Hegel 137

Hegel's Pheneomenology of Spirit:

137.


ARGUMENT:


Force is itself this universal medium in which the moments subsist as 'matters' - or in
other words - Force has expressed itself - and what was supposed to be something else
soliciting it is really force itself

it exists as the medium of the unfolded matters

but equally essentially it has the form of the supercession of the subsisting matters - or
is essentially a One




COMMENTARY:


it is clear that 'Force' becomes a characterization of the unconditioned universal - of a
One

and what this tells us is that the unconditioned universal - is undefined - it can
function as a ground for definition

in this case the idea that is being run through the universal is force

one gets the impression that any notion could have its place here -

that Hegel's universal does not discriminate regarding its use

this is OK - but what it really points to is that this universal is an unknown that
becomes the ground for description - in this case 'force' - but anything is possible

we can also see from this that language has meaning given particular use - given a
particular slant -

the term 'force' is a term that is designed to function in e.g. a dynamic context - in a
context that is - in which we wish to explain movement -

how far you want to go with this depends on how far you think the concept extends

if you end up thinking of it in a holistic way - the particularity of the concept is by
definition lost - you move into the realm of such indefinite terms as 'one', 'universal'
etc.

and its really at this point that function is lost

and this is why in my view such terms as 'universal' 'one' 'totality' are of no use

they are actually not positive concepts though they are often presented as such - they
are in fact non-functional concepts - that have been mistakenly accorded significance

perhaps this is overstating the case a little

clearly such concepts have function - but only in a formal sense

whereas when it comes to force e.g. we are dealing with a concept that defines action

we can I think also say of these formal concepts that in a metaphysical sense - they
function as signs of the unknown

they function as markers of the foundationless ground of consciousness and the world

Hegel 136

Hegel's Pheneomenology of Spirit:

136.


ARGUMENT:


the unconditioned universal is simply and solely the plurality of the diverse universals

the universal an undivided unity with this plurality

these 'matters' mutually interpenetrate but are independent

their unity directly unfolds its diversity and once again reduces itself to unity

this movement is what is called Force

one of its movements - the dispersal of the independent matters in their immediate
being is the expression of Force

but force taken as that in which they have disappeared is Force proper - Force that has
been driven back into itself from its expression

Force exists only in thought

what has been posited is the Notion of force - not its reality

in fact Force is the unconditioned universal - which is equally in its own self what it is
for another - or which contains the difference in its own self

in order then that Force may in truth be - it must be set free from thought - it must be
posited as the substance of these differences

Force exists as an exclusive One - for which the unfolding of the different matters is
another subsisting essence - and thus two distinct independent aspects are set up

these differences are superficial vanishing moments

there would be no Force if it did not exist in these opposite ways

these two moments exist independently and supersede themselves

in general it is clear that the movement is nothing else than the movement of
perceiving

thus the movement which was the destruction of contradictory notions - has objective
form and is the movement of Force

the outcome of which is the unconditioned universal as something not objective but
rather the inner being of things


COMMENTARY:


the inner being of things - if indeed things have an inner being - is consciousness

the nature of consciousness is that it is inner - that it is internality

this is the essence of consciousness and effectively nothing more can be said of it

there are no substantial issues to the question of consciousness -

consciousness is not a substance - it is a dimension - the internal dimension that is
awareness

consciousness recognizes consciousness directly - which is to say internality
recognizes internality

or dimensional entities recognize dimensional entities - perhaps it is a recognition of
type

the point is not all entities have an internal dimension -

I would put it to you that from what we can see most of reality is one-dimensional

consciousness is thus exceptional

and what this amounts to is to say much of reality is one-dimensional - simply
externality

some of reality has an internal dimension

not very neat logically - somewhat skew-whiff - nevertheless - from what we can see
that's how it is -

such an argument would not sit well with Hegel - it is clear he does not want
exceptions in his universe

he has represented the object as an argument from consciousness - and
extended this description - as a matter of logic to everything

so the world of the universal and the universals within the universal - and the
movements of these universals - the movements of difference and unity - is for Hegel
not just a construction an invention an imagination of consciousness - but rather the
objective reality of the world outside of consciousness -

the hard and pure reality is that the world outside of consciousness is unknown

Hegel has indeed resisted this conclusion with every trick of the trade - and yes his
resistance has resulted in a rather magnificent work of art - one is often reminded of a
painter of grand scale and style when reading Hegel -

nevertheless the truth is any work that begins - only begins on a blank canvas

Hegel knows his grand picture is only a picture - and he has it mind for it to be the
reality - that is pictured - and for this picture and its reality to in some sense be one

for that to happen we need something to kick start it off the page - or out of the mind

enter force -

now the universal is force - and force of course will get everything moving

this jump from concept to reality here is reminiscent of the ontological argument of
Anselem

Hegel 135

Hegel's Pheneomenology of Spirit:

135.


ARGUMENT:


the unconditioned universal is an object for consciousness - there emerges in it the
distinction of form and content - and in the shape of content the moments look like
they did in the first presentation - on one side - a universal medium of many subsistent
'matters' - on the other a One reflected into itself - in which their independence is
extinguished

these moments exist only in this universality - they are no longer separated from one
another - they are essentially self-superseding aspects - and what is posited is only
their transition into one another


COMMENTARY:


I have an argument with Hegel regarding his unconditioned universal - either it is
unconditioned or it is not -

if it is unconditioned it is without form and content - it is pre these conditions

and as such it is correctly understood as the unknown -

and in my terms the description 'unconditioned universal' can be dropped altogether

on the other hand if Hegel is offering a theory of the object - his unconditioned
universal as stated above - all very well - this is a reflective argument concerning the
unknown -

as I have said before as a theory of the unknown such a creation is in principle as good
as any other

but let's be absolutely clear here - what we are talking about is a theory of the object of
consciousness -

a theory of - the object is not this theory - the theory is a response to the object - and
here I mean the object is pre any such theory - the object 'in itself' is unknown - and
remains so regardless of one's ingenuity and imagination

Hegel 134

Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit:

134.


ARGUMENT:


consciousness negated its one-sided notions and abstracted them - it gave them up -
but the result is the unity of 'being-for-self' and 'being-for-another'

the absolute antithesis is posited as a self-identical essence

being-for-self and being-for-another are the content as well as the form of the
moments in reciprocal relation

but being-for-self and being-for-another are the content itself since the antithesis in its
truth can have no other nature than the one yielded in the result - that the content
taken in perception is true - belongs in fact only to form - in the unity which is
dissolved

the content is likewise universal

no particular content could fail to fall within this unconditioned universality

in general to be for itself and to be in relation to an other constitutes the nature and
essence of the content - whose truth consists in it being unconditionally universal


COMMENTARY:


I would put that Hegel's unconditioned universal which he argues constitutes the
nature and essence of content - is effectively an abstraction that is empty of content -
and is a theoretical devise designed to empty content from perception -

for it is true that in the unconditioned universal there is no negation -

the reason for this - is I suggest - there is nothing to negate

the unconditioned universal is being put up as a category of knowledge that has no
content - it comes at the end of a rather tortuous logical route

what it amounts to is this - that reflective consciousness reveals perceptual
/ conceptual posits as ultimately without epistemological content - that is as unknowns

what I have put is that the object of consciousness is unknown - reflection on this I say
- simply - finally reflects this reality -

this is the reality of the 'unconditioned universal'

in the meantime - between immediate perception - the perceptual unknown - and the
reflective unknown - is the operating reality of consciousness in the world

it is between the unknowns of perception and reflection that the world we deal with -
with all its features in tact - is to be found

veridical reality and its interpretations - is the world we operate in

the illusion of knowledge is the operating basis of consciousness in the world

consciousness is aware of the uncertainty of its posits - and finally of the relation that
creates them - and yet at the same time recognizes the absolute necessity of these
posits

these posits - which finally comes down to consciousness and its object - are real -
though uncertain - they are the 'foundations' of the world we operate in

they are nothing more or nothing less than operational posits

consciousness can never escape consciousness - to have any sense of itself - it must
hold itself as object -

this holding of the self as object - this subject positing itself as object - reveals a
complete absence of self knowledge

self knowledge I would suggest is an operating illusion of consciousness

Hegel 133

Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit:

133.


