3.01. The totality of true thoughts is a picture of the world.
a thought is a picture - let us say
all pictures are pictures of the world?
(everything pictured is in the world)
the notion of the totality of thoughts is not sensible
for the idea of the totality - is a thought that is outside of it
therefore the totality is always incomplete
let us say a true picture is a picture of the world
in so far as there is no comprehensive view
that is you can't step out and hold the world as object
then a thought is a picture - is as good as it gets
3.02. A thought contains the possibility of the situation of which it
is the thought. What is thinkable is possible too.
in the first place a thought as a reflection of what is outside itself
in the second place the initial thought can be the subject of thought -
of further reflection
so in the first case - a thought reflects what is -
what is possible is a further reflection on what is
it is to think outside of what is actual - to go beyond it - to imagine a
thought in the first place contains the actuality of the situation of which
it is the thought
what I suggest is that what is possible in thought depends on what is actual
possibility does not begin from nothing
what is thinkable is possible too - because what is thinkable has its basis
in actuality
possibility is a reflection of actuality
3.03. Thought can never be of anything illogical, since, if it were, we
should have to think illogically.
thought as reflection
is neither logical or illogical -
these notions are decisions - reflections on the functioning of thought
i.e. how it is to function - square circles is a dead end - not a road
forward
thought in itself has no defining characteristics - but for those
characteristics thought gives itself on reflection
remember - a reflection is a reflection of - it is not without bounds
(logic is not some sacred site of eternal significance and truth - it is -
itself a thought - a thought about how and when thought - fits
therefore - it is open to review - can be reflected upon - )
3.031. It used to be said that God could create anything except what would
be contrary to the laws of logic. - The truth is that we could not say what an 'illogical' world would look like.
it would be like this world - unknown
3.032. It is impossible to represent in language anything that 'contradicts
logic' as it is in geometry to represent by its co-ordinates a figure that contradicts the laws of space, or to give the co-ordinates of a point that
does not exist.
language is the point of contact of consciousness and the non-conscious
articulated
it is the space of articulation
an articulation that is only possible given how the world is - a two
dimensional reality (consciousness and non-consciousness - the inside
the outside)
language is thus the articulation of the unity
what this unity is - amounts to - is always open to question - it is the
project of consciousness - it is the point at which language is speechless
language does represent
what is represented though is always a question to be answered
logic is a theory of the limit to sense
for the limit to be drawn - the other side of sense must have significance
that is that which does not make sense - must be conceivable
and if conceivable it is already represented
the important thing to see here is that sense is never in question
any limit - theory of sense - is made - sensibly -
therefore it is a case of sense defining itself - or more to the point -
defining itself for a specific task
given consciousness there is sense
logic is thus a template applied and reapplied - wherever required for
whatever purpose - within sensibility - it is a conceptual tool
3.0321.Though a state of affairs that would contravene the laws of physics
can be represented by us spatially, one that would contravene the laws of
geometry cannot.
geometry is the theory of spatial form - it is revisable
3.04. If a thought were correct a priori, it would be a thought whose
possibility ensured its truth.
experience is the ground of contact of the conscious and the non-conscious
it is the real world - it is the domain of thought - there is no thought
outside of this -
3.05. A priori knowledge that a thought was true would be possible only if
its truth were recognizable from the thought itself (without anything to
compare it with).
every thought is true a priori - in that every thought is a reflection of
the question - what? - is resolved by correct placement - it is a question of location
therefore a thought is true a priori and it is true a posteriori
it is a matter of where you look -
a thought in itself can never be false
3.1. In a proposition a thought finds an expression that can be perceived by
the senses.
this is true on the level of non-reflective awareness
reflective knowledge puts the senses in question
there are propositions in which a thought does not even look for an
expression that can be perceived by the senses - i.e. this proposition
3.11. We use the perceptible sign of the proposition (spoken or written, etc.)
as a projection of a possible situation.
