the end of reflection

knowledge is reflection

theory of knowledge - reflection on knowledge

reflection on reflection is what?

consciousness recognizing itself

and in this recognition knowing the end of reflection

that the end of reflection just is reflection

that there is no analysis beyond this

reflection is reflection

that this is consciousness

consciousness knowing consciousness

and this reflection is - what?

how will we describe it?

it is the assertion - the statement of the fact
of the essence of consciousness

that consciousness is reflection

the unity of consciousness

what to call this meta reflection?

that reveals consciousness - that is consciousness

that the revelation is the essence

the essence the revelation?

perhaps

the transcendental reflection

it is that reflection which states the ground of
reflection

the ground of knowledge

and the act of reflection

this is the nature of it

and as such it is internal - in a meta sense

it is not a surface act an outside act -
as in observable

it is an act of mind

what I am also saying is that mind just is this

if we can call mind anything - it is an act

so the idea of mind as substance or thing -
is not metaphysically sensible -

at best it is an imaginative - poetic notion

mind as reflection is fundamental

reflection in this sense is the logical foundation -
definition of mind -

you can't go any further with this analysis

so why do we - or at least I - ask this question?

habit - metaphysical habit perhaps

or is it just that the nature of reflection is to ask -
to reflect?

to come to the end of it - in this sense seems strange

but it is more than this - there is a sense in which
reflection points to something more fundamental -

points beyond itself

beyond reflection - in the strict sense of beyond -
is the unknown

and this is just really to put everything in perspective

it is to make the point that the object of reflection -

that which reflection addresses

that which is its focus - is the unknown

the first reflection in a metaphysical sense

reveals the unknown

some points

so

consciousness / mind is the inside

of the body / of the world

it cannot be known objectively - observationally

we cannot observe mind

mind is the observer

knowledge of consciousness is subjective

it is reflective knowledge

the reflectivity of consciousness - is simply the way
it works - what happens - inside

as to what this is - how to describe it - again -
this cannot be done - objectively

mind is knowing from the inside

any account of the reflectivity of mind - is reflective

that is any account of reflectivity - is reflection

the fact that mind can look at itself -

hold itself as object

the subject as object

is to say the object is contained in the subject -

therefore knowledge of consciousness - of the mind -
is analytical knowledge

the reflective capacity of the mind is infinite

it is the infinity of operation

the operation is reflection

in this sense - the mind is infinite

however it is not an infinity that increases

it is not a quantitative / substantive infinity

it is rather what we would call a mathematical /
logical infinity

in this sense the mind is infinite

the essential characteristic of the mind of consciousness -
is focus

focus in / focus out

the mind is Janus

this is the primary characteristic

all conscious activity is reflective

the mind is reflectivity

all reflective activity is focused

reflection as such cannot be explained non-reflectively

the reason for reflectivity - for the reflective mind -
is speculative

it does not appear that all consciousness is reflective -
or reflective to the same degree - of the same kind

in so far as the mind is the inside

mind is everything - is in everything

everything - any thing - that has an outside - by
definition has an inside

however - it seems clear that most of nature -
is non-reflective

which is to say that inanimate entities - do not know

so - talk of the inside - of mind - in such categories -
is effectively irrelevant

the mind of things - the inside fits with its outside

this is not an empirical - rather logical assertion

understanding the surface of something -

and the differences in surfaces -

is a key to knowing the nature of the inside of things

this though is speculative

inside knowledge - is confined to entities that have
reflective consciousness

reflectivity seems to be a characteristic of certain
complex living physical entities

to say this - to go here - is a reflective view

in truth we cannot have real objectivity

in the sense of step out of ourselves - and look back

the idea of this is the fallacy of third man -

such concepts - i.e. - Spinoza's substance though illogical -

have imaginative value

reflection is knowledge

the object of knowledge - is that which is not knowledge

the object is not altered by the focus of consciousness

reflection creates its own platform

its own foundation

knowledge is a response to need -

the need to know

the need to know the unknown

knowledge is therefore necessary

creativity - meta creativity is

consciousness fulfilling its need

an inside job

what I have been arguing is that the mind is not
a brain function

that the mind is the inside - the internal dimension
of things

and of this I say we have no observational knowledge -

no objective knowledge

knowledge of the mind is reflective

this is not to say all mind is capable of knowledge -
that all mind is reflective

the inside of a cell?

does a cell know itself? - I doubt it - but I suspect
there is some ontological sense - in its functioning -
but this though is not awareness

(interesting question - I think I'll have to swat up
on Liebnitz

monads just might be the go here)

perhaps here

mind and body are identical in some kind of way?

that the physical complexity of a human brain -

is matched

not with complexity - in the physical sense

but with the complexity that is - reflective consciousness

so the identity is one of fit - one of match

the inside of a human cell - is not conscious of its
complexity - for the reason that it is
not complex

in fact for all intents and purposes - not much point
in referring to the consciousness - or the mind of a cell

Damasio I think made the point that mind is a characteristic
of complex living things - he didn't seem too enthused about
the consciousness of i.e. - a rock

and this point I think is that mind comes with living
complexity

I see the point

but still I put my 'inside story'

admittedly on metaphysical grounds

but I would say the inside of an inanimate object - is -
likely to be - as active as its outside

- no movement

and in any case what I want to say is you could never know -

knowledge of mind - other minds - is - essentially -
analogical - in relation to higher order living things -

metaphysical - otherwise

that is an entity if an entity - is metaphysical two
dimensional - inside / outside

otherwise we are not talking about a thing

i.e. - it makes no sense to say - there are things
that just have an outside -

and likewise - no sense to speak of entities that just
have an inside -

no comfort therefore to ghostbusters

the ontological argument and painting

if we regard the object of knowledge as unknown

the question then is how to give it character

so initial metaphysical definition

i.e. - existence

existence as a description of the full range of what
is in question

then to further characterization -

i.e. - God - as a name of existence -

we impose an image

(we make images - this is what we do - as much as
walk and run)

an image which is loaded up - with the attributes
we believe to be essential

(it's meta pioneering - loading up the wagon -
staking out the claim - building the cabin)

the ontological argument as put by Anselem is a mistake

in the sense that - to think existence is - that which
is described -

when in fact it is the description - of that which -
needs to be formulated - described -

that which is unknown - not known -

my point is that there is no existence but the concept of

which is description of the unknown -

if the description is adopted - and it is

we can then speak of - not the unknown - but existence

a small advance really -

that necessitates further characterization -

strictly speaking - in a logical sense - there is nothing
to begin with

so - to make an existential statement

is to characterize

it is always to describe

the existential statement simply brings the flux - to order

it is the maestro's tap to the orchestra's cacophony

the ontological statement creates a platform on which to build

below is the unknown

God - the concept is such a description

existential concepts describe

and any creation here - is descriptive

this is all to speak analytically -

we operate with an enormous treasure chest of concepts
and description

we are really just creating the art work - as we go -

we place ourselves - in the picture - on the canvas -
and begin to paint - and we never stop - or leave

the ontological argumnt

Spinoza puts up a concept which is not
self-contradictory -

and from which he can deduce concepts (mind
and extension) necessary for an explanation
of the world

which is to say - substance

OK - so the concept of substance is used to produce
other concepts - which give substance to the concept

so the concept of substance - as put by Spinoza - is -

self explanatory -

(which is not only its method - but its essential
character)
where Spinoza is clear is that he has put forward
a foundational concept

that is so -

just because it has no foundation

it cannot be regarded as derivative

as coming out of another

it is defined so

it is this - a foundational concept - that is without
foundation itself -

its purpose though is to give foundation to secondary
concepts

so

the trick is

to say there is no foundation to existence

there is only what is -

existence is its own foundation -

so

you might ask

how did existence get into this?

well - what is existence?