ARGUMENT:


with this Understanding consciousness has superseded its own untruth and the untruth
of its object

what has emerged is the Notion of True - but this is not yet a Notion - it lacks the
being-for-self of consciousness

the Understanding without knowing itself - lets go its own way -

this truth follows out of its own essence - consciousness plays no part in its realization
- it simply apprehends it

we must step into its place and be the Notion which develops and fills out

it is through awareness of this fully developed object that consciousness first becomes
a consciousness that comprehends its object


COMMENTARY:


consciousness superseding its own truth and its object's - is to point out that
consciousness posits or holds the object in awareness - and so too consciousness
posits or holds itself in awareness -

and the reason for this is the first realization of consciousness - that its object is
unknown - and the second realization is that it (consciousness) is unknown

whatever thus comes to be the object and the awareness of the object is never held
with certainty - consciousness deals with the world and with itself as uncertain posits

and this fact is the origin of consciousness' creativity - what I guess Hegel would call
its movement

the movement of consciousness is no more than its uncertainty in action

truth in fact is just a marker for consciousness - if a state of consciousness is marked
as true it is viewed as having function - if false - the marke is do not proceed - go
directly to jail

this fully developed object is just the unknown with layers of clothes - and the truth of
this adornment is only to do with whether these accessories enable the object to have
the function consciousness intends

Hegel 132

Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit:


III. FORCE AND THE UNDERSTANDING: APPEARANCE AND THE SUPERSENSIBLE WORLD

132.


ARGUMENT:


seeing and hearing have been lost to consciousness - and as perception consciousness
has arrived at thoughts - which it brings together in the unconditioned universal

if this was an inert simple substance - it would be one extreme of being-for-self - for
it would be confronted with non-essence - but if so it would be unessential - and
consciousness would not have escaped the deceptions of the perceptual process

however this universal has returned into itself out of conditioned being-for-self

this unconditional universal which is the true object of consciousness - is still just an
object for it

consciousness has not yet grasped the notion of the unconditioned as Notion

it is essential to distinguish the two -

for consciousness the object has returned into itself from its relation to another and
has become Notion in principle - but consciousness is not yet for itself the Notion -
and consequently does not recognize itself in that reflected object

for us this object has developed through the movement of consciousness and
consciousness is involved in that development - and the reflection is the same both
sides - there is only one reflection

but since this is movement consciousness has for its content objective essence and not
consciousness as such

consciousness shrinks away from what has emerged and takes its essence in the
objective sense


COMMENTARY:


clearly Hegel wants to argue that self-consciousness or consciousness of
consciousness - consciousness holding itself as object - is an outcome a development
of consciousness' movement

in general on this issue I wish to say consciousness is self-consciousness

that it makes no sense at all to speak of awareness that is not in some sense aware of
itself

all awareness is self-aware

and I argue this is just what distinguishes consciousness from its primary object - the
non-conscious

the conscious dimension of an entity is the internality of that entity - the non-
conscious - the externality - is in the first place the body and then the external world the
body exists in

also it is clear that this primary distinction of consciousness and non-consciousness -
of internality and externality - mind and body - is only possible because consciousness
is aware of itself

it is this awareness (of self) that is at the basis of notion - of distinction

consciousness just does distinguish itself and it can only do this if it is aware of itself

and here too is the foundation of logic - for it is in consciousness' awareness of itself
that negation is introduced -

because of its awareness and the distinction this implies - consciousness is thus aware
of what it is not

and this 'what it is not' - is the basis on which - the 'other' is recognized and defined

just a note - it is important to see that consciousness does not as many philosophers -
principally Descates - have thought - see the body primarily as its negation

consciousness recognizes itself as internality - consciousness sees itself as the internal
dimension of an operating unity - the non-conscious dimension of which is the body

so in this sense consciousness sees the body as itself revealed

and itself as the body hidden

the unity which is consciousness and non-consciousness - that is in a non-dimensional
sense - is unknown

Hegel 131

Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit:

131.


ARGUMENT:


empty abstractions of 'singleness' 'universality' 'essence' 'non-essential' - whose
interplay is conceptual understanding - are often called 'sound common sense'

philosophy recognizes them in their perceptual determinateness - whereas common
sense takes them for the truth - as substantial material content - in fact they hold sway
over it

the essentialities in fact run to and fro through all material and content

they are what the sensuous is as essence for consciousness - and it is through them
that the process of perception and its truth runs its course

this course of perceptual alteration constitutes everyday life and activity of
consciousness

in each single moment it is conscious only of this one determinateness - and then in
turn the opposite one

it does suspect their unessentiality - and resorts to the sophistry of asserting to be true
what is declared untrue

the nature of these untrue essences tries to bring together and thereby supersede the
thoughts of these non-entities

the understanding makes itself responsible for one thought in order to keep the other
one isolated - but the nature of the abstractions brings them together

it is sound common sense that is prey to these abstractions

it calls their deceptiveneess a semblance of the unreliability of Things

when the understanding separates what is essential from what is unessential - it does
not secure their truth but convicts itself of untruth


COMMENTARY:


these abstractions are based on nothing - that is there is no knowledge behind them -

they exist - Hegel's abstractions and anyone else's - as explanations of the relation of
consciousness to its object -

they are that is tools for organization - for procedure and ultimately for action

consciousness which has no basis in itself manufactures categories to function as basis
- as foundation -

the object as unknown is not diminished by these efforts - it remains unknown and for
this reason the categories hoisted onto it never sit with any authority -

they are infected by the nature of the thing - that is consciousness is aware even as it
uses such concepts - that they have no foundation - that they are just responses to the
unknown - and thus finally without basis

it is not that consciousness is involved in a conflict of truth over its abstractions - one
minute true - the next false -

the truth is just that consciousness knows it does not know - there is no conflict here

and truth is what functions - is what enables - clearly there will not be no end to such
an endeavour - and whatever is useful to this enterprise will find its place

its dangerous to speculate about the nature of common sense - but in my view what
common sense points to is conceptual openness

absolutes tend to be the refuge of insecurity - the trick is to underdstand that insecurity
is the grain of being - that it is the essential intrigue of conscious being

Hegel 130

Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit:

130.


ARGUMENT:


the singular being of sense vanishes in the dialectical movement of immediate
certainty and becomes universality

my meaning vanishes and perception and perception takes the object as it is in itself or
as a universal

singular being emerges in the object as true singleness - as the in-itself of the One - or
as a reflectedness-into-self

this is still a conditioned being-for-self - along which appears another being-for-self -
the universality that is opposed to and conditioned by singular being

these two contradictory extremes are in a single unity

being-for-self is burdened with opposition i.e. is at the same time not a being-for-self

the sophistry of perception seeks to save these moments by distinguishing between the
aspects - by sticking to the 'Also' and 'in so far as' - and finally distinguishing the
unessential from an essence

these expedients instead of warding off deception in the process of apprehension
- prove to be empty

the truth of this logic of perceptual process - proves to be in one and the same respect
the opposite of itself - and to have an essence of universality devoid of distinctions
and determinations


COMMENTARY:


sense experience as the immediate connection of consciousness to the world outside
itself - is strictly speaking without content

consciousness reflects on this immediacy and gives it form and content

the singular being of sense does not vanishes - it was only ever there as the contact of
consciousness with the unknown

my meaning is never definitive - perception regards the object as a sophisticated
unknown - that can be characterized and thus can be grasped for use

the 'single unity' does not burden us with contradictory extremes - the object is simply essentially and unessentially - unknown

how consciousness regards the single unity - depends on whether or not there is a clear conception
of use

it is not a matter of 'also' and 'in so far as' - consciousness deals with possibilities of
definition - possibilities of use - and the object does not have these possibilities -
outside of consciousness - the object as a question of use becomes a range of
possibilities

conception which is really only the operation of consciousness on perception -is never
without distinctions and determinations

that is so long as human beings have to act

Hegel 129

Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit:

129.


