patient C
is a case where a stroke victim would break out
into fits of uncontrollable laughter or crying -
without any outside stimulus to such events -
and without experience of joy or sadness prior
to such events - it is reported he would end up -
after the event feeling somewhat sad or somewhat
giddy -
so
what do we make of this?
is it case of an emotional state without cause -
(except we presume the brain damage from the stroke) -
or is it rather that the brain here is not functioning
normally - and the result is an apparent emotional state
apparent in the sense that the behaviour attendant
is characteristically viewed as emotional?
the question Spinoza would ask I think is - is there
a change in the potency of this individual?
there appears - from the report of the subject -
to be no change is his emotional state
no sense of joy - an increase in power - no sense
of sadness - a decrease -
but we have the usual suspects of laughter and crying
it looks to me as if here you have a case where
the behaviour is aberrant
it doesn't reflect the emotional state
or doesn't reflect it in ways that are a true
account of the state
so
what do we say here?
the report of being somewhat sad or giddy suggests
that indeed there could have been a change - but not
to the order - suggested by the behaviour
and so the question - how do we know?
and it's a good place for this question to come up
because it is clear that not just in the case of
patient C - but actually in all cases of overt emotional
behaviour - it is from an epistemological standpoint
a real issue
how do we know the emotions?
Spinoza's account - his definition of emotion III.
Def. III
is not an answer
yes Spinoza states here what an emotion is
and this definition is really a meta-scientific
statement
to get his view on the question of the knowledge
of emotion you need to look elsewhere
a good place is Part II Prop. 40
just quickly here - he outlines three kinds of
knowledge:
. vague experience / opinion or imagination
. common notions and adequate ideas of the
properties of things
. intuitive science - from the formal essence
of attributes of God to the essence of things
the question here is - what do we have with
the case of patient C?
Damasio seems to be arguing - we have knowledge -
at least of the second kind
and yes - if there is knowledge here - it is of
this kind
my question is
how can we be sure here?
and my question is really to Spinoza
is it possible to know with certainty -
what constitutes - a change in potency
that is to know if - certain behaviours are
signs of this
and signs of either an increase or decrease?
or as in the case of patient C - perhaps -
not a sign at all - rather an 'epistemological
phantom'
(good term - might just throw everything
out of whack)
I guess it is not - in reality such a dilemma
the way Spinoza sets it up - emotion is any
such change of potency
cases like patient C - are difficult - really
because despite our knowledge - our theories
of the brain we can't be sure -
not to say a clear picture might not emerge
but it is important for scientists to have a
clear understanding of what they don't know
and not to mask their ignorance in a mumbo
jumbo of cerebral circuits
the main point here is that patient C's behaviour
may not have anything to do with emotion
it's possible that - there is no change in his
potency at all
this view is almost the premise of Damasio's argument
therefore -