that is really the question -

or can be seen so

Spinoza addresses this question

his theory of substance is his attempt to give character -

to the concept of existence

for existence outside of any concept

is the unknown

the description of existence - the giving of content
to the concept is to characterize - define -

a contentless concept

yes you can say what exists exists -

it looks like you are talking about something

but in fact - it is really - language talking about language

another way - it is to say X is X

ontology - the concept of X -

the attempts to describe it - characterize -

does not

create anything

it is only an argument of understanding

how to best describe - what needs to be described

so just a recap -

what I want to say re Spinoza and substance - is

the concept emerges as any - meta principle -
from the unknown -

the unknown is its reason

and any concept just is a concept of existence

of what exists

so

we tend to say what exists exists

and our theories

either hit the mark or don't

this though is not how it is

what exists for all intents and purposes is made

by thought

pre-thought - what is - is - but it is unknown

but we need to know it -

to function -

we create -

our picture of existence

these pictures serve as proxy

it's a necessary proxy

for - there is no - non-proxy picture

there is only our conceptions -

their truth / falsity

again - a concept

each meta concept defines itself as true -

different meta concepts - pictures are not in conflict -

so long as you understand that

they are all valid pictures of the unknown

and the unknown is silent

mind as a presupposition to substance

mind is a presupposition to substance

the concept can only be formed given mind

but even this is not strictly true

perhaps it's knowing that is presupposed

in that to formulate the notion of substance

we presuppose a capacity to know

reflection on this may lead to mind as a concept -

and then on to substance

but - back to knowing for a minute

in a sense - mind is some sort of answer to the question

what is it to know?

mind - substantializes or objectifies the act - of knowing

if act is what we are talking of

and this is a real question

what are we talking about here?

the straight answer is I don't know

the formation of concepts - mind - substance

is a response to this

and what is it to respond like this?

what is going on?

the base line is lack of knowledge - of the act -

explanation is sought

how do I explain - describe what is going on - when I think?

the lack of knowledge is reflective

we are never as it were lost for words on the surface

a primary statement is made

i.e. - I think

even though its content is in question

even though - that is - it is regarded - on reflection -
as contentless

so more notions come into play -

as it were to underpin the essential scepticism

mind is what knows

and the flip

inorder to know - mind must exist

I know

therefore

mind exists -

and -

inorder for mind to be

real - meaningful sensible etc.

substance must exist (Spinoza would say)

and then again the flip -

inorder for mind to be

substance must exist

mind exists

therefore
substance

what goes on here

what is going on is the creation of foundation

I would have it that our fundamental intuition is
that we don't know

(this is to suggest that Descartes was mistaken in
thinking 'I think' is fundamental - it was only
fundamental because he chose not to think about
it further - that is it became his foundation -
his place to stop and build - and it was essentially
a clever appeal to the obvious)

and it is after this intuition -

that the necessity for knowledge - for foundation -
is - quite obviously - apparent

so -

the manufacture of knowledge -

of foundation

as necessary

and this is important

necessity emerges out of nothing

necessity emerges out of need -

the need for - knowledge - or a foundation for knowledge

and subsequently - a structure - a building - a description

foundation here is really - a logical construct

it is decided upon -

that there is foundation -

clearly this is an unknown -

but it is in response to this notion - this idea -
that things begin

it is essentially a process of explanation

a kind of fishing expedition

how to find in this notion all that we want -
all that we need -

i.e. - mind - substance

and it is essentially an artistic process or endeavour

a making of notion - form and content

and finally a picture - a presentation -

it is no more substantial than this -

we construct ourselves from necessity

Damasio V (ii)

I made the point earlier that Spinoza is not a mind-brain
identity theorist in that he doesn't equate the mind with
the brain - this is true

but by the same token it is true to say that Damasio's
work on the brain is work on the mind

the mind is everything - covers everything - so - indeed
an understanding of the brain is an understanding
of the mind -

the brain as mind

so - yes there is a sense in which - while Spinoza is not
an identity theorist - the identity thesis is not incompatible
with his view

and another point to make

perhaps quite a radical one -

and it is that one could say that for Spinoza the mind
is a non-issue

if nothing is not the mind

where's the problem?

so you could well read Spinoza as effectively disposing
of the problem -

scientists can get on with their work - without fear of
contradicting Spinoza's metaphysics

business as usual -

so I'm not sure given this view of the situation -
in what sense Spinoza's metaphysics can have any real
relevance at all to good science - and good science
of the brain /(mind)

perhaps his insights are of use to Antonio Damasio -

however - the point is - nothing Spinoza has to say
really has any empirical implications - and Spinoza
would argue that good science doesn't impact one way or
another on his metaphysics
Damasio has written a fine book - which among other
things may lead some readers to think that while science
is indeed important for the working out of detail -
metaphysics is where it is at for the big picture -
and finally and therefore - 'metaphysics' is just that -
'before physics'

the third man fallacy

for Spinoza

the attributes of extension and thought

can be regarded as separate

and yet identical

the mind is the idea of the body

the body - the mind as extended

so one is the other in a different form

but to say this - to visualize it - to understand it

you need to be able to see both

to speak of both mind and matter - objectively -

where does this objectivity come from?

how is it possible?

this is what I shall call the fallacy of the third man

the idea that there is a third position -
that is objective to mind and body

that is outside of mind and body

a vantage point

a third perspective

Spinoza's metaphysics depends on this possibility

at best it is a conception - (that does not know itself)

an idea -

but when you understand what it is supposed to do

- to be

it is a position - outside of - reality -

it is a position that in Spinoza's terms is not that
of the body or that of the mind

rather - that of -

of what?

as I said in the previous post - Spinoza didn't shrink
from the issue -

for him the answer is God - is substance

OK - very well

but my argument is that such is not a position we can
have or adopt - in Spinoza's form or any other

and it is in one form or another an argument in Western
philosophy that is the source of much error

the third man

what we can say is
we can look in and look out

Janus looks both ways

and from this -

that such implies a unity

if you like - an underlying unity -

the ground of vision

this is at the very least - a logical ground

i.e. - the inner and outer are not possible

unless they are the inner and outer of something

all we directly - actually know though - is what we see

or that we see -

our two dimensional vision
we we assume substance - to explain dimension

clearly though - seeing a dimension or two dimensions

is not to have an objective - non-dimensional view

it is not to have the substantial view

Spinoza - in a way saw this and it is I think the reason
for his substance argument

and further his idea that it is possible to see
'sub specie aeternitatis'

that is to say Spinoza saw the need for a third view

the view that encapsulates - in his terms the attributes
given - mind and extension

is God's view -

for extension and mind are attributes of God

and God is greater than his characteristics

or these characteristics

so God or substance is the third - overriding perspective

the reason for the argument is clear

however the truth is - there is no third view

no third man

or third perspective

and it is really impossible to say what such would even be

subjective / objective and _____?

what?

transcendental

perhaps

in the meantime

the unity of vision is a logical point

this is the best we can say

there is no inside / outside - subject / object -
unless there is a unity

it is a presupposition

the 'person'

you

yes - you

are a presupposition -

Damasio V

p.194

'That in complex systems such as ours, the brain's
regulatory operations depend on the creation and
manipulation of mental images (ideas or thoughts)
in the process we call mind.'

OK - so what we have here is a mind-brain identity
thesis - the mind as a brain process

Damasio notes that he is not confident of explaining
the relationship between brain circuitry and image

and that he has not nailed the problem to date

(1)

first up - a question - is Spinoza a mind-brain
identity theorist? - some people have argued this

I beg to disagree here

in Pt. II. P. XIII Spinoza states his view -

'The object of the idea constituting the human mind
is the body, or a certain mode of extension actually
existing and nothing else.'