ARGUMENT:


thus the object in pure determinateness (essential being) is overcome just as surely as
it was in its sensuous being -

from sensuous being it turned into a universal - but this universal originated in the
sensuous and is conditioned by it - and thus not a truly self-identical universality at all
- but one affiliated with opposition

for this reason the universality splits into two extremes of singular individuality and
universality - into the One of the properties and the Also of 'free matters'

these pure determinatenesses seem to express essential nature itself - but they are only
a 'being-for-self' that is burdened with 'being-for-another'

as both are essentially in a single unity - what we have no is an unconditioned
absolute universality - and consciousness for the first time enters into Understanding


COMMENTARY:


what we have from Hegel is a series of descriptions of the object - and he believes that
the incompatibility of these descriptions - the fact that they 'contradict' each other - is
really because the object itself is contradictory -

first as I pointed put earlier contradiction is a relation between propositions - that is
descriptions of the world - it is not a fact of the object of these descriptions -

it is just that the object is described variously

now there are a number of ways of accounting for this

my view is that the object itself is unknown - and that consciousness gives it
characterization in the form of description

now consciousness itself is essentially uncertain - hence possibility - possibility of
description - and the fact of various descriptions

you might say that the object of consciousness is still (perhaps eternally so) - but
consciousness is not - it is not stillness -

granted it reaches for definition - definitiveness - absoluteness - stillness

this you might say is the desire of consciousness

but it is a desire that is never satisfied just because consciousness itself is without
definition - indefinite - unessential and contingent

perhaps it is desire that is definitive - not that desired

we might say the object - the objective world - a world of things - suggests a
stillness - and consciousness follows that suggestion - but in terms of that suggestion
the result is always futile

I've got a little away from myself here -

my point is that really Hegel is not in his metaphysics of the object addressing the
object at all - rather what he is doing is characterizing the movement of consciousness

Hegel confuses the object of consciousness with consciousness

also he assumes that consciousness knows what is the case

the truth is rather that consciousness never knows what is the case - hence
metaphysics

Hegel 128

Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit:

128.


ARGUMENT:


with this the last 'in so far as' that separated being-for-self from being for another falls
away

on the contrary the object is in one and the same respect the opposite of itself -

it is for itself in so far as it is for another - and for another in so far as it is for itself

it is for itself reflected into itself - a One

but this 'for -itself' this being as a One is posited in a unity with its opposite - being-
for-another - and hence canceled out

in other words this being-for-itself is just as unessential - as the only aspect that was
supposed to be unessential - being-for-another


COMMENTARY:

we may wish to - but we cannot say - what is essential to reality - or existence

Spinoza I think would say existence is its own essence -

as I see it such a statement it is to say there is no essence to existence -

that indeed as Hegel has just argued - existence is unessential

that there is nothing but what is -

how we describe what is - is of course another matter - a complex matter in fact - but
the object of description is simply all there is -

there is nothing behind the veil -

OK -

I would simply add to this that outside of what is presented to consciousness is what is
not known

though I would not say the unknown is essential -

the unknown - is just that - unknown

and what is known is certainly not essential - again it is just what it is - knowledge

and 'knowledge' (as far as it goes) is just consciousness' reflection on the unknown

and by reflection I also mean here - what is usually referred to as what is presented to
consciousness

the presentation is the initial - the primary reflection

we feel secure in the world that is given in consciousness - it is our world - our every
day world

but here it must be realized is a security based only on the presence of consciousness

and consciousness as with any other natural phenomenon or natural form is not
guaranteed - it simply is - at least at this moment

essence is the desire to find some underlying certainty for the uncertainty that is
consciousness in the world

it is a false argument if taken too seriously - however if regarded as just a way of
dealing with the unknown - it's as good as anything else put forward by Hegel - or for
that matter - anyone else

Hegel 127

Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit:

127.


ARGUMENT:


the object is defined as having within it an essential property which constitutes its
simple being for itself -

but along with this it contains a diversity which though necessary is not essential
determinateness

this distinction is nominal

the unessential which is none the less supposed to be necessary - cancels itself out

it is what has been called the negation of itself


COMMENTARY:


look the fact of it is that this 'essential property' that is 'simple being for itself' is
unknown

we can decorate the fact with such phrases - but in the end that is what it comes to - decoration

we may wish to think of things as having simple base properties or essences and also
on top of this a collection of non-essential properties - and this way of thinking may
well be very natural - ingrained - and as it were necessary if we are to do anything
with an object or objects of our focus

but really all this amounts to is that consciousness characterizes the unknown - gives it
some structure and utility

my own view is that strictly speaking we can't say for sure what the origin of this
characterization is - on the face of it there are two options - consciousness or the non-
conscious -

origin is not really the issue - and it can't be decided

we have what we have and we work with it

my immediate response to this issue would be to say consciousness imposes its
characterization on the unknown - and I think there is value in looking at it this way -
it does set up the issue quite sharply -

however my considered view is as I just mentioned that strictly speaking once this
perspective is understood - it too must be held in doubt

Hegel 126

Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit:

126.


ARGUMENT:


the Thing is posited as being for itself - or as the absolute negation of all otherness -
this is self-related negation

but the negation that is self-related is the suspension of itself - and so the thing has its
essential being in another Thing


COMMENTARY:


the thing as being for itself - what can we make of this?

'being for itself' must be being outside of consciousness -

of course we have no knowledge of this -

such being - for consciousness - is no more than a logical possibility

it is to say yes the world could be without consciousness -

and that such a world would exist not for consciousness - rather for itself

for 'being in consciousness' it is fair to say is being for consciousness

that is from consciousness' point of view

bearing in mind there is no other 'point of view'

in the sense that consciousness is the focus - brings a focus to being - that which is the
object of the focus - from the point of view of that focus - exists for that focus

OK - this though is what you have to call a consciousness-centric view

and yes - this is not a criticism per se - for indeed the practical reality of consciousness
in the world is that consciousness is metaphysically central

however we can think beyond such - or outside of such a conception

we can imagine a world without consciousness

and if we do this we are imagining a world without self

and in such a world the categories of being for itself and being for another - do not
apply

all you have is being -

now you can call this pure being if you like - or give it some other poetic
characterization

the fact is that we are only speaking - and quite precisely - of what we cannot know

this is the result when consciousness imagines its non-existence you come squarely to
the unknown

Hegel 125

Hegel's Phenomenology of the Spirit:

125.


ARGUMENT:


the determinateness that defines a thing and distinguishes it from all others - puts it in
opposition to other things - also preserves its independence

its relationship with others establishes rather its continuity with others - and for it to
be connected with others is to cease to exist on its own account

it is the absolute character of the Thing and its opposition that it relates itself to
others - and is essentially only this relating

the relation is the negation of its self-subsistence - and it is really the essential
property of the thing that is its undoing


COMMENTARY:


they key concept here is uncertainty

the thing or entity in consciousness exists - even in phenomenal perception - as an
uncertain

its identity is unknown

how we describe it - what characteristics we operate with in relation to it - is
dependent on what we want to do with it - what function it is to have

and of course a thing can have many functions and many descriptions - all of which
are useful and true

i.e. - from the point of view of atomic science we do not regard the thing as 'a table' -
rather as an atomic structure or state

the reality outside of any description - is unknown

the object of consciousness - the focus of consciousness does not have any
absolute description or function

knowledge is an attempt to deal with the world outside of consciousness

consciousness presents an alternative to the unknown

how that alternative - in whatever form it takes - functions - is not a matter that is
decided in any independent sense -

we simply make our decisions and run with them - and in the course of this running
make assessments (finally based on nothing) as to whether these decisions have or
have not borne fruit - whatever we decide that is to be - or is to mean

Hegel 124

Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit:

124.


