definition

(it can be the sound of a signification

the sound of that pointed to)

a proposition signifies

a word can be analyzed within a proposition

an analyzed word must be regarded as independent for its relation to be seen (argued)

(a proposition proposes

a proposition proposes a world

the world of a proposition is always within

there is no proposition that contains all propositions

the world is never exhausted)


2.0123. If I know an object I also know all its possible occurrences in states
of affairs.

(Everyone of these must be part of the nature of an object).

A new possibility cannot be discovered later.


if to know an object is to know all its possible occurrences in states of affairs
I cannot know an object

one's conception of an object - what descriptions apply is a question of circumstance

there is no necessity here
the nature of an object is an open question)

objects exist in space and time
(descriptions are contingent)

discovery is thinking in a different manner

possibilities are conceived in circumstance

the world is fluid


2.0123. If I am to know an object I need not know all its external properties,
I must know all its internal properties.


an object is always an open question

there is no definite description

a description of internal properties is a description of the thing in itself

there is nothing fixed here

an object's external properties are its possibilities in the world

the world is not definable therefore it is not knowable in any final sense

there is no complete knowledge

a thing's external properties are not fixed

'the world' is a description of what we do not know


2.0124. If all objects are given, then at the same time all possible states are
also given.


all objects are not given

conceptions are made not given

possible descriptions are only the possibility of a different conception

possibility cannot be determined in advance

possibility exists because we do not know


2.013. Each thing is, as it were, in a space of possible states of affairs.
This space I can imagine empty, but I cannot imagine the thing without the space.


a space of possible states - is ascribing different descriptions to a thing
(a thing here an initial description - so a thing is never determined except
by fiat - or a decision to leave it alone)

I can't conceive a thing as having no description

space is the ground of description

the absence of complete description is what defines the world

the world is always more than all possible descriptions


2.0131. A spatial object must be situated in infinite space. (A spatial point
is an argument place).

A speck in the visual field, though it need not be red, must have some colour;
it is, so to speak, surrounded by colour space. Notes must have some pitch,
objects of the same touch, must have some degree of hardness, and so.


there is no fixed description of an object

a spatial point is an argument place

infinite space is the argument

perceptual events have a natural description a natural description is
non-reflective(what you might call a given description)

non-natural descriptions are explanations of natural phenomena

an object can be described naturally or non-naturally

all well formed descriptions are true

an object can be variously described

(the idea of 'object' is itself a description - a base description that all
other descriptions refer to -
the idea itself is finally without content

we describe it to give it content -

not because it has content but because we need it to have content so as it
manipulate it)


2.014. Objects contain the possibilities of all situations.


objects contain nothing

possibilities are given

situations arise - i.e. - descriptions are made

descriptions reflect time

time is not still

time means nothing


2.0141. The possibility of its occurring in states of affairs is the form of an object.


the occurrence of an object is its perception

the possibility of an object is outside of it

it's possibility is its conception and use

the form of an object is its natural history

it's natural history is what is said of it

or

the form of an object is always a mistake

a necessary starting point of action

it is never true but is regarded as so

here is the origin of exhilaration and also dread


2.02. Objects are simple.


simple or complex is a matter of regard

an object may be regarded as simple

(this is a pragmatic decision

it is always ontologically short sighted

to say something is simple is to choose not to think about it further

here is the origin of clarity and distinctness

it is also the first step of withdrawal from the world)


2.0201. Every statement about complexes can be resolved into a statement about
their constituents and into the propositions that describe complexes completely.


complexity is a view of - i.e. an object

it is a way of knowing

a possible way of seeing

the decision to resolve a statement about a complex into its constituents
is to explore the complex - to look into it

if an entity (i.e. a complex) is held to be closed exploration stops

this can only be for a purpose of use (or lack of interest)

(there is no epistemological basis to closing down exploration)

and any proposition (describing such an entity) is held to be closed to view

(even given this view completion does suggest itself

completion has more to do with the wish that consciousness did not exist

that the world is object without question

such a world cannot be known therefore it makes no sense

completion is about the end of desire - not the nature of the world)

if an entity (i.e. a complex) is regarded as open - so too its description

here there is no resolution

any proposition regarding it is held to be open to review

(how you hold a proposition is a decision about the world)