OK - Spinoza does not say the object constituting
the human mind is the brain

important point I think

now what this idea of the body means may be hard to
visualize to a century convinced the mind is the brain

before Descartes it had been thought it was the heart

the point being - it is just to identify the mind with
a part of the body

OK

we must address another prejudice - that of 'the' mind -
who today thinks of the mind as not being located in a
specific part of the body?

to understand Spinoza you must know that he does not
see it this way

the mind is like extension - an objective attribute
of reality

mind is not a exclusively possessed - by any feature
of reality

nevertheless we can speak of the human mind

the mind as the idea of the body -

here the body is the object of the mind

the mind the body's subject

the relationship of mind and body is the subject /
object relationship

it is a logical relationship

the unity of the mode that is a human being

is such

that it has a subjective dimension

and an objective dimension

the dimensions point to

or are expressions of

a unity

that is substance - writ small

or

the human being is an expression in miniature
of the essence that is God

that is the totality

reality - writ large

which is in Spinoza's view - at the very least

like man

mind and extension

subject and object

man was made in God's image

finally there is no other image

(2)

what of this view of mind?

what is Spinoza argument for it?

II.P.I - 'Thought is an attribute of God,
or God is a thinking thing'

particular thoughts are modes that express
the nature of God

so the attribute of all particular thoughts -
belongs to God

thought therefore is an infinite attribute of God

this argument depends on Spinoza's argument
for attribute

that is - the reality of attributes - and of thought
as an attribute - an attribute asSpinoza would have it
- objective - infinite -

the attribute argument goes back to the argument
for substance

but just looking at the argument of II.P.I

the form of it is - particular thoughts point to
a universal thought

if particular thoughts exist

therefore

thought

and for Spinoza

therefore

God

my own view here is somewhat different to Spinoza's

I argue consciousness is to be equated with ontological
- metaphysical internality

consciousness is the inside

and of what?

well at least of human beings -

and other conscious entities

human consciousness is distinguished from animal
consciousness to the degree that it is reflective

which is about thought

human beings can think about thought

I confess I don't know any other way to say this -
but 'reflectively'

and I don't think it can be described non-reflectively

the point is that on this view consciousness sees -

it sees itself - it sees the world - the surface

that it is the inside of -

I'm not convinced that all things - have an inside

I don't know

and for that reason I would not characterize mind
as Spinoza does - as an infinite objective attribute

my outlook does have implications for the Damasio
argument

first - mind is not a surface phenomena

so - it is not accessible to surface analysis
- i.e. - science

mind is - indeed the source of science - but it cannot
be the object of science

what we observe is only ever the surface of things

the observing itself is internal - not external

how to characterize the inner states?

can this be done?

yes but only introspectively - artistically -
figuratively - poetically

and that is to say you need a different language

the language of science will only ever describe
what is out there -

not what is inside

so on my view - the kind of picture the mind-brain
identity theorists put forward - a kind of positivism
of the mind - is just not possible

and I think even they know this

but science is a vain whore - wants everyone and everything
to come to her - when in reality it's a case of beauty is
skin deep

or at least science can be regarded this way

my picture really of mind and matter is that -

apart from what I have put - regarding the internal /
external distinction

what we are really talking about - is primarily a relationship

there is something of this in Spinoza too

for me it is not a relationship that is to be resolved -

it is rather - and simply the relationship of the inner
to the outer or subject to object

but however you want to describe it - my point is the human
being - ontologically - metaphysically speaking is -
a relationship - or a relation (in the logical sense)

not a substance - a relation

not a variation on a substance - rather - possibly a variation
on a relation

Damasio IV

on page 151

'the myopia of the future caused by prefrontal damage
has a counterpart in the condition of anyone who
consistently alters normal feelings by taking narcotics
or large quantities of alcohol. The resulting maps of
life are systematically false, consistently misinforming
brain and mind about the actual body state. One might
guess that this distortion would be an advantage. What's
wrong with feeling fine and happy? Well, there seems to
be a lot wrong, actually, if well being and happiness
are substantially and chronically at variance with what
the body would normally be reporting to the brain. In
effect, in the circumstances of addiction, the processes
of decision making fail miserably and addicts progressively
make less and less advantageous decisions for themselves
and for those close to them. The term "myopia of the future"
describes this predicament accurately. If left unchecked,
it invariably leads to a loss of social independence.'

the resulting maps of life are systematically false,
consistently misinforming brain and mind about the
actual body state

this view while on the face of it fairly uncontroversial
- perhaps even commonsensical - is not all it seems

first up feelings (Damasio's term - not mine) have never
been a reliable guide to biology or medicine

if they were we would have no need for these sciences

and isn't it clear that one's feelings of pleasure -
may have nothing to do with good health?

what's the drama here?

one's state of health from a scientific point of view
may or may not correspond to one's feelings

Damasio has not understood the first lesson of science -

that the reason we have science is because what feelings
tell us - is as good as next to nothing

how can the brain be misinformed?

could it be that the brain has the correct picture -
but the information is faulty?

how would you decide this issue?

first up you drop all talk of correct information and
false or faulty information - data is data

and simply look at cause and effect -

now this may be no simple matter

but the point is to drop presuppositions about correctness
- for want of a better word

Damasio - goes on to use 'normal'

and here he is really displaying myopia - philosophical
myopia

granted scientists in the main are cautious thinkers

they need always to work very conservatively - to build
up their facts for their theory -

but the point of good science - good theory construction -
is to see what you see objectively

and to do this you need to know what you are doing

in the case of the addict -

are you a medical scientist?

a social worker?

a born again Christian?

or a brain surgeon?

what would Spinoza say here?

I think he would regard all this talk about feelings
and brain maps as rubbish -

Spinoza says of joy - 'the passion by which the mind
passes to a greater perfection. The affect of joy,
related at the same time to both mind and body,
I call pleasurable excitement (titillatio) or
cheerfulness....."

how does this relate to the conatus

first conatus: III.PVIII. -

'The endeavour wherewith a thing endeavours to persist
in its being is nothing else than the actual essence
of that thing.'

as I read this - and I suspect it is not a standard reading

Spinoza is here saying it is of the nature of an existing
thing to persist in its existence

now this may or may not be a pleasurable or joyful affair

as a consequence -

we can say the addicted person - in this respect is no
different to the non-addicted person

it is of the essence of both to persist in the endeavour

and what is to count as success here?

a long healthy life?

well you might think so - but Spinoza does not say this

in fact he is quite clear that there is no goal to life
per se

yes we make choices - we imagine goals - ends

but these are products of the imagination - not reason

emotional props to the fact that the only reason for
existence - is existence

so the point is - there is no point - beyond existence

this is Spinoza's answer to the question of meaning -
of the meaning of life

life is the meaning of life

(or technically - existence is the meaning of life)

so the endeavour to persist - is what we do - whatever
we do - and it's no contest

there is no right or wrong way -

there is just what we do -

there is just existence

this is really all Spinoza says

for Spinoza - to understand a person's emotional state
is to understand their potency

their power

for emotions are for Spinoza the increase of decrease
of the power of the body and the idea(s) of this

and just what does this amount to?

an addicted person may well have the idea that he or
she is more powerful as a result of their drug use

are they mistaken in Spinoza's terms?

I think not

could they be dying as they have this sensation
and idea of power?

yes

so were they mistaken?

is it a case of the body map giving the wrong information
to the brain and mind?

not on Spinoza's analysis

if so

how are we to understand power?

power is existence?

if so

is death the loss of power

the loss of existence -

and is this the loss of life?

I don't think Spinoza sees it this way

life may - go - existence does not

the loss of life - the loss of power

or an existent's - loss of the power to act?

i.e. - the dead man still exists

action diminished -

perhaps for Spinoza death is the state where one
is only acted upon

and we can't really speak of 'one' here

so - perhaps only the actor - in Spinoza's sense
of the initiator - is an individual - existent

with the loss of the power to initiate - one has
lost life

it becomes a question - if you distinguish life
and existence -

can the power to exist be increased or decreased?