The method of projection is to think of the sense of the proposition.
the perceptible sign of the proposition is no more than what the proposition
reflects
it is the sign of that reflected
the issue is reflection not projection
in so far as a proposition is an act - yes it is a projection - but this
is just to say it is an act in the world
the sense of a well formed proposition - i.e. a linguistic statement -
a non-linguistic expression - i.e. - painting - dance - music - is given
if it is well formed within its type
we do not have to think of the sense of a proposition - except where we may
not immediately see where it is placed - where it fits - this is really
just a matter of organizing the shop
3.12. I call the sign with which we express a thought a propositional sign.
- And a proposition is a propositional sign in its projective relation to
the world.
this is only to say a proposition has a relation to the world - but even
this is imprecise
in fact a proposition is a relation of the conscious and non-conscious
dimensions - expressed -
it is thus the world expressed
3.13. A proposition includes all that the projection includes, but not what
is projected.
Therefore, though what is projected is not itself included, its possibility
is.
A proposition therefore, does not actually contain its sense, but does
contain the possibility of expressing it.
('The content of the proposition' means the contents of a proposition that has sense).
A proposition contains the form, but not the content, of its sense.
sense is given form and practice in a proposition - it is defined - for reason (purpose)
and with a view to practice
in this sense a proposition contains sense - encircles it - embraces it
the world of sense is the domain of the proposition - propositions are the
templates (flexible) hanging in the shed
a proposition is expression
without sense (not that this is possible) a proposition is empty - it is
just a form without content - and in that case - it doesn't express
this though is never the case
there is no content to sense -
a proposition is the form of sense
3.14. What constitutes a propositional sign is that in it its elements
(the words) stand in a determinate relation to one another.
A propositional sign is a fact.
the propositional sign here is broken down to elements
it is put that the determinate relation of the elements - of the words -
to one another is what makes a propositional sign - presumably what it is -
in what does the determinate relation of elements amount to?
where is the determination - words can be placed relative to one another -
is this then determination?
one would think not
the determination - that gives significance - does so because it makes sense
you see we begin with this - and can then go to some explanation of it -
a theory of sense - and to this end is developed theories of grammar -
and even theories of use
theories of determination
the real determination any theory attempts to account for is just the fact
of sense put in a particular form
in a proposal - that is in a proposition
we can understand sense metaphysically - as that which is the point of
contact of the conscious and the unconscious - consciousness in relation to
consciousness makes sense
awareness is sensibility
a propositional sign is a fact - yes - this though leaves the matter open
to say of anything that it is a fact is to propose it as worthy of
particular attention or focus - it has to do with advertising
3.141. A proposition is not a blend of words. - (Just as a theme in music
is not a blend of notes).
A proposition is articulate.
a proposition in a sense has nothing to do with words
words are - language is - a means of delivery
a proposition articulates - when it is articulated
3.142. Only facts can express a sense, a set of names cannot.
facts are constructions - constructions of sense
if I say 'Michael, Lisa, Judy, Molly' - pointing at these people and a cat -
this set of names express a sense
sense is not contained by language - sense is identified by it
3.143. Although a propositional sign is a fact, this is obstructed by the
usual form of expression in writing or print.
For in a printed proposition, for example, no essential difference is
apparent between a propositional sign and a word.
(That is what made for Frege to call a proposition a composite name).
yes in that every proposition refers - it may do more than this but at
least this -
3.1431. The essence of a propositional sign is very clearly seen if we
imagine one composed of spatial objects (such as tables, chairs, and books)
instead of written signs
The spatial arrangements of these things will express the sense of a
proposition
yes - a spatial arrangement of objects - can be (always is?) a proposal?
what is being said here though will not be expressed by the arrangement - the
arrangement points to it - suggests
the reality may be that there has been no proposal made - that the physical
arrangement is quite accidental - and has no significance in itself -
nevertheless - the arrangement will suggest if identified as an arrangement
significance here is clearly given prior to the proposition's statement
sense is a room - a proposition walks in
3.1432. Instead of, the complex sign "aRb" says a stands in relation to b
in the relation R', we ought to put, 'That "a" stands to "b" in a certain
relation says that aRb'.
the difference is between a complex sign and a proposition
between representation and assertion
there is nothing in a proposition that decides if it is an expression or
an assertion
a proposition is given its form in its act -
its act is identified (rightly or wrongly) by an actor
3.144. Situations can be described but not given names.
(Names are like points; propositions like arrows - they have sense.)
