Spinoza's theory of substance
is monistic
what exists is a singularity
there is only one substance
now according to Spinoza
we perceive attributes of this substance
(we are attributes of this substance)
attributes are what is perceived - expressions
on Spinoza's theory - perceived or not
they are expressions of what is
characteristics of it
now with these attributes - where does the weight lie?
in perceiving or in what is perceived?
I think Spinoza would say - the weight is equal
OK
still there is a question of the essence of substance -
i.e. that which all attributes have in common
that which is - if you like - prior to
perceived expressions
that which must be for them to be perceived expressions?
i.e. - can we distinguish - does Spinoza need to
distinguish - attributes from substance?
now extension and mind on Spinoza's view are two attributes
two perceptions of essence?
yes - it can't be two essences - perceived
the definition - of substance requires that it has an
infinity of attributes -
now we can ask - in relation to the two attributes -
extension and mind - how are they to be distinguished?
- on Spinoza's view
are they just equivalent descriptions of one phenomenon
- i.e. - substance?
it would seem so
now according to Spinoza - we can only describe substance
under - two attributes - we can see it as extended -
or as mental -
and we do make a distinction
it is real -
if so what can it be based on?
i.e. - what distinguishes mind and matter?
this seems to be the direction Spinoza wants to avoid
on his view - it is not a question of distinguishing the two
- rather it is - how to understand 'them' as one?
and here it seems we can only talk of descriptions
different descriptions - languages of - the one
two descriptions - two of an infinite number of
possible descriptions
so to the question - what is to count as the one
description of the one substance?
prime facie - you would think that such is possible -
even necessary -
(how else would we know substance as one - if we
couldn't so describe it?)
what is clear though - is that we can only describe
it terms of attributes -
is this to say no singular description is possible?
unless we say - as Spinoza does -
that substance is existence
OK - yes
substance in all its manifestations exists -
the question though is - how meaningful is such a
statement?
to assert x is to - make an existential statement
x as such - (even once asserted is still x) -
has no epistemic content
to say substance exists - appears to be making -
a statement about substance
it is not
the existential assertion of substance tells us
only that x is x
the common characteristic of all of substance's
attributes - is existence
again - to say A1 exists - A2 exists etc.
is to say nothing
if so -
how are attributes distinguished on Spinoza's theory
and
how are they to be understood as different from -
what it is claimed they are attributes of -
that is substance?
I think finally with Spinoza we have a pure assertion
of existence -
the grand existential statement
x exists
(whatever x is - it exists)
but it is - over and above this oddly enough -
an empty statement
I'm not sure that the existential assertion - is an empty
statement or a meaningless statement -
but it is - rather - colourless
and
lacking - substance
it seems our knowledge is attribute bound
we know substance through its attributes
our knowledge therefore is attribute specific?
as to knowledge of substance as a singularity -
this seems not possible -
for it requires that our knowledge is infinite -
beyond our limited perception (extension and mind)
we have no knowledge
except that logical knowledge that substance is infinite
this though amounts to saying substance is unknowable
- in itself
and in terms of its appearance - only in an attribute
dependent manner -
and severely limited in this regard
