we can observe the actions of the brain
form hypotheses - theories - draw up maps
we can then experiment to see what mental states are
associated with what regions etc.
what we are doing here is correlating mental and
physical states
if you ask - what is pain?
I can point to a region of the brain and it's activity -
and say this is the physical - neural expression of the
ideas that X has when he reports having painful images
in so doing I am assuming that the neural behaviour
is what - is reflected mentally -
is this so?
am I saying - one is the other?
or that both are expressions of something else
let's call it - 'more fundamental'
Spinoza called it substance
substance in the mode of a human being
but substance nevertheless - that which the physical
and mental are expressions of
we can only know this substance in these terms -
physical and mental
it is not as if substance is a third reality
in so far as we describe the physical and mental as
attributes
we can say they are attributes of -
substance
but in reality the physical and the mental are all
we know
so
when I experience pain
what is it?
is it - a physical expression
a mental expression?
both
so what sense - pain - the unified experience
here I don't think we can avoid going down the
substance route
the underlying reality
the unity
the experience that is pain
is
not known
we don't know what it is -
and for that matter what anything is -
any experience
short of a physical description and / or a mental
description
the thing in itself - experience
is not known
until that is we apply physical and mental predicates
I make this point to give some credence to the idea
of the unity of experience
it is to say the unified experience is unknown
the experience as known is divided
this analysis -
might in some way give some sense to what I think
Damasio was trying to do with his concept 'feeling' -
the place where physical and mental meet - are one
it is just that in my view - that place is not definable
- or characterizable
and I mean that in the strictest sense
the 'unknown' as I am using the term - is just that
i.e. - it is not 'an unknown substance'
or a 'thing in itself'
I put my argument in non-ontological terms
as simply the absence of knowledge
but just back to experience feeling and pain for a
moment
when I say experience is unknown
what this means is that it is unknown in an analytical
sense
what I experience - yes I describe as pain
this description - is not reflective
it is immediate - it is a given
given in the sense of what is presented
given - phenomenally
theoretical analysis will show I believe that the greater
the depth of the analysis the less that is known - and
finally - if there is an end to this - the end is the end of
knowledge
p.s.
I think it is important to understand that for Spinoza
the correlation of mental to physical as in what Damasio
does as a neuro-biologist is not an empirical matter
Spinoza was not putting forward an empirical hypothesis
his argument about the relationship of mind and body is
not touched either way by any empirical experiments
so - all the neurological research in the world - actually
has no bearing on his claims
for this reason you might question the whole basis of
his argument
this fact does explain why scientists have not paid much
attention to Spinoza - for right or wrong he has nothing
to say about what they do - if by that is meant proper
empirical research
it also follows that any attempt to show that empirical
research supports Spinoza's theory of the mind / body is
misguided
