Santayana goes on:
'But there is a biological truth, discovered much latter,
under this alleged analytic necessity: the truth that animal
experience is a product of two factors, antecedent to the
experience and not parts of it, namely organ and stimulus,
body and environment, person and situation. These two natural
conditions normally come together, like flint and steel,
before the spark of experience will fly.'
Santayana is here arguing for a non-subjective account of
experience
science uncovers the relation - physical - objective - which
is subjectivity (if understood properly)
this in short is a physicalist analysis - explanation of the
appearance that is consciousness
an 'experience' we mistakenly believe to be subjective
OK - first off - 'the truth that animal experience is a
product of two factors....'
this is an account of behaviour - based on - observation
and theory regarding the place - the significance of such
observation -
we are not presented with this truth
it is made - and within the edifice of science -
the science of the day
in general this is what science does - account for - explain -
the object - objective reality
and why does this ever occur - what is the reason?
you see - what is - presented - what is the object -
is not as is - known
most of what we are presented with - in the world -
we can place - already within some scheme of understanding -
hence at the most basic - almost intuitive level - we
know what we are dealing with
but if you were to strip away all this background knowledge -
the observer would come upon something - yes - but it would
be simply unknown
in this sense - the object of knowledge is - the unknown -
perhaps one of the first ways we learn to identify what is
before us - is in making the distinction between subject
and object - a fundamental ontological distinction - which
is validated by the world - and necessary for our understanding
the next point I want to make - more to the point of the
above quote - is that Santayana's idea of these two 'natural
conditions' accounting for consciousness is at best a hypothesis
based on the assumption - the metaphysical assumption of
materialism
on that assumption - of course it makes sense
but what can it explain?
a relation between two physical dimensions - i.e. - stimulus
and organ - body and environment - yes
that there is a relation - yes - under certain conditions -
results - behaviour - as a result of the interaction -
is observed -
so far so good
and the further hypothesis that - that what?
that such behaviour is - consciousness -
is an expression - of it
and it is here another physical state - i.e. - brain process
- perhaps
from an objective point of view - all this is fine
but the thing is that all this - all the above is premised
on the existence of a subject - or if you like an observer
and perhaps it is too much to expect that an observer can
explain his observing - as distinct from what is observed
still this is where we are at - it's what we are talking about
what you have here is a simple mistake
it is confusing the observed - with the observer
it is assuming we can deal with the act of observing
in the same way as any other physical event -
that is to be observed - i.e. - that it is out there
well it's clearly not - so though you may make some
lovely co-relations that appear to be in the vicinity -
i.e. - organ stimulus - body - environment - they do not -
cannot address the issue of consciousness
simply because consciousness - is not out there
to be observed -
this is just to say - on this kind of matter -
the best science can come up with is an analogy
and while I understand philosophical thinking can turn
you inside out - you may in search of truth become something
you did not expect -
it suggests a severe lack of character at least -
to actually argue that what your experience is observable -
and then - to pretend to hold to - such a blatant lie
who would you like to convince?