2.021 Objects make up the substance of the world that is why they cannot be
composite.


if so - the substance of the world cannot be composite - whence objects?

objects exist in the outside of the world (the inside is consciousness)

substance is that which is inside and out

substance per se is unknowable

the world is two dimensional

the point of unity (the world itself) cannot be seen


2.0211. If the world had no substance, then whether a proposition had sense would
depend on whether another proposition is true.


a proposition asserts

it is an assertion of what is the case or what is not the case or what could be
the case

a proposition invites assent or dissent

if a proposition can be assented to it has sense

if a proposition can be dissented from it has sense

sensibility is a question of intelligibility


2.0212. In that case we could not sketch any picture of the world.


if there was no substance there would be no assertion

if no proposition - no proposition could be dependent on another


2.022. It is obvious that an imagined world, however different it may be
from the real one, must have something - a form - in common with it.


imagination is consciousness over reaching known reality

imagination is creativity and the ground of creativity

what is real is the starting point for the imagination

whatever is created is created from - the given reality is contained in any
imagined reality


2.023. Objects are what constitutes this unalterable form.


consciousness objectifies


2.0231.The substance of the world can only determine a form, and not any material
properties. For it is only by means of propositions that material properties are
represented - only by the configuration of objects that they are produced.


forms of knowing are given in consciousness

the material world is outside of consciousness

(consciousness is the inside of the world)

propositions represent consciousness in the world

the external world - the surface of the world exists in another dimension to
consciousness

its properties are reflected in consciousness

it is only known given consciousness

(consciousness impacts on the material world

the material world impacts on consciousness

this is a way of describing the dynamic of the unity)


2.0232. In a manner of speaking objects are colourless.


objectification is a function of consciousness

functions are colourless

colour is a property of the outside world

an object is a unity

it can be analyzed as colourless or colourful


2.00233. If two objects have the same logical form, the only distinction
between them, apart from their external properties, is that they are different.


their difference is a function of space / time position (only if this is
not regarded as an external property - if it is they are so distinguished)

difference is contingency

the world distinguishes itself


2.02331. Either a thing has properties that nothing else has, in which case we can
immediately use a description to distinguish it from the others and refer to it;
or, on the other hand, there are several things that have the whole set of properties in common, in which case it is quite impossible to indicate one of them.

For if there is nothing to distinguish a thing, I cannot distinguish it,
since otherwise it would be distinguished after all.


distinction is a question of knowledge

(separate entities are distinguished by spatial position this at least)

what I know of a thing is what distinguishes it

if it cannot be distinguished - this is a property of me - not the thing

distinction is separateness

if there is no separation there are no things

if things are separate they are distinguished


2.024. Substance is what subsists independently of what is the case.


what is independent of what is the case is what is not known

substance is the unknown


2.025. It is form and content.


form and content are categories of knowledge

what is beyond knowledge is unknown


2.0251. Space, time and colour (being coloured) are forms of objects.


objects are expressed in space and time

thought is expressed in space and time

space and time are expressions of the world

the world here - in itself so to speak - is unknown

the world (again so to speak) is known through its expressions

colour is a point of unity of mind and matter

the unity of the world cannot be seen

colour is a sign


2.026. There must be objects if the world is to have an unaltered form.


there is no necessity to objects

objects could well not exist

the world would not thus cease to exist

the world is necessary

(necessity is without description)

if the world has an unalterable form we could never know what this is

to imagine such is to suggest the unknown is known

this is the origin of idolatry

(the absence of knowledge beyond consciousness is unalterable)

consciousness is not necessary


2.027 Objects, the unalterable, and the subsistent are one in the same.


objects are presentations to consciousness

consciousness objectifies

(there is no basis to appearance - that is there is nothing that appearance is
that does not appear

beyond appearance - beyond phenomena is what does not appear - is noumena

noumena is the unknown

thought is action that is not visible

there is no basis to thought - that is there is nothing that thought is that is visible)

the idea of unalterability is either the idea to form a basis for argument
that is to stand as premise or it is the wish for the end of desire which is
no more than fear of consciousness itself

the surface is guileless

consciousness reflects the surface

nothing subsists

you can decide to view everything as being indistinguishable

if so everything is unknown

here is the axis of joy and despair

(the question then is either embrace or shed)