a proposition may function as an arrow - it may also be the drawing of the bow
it is not that anything can or cannot be done - it's rather a matter of
practice - and practice recognized by a community of practitioners
language is like geology - the crevices on a mountain side - are made by
the constant impact of the elements -
what happens is what we then theorize about
what happens though has no deeper meaning than its occurrence
its explanation - any explanation per se - has no reality - that is it adds
nothing to the real event - it is just a way of seeing that gives the illusion
of reason - of foundation -
explanation is just one response to fear
3.2. In a proposition a thought can be expressed in such a way that elements
of the propositional sign correspond to the objects of thought.
a proposition just is the unity of thought and object expressed
the event of the proposition - or the action of it - is in the act -
without epistemological value
it is only on reflection - in reflection that value is found - is given -
3.201. I call such elements 'simple signs', and such a proposition
'completely analyzed'.
a complete analysis of anything is just a matter of definition -
what is complete?
if you think this question can be answered - away you go
if you have doubt regarding complete analysis - you will either drop the
whole project - or suspend judgement
a proposition is a proposal - its analysis is a proposal - the analysis of
the analysis etc.
do you ever get to the proposition as a subject of analysis -
perhaps it is not this kind of thing
we need to ask to what purpose this idea of analysis - simple signs -
completely analyzed?
3.202. The simple signs employed in propositions are called names.
OK - name here - a description of - an act - the act of naming - and this
is what?
the act of language - and then its archiving of the event in another form
- i.e. - a written form
in a written form - e.g. - it can then become an object - and its parts
if you will - are given - names
in this case the parts are refereed to as names
so the act of naming is translated to a form - and then described as naming
it seems as though strictly speaking - naming cannot be analyzed
it is a blind act?
3.203. A name means an object. The object is its meaning. ('A' is the same
sign as 'A'.)
the act of naming - the event of it has meaning - but we say this after
the act - on reflection - that is meaning is not shown - in the event -
meaning is known
the object is its meaning - rather I think the object is given meaning in
the act of naming - and really the giving of meaning is really just an act
(as in on the stage) - but necessary really - given that's where we are
3.21. The configuration of objects in a situation corresponds to the
configuration of simple signs in the propositional sign.
this is an arrangement that is designed to cover anxiety -
it is to say - everything is as it should be - there is no gulf
this is the given state of affairs anyway
it is only on reflection that there seems no basis to it - and to the theory
this is anxiety
3.22. In a proposition a name is the representative of an object.
in a proposition the name and the object are one in the same
name and object are divisions of the unity - into conscious and non-conscious
dimensions
the unity - and here I mean the whole proposition is undivided
it is without definition as it is
(if you were to see it from the outside - you would not know what it is -
though you would recognize that it is)
the relation subject to object
is a description of the unity
the unity is what subject and object come out of
the relation of the conscious and non-conscious we can say is beneath the
reality - we can conceive it this way -
what this means is that substance is above - not below
3.221. Objects can only be named. Signs are their representatives. I can only
speak about them: I cannot put them into words. Propositions can only say how
things are, not what they are.
objects can be thought out - apart from straight recognition - this is the
point of objects - to be reflectively discussed -
in this sense they are only held to be what they appear as - for the purpose
of reflection - the nature of objects is an open question
the sign and that signified are distinguishable only in analysis -
the point of analysis is to provide space for theories of action -
that is ways to proceed
an object is that - what it is - is a question of substance theory
substance theory has no foundation it is simply a way of unifying -
after analysis has diversified
the state of affairs remains impervious to these workings
it is always above the fray - and is in fact never touched - and despite
all such theoretical thrashings about stays as it was to begin - unknown
this is not despair it is rather to give blood reason to flow - the
beat to the heart
3.23. The requirement that simple signs be possible is the requirement
that sense be determinate.
yes it is a requirement - a requirement of use - of action - action is
determinate - action determines -
sense is essentially indeterminate - just as awareness has no given limit
it is the distinction between essence and act
3.24. A proposition about a complex stands in an internal relation to a
proposition about a constituent of the complex.
A complex can be given by its description, which will be right or wrong. A
proposition that mentions a complex will not be non-sensical if the complex
does not exist, but simply false.
When a propositional element signifies a complex, this can be seen from an
indeterminateness in the propositions in which it occurs. In such case we
know that the proposition leaves something undetermined. (In fact the notation
for generality contains a prototype.)
