contents of feeling
Damasio proposes that -
'The contents of thoughts with themes consonant
with the emotion; and a mode of thinking, a style
of mental processing...'
a regular grab bag this - something for everyone
the key thing is Damasio wants to distinguish emotion
and feeling
'consonant with emotion'
so feeling is something else - consonant with emotion
and yes you can dress feeling up with themes and modes
and style
but I don't see the point
if you take Spinoza's definition of emotion - you have
an elegant simple and powerful conception - and there
is no theoretical need for this ring in 'feeling'
Damasio's 'feeling' is a straw man
'Feeling in the pure and narrow sense of the word,
was the idea of the body being in a certain way.
In this definition you can substitute idea for
'thought' or 'perception'. Once you looked beyond
the object that caused the feelings and the thoughts
and the mode of thinking consequent to it, the core
of the feeling came into focus. Its contents
consisted of representing a particular state
of the body.'
OK - essentially no different to Spinoza's definition
of emotion
'Feelings, in the sense used in this book, arise from
any set of homeostatic reactions, not just from emotions
proper.'
first up homeostasis is an explanation of phenomena
as in a theoretical account of what is happening
strictly speaking there are no homeostatic reactions -
there are reactions observed and explained as homeostatic
this confusion of phenomenal and the theoretical in
Damasio is endemic
secondly - what does he mean by emotions proper -
presumably something other than emotions
and what really does he think the term emotion refers to?
some background engine room?
and by all means create a science which generates
ontologies - but you have to have some observational-
experimental evidence - otherwise stick to poetry -
and call it poetry
'Feelings are perceptions, and I propose that the
most necessary support for their perception occurs
in the brain's body maps'.
'the brain's body maps'
again - a theoretical notion - designed proposed
conceived ultimately to try and explain observed
actions and reactions
feelings are perceptions
this idea he has of the brain's body maps - as the
most necessary support of the perceptions -
OK if support here means explanation
the brain's body map - only exists as an idea -
and he is saying this idea supports the idea of
feelings as perceptions
an argument for an argument
why is a feeling - a perception - why not a conception?
perception in science usually refers to the deliverance
of the senses
is this what Damasio thinks feelings are?
I don't think so
but I am yet to see what the point of perception is here
except I suppose he has to prop up his notion of feeling - with something and really -
anything would do - given that there is nothing to it anyway
why not say a feeling is an awareness - of - of what?
well I would go with Spinoza here - awareness of potency
awareness of increased capacity or decreased capacity -
i.e. pleasure and pain
perhaps the whole point of Damasio's endeavour is to
try and explain that when I say I feel - it is equivalent
to saying - the brain feels - or my brain feels -
and he wants to give this notion of a feeling brain
some creds with his home boys - the neuro-bios
to locate feeling in the brain -
to say an attribute of the brain is feeling -
is to what?
presumably from a scientific point of view
it is to observe feeling in the brain
therefore feeling as an observable - objective phenomena?
what Damasio does - is put up a concept of the brain -
and argue that - within this concept we can scientifically
recognize feeling
this though is to 'observe' theory - with theory
also within this - the notion of feeling - is to function
for Damasio (sometimes) - as a theoretical concept
phenomena
straight out - cause and effect - objectively observed -
is lost
has been supplanted by a theoretical model - masquerading
as phenomena
the problem here is - mistaking theory for phenomena
and the reason for this - in Damasio's case - is he wants
to give an objective account of a non-objective state
(and further to give it - top grade flesh and blood)
feeling is an internal state - it is not out there to
be observed
Damasio wants to observe feeling - or suggest with a few
neuro-bio models - tricks of his trade - this can be done
not so much - smoke and mirrors - just a series of mirrors -