Spinoza thinks so

but what does this mean?

and is he perhaps wrong here?

perhaps existence is the constant - life - the variable?

so what is it to increase the power of the body?

avoid death as long as you can - eat well exercise -
avoid drug use?

yes I suppose if you have something like Damasio's
view of the power of the body

a standard scientific / medico view of health

but it amounts to the view - power is health

OK - so you can't act if you are incapacitated -
i.e. - unhealthy to some degree

perhaps Damasio is right

what worries me though is - there is no real theory
of power or theory of action in Spinoza

if you discount death - and the idea of the standard
of longevity

take it out of the picture

who's to say?
who's to say what an active life is?

what an increase in power of action is?

what is the standard?

who's to know?

Spinoza does not offer us secondary theories here

there is substance - and within substance -
modes affected

that's it - it's that simple

so

does it finally just come back to pleasure and pain

I suspect this really was - Spinoza's considered
opinion

and if so all bets are off

Spinoza God Nature the unknown

so substance -
in itself - conceived through itself

God - absolutely infinite - substance - infinite attributes

and Nature -
absolutely infinite substance - infinite attributes
hence God or Nature

thought - is an attribute of God

therefore God can be regarded as a thinking thing

and

Nature can be regarded as a thinking thing

God is not exhausted by thought -

thought like extension

characteristics of God -

not the only characteristics

of God or Nature

therefore

the unknown

if the concept of infinite attributes

is to make any sense

the unknown

the unknown attributes of God or Nature -

infinite

apparently

existence in itself

is the idea of existence in itself an idea that can be
confirmed or denied?

not I think by observation

in that what we perceive is particular

rather it is a matter of reasoning

x exists

therefore

existence

the argument that the particular can only exist given
the universal of which it is an instance

the idea of existence is therefore - on this argument
a necessary conception

unless you are prepared to argue - particulars -
all particulars exist in a void

and have no reason - for their existence

so existence is what?

it is difficult to see what can be said here

to assert the existence of x

pure and simple is to ?

assert - that_________

existence is no predicate?

i.e. - it is to say nothing of a thing

only 'that'

is it no more than - assertion?

to assert - that

and such an assertion - that x exists is to make
a logical assertion

one that is - in it's fundamental form - is true
if it is not a contradiction

the question of the character of x

is as Quine has put it - the question of value
of the variable

the existential status - of x - is a question of content

the bald assertion - 'x exists' - as such is contentless -
in fact

the existential statement as such - has no content

the nature of that which is being asserted is a question
of knowledge -

not existence per se

ironically - to say something exists - is to say nothing

but as to existence - as a universal - the ground of being -
if you like

how does this fare?

as I suggested above it is more in the line of a logical move

an argument about the basis of particularity

which is only an argument

there is no necessity here

i.e. - the world just may be particular things in a void

I find the idea strange - but nevertheless - it's open to
argument

and if so

we cannot hold the concept of existence in itself as anything
other than

a theory of ontology

cause of itself V

my preferred position in all this is to say -

cause of itself - as in existence itself

is a concept - that really - properly points us to

the unknown

- to just what we don't know

and the fact of not knowing

and it is this which is the true object of knowledge

I mean here - it is in a sense - always before us

that we don't know

what we glean - or think we know -

is set against this ever present backdrop

it is the theatre on which - in which our knowledge plays
are performed

cause of itself IV

could the cause of itself argument not be an argument
from necessity?

rather an empirical argument?

rather an argument based on observation and experience?

not that we observe existence in itself

or substance as Spinoza would have it -
but rather that

we know things exist - and persist in their existence

also

that the death and destruction of any one particular thing -

is not the death and destruction of all

and experience teaches us that the world recreates itself -
or - new things emerge

and persist in space / time - endure - to the point -
at least of dramatic change

i.e. - death - destruction

isn't it safe to assume that this state of affairs will
continue?

where is the need for necessity?

and yes - on the basis of these observations

why not speak of 'existence'?

existence as such

- as the explanation for the myriad creations and changes -

where's the problem?

if there is none

we can drop -

necessity - the ontological argument - substance

and substance on such a view is just a description of what
exists

or even the term we might reserve for something approaching
a complete description

seems easier to me

cause of itself III

D.I. By cause of itself (sui causa) I understand that
whose essence involves existence; or that, whose nature
cannot be conceived except as existing
essence must be existence

for without it - existence the entity cannot exist -

obviously -

therefore
that which must exist -

cause of itself - is that which exists

what cannot be conceived as not existing?

what must exist -

reality

the basis of everything

substance

the totality

the ground of contingency

how can we know of this?

existence per se

it's a conception

that cannot be conceived without existing?

OK

let's say yes

but

what is it a conception of?

of - necessity?

is it anything other than this

- the idea of necessity

applied to what exists

OK

how to know - if necessity - applies

is applicable

outside of the realm of ideas

to anything?

still - the reality

that time passes through

that space covers

regardless of any existing thing

what to call this?

substance

a spot on description really -

must reality exist

yes

can you conceive otherwise

no

so it seems

still even so -

what can you say of this?

of this necessity

that it must be

and this is to say?

only - that it will not pass

persistence -

this we know as -

certainty

is this so?

a certainty of what?

thought -

knowledge

based on?

thought

pure logic

is?

what must be

is that logic?

necessity?

why must necessity apply

to existence?

logic

to have any sense

is about

what we can think

we can think necessity

but is existence necessary to this

what else could necessity refer to?

and it only has meaning - in relation to existence

without a non-contingent sense of existence -

necessity is meaningless

necessity becomes the description of substance

which must be that substance is

is necessary -

cannot not be -

still it's rather colourless - substance

it must be

what exists exists

what we can know

- only what is -

only what is necessary

very good

the scaffold argument

as I am representing it

the substance argument is a scaffold argument

you put up the scaffold to build the edifice

after the building is complete you remove the scaffold

the point being substance is a false foundation

its purpose is to get the ideas of extension and mind -
up and running

the twin spires if you like

after these have been established -

substance has no further use

it can stay or be dismantled - it matters not

it is not part of the edifice
the edifice - it helped build -

was necessary to the construction

a kind of seventeenth century take on Wittgenstein's ladder

substance has no substance

this problem - the problem of mind for Spinoza -

that mind becomes an infinite regress of ideas
you would think should be resolved in substance

the fact is though substance - is only known as -
mind or extension

so - the infinite regress of ideas - just is substance
(as mind)

substance is no foundation for Spinoza

it may appear to be - he may believe it is

he does want it to function as such

but this is not the case

substance - for all we know - is its attributes

its expression

strictly speaking - expression

- no - 'its'

there is no substance to substance

substance in this sense - if you wish to keep the concept -
is the unknown

this is the best you can do

otherwise the picture we have -

is expression - nothing more nothing less

just - revelation

and revelation of

itself

revelation of revelation

no substance to it

strangely modern

mind without substance

the mind as the idea of the mind?

this is OK

the issue is -

is the idea something had

if had - it is known - that it is had -

so -

which is -

presumably - the idea of - having and idea -

and is this too - had?

the point is - ideas are not enough to establish mind

mind as self-consciousness

just ideas -

leads to an infinite regress

perhaps -

this would suit Spinoza

but the infinite regress occurs

because - in such an argument -

there is no mind

- no foundation to ideas

ironically no substance to it

- on such a view there is no account of the observer

simply the order and succession of ideas

OK some modern objectivists would like this -

but it leaves a hole

perhaps it's the problem of taking the objectivity
of science too seriously

thinking the objective perspective

is all there is to it

it's too one dimensional

Spinoza - it seems has objectified - ideas

given a 'scientific' account
much to be said for it

but the real problem of mind is not

to my mind -

is not the relation of mind to body

it is rather the problem of the relation of mind to mind

this is the problem of consciousness

mind and body - a side issue

Spinoza mind self-consciousness

for Spinoza

as I understand it mind is an objective property
of substance?