ARGUMENT:


the contradiction present in the objective essence - is that the thing is self-identical
and its otherness is preserved - this contradiction is distributed among different things

different things exist on their own account - and the conflict is that each is different
from the other

each is determined as being a different thing - and its essential difference is its own
self

its self is a simple determinateness

it is an actual difference manifoldly constituted

but this manifold - in that it distinguishes a thing from others is unessential

thus the thing does have the twofold 'in so far as' within its unity - but the aspects are
unequal in value

this opposition does not develop into an actual opposition in the thing itself - but is an
opposition of the thing to that outside itself


COMMENTARY:


Hegel is here saying what distinguishes things is not essential to the individual things
- rather that it is unessential

and he says what determines the identity of anything - is essential

any account of the nature of a thing - of the logic of a thing will if it is successful
distinguish that thing from all other things

so I am saying that there is an argument that the essence of a thing is what it is not -
that is what is excluded from its definition

on such a view a thing is that which is not-known -

and it is to say we define entities negatively

that definition is a negative description

it is to put - is it not that 'x' is -x?

where 'x' here is a focus of consciousness - an entity to be described

and '-x' - the account of what x excludes?

my general point is that to define an entity with any precision will always entail a
characterization of what it is not -

for it is only in terms of what it is not - that we are able to differentiate it from
everything else

a corollary of this is that we cannot define everything - or the totality - or 'the' one -
just because there is nothing to distinguish it from

the way consciousness determines its focus is by determining what it is not

the focal point is therefore never grasped positively - only negatively

what is clear here I think is that the essence of consciousness is negation

consciousness brings negation into play in the world

and it is through negation that it determines and distinguishes

negation is the essential operating category of consciousness

can we say that negation is consciousness?

that into a 'world of assertion' consciousness brings negation?

and the game is on

Hegel 123

Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit:

123.


ARGUMENT:


the object is now for consciousness the whole movement previously shared between
object and consciousness

the Thing is a One reflected into itself - it is for itself but also for another - a being
that is doubly differentiated but also a One - but the Oneness contradicts this diversity

hence consciousness would have to assume responsibility for placing the diversity into
the one - and for keeping it away from the Thing

it would have to say that in so far as it is for itself - the thing is not for an other

but the Oneness also belongs to the Thing itself as consciousness has found by
experience - the thing is essentially reflected into itself

the Also - or the indifferent difference falls as much within the Thing as it does the
Oneness - but since the two are different they do not fall within the same Thing - but
different things

the contradiction that is present in the objective essence as a whole is distributed
between two objects

in and for itself the Thing is self-identical - but this unity of the Thing is disturbed by
other Things

the unity is preserved - and at the same time the otherness is preserved outside of the
Thing and outside of consciousness


COMMENTARY:


consciousness recognizes what it is not -

it is not that which is outside of itself - it is not that is - its object

this is a base fact essential to the logic of consciousness

it is this fact which is the source of consciousness' identity -

its identity is essentially - what it is not -

consciousness can reflect oo consciousness - and this is self-consciousness

the reflection of consciousness on itself reveals that it is - what it is not

and for all intents and purposes this is as good as it gets

that consciousness knows itself as what it is not

as to positive definition of consciousness by consciousness -

this does not occur -

the drama of this fact has led though to positive definitions -

and these are really definitions in panic

we hear it said that consciousness is spirit - is soul is mind etc.

but really consciousness is what its object is not -

there is a beauty in this definition - it is non-substantial - it is purely logical -

my specific point here is that the object is never compromised by consciousness

the object outside of consciousness is unknown

consciousness gives it knowledge - that is description -

the object is not a movement - it is a point of focus -

the thing is an unknown - it is given description in the action of consciousness

the giving of description - does not in any way alter the object - rather description
gives the object possibilities of use and function

different descriptions will give the object different possibilities - different utilities

the thing itself does not reflect - this if nothing else defines the thing - as what it is -
and what it is not

it is not consciousness

the relation of consciousness to its object - which is the phenomenal world - is a
relation of clarity and uncertainty -

this just is the relationship - it can be no otherwise -

we perceive the world clearly - the world is clear -

nevertheless on reflection - in reflection - it is uncertain

my view is that uncertainty is the gift of consciousness

that in a world without consciousness - no categories of thought would apply

we would simply have what is unknown

Hegel 122

Hegel's Phenomenology of the Spirit:

122.


ARGUMENT:


we see consciousness alternately makes itself - as well as the thing - into both a pure
many-less One - and into an Also that resolves itself into independent matters

consciousness finds - that not only its truth perceiving contains the distinct moments
of apprehension - and withdrawal into itself - but rather that the truth itself - the
Thing - reveals itself in this twofold way

our experience then is this that the Thing exhibits itself 'for the consciousness
apprehending it' in a specific manner - but is at the same time reflected out of the way
in which it presents itself to consciousness and back into itself

in other words - it contains in itself an opposite truth to that which it has for the
apprehending consciousness


COMMENTARY:


the relation between consciousness and its object - or consciousness and the Thing is
that of revelation

consciousness reveals - the object of consciousness is revealed

the revelation then is a revelation in consciousness

that which is revealed has the characteristics that are revealed

strictly speaking we cannot say whether these characteristics come from
consciousness to the object - or from the object to consciousness

there just is no way to decide this issue

all you can logically say is that what is revealed is revealed

so what we are talking about here is not consciousness 'and' the object or visa versa

what the revelation reveals is a relation

it is the relation that is revealed -

and it is because it is the relation that is revealed we can say - that what is revealed in
consciousness is just what consciousness reveals

that is that there is a complete correspondence

this is the first moment of consciousness - and it is what appears to be sure

the second moment of consciousness is reflection -

it is here that it becomes known that this initial correspondence - is without any
foundation - and even more devastatingly that we cannot characterize consciousness
or its object in any sustainable way -

that is to say consciousness and its object are 'doubfuls' (to use a kind of Hegelian
term)

my point is you have the initial revelation - but a revelation is all that it is -

on reflection it is seen to be without a basis -

this does not take away from its reality -

what it does is show us that its reality is purely phenomenal

that there is nothing we can point to with any certainty - behind this appearance - this
revelation -

in fact all that is revealed there is uncertainty

we are left simply with what occurs -

we may wonder at this - and yes we do - and in response to this wonder we attempt to
give the phenomenal some underpinning -

this epistemological endeavour though is not really to do with the phenomena at all -

granted this is the almost universal assumption - that we are in theorizing foundations
- giving phenomena an epistemological basis and content -

in fact as I have pointed out - this can't be done

and if so the epistemological enterprise needs to be re-evaluated

what I suggest is that the whole business of epistemological is to do with utility -

that is how to operate with - to utilize - to work with the given phenomena

in practical terms i.e. it is often seen to be necessary to give our perceptions a basis
that is not perceived - in order to make the perception operable

so epistemology and indeed metaphysics are sciences of operation - sciences of action

the whole point of speculation is to find the best way forward -

I don't think that speculation ever actually delivers here - but it does give that
appearance

the final point is that we ultimately do not know - how to proceed - and this is of
crucial importance -

but nevertheless we must - and so we do - and speculation gives us options

options that is for dealing with the unknown

Hegel 121

Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit:

121.


ARGUMENT:


now in perceiving in this way consciousness is also reflected into itself

in perceiving the opposite moment to the Also turns up

this moment is the unity of thing with itself

this unity consciousness takes upon itself

for the thing itself is the subsistence of the many diverse and independent properties

positing a thing's properties as a oneness is the work of consciousness - and therefore
consciousness has to prevent them from collapsing into oneness in the Thing

it introduces the 'in so far' - preserving the properties as mutually external - and the
thing as the Also

the oneness here which was called a property is represented as 'free matter'

the Thing is raised to the level of a genuine Also - since it becomes a collection of
matters - and instead of being One becomes the enclosing surface


COMMENTARY:


firstly -

consciousness reflecting into itself - just is the issue of consciousness -

the fact of it is really not at issue - the question is - what does this mean - what sort of
'thing' reflects into itself -

the reflectivity of consciousness does distinguish it from the non-conscious -

but can we explain it?

can we explain its logic?

in the case of a physical reflection - i.e. - a mirror reflection - the reflection is external
to the thing reflected

what does it mean to reflect into the thing

what is reflected in?

is it consciousness -

or is it an awareness of consciousness?

and how does consciousness 'hold itself'?

and if it does not hold itself in reflection -

can it be said to reflect into itself?