The contraction of a symbol for a complex into a simple symbol can be
expressed in a definition.
a proposition determines nothing - it is proposal for consideration
its truth is a decision about the world - which can never be determined
therefore we decide - if needs be - and justify (argue) afterwards - this
can be the origin of creative metaphysics - or indeed the refuge of a closed
mind - if the former we can have true rationality - if the latter the result
is war on one scale or another
it is in any case the origin of excuse
3.25. A proposition has one and only one complete analysis.
to think like this is to be deceived by the form of a proposition -
it is to think that a definite proposal can only have a definite analysis
a proposition sets up a space for discussion
it is a diamond of possibility - in which you can find possible worlds -
including the best of
3.251. What a proposition expresses it expresses in a determinate manner,
which can be set out clearly: a proposition is articulate.
we can say of anything that it expresses - the point of expression is
the fact - the existence of consciousness
it is not that the world expresses -
it is that given consciousness - the world expresses to - consciousness
to bring it all together - that is not to imagine one without the other -
which is indeed the human reality
yes - a proposition which is an expression of the unity of the conscious
and non-conscious dimensions - and always expresses the world - as is -
i.e. not deconstructed
(deconstructing a matter is just tinkering with ideas of how it functions -
it will function regardless of theory - analysis is always outside of action)
what we make of the proposition - is the same question - what do we make
of the world?
the issue of knowledge is never resolved
the proposition becomes the subject of reflection
(the end point is never reached)
a statement of reflection is a proposition
it too can be the subject of reflection
the necessity of action - a very practical necessity - which is always a
cutting off of reason - determines the status of whatever proposition -
i.e. - that it is to be a foundation of others - this is just a denial of
logic - a decision for action
man is therefore never rational in action only in reflection
and therefore rationality has only contemplative value
3.26. A name cannot be dissected any further by means of a definition: it is a primitive sign.
the point of naming is to make a primitive sign
3.261. Every sign that has a definition signifies via the signs that serve
to define it; and the definitions point the way.
Two signs cannot signify in the same manner if one is primitive and the other
is defined by means of primitive signs. Names cannot be anatomized by means of
definitions.
(Nor can any sign that has a meaning independently and on its own.)
the question really is what is primitive?
we say a name is primitive - that this means it cannot be further analyzed - anatomized
OK - but this is metaphysics by fiat -
I would put that there is no primitive - or rather that we do not know what primitive is
- or is to amount to - except pragmatically - and so there is no sign of it -
the idea of the primitive is perhaps all that is primitive
it underlies human behaviour
it is the reaching to I would suggest and not the point arrived at -
it is a heuristic endeavour
and it may indeed have a biological basis
nevertheless metaphysically speaking it is not to be found
though I grant a primitive - a fundamental is assumed - in any human endeavour
the point I guess is that we operate always in self deception
the truth is indeed possible and conceivable but not endurable
3.262. What signs fail to express, their application shows. What signs slur
over, their application says clearly.
what a sign refers to is always indeterminate
what a sign refers to is a question of definition
the matter is really never settled
we assume a meaning - without ever knowing what that is
application becomes significant - because of application
we are always insisting on meaning
it is the insistence that for all intents and purposes becomes the meaning
language is a means
theories of its structure (grammar) are arguments for significance
structure can give the illusion of substance
3.263. The meanings of primitive signs can be explained by means of
elucidations. Elucidations are propositions that contain primitive signs.
So they can only be understood if the meanings of those signs are already
known.
a primitive sign if it is such - has meaning - that is if it is a sign
(a sign if it is a sign - is a sign of)
what that meaning is though - is a matter independent of the sign
we sometimes embrace the unknown in order to explain - surround it - give
it place
within
this connects a sign to other signs - it gives the impression of elucidation
impression is what we run with
and everyone knows this is not something that bears too much looking into
everyone has a go
propositions - arrows are shot at meaning
illusions connect or they don't
what is already known is just firmly held belief
this is the epistemological basis of prejudice
language is competing prejudices
to speak is to covet
3.3. Only propositions have sense; only in the nexus of a proposition does a
name have meaning.
meaning is the ground of propositions
any proposition has meaning
(otherwise there would be no reason for the proposal)
a proposition - is not all propositions - therefore the proposition is
defined by what it does not propose - this is just what the meaning of a proposition amounts to
a proposition is thus a definition of meaning - a specifying of reality for
attention
3.31. I call any part of the proposition that characterizes its sense an
expression (a symbol).
(A proposition is itself an expression.)
Everything essential to their sense that propositions can have in common
with one another is an expression.