a subjective / objective distinction does not exist
for Spinoza

Spinoza's world is fully objective

all knowledge is objective

the question is in what sense is mind an objective
property of substance?

an attribute Spinoza says in D.4 is that which the
intellect perceives as the essence of substance

the intellect perceives

for Spinoza - extension as an adequate idea and mind -
an adequate idea

a clear self-contained idea as it were

so what part does observation - or experience play
in this?

observation and experience are - can be - either the
basis of inadequate or adequate ideas

the raw material - of experience is the data for ideas

how the data is understood determines the kind of
knowledge that results -

so the question of knowledge - of adequate ideas -
is about seeing the world without confusion -
which is seeing it - as it is objectively -
that is adequately -

understanding that the essential properties of substance
are extension and mind - is to understand the objective
features of substance - the world as it is - the question
though is how is this achieved?

one answer might be that of Pt. II. Prop. 7: 'The order
and connection of ideas is the same as the order and
connection of things.'

this is to see and understand the correspondence of
mind and matter

the point being we come to mind and extension in the
understanding of ideas and physical properties

and we come to see the mind as the idea of the body -

this is a result of the intellectual process of adequate
ideas

my mind and my body are then understood as characteristics
of a greater reality - that of mind and extension

so it is the mind at work that gives us this knowledge of
mind and extension

and mind here?

is what

an adequate idea

so

what does this break down to?

an adequate idea of an adequate idea

is this Spinoza theory of consciousness?

the point being if the mind is an adequate idea

to have this adequate idea

this perception of essence

must itself be an adequate idea

but then the question could you have anything else?

i.e. - an inadequate idea of an adequate idea?

no -

to have an adequate idea of the mind is?

the question - is it two - adequate ideas

or one?
for Spinoza can the mind be an object of the mind?

actually I suspect not

I think Spinoza is clear here - the mind is the idea
of the body -
it is not - the idea of the idea

and it is for this reason

we can't find self-consciousness in Spinoza

cause of itself II

the point of D.I. - cause of itself

is to show the limit of explanation

to make clear that explanation finally has an object

and that the object - is what is to be explained

defining that object - is the adventure of thought

but that it is - despite any understandings - any conception

is just the very point of the endeavour

there is to be no endless chain of reasoning or observation

for such a process has - by it's very nature

lost sight of it's own reason

Spinoza quite reasonably calls that which is the object
of thought and action -
substance

and I think he is clear that we cannot know it - though
you wouldn't know this from his argument - and I think
because he was primarily concerned with what can be
known and the conditions of this knowledge

he was from the beginning an existentialist - I don't
mean this in the modern sense - but rather in the sense
that his focus was squarely on existence - people
existing -

but as to the nature of substance - the nature of nature -
the nature of God - he is modest in his claims - modest
but sure

he begins and ends just with what we are - extension
and thought

he says these are two of an infinite number of
possibilities -

for the infinite number of attributes read -
what we don't know

what we do know is thought and the physical world

these are expressions - bone fide - of reality -

that which is to be accounted for -

and it's - all here - ready to read - the patterns
and possibilities of thought and the nature of the
physical world -

in this sense there is no mystery

the question is how to put these - perhaps apparently
disparate attributes -
characteristics together?

how to understand the relation between knowing and
what we know?

and there is nothing to it -

it is just this - knowing and the known -

two dimensions of the one existence

the subject and the object

as to why this - why this reality - this existence -
this arrangement?

there is no answer

the question is not existentially meaningful

reason being - it is no other way

the world we live in just is as it is

how best to describe - if it is necessary to describe

and it is clear that given the passions of man -

and the violence and turbulence that results from their
reign and expression

there is a place for clear explanation

it is not only desirable - it is necessary

necessary - because false gods are always being invented
to the service of discord

cause of itself

'By cause of itself, I understand that whose essence
involves existence; or that, whose nature cannot be
conceived unless existing.'

'whose essence involves existence' -

that which exists

cause of itself therefore - that which exists

that which exists is that which exists

'whose nature cannot be conceived unless existing'

i.e.

you can't have the conception of x

unless x exits

is this to say -

what exits determines what can be thought?

yes

so the first part says

the cause of itself is that which exists

and the second part

that which exists cannot be conceived unless it exists

so again

conception dependent on existence

is it essential that anything in particular exists?

and what does this question mean?

is the existence of a particular thing anything but
accidental?

is it necessary that a particular thing exists?

one would think not -

as the existence of any particular thing - it seems
is a contingent matter

OK

is it necessary that something exists

that existence - exists

well this concept of existence - is - in fact nowhere
to be found in re

the concept is a universalization of particularity

what exists is particular entities

existence is not a particular entity

it is a conception - with no particularity - or existence -
except as a conception

one would think it cannot be 'that whose essence involves
xistence'

and of particular things -

again it seems there is no essence to them

that which is cause of itself

cause of itself

eternity?

a conception yes

its existence -

as that which we don't - cannot know

essentially a negative concept

(with positive overtones)

singularity

the concept of singularity

Spinoza defines the concept of singularity

this at least

cause in itself?

the idea of cause

and then cause as sui generis

the definition of substance could be no more than an
intellectual exercise - an exercise in logical thinking

introducing cause - and cause in itself

and applying this to the concept of substance

is to take the concept of substance - the idea of it -
and give it objective existential status

at this point we are no longer looking at a concept

rather a reality - an existential reality

at this point substance exists

and what sort of a move is this?

at this point - substance - the concept - is used as a
definition of existence

is this a philosophical sleight of hand -

from the concept of 'rabbit' to rabbit?

and then apply the characteristics of the actual -
back to the concept?

in this case the attributes of mind and extension

so my argument is that substance the concept of
substance

is no more than a definition of singularity -
of oneness - of unity

now does such a definition - concept apply to
what exists -

to reality?

Spinoza's argument -

well if reality is a singularity - a oneness -
a unity - yes

it applies to nothing else -

so is reality this?

yes according to Spinoza

but why -

you can ask?

what I say is - the argument for substance is not
relevant here

for it is an argument for the concept

if the concept is to apply to what exists -
we must have another argument?

question

what sort of argument?

how could you show that the concept of substance does
or does not apply to what exists?

is this issue empirical?

if not - what kind of question is it?

can an observation settle the matter?

no

for a theory of the nature of reality is not just a
theory of what can be observed

or is it?

the other important issue here is

the question of the status of such a conception as
that of substance

and in particular Spinoza's substance

can we conceive of a totality?

according to Spinoza we can if we think about it
correctly - as in finite and self-caused

but the issue is - what is being conceived in such?

is it reality - the real world

or is but an idea - it is assumed can be applied

an idea is an idea

how do we know that such has content

existential content?

does it matter?

not in the realm of imagination

but yes - in the realm of fact

so - yes we can imagine with Spinoza such a concept
applying

but this is not to say yea or nay regarding its actual
application

the problem is that empirical testing

is with and in nature

we never have the vantage point of looking at nature
from the outside

we don't have a God's eye view

mind and matter

mind and matter as dimensions

expressions of the one substance

we see this in human beings - and other entities -
by inference

what empirical reasons do we have to believe that
this arrangement is universal?

