26.9.05

Quine: speaking of objects

how about this -

to assert x exists is to acknowledge x

isn't it just this

what x is - what the acknowledgment amounts to

perhaps - how we describe x and its acknowledgment -
is another matter

strictly speaking all bets are off - or can be

in section III of his essay Quine says:

'Now if objective reference is so inaccessible to
observation, who is to say on empirical grounds that
belief in objects of one or another description is
right or wrong? How can there ever be empirical
evidence against empirical statements?.....Grant that
a knowledge of the appropriate stimulatory conditions
of a sentence does not settle how to construe the
sentence in terms of objects. Still it does tend to
settle what is to count as empirical for or against
the truth of the sentence........by arbitrary
projection in the case of the heathen or as a matter
of course in our own, therefore what has already
been counting as empirical evidence for or against
the truth of the sentence comes to count as empirical
evidence for or against the existence of objects.'

a big jump here - or are we just switching horses
mid-race?

the truth of the sentence is the truth of what?

nothing has been resolved here

we can't be sure what the sentence refers to -
or what its assertion signifies -

so its truth is really out of the question at
this stage -

sameness of meaning (object-ontology or not) is assumed -
isn't it - under certain conditions - and of course
without empirical evidence?

its assumption - rather necessary - for getting on with it

perhaps we are dealing here - in human communication
with gross collective stupidity - that works?

in general here I think Quine is confusing theoretical
with non-theoretical categories

granted when I say 'there's a rabbit' - the term 'rabbit'
is an object term

but what does this mean?

isn't it that on reflection we describe such terms as
objective - and this is to classify - theoretically -
a particular term

pre such classification - such terms i.e. - 'rabbit' -
are without classification - hence non-theoretical

so really when Quine asks - is the native referring to
(what we understand as) 'rabbit' - he is asking - does
the native have such a meta conceptual scheme?

it is not about the happening - of the appearance of
the rabbit - or the utterance of the native -

isn't it to point to the fact? - much here is assumed -
even more unknown

nevertheless we manage - or at least move on