An expression is the mark of form and content.
a symbol identifies the act of meaning
an expression shows
an expression shows that meaning is in definition - that it is in a
specific play
it is like cutting out - or drawing a figure on a piece of paper
meaning is both sides of the line
the focus though is that space contained by the line
propositions focus
so it is not so much that a proposition expresses - it is rather that it focuses
form and content are what is being proposed
so yes form and content are the mark of a proposition
a proposition though is more than just an expression
a proposition is a focus - within focus
3.311. An expression presupposes the forms of all the propositions in which
it can occur. It is the common characteristic mark of a class of propositions.
do we need to speak of an expression at all?
an expression as the basis for a proposition -
that which is common to propositions may well be that which is expressed
but that which is expressed is surely a proposition?
3.312. It is therefore presented by means of the general form of the
propositions that it characterizes.
In fact, in this form the expression will be constant and everything else
variable.
A proposition is the making of an expression
the focus of a proposition is its definitiveness
a proposition is not so much a proposal to halt variability
it is more that it is a decision to hold
3.313. Thus an expression is presented by means of a variable whose values
are the propositions that contain the expression.
(in the limiting case the variable becomes a constant, the expression becomes a
proposition.)
I call such a variable a 'propositional variable'.
the idea that what is expressed in a proposition is a constant and the
propositions in which it is expressed are the variables
the variable in this case then is the actual proposition - this is
the propositional variable
propositions on this view are casings
and the expression is what - substance?
what is expressed - content - the proposition - form?
is this not 'a ghost in the proposition' theory?
either that or - we say a proposition - is always the subject of further
propositions
that the question of content is not resolved - only reflected upon -
and that this is not an exercise in a form of infinite regress - but rather
a study of possibility?
a proposition as a focus - but the focus itself is variable - it is not fixed
3.314. An expression has meaning only in a proposition. All variables can be
constructed as propositional variables.
(Even variable names)
an expression here is what - does it have any substance to it - or is it
an open concept - that expressed - as in an event - an action?
and what is a proposition as distinct from an expression?
is it being suggested that there are such things as propositions that are
empty - waiting to be loaded up - with an expression?
a proposition as a shell - an expression as the powder
(they say Wittgenstein wrote the Tractatus while on the front in the war)
3.315. If we turn a constituent of a proposition into a variable, there is
a class of propositions all of which are values of the resulting variable proposition. In general, this class too will be dependent on the meaning
that our arbitrary conventions have given to parts of the original proposition.
But if all the signs in it that have arbitrarily determined meanings are
turned into variables, we shall still get a class of this kind. This one,
however, is not dependent on any convention, but solely on the nature of the
proposition. It corresponds to a logical form - logical prototype.
the meaning of a variable proposition - the signs of which are all variables -
is dependent not on convention - but on form
this is to make the point that conventional meaning is not arbitrary but
finally founded in logical form
it is to say that logical form is at the basis of the generation of variables
yes this sounds good
the question though is to do with logical form - logical prototype -
do we have such - or is it rather an assumption made after the fact -
to explain the fact?
could it be that the logical form of the proposition just is the proposition?
that each proposition displays form -
as a shadow is reflected in light?
3.316. What values a propositional variable may take is something that
is stipulated.
The stipulation of values is the variable.
the variable is just the stipulation of values
stipulation?
isn't it rather that values are created in a propositional variable -
not I suggest from nothing - but rather from looking in a different place -
which is just what a variable does
the form of the variable (as variable) is direction
3.317. To stipulate values for a propositional variable is to give the
propositions whose common characteristic the variable is.
The stipulation is the description of those propositions.
The stipulation will therefore be concerned only with symbols, not with their
meaning.
And the only thing essential to the stipulation is that it is merely a
description of symbols and states nothing about what is signified.
How the description of propositions is produced is not essential.