I have argued that mind is

an internal dimension of the entity

the human being as an entity - knows - this dimension
of itself

(this dimension - is self)

clear enough

but how can it possibly know this - outside of itself -

that is in empirical terms?

to suggest that it does - and that this attribute
(or as I say dimension) exists in all things -

is this not a form of the final cause - the anthropomorphism
that Spinoza was so keen to debunk?

a second point I want to make

Spinoza's view is that the entity can be read as either
mind or extension -

i.e. - that a complete explanation can be given -
in either attribute

I say to this -

the mind can be a complete - is - a complete explanation
of the inside - of an entity

of that dimension

a physical explanation - a complete account of the outside

of that - dimension

but as regards the entity in toto -

there is no one account -

there cannot be one account

there is no one overriding perspective

only the possibility of attributive accounts -

in Spinoza's terms - no substance - no substantial account?

aspects - we can detail -

but this is all

Spinoza - to solve this problem -

argues for 'sub specie aeternitatis'

the perspective of eternity

this is not a perspective we have access to -

and the idea of it?

it is an abstraction from attributes

an abstraction

that is more in the line of imagination than science

we cannot step outside of space / time and hold -
reality as an object of thought or perception

to suggest such is to engage - in a cosmological absurdity

awareness

and awareness -

awareness is the logical space of reflection

reflection?

the subject regarding itself as object

the mind seeing itself as mind

knowing as knowledge

the act as object

the translation of logical categories

the subject translating to object

and in the act remaining subject?

or is it the subject translates to object -

and in so doing becomes the subject-object?

to put it this way is to break it down

or to begin with the elements and build to the composite -
when in fact in reality -

in practice -

the composite is what we have

the subject as subject / object

this may be a way of putting it

but what does it mean?

what is subject /object

well - the unity of consciousness

what we experience

?

still this seeing the subject as object -

this 'seeing as'?

and it is this - isn't it - that is the question

is this what underlies reflection?

or just another description - equivalent description of it?

awareness as the logical space of reflection?

the act as a state

yes - as in the state of the act

the act as state

the act of reflection as the state of awareness

doesn't take us too far

the act as ground

ground of itself -

this is to say at least

that reflection is - in this sense -

without foundation

in that there is no foundation

the act is pure

the state essential

knowledge and the mind II

I put in the previous post that the mind -
consciousness - reflects

that this is the process of knowing

the object of knowledge - of consciousness of the
mind - is that which is outside

the mind - consciousness is the inside of the body

the body is outside - the world if you like is outside

that which is outside is the object of knowledge

consciousness - the mind - is not - outside itself

therefore - it is not the object of knowledge

the point being

there is no knowledge of consciousness - of the mind

we cannot know the nature of the mind

consciousness is knowing - not the object of knowledge

the mind - knowing - is unknown

the best we can say is consciousness reflects -
this statement itself is a reflective statement

this is a statement of what the mind does

not what it is - if what it is - is to mean something
other than what it does

what the action of the mind is

and any reflection on reflection

is but - logically speaking a statement of reflection

we are aware of what the mind does - its action

awareness is not knowledge

consciousness

the mind is the idea of the body

but the mind must also be the idea of itself

how can this be for Spinoza?

the point is consciousness is aware of itself

where is self-awareness in Spinoza?

the idea of the idea (of the mind) -

does Spinoza recognize this?

self-consciousness

does he account for it?

what does he say here?

surely mind is the idea of itself?

the mind holding itself as object

is what?

the mind cannot regard itself from the outside

there is no outside

can the mind see itself from the inside?

what does this mean?
what is reflection - if that's what this is?

can we say - mind is the capacity

mind reflects -
on the body
on the world -

on itself

what is reflection then?

a function?

if so - a function of what?

is it that we recognize reflection

in the act of - reflection?

this is as it were a logical description of what?

an act -

beyond this

where can you go?

any account is just - reflection

so - the action of the mind is

the fundamental - the function -

is what?

closed -

reflection cannot be - further analyzed -

we can describe what the mind does

- and this description is what the mind does -

we can never get out of reflection

we cannot explain the mind - further

we can only -

do what the mind does -

the mind is this act

this act - is unanalyzable -

or the analysis is final

the analysis cannot be further elucidated

we cannot see outside of this

we can only describe the inside - of the mind -

and what this tells us is that the mind is this inside -
the inside

reflectivity - the mind is

just this - fundamental - dimension

a dimension - the act of which is reflection -

there is no external view of the mind -

it is just this function - this internal act

the world - the outside - does not reflect

it is reflected on

the physical world is the ground of reflection -

mind is the act of reflection

body is the object of reflection

the primary object

primary reflection can be the subject of reflection

secondary reflection is the mind reflecting on itself -

on its (primary) reflection

the mind is limitless in its reflective capacity

reflection in a logical sense is without bounds -

however - this said - always it's primary object -
is the physical world

the outside of mind

the non-reflective surface

mind body brain

the question of the relation of mind and body

the question of objectivity

how do I know of mind

I have consciousness

and this having of consciousness is to know of the
having of consciousness

certainly human consciousness

I know that I know

perhaps we can short cut it by saying consciousness is lucid

what I mean is it sees itself

in every act of itself

every idea if you will

an idea is self-aware

can this be further analyzed? - I think not

so - the body

the mind regards

the mind regards the body as outside of itself

it regards itself as inside the body

the mind knows the body as matter

matter is 'that which is outside'

the mind knows itself as 'not matter'

the mind recognizes its content as ideal

therefore itself as ideal

the inside of the body is consciousness

the outside of consciousness is body - is matter

the unity is logical

mind and body are two dimensions of the one entity

the physics of the body is the surface of the entity

this is the object of science

matter is surface

the inside is consciousness

it is the knowing of the surface

that which knows
that which is known

the brain as an object of science is no different to
any other physical surface

it can be known

our knowledge of the brain is knowledge of the surface -
of a surface

it is not knowledge of consciousness

the outside is not the inside

the mind is not an object of knowledge

it is the knower

to regard the mind as object is to mistake it for the body

Damasio III (v)

we can observe the actions of the brain

form hypotheses - theories - draw up maps

we can then experiment to see what mental states are
associated with what regions etc.

what we are doing here is correlating mental and
physical states

if you ask - what is pain?

I can point to a region of the brain and it's activity -
and say this is the physical - neural expression of the
ideas that X has when he reports having painful images

in so doing I am assuming that the neural behaviour
is what - is reflected mentally -

is this so?

am I saying - one is the other?

or that both are expressions of something else

let's call it - 'more fundamental'

Spinoza called it substance

substance in the mode of a human being

but substance nevertheless - that which the physical
and mental are expressions of

we can only know this substance in these terms -
physical and mental

it is not as if substance is a third reality

in so far as we describe the physical and mental as
attributes

we can say they are attributes of -

substance

but in reality the physical and the mental are all
we know

so

when I experience pain

what is it?

is it - a physical expression

a mental expression?

both

so what sense - pain - the unified experience

here I don't think we can avoid going down the
substance route

the underlying reality

the unity

the experience that is pain

is

not known

we don't know what it is -

and for that matter what anything is -

any experience

short of a physical description and / or a mental
description

the thing in itself - experience

is not known

until that is we apply physical and mental predicates

I make this point to give some credence to the idea
of the unity of experience

it is to say the unified experience is unknown

the experience as known is divided

this analysis -

might in some way give some sense to what I think
Damasio was trying to do with his concept 'feeling' -

the place where physical and mental meet - are one

it is just that in my view - that place is not definable
- or characterizable

and I mean that in the strictest sense

the 'unknown' as I am using the term - is just that

i.e. - it is not 'an unknown substance'

or a 'thing in itself'

I put my argument in non-ontological terms

as simply the absence of knowledge

but just back to experience feeling and pain for a
moment

when I say experience is unknown

what this means is that it is unknown in an analytical
sense

what I experience - yes I describe as pain

this description - is not reflective

it is immediate - it is a given

given in the sense of what is presented

given - phenomenally

theoretical analysis will show I believe that the greater
the depth of the analysis the less that is known - and
finally - if there is an end to this - the end is the end of
knowledge

p.s.

