Davidson goes with Brentano in defining the mental
as intentional - but clearly in the full flowering
of his argument it is the anomalous character of
mental events - that effectively defines them as
mental - or a special case of physical
I think this is ill-conceived
it is their ontology that is characteristic -
and by this I mean their categorical ontology
- which is that they belong to - are events of
a non-objective - i.e. - non-public - non-
observational realm - the dimension of
intentionality - if you like
mental events are in the world
the objective world is physical
the world from the point of view of consciousness -
given the existence of consciousness - is dimensional
we ask what is common to these dimensions?
in what sense are they 'one'?
or in what sense are they expressions of a unity
how to describe this unity?
I argue we can only come at the unity from the inside
that is - if there is a law to govern the physical
and the mental - an objective - or perhaps more precisely
a meta-objective law
we cannot know it
and as to the mental - specifically
it is not physical - do not imagine physical laws here
if you do you are just committing a fundamental category
mistake
are there laws to the mental life?
(given that by 'law' we generally mean the objective /
observational / physical - we may want to drop the term
in this context)
but if we continue with this terminology - they can only
be reflective laws -
laws - perhaps generalizations based on reflection
the conscious life human beings clearly operate -
is defined within certain parameters
it is in some sense common ground
conceptual psychology - theories of human nature and
behaviour - clearly have a place here - myth has always
been fundamental to the understanding of the inner life
and also we develop pictures profiles of the mental
life of man in our creative artistic expression