(a)
this is to say that to stipulate values is to show - display the variable -
in propositions that are instances of it
this is a definition of stipulation
and this showing (stipulation) is the description of the propositions -
so the display is the description?
the point being a display is self explanatory - and thus complete?
you can of course define description in such a way
the world - as is - as displayed - is (its) description
this works I think as it were from the point of view of the world - without
consciousness
consciousness reflects - this is what it does - just as the rain falls
and the sun shines
display is just the object of reflection
presentation is not enough for consciousness - it is just the beginning
the idea that we can see things - one dimensional - i.e. Neurath 'everything
is surface' - I understand as quite a brilliant solution to the problem of metaphysics - the problem that is that we have metaphysics -
the point is it doesn't work - its very formulation requires what it denies - reflection
(b)
the description will be concerned only with symbols - not their meaning
yes you can focus just on symbols - and not on what is signified
so the question then has to do with the relations - thus logical relations of symbols
OK -
however for a symbol to have sense it need be distinguishable from other
symbols - how is this to be if what is signified is not in question?
without some basis for the symbol - other than its presentation - it has no significance
you cannot separate a sign from meaning
always the question is one of meaning - symbolism - is a merely a
propositional variation with hidden values
in art the artist constructs and organizes symbols
logicians do just this
propositional logic is the basis of art
3.318. Like Frege and Russell I construe a proposition as a function of the expressions contained in it.
yes a bottom up approach - (very British I would think)
the top down idea is that the expressions have significance in so far as
they are propositioned -
that is their inclusion in a proposition is the what makes for their value
it is always a question isn't it of where you begin - do you start with a
stone or begin with a mountain?
3.32. A sign is what can be perceived of a symbol.
a sign is thus syntax
3.321. So the one and the same sign (written or spoken, etc.) can be common
to two different symbols - in which case they will signify in different ways.
the same syntax common to two different - propositions e.g.
if the symbols are unique - separate - they have different signification
(though the same signage)
3.322. Our use of the same sign to signify two different objects can never
indicate a common characteristic of the two, if we use it with two different
modes of signification. For the sign, of course is arbitrary. So we could
choose two different signs in stead, and then what would be left in common
on the signifying side?
signs do not determine substance
3.323. In every day language it very frequently happens that the same word has
different modes of signification - and so belongs to different symbols - or
that two words that have different modes of signification are employed in propositions in what is superficially the same way.
Thus the word 'is' figures as the copula, as a sign for identity, and as an expression for existence; 'exist' figures as an intransitive verb like 'go', and 'identical' as an adjective; we speak of something, but also of something's happening.
(In the proposition, 'Green is green' - where the first word is the proper
name of a person and the last an adjective - these words do not merely have different meanings: they are different symbols)
the point is isn't that appearance demands scrutiny -
or that language as practiced on let us say a veridical level challenges
us to think?
3.324. In this way the most fundamental confusions are easily produced
(the whole of philosophy is full of them).
perhaps there is no pristine surface to begin with
that to think this is the mistake
the fact of different symbols for identical signs - is the fact of beauty
and the world is such an intrigue
here is the struggle of art
the origin of delight
3.325. In order to avoid such errors we must make use of a sign-language that
excludes them by not using the same sign for different symbols and by not using
in a superficially similar way signs that have different modes of signification: that is to say a sign-language that is governed by logical grammar - by logical syntax.
(The conceptual notation of Frege and Russell is such a language, though
it is true, it fails to exclude all mistakes.)
it is the assumption of error that bothers me here
indeed we can think more clearly when this is required
the way the world is - is not an error though - unless you are of a
Platonic bent
the notation of logical syntax - if adopted as the language of thought will
knock out - in one foul swoop the dramas of semantics
and there is indeed a clarity in syntax - ask any artist
the point always with clarity though is what is left out?
what is left out is the world
3.326. In order to recognize a symbol with its sign we must observe how it is
used with a sense.
is this anymore than acknowledging that we can't really speak of a sign
outside of a working knowledge of its actual application -
that it is the application that gives a sign its meaning -
that the matter is not decided in some quasi a priori way?
the fact is we understand the indeterminateness of signs from practice -
we can indeed - develop variations in the syntax - but by why - if the
semantics in practice is clear enough?
3.327. A sign does not determine a logical form unless it is taken together
with its logico-syntactical employment.
true - it is a question of use
3.328. If a sign is useless, it is meaningless. That is the point of Oakam's
maxim.