2.0271. Objects are what is unalterable and subsistent; their configuration is
what is changing and unstable


the object is neither unalterable or unstable

consciousness objectifies and then reflects

consciousness is petulant

here is the source of innocence (playfulness) and wickedness

the descriptive possibilities of anything are either /or

this shows the space of consciousness in any description

this is the space of possibility

this space is never exhausted

the logic of either / or is applicable to any description of an object

that is it is not a fixed analysis - rather a tool of analysis

a means of setting up ground for thought

logic is not about the nature of things

logic is a set of tools

tools are tools if they fit the task

this suggests the world corresponds to these tools

that the world is so configured

this is where the idea of form comes from - the use of logic

natural history is comforting

it is not necessary

and you cannot predict the next fact


2.0272. The configuration of objects produces states of affairs.


the object as such is what it is

any configuration is a conceptualization

that is it is meant either as an explanation or as an artistic representation

the configuration of objects is at the phenomenal (as distinct from the
conceptual) level a question of relation

the relations of objects is like a board game - it is at the simplest level
a question of placement and position

we then describe from various (different) points of view

this is always a matter of physicality and ideality

where you are - and the metaphysics you bring to place

objects produce nothing beyond themselves

a state of affairs is a conception


2.03. In a state of affairs objects fit into one another like the links
of a chain.


in a relational conception anything can be related to anything

if the object of conception is more than one - the conception is relational


2.031 In a state of affairs objects stand in a determinate relation to one
another.


relational conceptions determine however there are no fixed relations

things can be conceived in any number of ways

relations - kinds of relations can be created

how things are related depends on what questions are asked

the reason for seeing things in any particular way is not necessarily clear

the reason for anything at all is the point of all our endeavours

it is the eternal focus

the fact of not-knowing is the driving force - the conatus aware

not-knowing is the reason for conscious life

it is the source of anxiety


2.032. The determinate way in which objects are connected in a state of affairs
is the structure of the state of affairs.


how objects are conceived is a state of affairs

the structure of a state of affairs is a theory of conception

that is a reflection on the original conception

there is theoretically no end to reflection on reflection

if a state of affairs is determinate - its determination is never reached

structure is ephemeral


2.033. Form is the possibility of structure.


the possibility of thought (conception) is not knowable

(here is the true zest of life)

the conception of structure is the conception of how a thing stands

the limit of a thing is defined by its structure - i.e. a different structure a different thing

a different thing has a different conception

form is an open concept

structure is a picture of form


2.034. The structure of a fact consists of the structures of states of affairs.


the structure of a fact is internal logic - why it is what it is and not another
fact

the structure of states of affairs is external logic - the logic of relations -
this has no bearing on the (internal) nature of individual things


2.04. The totality of existing states of affairs is the world.


therefore the world is the state of affairs
therefore the world is one state

the concept of one here cannot be defined

it cannot be a closed concept unless there is something outside the world

if one is an open concept - there is nothing outside of the world

and one here (i.e. the world) is by definition without definition

a totality if closed is such that it has a limited number of members

(such a world is fixed)

a totality if open has an unlimited number of members

such a concept can never be stated

(such a world is not fixed)

we can speak here only of what is not known

as such it is without logical characterization

if so we should give up speaking of the world


2.05. The totality of existing states of affairs also determines which
states of affairs do not exist.


a totality does not entail non-existence

an existing state of affairs does not determine what does not exist

x may exist or not exist

not x is the boundary of x


2.06.The existence and non-existence of states of affairs is a reality.