I think it is important to understand that for Spinoza

the correlation of mental to physical as in what Damasio
does as a neuro-biologist is not an empirical matter

Spinoza was not putting forward an empirical hypothesis

his argument about the relationship of mind and body is
not touched either way by any empirical experiments

so - all the neurological research in the world - actually
has no bearing on his claims

for this reason you might question the whole basis of
his argument

this fact does explain why scientists have not paid much
attention to Spinoza - for right or wrong he has nothing
to say about what they do - if by that is meant proper
empirical research

it also follows that any attempt to show that empirical
research supports Spinoza's theory of the mind / body is
misguided

Damasio III (iv)

false body mapping

on the face of it a curious notion

I understand what is being put here - that i.e. -
we can be in pain but not feel it we can have pain
but not feel it - yet in some sense know that we
have pain

the idea of false body mapping that Damasio puts is
designed to avoid the problem

and the problem is crucial - for his theory of the
feeling brain

it is this - if the brain maps - falsely - in some
circumstances - how can we know that it ever tells
the truth?

and of course the question -

how do we know what is the truth here?

clearly feelings are not the criterion - we know they
can be false

but how do we know this?

if feelings are all we have to go on - and I stress
'if ' here - then what we feel is true

and if so there is by implication - no false body mapping

and this just may be to say - the body tells the truth -
its truth - even when prior so called knowledge suggests
the opposite

putting it sharply - if there is no feeling of pain -
there is no pain

the 'pain-body map' is not operating - it has been
replaced - or was not operatintg in the firat place

another map operates

and so it's not a question of true or false here -
just obsolete and new - maps

perhaps Damasio might consider the idea that body
mapping is not a static business

that yes there is always a body map - but at no point
of space or time can it be the same as that which preceeded
it - or that of the next instant

perhaps Wittgenstein's idea of family resemblance is
to the point here

if so - and I think this does make sense - what sense is
then left of the notion of body map

is it strictly speaking never possible to obtain such

for as I have suggested there is no permanence here

we can take a snap shot of the brain or regions of it -
but immediately the map has changed

you can't freeze time and space

and you would need to have a sharp concept of map

the alternative is to recognize - that in the body /
brain mapping business

the stock is always obsolete

(it's the same problem for Wittgenstein's theory of
meaning -

OK - eliminate essentialist definition - recognize
that meaning is never dedicated - is never fixed -
good thinking - but whither meaning?

Wittgenstein - regarded such - philosophical discussion
as illness and his task to cure it

be careful what you wish for

his theory of meaning itself - on it's own argument -
has no meaning

which is just the view he started with against the
verificationists - and the author of the 'Tractatus'

verifiability as a result died as a criterion of meaning

but the cost was to kill off - the criterion of meaning -
any criterion of meaning

so you could ask - hey what was it all for?

Dashiell Hammett when ask in later life - why he froze
insects for a hobby said 'one way of filling in time is
as good as another'

very subversive

Spinoza would have smiled

it is reported that one of Spinoza's pleasures was to
watch spiders fighting

back to the issue at hand - if there is anything
left after that)

on the other hand

if we take the view that feeling doesn't amount to much
in terms of the science of the brain - that it is not
based on knowledge - that it is essentially ephemeral

we have to fall back on the hard slog of observation
and experiment

to find out how the brain functions

and this kind of work - how does it relate to how you feel?

well it's the old question

is there a correspondence between the physics of brain
activity -

and one's consciousness - in Damasio's terms 'feelings'?

all the imaging in the world only produces images of
what is seen

not what is felt

Spinoza takes the radical view - the physical reality
and the mental reality are depictions of the one reality

we know - ourselves in two ways

they do correspond

but you will not find matter in mind or mind in matter

however - what for Spinoza - you find in both is substance

substance is mind
substance is matter

so the correspondence is not one to one

as in mind is matter or matter is mind

it is rather - a three way relationship

mind and matter both reflect accurately substance

mind and matter are aspects of substance

so in the case of feeling pain

good science should be able to show this in physical terms

in the case of not feeling pain -

good - up to date science will show this too

it really doesn't make any sense to speak of false pain

Damasio III (iii)

in his section in chapter 4 - feelings in the brain -
new evidence

Damasio - gets subjects to think of emotional episodes
in their lives - and then the measurement -

'All the body sensing areas under scrutiny -......showed
a statistically significant pattern of activation and
deactivation.......The results told us in no uncertain
terms that some of the mysteries of the physiology of
feelings could be solved in the neural circuitry of body
sensing brain regions and in the physiological and chemical
operation of those circuitries.'

OK what do we have here?

let's begin with Damasio's idea of feeling - seeing as
we can't get rid of it

a feeling of sadness e.g. -

OK I feel sad

I may identify certain physical and mental reactions

i.e. - the feeling - leads me to think - let us say
negatively about a certain circumstance - these negative
thoughts are the mental dimension of this feeling

this feeling also expresses itself physically -
let us say I weep

so the feeling is these reactions

what I know is these reactions

if someone says what's the matter

do I say 'I think negatively about.....and I weep' -

no I describe these reactions - events as sadness

I give the experience a name - commonly associated
with such reactions

and if I am further asked - what do you mean by sadness?

I say 'well you know - it's a feeling'

feeling is more general category

used to explain the term 'sadness'

but what is real here?

are these feelings - some sort of state - actual state -
underlying these reactions?

or are feelings - and feeling - just labels for reactions?

Damasio thinks that because - you can observe a change
in brain chemistry when someone says they are feeling
sadness - you have found feeling in the brain

what you have is in fact is not the discovery of feeling

rather physical reactions in the brain

that are associated with reports of - in this case -
sadness

no different really to tears

you see what's interesting here is how you interpret
the brain activity

Damasio wants to say it is the state of sadness

such and such a reaction - just is sadness - under these
circumstances with this subject

that's what it is

he thinks he's found feeling in the brain

all we can say experimentally is these actions / reactions -
(brain activity) is happening - is observed

(and that it corresponds to certain reports of emotional
states)

is the activity - the source of the tears and the negative
thoughts?

or is it just what is observed?

putting it bluntly - is brain activity the cause of the
experience - or just an expression of it (whatever it is)?

in Damasio's terms - is the brain activity the feeling -
or is it rather an expression of the feeling (again whatever
this means)?

Damasio would have to say the former wouldn't he -

because if he didn't - what is this thing called feeling?

what is feeling - if not finally brain activity?

and of course the brain must be running the show -
or else - what's going on?

surely you are not saying brain activity is just an effect
- an expression?

an effect of what?

it is in fact what I am suggesting - and my reason
is as follows

what happens in this world - from a Spinozistic point
of view - is expressed and can be understood in physical
and mental terms

what happens is so expressed

thought - and here - brain activity - are expressions
of modes of being

what we know is not the cause of things - only the
expression of the cause

or we can as it were - only approach cause through
expression

expression of what - you ask?

fair enough

what I say is this - we don't know

for Spinoza it is substance

and if you think of substance - in itself as it were -
without it's expressions - independent of it's attributes

what do you have?

well I don't think Spinoza would wish to go there -
or say that you can

but if you do you will be face to face with the unknown

Damasio III (ii)

anyway

'Some variation of pleasure or pain is a consistent
content of the perception we call
feeling.'

in common parlance we say people perceive and they feel

two different activities - though related

I perceive a work of art

I feel uplifted by it

we don't normally say I perceive pleasure

I feel pleasure - and often as a result of a perception

the feeling is a consequence of

not the object perceived

cause and effect - if you like

it seems that for Damasio the cause (perception)
is the effect (feeling)

'Feeling is the perception of a certain mode of the
body along with the perception of a certain mode of
thinking with certain themes.'

a feeling - if we have to keep using this term -
is a description of a unified state of consciousness -

meaning - when I feel good - it's just that -
it's not that yes my body feels good - I have
good thoughts -

that may be an explanation - but it is not the
phenomena - or how we report the experience to ourselves

strictly speaking - feeling is without content

the experience is without content - that is until
we analyze it - break it down

these break downs actually add nothing to the experience
- only to the understanding of it

and - that is - if understanding is required

'Feeling is a consequence of the ongoing homeostatic
process - the next step in the chain.'

homeostasis

I don't know - I think we're being dazzled here
with a motherhood claim

when we explain - we look for regularities

the regularities will be found

it's what explaining is about

finding regularities is about theory construction

it's the imposing of theory on phenomena

pre-theory construction - the phenomenon - any phenomena -
is what it is - at this stage - essentially unknown

to find regularities - is to systematize to theorize

so homeostasis in this sense is the presumption of theory

it's there before you look

just another point -

I think Damasio wants this concept to be all things
to all men

biological meta-scientific - and metaphysical

as a metaphysical concept - it is as I said a motherhood
statement that has more to do with theory construction
than what a theory is about

but if it's meant as an empirical statement -
where the empirical content?

we know it can be verified - every time you open your eyes

but can it be falsified?

what observations would - could lead to its rejection?

is it possible that we could observe a fundamental process
that is not moving to regularity

and how would we know - identify such?