(If everything behaves as if a sign had meaning, then it does have meaning.)
yes there is a test of utility - but it is never finished - we create new signs
for new pathways
(once a sign has been used it is useful - even if the original use is forgotten
or lost)
3.33. In logical syntax the meaning of a sign should never play a role.
It must be possible to establish a logical syntax without mentioning the
meaning of a sign: only the description of expressions may be presupposed.
this is to ask too much and for why?
either a sign has meaning or it does not - if not - we are saying it cannot
be used -
if it does - then it may be used - where is the problem?
just as the meaning of a word is not a syntactical issue - nevertheless the
presence of syntax is acknowledged -
so too with syntax - though the issue of meaning is not being worked - it is
nevertheless in the yard -
it is really just a question of what is being done - and effectiveness usually
presupposes a division of labour
3.331. From this observation we turn to Russell's 'theory of types'. It can
be seen that Russell must be wrong, because he had to mention the meaning
of signs when establishing the rules for them.
the meaning of sign is its use - a rule stipulates correct use
3.332. No proposition can make a statement about itself, because a propositional
sign cannot be contained in itself.
my argument here would be that in a proposition there is nothing to refer to
as the proposition itself has no content - it is a pointing to
3.333. The reason why a function cannot be its own argument is that the sign
for a function already contains the prototype of its argument, and it cannot
contain itself.
For let us suppose that the function F(fx) could be its own argument: in that
case there would be a proposition 'F(F(fx))', in which the outer function F
and the inner function F must have different meanings, since the inner one
has the form f(fx) and the outer one has the form ΓΈ(f(fx)). Only the letter
'F' is common to the two functions, but the letter by itself signifies nothing.
This immediately becomes clear if instead of 'F(Fu)' we write
'($f):F(fu).fu = Fu'.
That disposes of Russell's paradox.
a proposition that refers to itself must contain itself - thus another
proposition - same proposition? - how can this be? - anyway - the second
proposition presumably points to the first - and the first points wherever
clearly two different propositions - they do not have - cannot have the
same referent
Russell's paradox can occur if you regard a proposition as the same kind
of thing that it points to - as Russell correctly saw
a proposition points to - picks out - cuts out - what it refers to -
(if we want to keep using the idea of reference) - ideally
the domain of a proposition is not the proposition
a proposition can never be in the domain of a proposition
just as the domain of consciousness - that outside of consciousness is not
consciousness
consciousness can never be in its domain
(and yes - something of an argument against the mind-brain identity theory)
ps.
self reference -
the self?
a proposition can refer to the referent or that which refers
it can refer both ways -
so the self as a propositional function?
just a thought
3.334. The rules of logical syntax must go without saying, once we know how
each individual sign signifies.
how a sign signifies is not without question
3.34. A proposition possess essential and accidental features.
Accidental features are those that result from the particular way in which the
propositional sign is produced. Essential features are those without which the
proposition could not express its sense.
a proposition does not express anything
a proposition is that which is expressed
a proposition is a tool of awareness
consciousness proposes a view of the world
the view - the proposition - defines focus
the propositional sign has objective status
therefore it can be referred to
it can be the subject of other propositions
secondary propositions are reflective
3.341. So what is essential in a proposition is what all propositions that
can express the same sense have in common.
And similarly, in general, what is essential in a symbol is what all symbols
that can serve the same purpose have in common
there is nothing essential in a proposition
the natural history of a language creates structure - use creates structure
this is not essence -
how would you ever identify essence?
what is it supposed to be?
sense as I think of it is logical space
it is a function of awareness
that a proposition opens up and gives form to logical space is we can say what
a proposition does
the form of logical space here is the domain of possibility
the propositional sign defines the domain
to say this is to reflect on the fact of propositions
it is to offer a theory of reason and structure
such a proposal is we shall say a meta proposition
bear in mind this too is not immune from discussion and focus
finally we only ever have a working theory
in this case - of propositions
there is no essential definition
every definition is open
3.3411. So one could say that the real name of an object was what all symbols
that signified it have in common. Thus, one by one, all kinds of composition
would prove to be unessential to a name.
names are empty forms - they are given content in application
there is of course a history of application - that is common usage
yes you can match symbols with objects - this is linguistics
saying what symbols have in common is an exercise in contingency
it can be of interest for a specific purpose -
it is about usage patterns
3.342. Although there is something arbitrary in our notations, this much is not
arbitrary - that when we have determined one thing arbitrarily, something else
is necessarily the case. (This derives from the essence of notation.)
it can be that one thing so defined entails something else - this is a
matter of definition and definition is always a matter of argument
there is no essence to notation - to think this is to dream a language that
would by definition have no application - would not thus be a language
3.3421. A particular mode of signifying may be unimportant but it is always
important that it is a possible mode of signifying. And it is generally so in philosophy: again and again the individual case turns out to be unimportant,
but the possibility of each case discloses something about the essence
of the world.