(We also call the existence of states of affairs a positive fact, and their
non-existence a negative fact.)


consciousness always reaches beyond the given

logical possibility is a deeper understanding than the factual world

(the deeper - or wider you go in thinking - the less substance there is in the
world

finally you see there is no substance)

the existence of states of affairs is only the necessity (natural) of focus
(the entity is so structured)

reflection - a step back from the immediate - transforms the world to idea

thought is sublime

the purity of touch of sense is exquisite

positive skepticism is to see the absence of knowledge as the ground of being

where you begin and end

negative skepticism is the view that the illusion of knowledge should be true

it is metaphysical denial - an understandable lack of nerve

(for all intents and purposes illusion is necessary for human survival)

you don't have to abandon everything to live in truth and dignity

it is rather the understanding behind the understanding

freedom is at the heart of not-knowing


2.061. States of affairs are independent of each other.


this is a question of conception

when we conceive we determine what is to be included and what is not

(you can think in such a way that all states of affairs are expressions
instances of the one state of affairs - therefore there is no independence)

focus is always where we start

perception is objective (in that it determines what is in and what is not)

reflection - conception is without this necessity

its propensity is the lack of focus

it moves to the point of no focus

what I am saying here is about pure thought

it is nevertheless true of very practical thinking

the absence of knowing demands that we explore

dilemmas initially set limits to thinking

problems can require the isolation of one matter from another

this is not to do with the nature of things -

rather it is about the nature of action


2.062. From the existence or non-existence of one state of affairs it is
impossible to infer the existence or non-existence of another.


if so science is impossible or it is without any logical foundation - and thus
is mythology

mythology is a form of necessary illusion

knowledge is the necessary illusion

(the world is not altered)


2.063. The sum total of reality is the world.


reality is not a quantity


2.1. We picture facts to ourselves.


we may so describe consciousness

such is an attempt to give explanation to thought

it is a reflection on the fact

given that we don't know -

really any sensible metaphor will function as well as the next

picturing has the advantage of being childlike

the focus of consciousness captures what is before it

the metaphor is simple and straightforward

in reality though a picture is always outside of consciousness

facts are definitions

decisions in logical space

what is there to picture?

logical space is blank without feature

the drawing of boundaries is ideal

it has no imprint

a picture theory of consciousness conceals the truth


2.11. A picture resents a situation in logical space, the existence and
non-existence of states of affairs.


a picture presents a situation in logical space -

a picture is a presentation

in presenting a situation in logical space

it is a picture presenting a picture (a situation)

in a picture (logical space)

so

a picture presents a picture which presents a picture

what we are talking about here is reflection

reflection of reflection of reflection

this is consciousness

this is how consciousness works

reflection on reflection on reflection

logical space -

is the space of unity

the point of contact between the inner and the outer dimensions

logical space as the space of unity is the space of both dimensions

from the point of view as it were of unity

logical space is necessarily a construction

but nevertheless we regard it as reality

a reality that exists but must be made in order to be known

consciousness posits logical space and then recognizes it as the reality
it participates in

consciousness that is defers to its construction

logical space thus reflects both inner and outer dimensions

it is the resolution of inner and outer

(it is known only from the inside - exists only given that reality is two
dimensional and therefore is a unity

we can well imagine reality as one dimensional - there is no question of unity
and therefore in a world without consciousness - no space of unity - no logical space)

a picture presents a situation in logical space

a picture presents a picture

the existence and non-existence of states of affairs

this is just to say logical space is the space of possibility


2.12. A picture is a model of reality.


a picture is a picture

actually the external reality - the surface reality is reflected in consciousness

and this reflection can then be subject to further reflection

the relationship is two way

consciousness reflects out to the (external) physical world

reality as such is never pictured

we never step out of it to picture it

we are in it

it reflects - and more than this we are its reflections

reflections that reflect


2.13. In a picture objects have the elements of the picture corresponding to them.


in a reflection of an object the object is reflected


2.131. In a picture the elements of the picture are the representatives of
objects


a reflection reflects what is reflected

a reflection in this context is an inside view of an outside event

(it can also be an inside view of an inside event)

why do we say a picture represents?

that is why don't we say the landscape represents the picture?