I am hoping Hegel will throw some light on all of this -

just to say consciousness reflects into itself is really where the issue of consciousness
begins -

secondly -

it's clear isn't it that all conscious perception is the perception of a diversity in one -
and indeed a diversity of 'ones'?

this is just what happens in conscious apprehension

and what this diversity in unity leaves us with is uncertainty

and that I would say just is the revelation of consciousness - uncertainty

Hegel's 'free matter' here is simply a tag for the unknown -

and yes the thing is of the surface of the world - it is of the external dimension

consciousness is the inside of the world -

it is internality

and indeed the external world encloses the internal

Hegel 120

Hegel's Phenonenology of Spirit:

120.


ARGUMENT:


the diverse aspects for which consciousness accepts responsibility are specifically
determined - white is white only in opposition to black etc.

and the Thing is one precisely by being opposed to others

it is not by being a One that a thing excludes others from itself - for to be a One is the
universal relating of self to self - it is through its determinateness that it excludes
others

things are therefore in and for themselves determinate - they have properties by which
they distinguish themselves

the Thing has a number of properties

in the first place the thing is what is true - it possesses intrinsic being - and what is in
it is the thing's essence

secondly - the determinate properties do not exist on account of other things - and for
other things - but in the Thing itself - they are determinate properties in it because they
are a plurality of reciprocally self-differentiating elements

they exist in and for themselves

the Thing is the Also - or the universal medium in which many properties subsist apart
from one another


COMMENTARY:


my argument is that pre-consciousness - what exists is unknown - and that therefore
the object of knowledge - is the unknown

consciousness reveals the world - as the revelation of consciousness

so yes the sky is blue the grass is green and the farmer and his tractor are coming up
the road

what we perceive is the revelation of consciousness

now the question - can we say that the world of veridical perception is a true account
of the nature of the world?

can we start at least with this assertion?

my answer is that we don't know -

what we do know is that such a world is revealed in consciousness - it is what we
know - because of consciousness -

outside of consciousness - or let us say in terms of some other form of consciousness -
some other revelation - the world may look entirely different to how we see it

or indeed it could be that how we see it just is the way it is -

the point is we can't know the answer here -

so we are wise to regard the deliverances of consciousness for just what they are -
deliverances of consciousness

why a thing is white and has certain shape or taste - why that focus of consciousness
yields those descriptions is not a question we can finally answer - we only have these
deliverances - and the explanation that they are not properties of the thing - but rather
descriptions of it given in consciousness

now we may wish to explain this and account for it - and to this end sciences have
been developed

clearly our perception of the world is determined by our physicality - that is the forms
of that perception are determined by the body

consciousness as the internal dimension of a two-dimensional being operates through
the agency of the body

this though is not to argue consciousness is of the external dimension - that it is
physical -

awareness is not an external property - it is therefore not a physical manifestation

even so we can understand something of the way consciousness receives the external
world through an understanding of its immediate external - the body

the limit though that science has to recognize here is that it is only ever a reflective
argument - that is an argument after awareness -

understanding the surface world (the body and beyond) is not to explain the internal
dimension

the internal dimension is the seeing - it is the seeing that is never seen

we do of course reflect on the nature of consciousness - but again this is awareness
holding itself as object -

the subject truly cannot be the object - so any internal focus of consciousness will only
reveal consciousness

the point being that consciousness though it reveals - is never revealed

Hegel 119

Hegel's Pheneomenology of Spirit:

119.


ARGUMENT:


I become aware of the thing as a One - and have to hold fast to it in this its true
character

if in the course of perceiving it something turns up which contradicts it - this is to be
recognized as a reflection of mine

there also occur in the perception various properties which seem to be properties of
the thing - but the thing is a one - and we are conscious that its diversity - by which it
would cease to be a one falls in us

so in point of fact the thing is one only to our eyes - tart to our tongue - cubical to our
touch

we get the entire diversity of these aspects - not from the thing - but from ourselves

and they fall asunder for us because the eye is distinct from the tongue etc.

we are thus the universal medium in which such moments are kept apart and exist
each on its own

through the fact then that we regard the characteristic of being a universal medium as
our reflection -we preserve the self-identity and truth of the thing - its being One


COMMENTARY:


the thing as one is no more than the focus of consciousness - consciousness defines
and determines its object

conscious definition is never fixed - so there is always the possibility of revision -
such revision though is always a result of a reflection on the initial perception

the fact that the object defined as one has properties does not take away from its unity

the properties are signs of the unity - they point to the unity -

the properties of a thing are our descriptions of it - they are our attempt to determine the
thing - to give it some utility - some possibility of function

no description is final - all descriptions are revisable - the thing in itself is unknown

it is true to say that the entire diversity of these aspects come from ourselves - and not
from the thing

and further that the very focus of consciousness - which is the thing - which makes an
unknown a thing of focus - likewise comes from ourselves

the focus of consciousness however it is defined is never the truth of the thing - except
in the sense that we decide that it is - and we do this for our purposes

'the thing' outside of consciousness is the unknown - consciousness describes -

the unknown though is not made by consciousness - it is the object of consciousness

Hegel 118

118.


ARGUMENT:


thus it becomes quite definite for consciousness how its perceiving is essentially
constituted - that it is not a simple pure apprehension - but in its apprehension is at the
same time reflected out of the True and into itself

this return of consciousness into itself which is directly mingled with the pure
apprehension of the object -

this return into itself alters the truth

consciousness at once recognizes this aspect as its own and takes responsibility for it -
by doing so it will obtain the pure object in its purity

we have in perception the same as happened in sense certainty - the aspect of
consciousness being driven back into itself - but not as this happened in sense
certainty - not as if the truth of perception fell in consciousness

on the contrary consciousness recognizes that it is the untruth occurring in perception
that falls within it

but by this recognition it is able to supersede this untruth

it distinguishes its apprehension of the truth from the untruth - and since it undertakes
to make this correction itself - the truth qua truth of perception falls within
consciousness

consciousness no longer merely perceives - but is conscious of its reflection into itself
- and separates this from simple apprehension


COMMENTARY:


consciousness' perceiving is a simple apprehension -

the object of this apprehension is given form and content in the act of conscious
attention

the object of consciousness - is embraced by consciousness

prior to conscious apprehension - the object is unknown

the essence of the object of apprehension - the fact that it is unknown will be at the
heart of any conscious apprehension and characterization

and in so far as this is the case - the truth is never altered - it is rather given new
clothes

the object as unknown is the pure object -

this reality is the pre-conscious reality -

consciousness imposes its categories on its object of focus - and these categories
function as the phenomenal dimensions of the object -

reflection on any of the attributes of the object apprehended - is to raise questions -

it is here that the uncertainty of the apprehension emerges

this uncertainty is a reflective uncertainty

yes the object in consciousness - as now an object of consciousness - is subject to the
nature of consciousness - and that is the essential uncertainty of consciousness

in reflection the object is uncertain

so it is in reflection that the true nature of the object of consciousness is revealed -

it is revealed as uncertain - and thus in any final sense - unknown

so we can say consciousness does not just perceive - but it reflects on its perception

however it is not the object that reflects to consciousness

the object is made by consciousness and reflected on by consciousness

before its making the object is unknown - after its making the object is unknown -
however in the making - the uncertain making - the object is given the possibility of
utility and function

Hegel 117

Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit:

117.