anything can be of significance depending on how you look
essence is an argument - the idea of a base that is common to all
it can be a useful notion given certain purposes
mainly it has to do with conception to the service of unity - and the point
of this?
metaphysical security - intellectual and finally emotional
circumstance can lead us to seek out conceptions of this kind
circumstances though can just as easily lead us to throw it off and seek
out the non-essential
3.343. Definitions are rules for translating from one language into another.
Any correct sign-language must be translatable into any other in accordance
with such rules; it is this they all have in common.
natural languages are existing languages -
translation is the establishing of correspondence rules
the assumption therefore is that there is correspondence
which is to say - the assumption is - common meaning
artificial languages are created in response to perceived functional
deficiencies of natural languages
the meaning of terms in an artificial language is thus not a matter of
correspondence but revision
artificial languages may also have terms that are unique to that language and
thus defined by it
the meaning of an artificial language is determined by the task it is being
designed to fulfill
translatability of natural to artificial and artificial to artificial is not determinate
translatability is not determinate
it is this that they all have in common -
the indeterminacy of translation
(for determinate translation - you would need to assume the existence of a set
of fixed meanings that all languages express - that they all refer to -
you would then have the question - why not just one language?
different languages have different histories - they come form different points
in space and time - the common feature of all is that they are a means of
expression
the need to express is at the core of it
the meaning of a term is the history of its use)
3.344. What signifies a symbol is what is common to all the symbols that the
rules of logical syntax allow us to substitute for it.
what is common to a symbol is what is common to all symbols - and that is the
rules of logical syntax - for they allow us to substitute symbols - without
changing what is signified
3.3441. For instance, we can express what is common to all notations for truth
functions in the following way: they have in common that, for example, the
notation that uses '~p' ('not p') and 'pvq' ('p or q') can be substitutes for
any of them.
(This serves to characterize the way in which something general can be disclosed
by the possibility of a specific notion.)
all notations for truth functions have in common the rules of logical syntax
3.3442. Nor does analysis resolve the sign for a complex in an arbitrary way,
so that it would have a different resolution every time that it was
incorporated in a different proposition.
the sign for a complex is resolved definitively regardless of the proposition
it is incorporated in
3.4. A proposition determines a place in logical space. The existence of this
logical space is guaranteed by the mere existence of the constituents -
by the existence of the proposition with sense.
logical space is revealed by the proposition - and logical space is determined
by the proposition
logical space is thus contained by the proposition and at the same time the proposition
is contained in logical space
it is like a proposition brackets logical space - ( )
it is this bracketing (the proposition) that brings logical space into
focus - what is inside the bracket (of the proposition) and therefore -
what is outside
the act of the proposition reveals logical space
3.41 The propositional sign with logical co-ordinates - that is the logical
place.
yes this is what I mean by the bracketing - the making of logical place
3.411. In geometry and logic alike a place is a possibility; something can
exist in it.
yes - logical space is conceived
it is a particular conception - the conception as it were without an object of conception
in this sense - a meta conception - in that it is the ground of conception
it is to conceive the space of all conception
logical place is the space of a particular proposition
3.42. A proposition can determine only one place in logical space: nevertheless
the whole of logical space must already be given by it.
(Otherwise negation, logical sum, logical product, etc., would introduce more
and more elements - in co-ordination.)
(The logical scaffolding surrounding a picture determines logical space.
The force of a proposition reaches through logical space.)
yes a proposition determines only one place in logical space
the implication of logical space in the determination of place tells us what?
I said above that logical space is revealed -
it is revealed - that is as a matter of logic - it is a logical function
it is the space not determined by the proposition
if so it is a function inherent in all propositions
logical space a first order function - of a proposition?
3.5. A propositional sign, applied and thought out, is a thought.
do we think only in propositions?
a proposition - in its least technical form is a proposal
the proposal comes out of what?
thought
thought here as the origin of the proposition
the thing is - if this is so - the proposition makes the thought out of which it comes
that is prior to the proposal thought is unknown - unrevealed - it is
characterless
the proposition as it were - a light turned on in the darkness
thought is both the darkness and the light
the proposition is thus the possibility of thought revealed