what it is about is that consciousness is in the world

that which is outside of consciousness - the physical world

is the object of consciousness

the object is surface - the surface is revealed

the subject (consciousness) is inside - the inside is not revealed

the inside is a reflection of - the outside

we step back and say one represents the other

because one is a reflection of the other

in fact both are dimensions - and thus finally - reflections of a unity

consciousness and the physical world thus both represent a unity

that which is reflected is only known in terms of its reflection

beyond reflection there is no knowledge

representation is thus a way of characterizing the relationship between
consciousness and its object - the external (physical) surface

it is thus a reflection on this relationship

a way of seeing it

it could also be put that a picture only represents if it is made to

that is the representation is not a characteristic of the picture rather of the viewer

it is thus a view of the picture that the picture represents

representation as such has nothing to do with the picture

it is a way of seeing the world - a way of relating things

one could though take another view and say there is no representation

it is just the one reality that has two dimensions

i.e. - the inside of a box does not represent the outside of a box

and the outside of the box is not a representation of the inside

representation does not come into the picture

this view has the advantage of elegance


2.14.What constitutes a picture is that its elements are related to one another
in a determinate way.


here you could well say that what constitutes the world is that its elements
are related in a determinate way

if so how would you then distinguish a picture from the world?

one would think this necessary for a picture to be a picture


2.141. A picture is a fact.


what is not a fact?

if a fact is to have any logical significance it must be distinguished from what
it is not?

either that or we are dealing with a form of speech

'it is a fact that it is Tuesday at 5.07 p.m.'

is what kind of a statement?

it is an assertion that asserts that what is asserted is true

it is a statement within the statement

the statement within refers to the statement without

it is thus self-serving

statements of this kind should be regarded as rhetorical rather than logical

to say a picture is a fact is really advertising - albeit of the no frills variety


2.15. The fact that the elements of a picture are related to one another
in a determinate way represents that things are related to one another in the same way.

Let us call this connection of its elements the structure of the picture, and
let us call the possibility of this structure the pictorial form of the picture.


a picture represents - it does not determine how the world is

the picture may function let us say on a veridical level - but be of no use on
an empirical theoretical level - i.e. that is of no value to science

here it is a question of the use of the picture - as to whether it represents
how things are

how things are will be represented conceptually

but again the representation - the conceptual picture is representative -
relative to use

the world is conceived differently - different conceptions reflect different needs
and differing metaphysical histories

conceptualizations (pictures) are tools for dealing with the world

let us say every concept represents

the problem of knowledge is not the problem of representation

the question is how to understand that an infinity of different pictures
can represent the one state of affairs

either there is in an infinity of falsehood and one picture applies or things
are not related in a determinate manner

and the possibility of different picture represents this - dare I say - fact

the possibility of a thing's structure - is really the possibility of
structuring - a form of picturing

which does not of course exhaust the possibilities of representation

the fact of it is that the object of knowledge is the unknown

the unknown is silent - it does not determine

the infinite possibility of representation is only possible given that the
object of consciousness - that which is outside of itself - is unknown

the unknown is silent - it does not determine - therefore anything is possible

rather consciousness' capacity to reflect and reflect on its reflection is
the source of all representation


2.151. Pictorial form is the possibility that things are related to one another
in the same way as the elements of a picture.


yes it is possible that things are related to one another in the same way as
the elements of picture

this is all that can be asserted


2.1511. That is how a picture is attached to reality; it reaches right out to it.


consciousness does indeed have as its primary object that which is outside of
itself

it makes no sense really to speak of the inside being attached to the outside

the inside can affect the outside - can impose itself - consciousness can
and does transform the physical world - alter its elements - configure them -
if you like

this is a reaching out I suppose

this though is always based on the outside's reflection on the inside

this is the reaching in


2.1512. It is laid against reality like a measure.


the picture is reality reflected

this is just what happens in the natural world (given conscious animals)

it is unremarkable

unless you think the rain falling the wind blowing and the sun shinning is
extraordinary

yes we have concepts of measurement

but again - reality is not a quantity

or to say that it is - leaves too much out


2.15121. Only the end points of the graduating lines actually touch the object
that is to be measured.


the measurement of the object by the picture is a relationship between the
picture and the object

the act of measurement is an act of consciousness - it is the relating
of the picture to the object in a certain way

this is the making of a relational picture

the relata are the object and the original picture

do we want to say that the relating of the concept (picture) to object is
picturing the picture in a relation (another picture)?

