for Spinoza
as I understand it mind is an objective property
of substance?
a subjective / objective distinction does not exist
for Spinoza
Spinoza's world is fully objective
all knowledge is objective
the question is in what sense is mind an objective
property of substance?
an attribute Spinoza says in D.4 is that which the
intellect perceives as the essence of substance
the intellect perceives
for Spinoza - extension as an adequate idea and mind -
an adequate idea
a clear self-contained idea as it were
so what part does observation - or experience play
in this?
observation and experience are - can be - either the
basis of inadequate or adequate ideas
the raw material - of experience is the data for ideas
how the data is understood determines the kind of
knowledge that results -
so the question of knowledge - of adequate ideas -
is about seeing the world without confusion -
which is seeing it - as it is objectively -
that is adequately -
understanding that the essential properties of substance
are extension and mind - is to understand the objective
features of substance - the world as it is - the question
though is how is this achieved?
one answer might be that of Pt. II. Prop. 7: 'The order
and connection of ideas is the same as the order and
connection of things.'
this is to see and understand the correspondence of
mind and matter
the point being we come to mind and extension in the
understanding of ideas and physical properties
and we come to see the mind as the idea of the body -
this is a result of the intellectual process of adequate
ideas
my mind and my body are then understood as characteristics
of a greater reality - that of mind and extension
so it is the mind at work that gives us this knowledge of
mind and extension
and mind here?
is what
an adequate idea
so
what does this break down to?
an adequate idea of an adequate idea
is this Spinoza theory of consciousness?
the point being if the mind is an adequate idea
to have this adequate idea
this perception of essence
must itself be an adequate idea
but then the question could you have anything else?
i.e. - an inadequate idea of an adequate idea?
no -
to have an adequate idea of the mind is?
the question - is it two - adequate ideas
or one?
for Spinoza can the mind be an object of the mind?
actually I suspect not
I think Spinoza is clear here - the mind is the idea
of the body -
it is not - the idea of the idea
and it is for this reason
we can't find self-consciousness in Spinoza