ARGUMENT:


the object which I apprehend presents itself purely as One - but I also perceive it as a
property that is universal - which thereby transcends the singularity of the object

the being of the objective essence of the one was therefore not its true being

but since the object is what is true - the untruth falls in me - my apprehension was not
correct

on account of the universality of the property - I must take the objective essence to be
on the whole a community

I now see the property to be determinate and opposed to another and excluding it

therefore the objective essence is not a community with others - on account of the
determinateness of the property I must break up the community - and posit the
objective essence as one that excludes

in the broken up One I find many properties that are mutually indifferent

therefore I do not apprehend the object correctly when I apprehend it as an exclusive

it is now a universal common medium in which many properties are present as
sensuous universalities

what I perceive as the simple and the true is not a universal medium - but the single
property by itself - which is neither a property or a determinate being - for now it is
neither in a One nor connected with others

only when it belongs to a One is it a property - and only in relation to others is it
determinate

as this relating of itself to itself - it remains merely sensuous being in general - since it
no longer possesses the character of negativity

and the consciousness that takes its object - as my object - has ceased to perceive and
has withdrawn into itself

sensuous being and my meaning pass over into perception -

I am thrown back to the beginning and drawn into the cycle which supersedes itself
each moment and as a whole


COMMENTARY:


the object I perceive is a possibility of description

it is in this state an unknown that is open to consciousness - open to interpretation

any conception of it - as e.g. - 'one' - is revisable - but nevertheless any such
description is true - as true as any other -

the truth of descriptions is determined by their use

the concepts that Hegel refers to here - the one - property - universal - common
medium etc. - are all in themselves valid -

that is the unknown can be defined and described in such terms -

for them to make sense we need to know their point or their use

what is clear from Hegel's analysis is the interconnectedness of such concepts and the
importance of argument -

argument is what relates one conception to another

on the conceptual level - the focus of consciousness - the unknown - becomes an
argument

here really is the beginning of objective status -

what was unknown is now argued - and as an 'argued' is at least a public entity - and
open to the possibility of description

Hegel 116

Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit:


116.


ARGUMENT:


consciousness is determined as percipient in so far as the Thing is its object

it has only to take it - to confine itself to a pure apprehension of it - and what is thus
yielded is the True

if consciousness did anything in taking what is given - it would by such adding or
subtracting alter the truth

since the object is the True and universal - the self-identical - while consciousness is
alterable and unessential - it can happen that consciousness apprehends the object
incorrectly and deceives itself

the percipient is aware of the possibility of deception - for in the universality which is
the principle - otherness itself is immediately present for him - though present as what
is null and superseded

his criterion for truth is self-identity - and his behaviour consists in apprehending the
object as self-identical

since diversity is explicitly there - it is a conception of the diverse moments of his
apprehension to one another

if a dissimilarity is felt in the course of this comparison - then this is not an untruth -
but an untruth in perceiving it


COMMENTARY:


consciousness is never determined - the essence of consciousness is indeterminacy

the object apprehended in the apprehension is made indeterminate

truth is a reflective argument of consciousness - in regard to its descriptions of that
apprehended

the 'object' apprehended is in itself neither true nor false

truth is a decision regarding propositions - their utility or not -

propositions are descriptions of what is presented to consciousness

to say a thing is self-identical - is simply to say it is a thing

identity per se is an illusion in this world - it is a mistaken concept -

every 'thing' that exists - exists as non-identical to any other thing

the object outside of consciousness is unknown - the object in consciousness is known
- as knowledge it exists as an indeterminate - this is the essence of its utility - its
indeterminateness -

the point is that our knowledge of the object is always an open question - that is it is
never finally resolved-

in practice we always run with some conception of the object of consciousness - but
no conception is fixed - the conception of the object - which is the object - holds only
in terms of its utility - conceptions change radically or ever so slightly depending on
how the knowledge functions

and the question of function is never determined - it simply just how we act - and
there are no absolutes in human action

there can be no incorrect apprehension - consciousness simply internalizes the outside
world -

what it does with this internalization - how the internalization is utilized - depends
entirely on the circumstance of the percipient - and here we include the state of the
body - the state of the immediate external -

all we can offer here is the possibility of different perspectives - different perspectives
determined by differing circumstances

what Hegel calls the awareness of the possibility of deception - is really only the
awareness of the indeterminacy of consciousness

there is no deception as there is no determinateness -

there is only indeterminacy and thus the possibility of differing perspectives

you never deceive yourself -

therefore the question of the truth of the apprehension is a meaningless question


NB.

consciousness and self-consciounsess

just a note here -

we do not have from Hegel as yet any real definition of consciousness -

and there has been to date no account of the nature of self-consciousness

I want to preempt here and put that all consciousness - is self-consciousness

that any distinction between consciousness and self-consciousness cannot be
maintained

my point is that all consciousness is aware of itself -

that is consciousness is aware of consciousness -

that it makes no sense to speak of consciousness as just aware of that which is outside
itself
for the awareness of the outside is just internalization

the object becomes consciousness

as such it is still the object of consciousness

but at the same time it is consciousness

it is subject and object

all consciousness is self-consciousness

consciousness by its nature is aware of itself

'itself' here is awareness

'awareness' thus by its nature is self-referring

this characteristic - self-reference - is what makes it awareness

it is what distinguishes consciousness from the non-consciousness

the non-conscious is not self-referring

it is simply what is - it is one dimensional

in relation to consciousness - it becomes the object of consciousness

further -

what are we to make of self-reference?

how can a subject refer to a subject?

we know this happens but how does it happen?

what is the logic of it?

the point is reference is based on the distinction of referee and referent

clearly if consciousness refers to itself - what you have is the identity of referee and
referent

on the face of it - this is not possible - if what we understand as reference is to occur

so sticking with this idea of reference - what is possible here?

that consciousness reflects itself

and that the reflection becomes the referent -

still the question - how does this happen?

perhaps we have no way of saying how this happens

but is it fair to say it must if self-reference is to occur?


p.s.


consciousness is internality

if it relects - it reflects out

its reflection that is - is its relation with the world outside itself

its reflection is this relation - inter-internal /external

the 'self' that consciousness knows is this relation

Hegel 115

Hegel's Phenomenolgy of Spirit:

115.


ARGUMENT:


the Thing as the truth of perception is:

(a) a indifferent passive universality - the also of many properties

(b) negation or the ONE which exclude opposite properties

(c) the many properties themselves - the relation of the first two moments or negation
as it relates to the indifferent element and expands into a host of differences - the
point of singular individuality in the medium of subsistence radiating forth into
plurality

in so far as these differences belong to the indifferent medium they are universal

they are related to themselves and do not affect one another

but in so far as they belong to the negative unity they are exclusive of other properties

they necessarily have this relationship of opposition to properties remote from their
Also

the sensuous universality - or the immediate unity of being and the negative is a
property only when the One and pure universality are developed from it - and
differentiated from each other - and when the sensuous universality unites them

it is this relation of the universality to the pure essential moments which at last
completes the thing

so in summary:

the thing is a passive universality of many properties - it is also the one which
excludes opposite properties and the point of singular universality that expresses
plurality

we can distinguish pure universality and the one - sensuous universality (sensuality)
unites them

the relation of universality to the essential moments (universalities) completes the
thing


COMMENTARY:


yes - 'the thing' presents as a singularity that expresses many properties -

the 'properties' are descriptions given of the thing

'the thing' is a description that functions as the reference for the descriptions (of the
properties)

that is it becomes the reference - the term itself I am saying is the reference for the
descriptions given to it -

the terms 'the thing' or 'the entity' - 'the object' etc. are base descriptions of the
unknown that is the subject of focus

they are good descriptions in that they are clearly content free

they are simple recognitions that the unknown is in play -

they announce the unknown and are true to it

description here is the defining of a domain - or should I say the assertion that a
domain is established - for the purpose of description

secondary descriptions - what Hegel would call properties - give the base description
character - give the domain content

at this point for all practical purposes the thing is known -

what acts are performed in relation to it are dependent on the secondary descriptions
put forward

that is its capacity is directly related to its description -

there is no necessity in relation to description

entities are transformed by being variously described

the thing in itself - what Hegel would refer to as a universal - is the unknown - in
focus - an unknown

when Hegel says the thing is a negation of the one that excludes opposite properties -
he is suggesting that the thing is fixed -

which in my terms would be to say there is one set of descriptions that apply to the
entity - and that is that -

rather I would suggest that the point about the thing as unknown is just that it is not bound by any description

true we will define a thing which means we will go with or run with a set of
descriptions - this is just a decision to utilize

what descriptions are used will depend on what purposes are in play - and how the
thing is to be utilized -

again there is no necessity in this

under different circumstance - inevitably different descriptions will be operative -

we can say it is the same thing because - whatever description - at heart the thing -the
object etc. - is unknown

description does not alter this fact - and this fact - the fact of the unknown - allows for
various descriptions and is indeed the source of the possibility of description

the thing is never fixed - it is though a focus of possible description

one's circumstances - and I mean this in the broadest possible terms - will suggest
appropriate description of that which is the subject of conscious focus

Hegel 114

Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit:

114.