the point is pictures contain pictures

here there are pictures of objects and pictures of the relationship of pictures
to objects

a picture does not touch the object pictured it reflects it

the object reflected is held to be complete within its conception

but this is to say what is conceived is always an object (and beyond this the relations
of objects)

we understand that that which is objectified is never known

this is clear given the possibility (and actuality) of diverse conceptions of
the object

picturing finally tells us nothing of the nature of the thing pictured

it is about absorbing details into the bigger picture

and the bigger picture is never the big picture

(the big picture is actually blank)


2.1513. So a picture conceived in this way, also includes the pictorial
relationship, which makes it into the picture.


this is not so

the picture as such has no necessary relationship to the object pictured

what makes a picture of x - a picture of x?

a decision to relate the two

in the natural course of things this is done without thinking

in the case of non-veridical (natural) conceptions it is obvious that bridging
conceptions are made

the point is the pictorial relationship is separate from the original picture

it is another matter - a conception of picture and object


2.1514. The pictorial relationship consists of the correlations of the
picture's elements with things.


this is not a naive matter

not all of a picture's elements will be obvious to the naked eye

not all of the object's possibilities will be included in the picture

the pictorial relationship will therefore not be determinate

every picture is unfinished


2.1515. The correlations are, as it were, the feelers of the picture's elements,
with which the picture touches reality.


yes the picture is always uncertain


2.16. If a fact is to be a picture, it must have something in common with what it
depicts.


this is a minimal view of facts

what if a fact didn't have something in common with what it depicts?

then it wouldn't depict what it depicts -

therefore it would be a fact that is not a fact

(a most interesting fact)

so any fact is a picture?

if it is a fact

the only way out of this is to say there are non-depicting facts

that facts are something other than pictures?


2.161. There must be something identical in a picture and what it depicts, to
enable the one to be a picture after all.


this something is what?

is it an axiom?

x' is identical to x?

that is a conception of identity

interposed between picture and object

a conception of logical identity

identity by the way is just short sightedness

nevertheless very useful -

and indeed necessary (in a contingent sense)

so

we employ identity relations to pictures and their objects

for otherwise they would not be pictures of

identity is something other than a picture placed against an object


2.17. What a picture must have common with reality, in order to be able to
depict it - correctly or incorrectly - in the way it does, is its pictorial form.


this suggests there is something in the picture which makes it a picture of

this is how we tend to think of pictures

but it is only after the connection has been made

and the connection is the conception of relation

this again is independent of the picture and the object


2.171. A picture can depict any reality whose form it has.

A spatial picture can depict anything spatial, a coloured one anything
coloured, etc.


the metaphor of picture - or indeed just the idea of picture is no substitute for
consciousness - if this is the idea -

pictures are observed - they are out there

this will not do as a theory of mind

mind is not out there - a public theory of mind is not clever it is absurd

consciousness cannot be characterized empirically

consciousness is the internal dimension of persons

it can only be characterized by what it does - and that is reflect

if indeed we have knowledge of the mind it is reflective knowledge

the function of mind is reflection

reflection is internal - it is non-empirical

space and colour are features of the surface

of the external world

our conceptions - our reflections recognize these attributes

this is not to say my reflection is coloured

or my reflection is spatial

recognition is an act without content

it is what is recognized that has content


2.172. A picture cannot, however, depict its pictorial form: it displays it.


its pictorial form - its relation to the object is not depicted or displayed

the relation is not in the picture

the relation is outside the picture outside the object

what the picture displays is a question for the observer

what it depicts is a question for the observer

it is the observer who depicts what is displayed

the picture itself - in itself is unknown


2.173. A picture represents its subject from a position outside of it. (Its standpoint is representational form). That is why a picture represents its
subject correctly or incorrectly.