'The above hypothesis is not consistent with the view
that the essence of feelings (or the essence of emotions
when emotions and feelings are taken as synonymous) is a
collection of thoughts with certain themes consonant with
a certain feeling label, such as thoughts of situations
of loss in the case of sadness.'

feeling as I am going to use the term - is undefined -
contentless

not to say - it is not a real phenomena -

so yes - feeling is not just a thought

a thought here

the thought of sadness -

is a reflection on - feeling

it is one step removed

an attempt at - objectivity

it is a thought about....

a feeling

and this characteristically occurs when people
do not understand - what they are feeling - or why -

they reflect on it

think about it

a sad thought - is what?

is there such a thing

you can think about sadness

you can feel sad - and think about it

but a sad thought?

I don't know about that

I guess I am putting here that thinking is always a
reflective action

after the fact - of experience -

which prior to thinking is essentially unknown -
an unknown reality had - but not known

in practice of course it is generally not this
black and white

'If feelings were merely clusters of thoughts with
certain themes, how could they be distinguished from
any other thoughts?

feelings per se are not thoughts

feelings are if you like raw experience

that are objects of thought

'How would they retain the functional individuality
that justifies their status as a special mind process?'

this special mind process

yet to be established Antonio

in fact if what I say is on the mark - feeling is not
a process or special - or for that matter - of the mind

feeling is raw experience - undefined - the object of -
thought

'The particular state of those body components, as
portrayed in the brain's body maps, is a content of the
perceptions that constitute feelings.'

'the particular state of those body components' -
is to say nothing

'The immediate substrates of feeling are the mappings
of myriad aspects of body regions designed to receive
signals from the body.'

this 'substrates of feeling' - makes its appearance

perhaps next - we will find substrates of substrates

that might explain things even better!

'Some might object that we do not seem to register
consciously the perception of all those body-party states.
Thank goodness we do not register the all indeed.'

look - what we experience is what we experience -
it is unified and undefined

you can break it up into body parts if you have a mind to

that is explanation

you do not 'experience' - the explanation of your
experience

'Obviously, we do not 'experience' the blood level of
glucose dropping...'

well we experience something when that happens

science and medicine give us an explanation of that
something

the experience is not effected - by the explanation

it would be the same without it

'Experiencing a certain feeling is experiencing the body
in a certain way......'

again - if you say so - if you want to explain it that way

we do recognize different kinds of experience

firstly just because the experiences are different

and we then go on to think about what that might mean

'I caution that the emergence of mental images from neural
patterns is not a fully understood process.....'

it has only ever been proposed - never understood

it's at this point one wonders whether we are dealing
here with a genuine argument or just some kind of a con

'In brief the essential content of feelings is the mappings
of a particular body state....'

the map is a map

a picture -

the content of feelings is always a theoretical issue

feelings do not come with their content on their sleeves

apart from the content we give - them - they have no content

'A feeling is in essence an idea - an idea of the body and,
even more particularly, an idea of a certain aspect of the
body, it's interior, in certain circumstances.

yes well we can elucidate feeling in such a way

but I think really at this point Damasio should try to get
in touch with or reconnect with his feelings

'A feeling of emotion is an idea of the body when it is
perturbed by the emoting process.'

not what I had in mind - a feeling is an emotion caused
by emotion

here we are again

the cause is the effect

very scientific

Damasio III

contents of feeling

Damasio proposes that -

'The contents of thoughts with themes consonant
with the emotion; and a mode of thinking, a style
of mental processing...'

a regular grab bag this - something for everyone

the key thing is Damasio wants to distinguish emotion
and feeling

'consonant with emotion'

so feeling is something else - consonant with emotion

and yes you can dress feeling up with themes and modes
and style

but I don't see the point

if you take Spinoza's definition of emotion - you have
an elegant simple and powerful conception - and there
is no theoretical need for this ring in 'feeling'

Damasio's 'feeling' is a straw man

'Feeling in the pure and narrow sense of the word,
was the idea of the body being in a certain way.
In this definition you can substitute idea for
'thought' or 'perception'. Once you looked beyond
the object that caused the feelings and the thoughts
and the mode of thinking consequent to it, the core
of the feeling came into focus. Its contents
consisted of representing a particular state
of the body.'

OK - essentially no different to Spinoza's definition
of emotion

'Feelings, in the sense used in this book, arise from
any set of homeostatic reactions, not just from emotions
proper.'

first up homeostasis is an explanation of phenomena

as in a theoretical account of what is happening

strictly speaking there are no homeostatic reactions -
there are reactions observed and explained as homeostatic

this confusion of phenomenal and the theoretical in
Damasio is endemic

secondly - what does he mean by emotions proper -
presumably something other than emotions

and what really does he think the term emotion refers to?

some background engine room?

and by all means create a science which generates
ontologies - but you have to have some observational-
experimental evidence - otherwise stick to poetry -
and call it poetry

'Feelings are perceptions, and I propose that the
most necessary support for their perception occurs
in the brain's body maps'.

'the brain's body maps'

again - a theoretical notion - designed proposed
conceived ultimately to try and explain observed
actions and reactions

feelings are perceptions

this idea he has of the brain's body maps - as the
most necessary support of the perceptions -

OK if support here means explanation

the brain's body map - only exists as an idea -
and he is saying this idea supports the idea of
feelings as perceptions

an argument for an argument

why is a feeling - a perception - why not a conception?

perception in science usually refers to the deliverance
of the senses

is this what Damasio thinks feelings are?

I don't think so

but I am yet to see what the point of perception is here

except I suppose he has to prop up his notion of feeling - with something and really -
anything would do - given that there is nothing to it anyway

why not say a feeling is an awareness - of - of what?

well I would go with Spinoza here - awareness of potency

awareness of increased capacity or decreased capacity -

i.e. pleasure and pain

perhaps the whole point of Damasio's endeavour is to
try and explain that when I say I feel - it is equivalent
to saying - the brain feels - or my brain feels -

and he wants to give this notion of a feeling brain
some creds with his home boys - the neuro-bios

to locate feeling in the brain -

to say an attribute of the brain is feeling -

is to what?

presumably from a scientific point of view

it is to observe feeling in the brain

therefore feeling as an observable - objective phenomena?

what Damasio does - is put up a concept of the brain -
and argue that - within this concept we can scientifically
recognize feeling

this though is to 'observe' theory - with theory

also within this - the notion of feeling - is to function
for Damasio (sometimes) - as a theoretical concept

phenomena

straight out - cause and effect - objectively observed -
is lost

has been supplanted by a theoretical model - masquerading
as phenomena

the problem here is - mistaking theory for phenomena

and the reason for this - in Damasio's case - is he wants
to give an objective account of a non-objective state
(and further to give it - top grade flesh and blood)

feeling is an internal state - it is not out there to
be observed

Damasio wants to observe feeling - or suggest with a few
neuro-bio models - tricks of his trade - this can be done

not so much - smoke and mirrors - just a series of mirrors -