ARGUMENT:


if the many determinate properties were strictly indifferent to one another - if the were
simply and solely related - they would not be determinate

for they are only determinate in so far as they differentiate themselves from one
another - and relate themselves to others as their opposites

yet thus opposed to one another they cannot be together in the simple unity of their
medium - which is just as essential to them as negation

the differentiation of the properties in so far as it is not an indifferent differentiation
but is exclusive - each property negating the others - falls outside the simple medium

therefore it is not merely an also - an indifferent unity - but a one as well - a unity which
excludes another

the one is the moment of negation - it is a relation of self to self - and it excludes
another - and it is that by which thinghood is determined as a thing

negation is inherent in a property as a determinateness - which is immediately one
with the immediacy of being - which is universality

as one however this determinateness is set free from this unity with its opposite - and
exists in and for itself


COMMENTARY:


how is that the one contains or is a plurality?

if so - what sense of referring to it as 'one'?

and yet - is not a plurality - many of the one?

if so what sense of referring to the 'plurality'?

we can of course take Hegel's road here - and say there is a contradiction at the heart
of being

this is an option - and it makes sense on the face of it

the other option I see is that we say the fact of the contradiction shows us that we
cannot go there

and where is there?

if we assert being is one - or if we assert being is many - or indeed that being is one
and many - we are making the claim that we can know the nature of being - the nature
of existence

that we can give it a formal characterization - and that we can assert this claim as a
true claim

in my view the fact that we can put forward contradictory metaphysical arguments that
ultimately end in contradiction - shows us that we cannot know the essence of things -
the nature of reality

a way of putting it is to say reality - itself - resists such a claim - and furthermore
denies it - throws it back at us as nonsense -

the trick I think is to see that concepts such as the one - or the many e.g. - are
strategies for dealing with the unknown

and by dealing with the unknown I mean in practice - we need certain ideas and
categories for organization and operation

understanding a contingency in terms of the idea of unity can in certain circumstances
be useful and productive

perhaps given different circumstances - different players different goals - the idea of
plurality may prove to be more useful - more productive

there is no guide to what tools to use - what tools to make - or what results can be
expected -

ultimately the solution to any problem of action is a shot in the dark

how we conceive the problem - how we conceive the solution - when and how we
decide to stop or to go on - is finally a matter without knowledge

Hegel's analysis goes awry in my view just because of his use of logic

the concepts of negation and contradiction are properly used in the assessment of
propositions - that is descriptions of reality

my point being - reality does not negate - the world does not contradict itself -

negation is an operation on a proposition - it is an operation of denial - 'it is not the
case that......'

the negation of a proposition is the assertion that the proposition does not apply to the
circumstances under consideration -

it is the assertion that given the way the world is the proposition has no function

a contradiction likewise is a propositional operation or outcome that shows the
proposition that contains a contradiction has no function

negation is an operation on propositions - it is not an assertion that reality contains
negativity - or in the case of contradiction that the world asserts and denies itself -

all our propositions are attempts to provide some basis for action - logic is a means of
determining the functionality of such propositions

reality as such - is not affected one way or another by our propositions

our propositions nevertheless can have function

Hegel 113

Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit:

113.


ARGUMENT:


the This therefore is established as not This or as something superseded - and hence not
as Nothing - but as a determinate nothing - the Nothing of content viz. of the This

thus the sense element is present - not as what is immediate certainty - rather as a
universal - as that which will be defined as property

the immediacy is a universal immediacy

being is a universal by virtue of it having mediation or the negative in it

when it expresses this in its immediacy it is a differentiated determinate property

many such properties are established simultaneously - one being the negative of
another

these determinacies are related only to themselves - they are indifferent to one another
- each is on its own and free from the others

the simple self-identical universality is itself distinct from these determinate properties
it has

it is pure relating of self to self

the abstract universal medium which we call 'thinghood' or 'pure essence' is a simple
togetherness of a plurality - but the many are in their determinateness simple universals
themselves

this salt is a simple here and at the same time a manifold - it is white and it is tart -
cubical and of specific gravity

all these properties are in the simple Here in which they therefore interpenetrate - none
has a different Here from the others - but each is everywhere in the same Here as the
others

and without being separated by different Heres they do not affect each other in this
interpenetration

the whiteness does not affect the cubical shape etc.

since each is a simple relating of self to self - it leaves the others alone -

and is connected by the indifferent Also - this Also is thus the pure universal itself -
the medium - the 'thinghood' - which holds them together in this way


COMMENTARY:


the relation of consciousness to its point of focus (the object) - results in the revelation
that is the 'object in consciousness' and 'consciousness in the object' -

the relation is appearance

consciousness and the object are outside of this relationship - this happening this
event of relation - unknowns

it is the relation that reveals consciousness and the object - as phenomena

the primary act of consciousness is description

the sensual properties of a thing are its natural affects on the body

in describing these natural affects we begin with the differing ways they affect the
body - we describe them in terms of sense experience

these are 'affective descriptions'

the thing itself is nothing more than its affects on the body

affects possible because of the way the body is -

that an object might affect different bodies in different ways - or the same body in
different ways at different times - just points to the fact that its descriptive
possibilities are not limited

the thing itself - if you want to go there - is just 'that which affects'

what distinguishes one thing from another is really just a question of description - how
it is described

the fact there can be no final - essential description is just testament to the fact that
consciousness and its objects are never fixed in time and place

any here and now is just an occasion for description

all that we have of the here and now is the history of its marks - that is the history of
descriptions

a thing's properties are its descriptions

outside of its descriptions the thing is an unknown

the thing itself remains the focus - the point of all descriptions -

Hegel's 'indifferent Also' is a conjunction

we can create complex descriptions of the object of focus by conjoining descriptions

the object itself is not in any way altered by this action

its revelation though is expanded

the point of any description is just that it is a platform from which we can act in relation
to the object of consciousness

it is a platform that suggests the possibility of action - of utility

what this in fact amounts to is in the end a matter of practise - what happens

in order to act - we must always defy essence

which is to say we must always pretend knowledge

Hegel 112

Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit:

112.