the fact that a picture is outside of its subject - does not bear on its
correctness or not

a picture is always correct - it is just a question of what it is a picture of


2.174. A picture cannot, however, place itself outside its representational form.


the representational form is outside the picture

the picture is not a self - it does not place


2.18. What any picture, of whatever form, must have in common with reality,
in order to be able to depict it - correctly or incorrectly - in any way at all,
is logical form, i.e. the form of reality.


the outside dimension (of reality) is reflected in the inside dimension
(of reality)

this is not a must have - it is just the way it happens


2.181. A picture whose pictorial form is logical is called a logical picture.


a statement of logic defines possibility - that is logical space


2.182. Every picture is at the same time a logical one. (On the other hand,
not every picture is, for example, a spatial one)


every picture may be pictured logically - that is as a statement of what is
possible

however the same picture may just be seen as a statement of what is


2.19. Logical pictures can depict the world.


logical pictures state what is possible - that is express possibility

the world can be so regarded - as what is possible - as possibility

such a view determines the world as free of determination


2.2. A picture has logico-pictorial form in common with what it depicts.


logic is substanceless it asserts possibility

a logical picture has nothing in it


2.201. A picture depicts reality by representing a possibility of existence and
non-existence of states of affairs.


there is nothing depicted in a statement of possibility


2.202. A picture represents a possible situation in logical space.


a picture can be regarded in this way

but if so the picture is merely the stepping stone for the consideration of possibility

again a picture represents nothing unless it is held to be in a relation of representation

representation is an idea of relation

logical space is blank


2.203. A picture contains the possibility of the situation that it represents.


a picture per se represents what is

possibility cannot be represented it can only be stated


2.21. A picture agrees with reality or it fails to agree; it is correct or incorrect, true or
false.


reality is

it doesn't agree or disagree

there is nothing for it to agree or disagree with

a picture is a focus within

it is a feature that is held to represent another feature

reality is silent

it does not say yea or nay

the status of relationships is a matter for those in relationships

you have the picture you have the object

the relation is a third party affair

a decision


2.22. What a picture represents it represents independently of its truth or
falsity, by means of its pictorial form.


truth is a separate consideration to representation

the issue of truth is one that must be defined on each occasion

that is what is to count here as truth?

e.g. naive correspondence or indeed its absence


2.221. What a picture represents is its sense.


a picture does not represent itself

a picture represents something else

a picture is a form - and so long as it is this - it has sense

a picture that is not a picture is something that makes no sense

the sense of a thing is its logical form

a picture does not represent sense - a picture has sense

recognition of logical form is sensibility

the world is sensible

the question of sensibility arises in language

it is a statement that is sensible or not

a grammatically well formed statement is sensible


2.222. The agreement or disagreement of its sense with reality constitutes its
truth or falsity.


a picture if it is a picture makes sense as a picture

its agreement or disagreement with reality is matter of correct placement


2.223. In order to tell whether a picture is true or false we must compare it
with reality.


in order to tell whether a picture is true or false we must decide where to put it


2.224. It is impossible to tell from the picture alone whether it is true or
false.


truth is only one possibility of the significance of a picture - it is the least important


2.225. There are no pictures that are true a priori.

A logical picture of facts is a thought.


(a) true a priori


the conditions of experience are prior to it in a logical sense

this is to think outside of experience about experience

therefore any statement of these conditions has a priori status

if however you are thinking within experience and not outside it

any theory about experience emerges from within it

here there is no a priori

a priori is thus a question of thought positions - outside or in?

it is a matter of meta place - perspective

(we adopt positions only because there is no position)


(b) a logical picture of facts is a thought


a logical picture of facts is a theory of thought

thought can only be addressed by thought

that is we can only look at it from the inside - in thought

pictures within pictures

thought outside its picturing is an unknown

so thought in relation to the non-conscious world?

a thought reflects

a thought is reflection

a reflection of thought is a fact?

yes

if it is understood that 'fact' here is a theory of what is reflected

thought is reflection -

this tells us only that thought is one element of a relation - that reflected -
the other element - that which is reflected (non-thought)

I don't think anymore can really be said here

mind and matter