I intend to review Antonio Damasio's book
'Looking for Spinoza'
and I will begin here with chapter 1
he begins by saying feelings of pleasure and
pain are the bedrock of our mind
and that we often fail to notice this simple
reality - because images use up so much of
our attention
so bedrock -
as in a reality behind image?
and is this to suggest feelings - and feelings
of pleasure and pain - are somehow behind images
the image is what is up front
the feeling behind the image?
I would have thought pleasure and pain are direct
in awareness
not a backdrop
as far as I know the term 'feeling' is not used
by Spinoza
OK - let's not make too much of this
pleasure and pain?
passions - by which the mind passes to a higher
or lower state of perfection
and passions?
here we need to go to emotion
and for Spinoza - the modifications of the body
by which the power of the body is increased or
diminished and at the same time the ideas of
these modifications
if adequate - these emotions are actions
if inadequate - passions
so passion here?
two definitions?
one - the passing to a higher or lower state
two - inadequate cause of such a passing
as in III.D.3:
'therefore, if we can be the adequate cause
of any of these affectations, I understand by
the effect an action: otherwise a passion.'
on the face of it - a difficulty here -
is passion any modification that leads to higher
or lower states or just inadequate modifications?
i.e. could I be self directed and passionate?
or am I only passionate when acting in response to?
is it me that's confused here?
OK back to emotion -
the modifications by which the body's power is
increased or diminished and the ideas
so essentially changes in potency
passions?
inadequate emotions -
i.e. not self directed
OK - now back to pleasure
pleasure is
the passion by which the mind passes to a higher state
something doesn't quite fit
how can a passion lead to a higher state if by
definition a passion is an inadequate effect -
a result not self directed?
unless we are to say that pleasure is in itself
a higher state of perfection
and it can come about either adequately or inadequately
yes
I think this is right
this is what Spinoza is saying
passion and emotion -
passion - an inadequate cause
emotion - any modification of potency
pleasure - whatever the cause - a higher state
of perfection
very subversive
so Damasio's - 'feelings of pleasure and pain'
are what exactly in Spinoza's terms?
III P.XI. note -
'We see then the mind can suffer great changes,
and can pass from a state of greater or lesser
perfection; these passions explain to us the
emotions of pleasure and pain'
here - pleasure and pain - emotions
and the changes that can occur which lead to
these emotions - passions
so why does Damasio refer to pleasure and pain
as feelings?
and then later 'feelings and their essential
ingredients - pleasure and pain'?
on page 6 he says -
'Could it be that while emotion and feeling
were twins, emotion was born first and feeling
second, with feeling forever following emotion
like a shadow. In spite of their close kinship
and seeming simultaneity, it seemed that emotion
preceded feeling. Knowledge of this specific
relationship, as we shall see, provided a window
into the investigation.'
so it is clear - Damasio wants to introduce feeling -
his chapter is called 'Enter Feeling'
and this of course is fine - but it is not Spinoza
Spinoza argues pleasure and pain are emotions
they are not something else - the long lost twin
this is not an argument against Damasio's thesis
only a questioning of his use of
Spinoza
now as I said above 'feeling' is not a category
Spinoza uses or at least as far as I can see -
I might well be wrong here
but just to tie it up
if pleasure and pain are emotions as Spinoza says
again what does this mean?
emotions?
Pt. III def. III -
'By EMOTION (affectus) I understand the modifications
of the body by which the power of action of the body
is increased or diminished, aided or restrained, and
at the same time the ideas of these modifications'
in the Everyman edition of the Ethics 1989 there is
this note by Parkinson:
'It is worth noting that an emotion, for Spinoza,
is both mental and physical; in his terms, it is the
same state of substance expressed through the
attributes of thought and
extension.'
affectations
changes - modification in substance -
that are expressed in extension and thought
so pleasure is a state of mind and body
in so far as it is state of mind it is an idea
in so far as it is state of the body it is a
physical change
so 'feeling'? - is what?
the term we use to describe this -
Spinoza's term was 'emotion'
and Damasio cannot really just say that 'feeling'
is the same as 'emotion' - given that he wants to
distinguish the two terms
so - again what is feeling?
in this chapter it hasn't been defined - except
rather poetically as a 'twin'.
I think the key to Damasio's distinction is in
his science
he says on page 5 -
'But the opposite was not true: Some patients who
lost their ability to experience certain feelings
still could express the corresponding emotions'
what follows here is the twin metaphor
earlier he says -
'Imagine, for example meeting someone who, as a
result of damage to a certain location of the brain,
became unable to experience compassion or embarrassment -
when compassion or embarrassment were due.....'.
so what is going on here?
what is this - either you have the emotion or you don't?
and here too one needs to think about what is meant
by emotion
no doubt neurologists begin with standard behaviour
i.e. - standard emotional responses are categorized
in a standard way
we identify embarrassment i.e. - by certain behaviour -
which in normal functioning human beings doesn't vary
too much
however this would not be expected in the case of
certain brain injuries
isn't it most likely that the neurologists cannot
interpret the behaviour of the non-embarrassed individual?
it is not to say there is no emotional response -
just that it is not recognized or indeed perhaps even
understood -
be this as it may I still don't see what 'feelings'
are supposed to be?
are they known internal states?
and how - for Damasio are they different from emotions
what is it to lose the ability to experience certain
feelings and still be able to express the corresponding
emotions?
I just wonder if these patients are being read correctly
again if you experience pain you have the emotion of pain
the emotion of pain is the experience
if you don't experience pain you don't have the
emotion of pain
emotion from a Spinozistic point of view
is a unified event
it is not as if something can happened to the body that
weakens it and this is not experienced in the mind
the loss of power
you see there just may be very good reason for why
Spinoza put this thesis in such general terms -
increase in power / decrease in power
and it is this generality that makes feelings irrelevant -
unnecessary and likely to just get in the way of clear
thinking
it is not where you have a certain feeling that is to
the point
it's about potency
and yes we have certain names for the increase of potency
and for the decrease
these particular expressions are useful - but finally
irrelevant to the real state of affairs
it looks to me as if Damasio has introduced feeling
into the argument - and as it turns out - as the basis
of his argument - without really defining it
satisfactorily in relation to emotion
we'll just have to see
he began chapter 1 with the statement that:
'Feelings of pain and pleasure or some quality in
between are the bedrock of our minds'
this rock is not bedded - and rather slippery - I think