ARGUMENT:


since the principle of the object is in its simplicity a mediated universal - the object
must express this nature in its own self

this it does by showing itself to be the thing with many properties

the wealth of sense knowledge belongs to perception - not to immediate certainty - for
which it was only the source of instances -

for only perception contains negation - that is difference or manifoldness within its
own essence


COMMENTARY:


in truth can we speak of the object itself - outside of its perception?

outside of perception what you have is that which does not appear - that which is not
known

that which does not appear - that which is not known is the point of perception

that is the point outside of perception - that perception is directed to

it is this point that is the object independently of its characteristics

the characteristics of the object come into being through the relationship of perception

that is as a result of the act of perception on its point of focus

the fact of this event is the revelation of perception

as a result of this event we refer to the object as object -

that is a point of focus that has primary and secondary properties

the object is not manufactured by consciousness

it exists independently of consciousness (as an unknown) but the event of perception
reveals a definite relationship between consciousness and its point of focus which is
the object characterized - the object as a known

I say consciousness characterizes its point of focus - this is just what it does

we never perceive the object as just a point of focus - always as a revelation to
consciousness

nevertheless we can say that in the moment of perception - we only know what is
before us in terms of how it is described - though we describe as a matter of reflex -
logically speaking the description is still a reflective act - after immediacy

so perhaps you could say we perceive the object initially as unknown and known

and if this is so it suggests we perceive the object as it is and as its is perceived -

as it appears and as it does not appear -

if this is so - you have always a logically complete picture of the object

also I wish to say perception is specific

description may not be - but perception is

perception is focus

so - the object is that which is focused on -

perception defines the object - as focus

the characteristics of this focus as revealed in perception are the common reality of the
perception and the object - the common reality - the object perceived -

that is the event - the singular event - of the object perceived


NB.


what perception reveals is the known and the unknown dimensions of the object of
perception

that is as well as what is given in the act of perception - we are as conscious entities
aware of what is not given - what is not known

the known always comes to us in the greater context of the unknown - what is not
revealed -

the awareness of what is not known is the intrigue of the object -

it as an awareness that has two aspects -

firstly what is not revealed

and secondly - the origin - the basis - the foundation of what is revealed

what the reality of the unknown introduces into the world is possibility

Hegel 111

Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit:

II. PERCEPTION: OR THE THING AND DECEPTION


111.


ARGUMENT:


immediate certainty does not take over the truth for the truth is the universal

perception takes what is present to it as a universal

the immediate self-differentiating moments within perception are universal

I is a universal and the object is a universal

there are two movements: the movement of pointing out is the act of perceiving - the
other is the same movement as a simple event - the object perceived

in essence the object is the same as the movement

the movement is the unfolding and differentiation of the two moments

and the object is the approached togetherness of the moments

the universal or principle is the essence of perception -

and in contrast to this - both the moments are distinguished - that which perceives and
that which is perceived - are the unessential

but because both are the universal - both are essential

since they are related to each other as opposites - only one can be essential

one of them - the object defined as the simple entity is the essence regardless of
whether it is perceived or not

the act of perceiving as the movement - is the unessential movement

the unstable factor that can be as well as not be


COMMENTARY:


the problem with this argument about essence is that we don't know what essence is
supposed to be -

for Hegel it is as if the term speaks for itself

he speaks of perception and the object as being moments of the same movement

one would think therefore the movement is what is essential

if i.e. essence is just that which underlies phenomena - that which is the basis of - the foundation of appearance - appearance of anything - then in so far as this essence does not appear - it is unknown

now we can conceptualize here - Spinoza went for substance - as that which is the
logical basis of all that exists - Plato forms etc.

what is clear is that these are conceptions - conceptions designed to give some
character to the unknown - to as it were give it a voice

that is such conceptualizations are theories of the unknown

Hegel's essence is such a theory of the unknown - but not a very articulate one - what does it tells us?

I don't really see how it adds to the discussion of perception and object

the question of perception is how to explain the object as independent of the
perceiver?

clearly the appearance of the object depends on perception - i.e. from one point view
its appearance is such and such - from another angle the appearance is changed -
relative to the first moment

what is it we are perceiving?

in what sense can we say there is a unity that is the object?

what is it that makes the object what it is?

we only have perception and conception - and both these ways of knowing - depend
on the object

so there is no 'objective' view

what we get back to is appearance

the object at place 1 time 1 through the eyes of A is y -

the object at place 1 time 2 through the eyes of A is yi etc.

if we are to speak of the object itself outside of perception - we can only say it is that which can appear -

and really this is not much help - for it is only a statement about objects per se - not about any object in particular

it is a conceptual argument

we cannot get to the immediate object

the immediate object remains unknown

so what do we perceive?

we perceive the unknown - (x at time 1 place 1 by A) and attempt to describe it -

any such attempt will be inconclusive - no matter how valiant

we will always be left with an incomplete picture

in Hegel's terms an unessential account

for this reason we can dispense with essence - and operate with confidence (so to
speak) with the unessential

the unessential is our best or worst response to the unknown

the point I want to make clear is that the unknown by definition is that which is
outside of consciousness -

and that whatever is outside of consciousness is unknown

it is a simple - but devastating point -

the object of knowledge is the unknown

the object of consciousness is to make the unknown - negotiable

that which is outside of consciousness is the unknown


NB.


the object is a function of consciousness

the act of perception is the establishing of a relationship between consciousness and
the object of consciousness

between consciousness and the world -

we can say the object is the point of perception

it is the focus

our relationship with the object - as phenomena - is given in the act of perception

what is perceived is given in this act

description of this - of the object - is an epistemological act

any description will place the object - the focus of perception in space and time - will
afford it substantial characteristics and sense qualities

do we say the attributes and qualities of the object are immediately perceived - that is
are given?

yes - we say this - but this is to give the object a description

and any description is non-immediate - which is to say it is reflective

it may be an 'immediate reflection' - but it is still a reflection

that is a move from the immediate event of perception

these reflective categories are given in consciousness by consciousness and for
consciousness

this is to say they are given to the object

for all intents and purposes 'object' is just that which is unknown and undefined

it is the 'point of perception'

this 'point' exists only because of perception - the fact of it - the nature of it

consciousness is internality

its object - is externality

its object is external to it - as a matter of logic

but its object - however that comes in perception - whatever form it takes - is - in the
first instance - unknown

description gives the appearance of transforming the unknown - to the known

we operate and negotiate our way in the world on the basis of description

the fact of the matter is that description is never determinate

it is just a false platform for action

the thing is though - without such a platform there could be no action

Hegel 110

Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit

110.


ARGUMENT:


this that is meant cannot be reached by language i.e. that which is inherently universal

they would have to admit finally they are speaking about something which is not

the unutterable is the untrue - the irrational - what is meant but not expressed

if we say of something that it is 'an actual thing' 'an external object' - its description is
the most abstract of generalities - and expresses its sameness with everything rather
than its distinctiveness

'this thing' is anything you like - if we describe it more precisely as 'this bit of paper' -
then each and every bit of paper is 'this bit of paper' - and I have only uttered the
universal

if you want to help out language you can point as in 'here' - even so a universal -
and therefore what I know is not an immediacy but a universal -


COMMENTARY:


yes - in my terms language does not refer -

language is a construction designed to mitigate against the fact of the unknown

language thus is platform for action

the unknown is never extinguished in language - it is covered

and the covering enables action -

the forms and categories imposed on the unknown - are the logic of action

in this sense what we are talking about is a metaphysical pretense - we operate as if
we know

and we must - if we are to operate at all -

there is no metaphysical dishonesty here - it a matter of simply dealing with the fact of
the unknown - and operating in relation to it -

in reality - we do what we must -

the ever presence of the reality of the unknown though - ensures that unless we are
deluded - we do not operate with certainty - we operate in uncertainty

this is to say that even in the face of our constructions on the unknown - we are never
imprisoned in by our conceptions or by our actions

the unknown is the source of freedom - whether you like that or not -

immediate experience is essentially unknown

we only know it in terms of conscious reflection

a reflection is by its nature - a move from the immediacy of the experience

any reflection will place the immediate experience in a conceptual context -

you could thus say the that the price of knowledge is the loss of the immediacy of the
unknown

conception is a move from immediacy

it is as though nothing can be done with the immediate (of course - it is unknown) -
and therefore the only way to deal with it is to redefine it in a non-immediate context
- that is in an epistemological context

that is we make it - known - and in so doing for the purposes of action it is no longer
unknown

however the truth of its real character - as unknown - is not thereby lost -

we are left always - regardless of what we construct and what we do - with an
irreducible sense of wonder

we are left always wondering and in that sense always directly in touch with and
engaged with the unknown