I made the point earlier that Spinoza is not a mind-brain
identity theorist in that he doesn't equate the mind with
the brain - this is true
but by the same token it is true to say that Damasio's
work on the brain is work on the mind
the mind is everything - covers everything - so - indeed
an understanding of the brain is an understanding
of the mind -
the brain as mind
so - yes there is a sense in which - while Spinoza is not
an identity theorist - the identity thesis is not incompatible
with his view
and another point to make
perhaps quite a radical one -
and it is that one could say that for Spinoza the mind
is a non-issue
if nothing is not the mind
where's the problem?
so you could well read Spinoza as effectively disposing
of the problem -
scientists can get on with their work - without fear of
contradicting Spinoza's metaphysics
business as usual -
so I'm not sure given this view of the situation -
in what sense Spinoza's metaphysics can have any real
relevance at all to good science - and good science
of the brain /(mind)
perhaps his insights are of use to Antonio Damasio -
however - the point is - nothing Spinoza has to say
really has any empirical implications - and Spinoza
would argue that good science doesn't impact one way or
another on his metaphysics
Damasio has written a fine book - which among other
things may lead some readers to think that while science
is indeed important for the working out of detail -
metaphysics is where it is at for the big picture -
and finally and therefore - 'metaphysics' is just that -
'before physics'
