Damasio begins with a somewhat sharper definition
of feeling - and the relation of feeling to emotion
emotions are public presentations
feelings private
emotions play out in the theatre of the body
feelings in the theatre of the mind
and he suggests that emotions precede feelings in
the history of a life
also that emotion and feeling are a continual process
and also - homeostasis
OK so he thinks it useful to distinguish private and
public dimensions of the organism
first up I should say I will look at this from the
point of view of Spinoza's thought
that's my first interest here - how accurate a
representation of Spinoza do we get from Damasio?
having said that - I recognize this may well be -
in the full playing out of events - a
misrepresentation of Damasio
the point being he may well be putting up his own -
deviant version of Spinoza's thought - in good faith -
in the fullness of the argument
nevertheless at the very least he claims to be
accurately representing Spinoza
so it's worth a look.
this private / public distinction?
first up let me say it's never been exactly clear
to me where Spinoza is on this question
does he think the mind is private?
is the mind the private dimension of substance -
extension its public face?
frankly I don't know how you would avoid some view
like this
nevertheless as far as I know Spinoza never made
such a commitment
my own view is that we should see consciousness
as the inside of the world
the inside of extension
and if this - there is not only external knowledge -
but also internal - inner knowledge
Spinoza though - I don't think viewed it this way
his perceptive was entirely objective
as if sub specie aeternitatis
we have ideas of ideas - that how is we know ideas -
it is how we know - mind
this is Spinoza's very bare - and beautiful simple
theory of consciousness
as a matter of logic - mind is not peculiar to
particular modes of substance
it exists as a dimension of - an expression of
substance - per se
it is one way that we know
and for Spinoza - therefore mind is objective -
primarily
it is a feature of the world
and the world is objective - it is not my thought
my thought is a feature of the world
I am in this sense entirely - objective
I don't think in Spinoza there is any subjectivity
there are only the objective features of reality
and we are this reality
our characteristics are these features - writ small
and these characteristics are all we know of reality
all we can know
OK - back to Damasio
feelings private - the problem here is science
how do you establish the existence of non-observable
entities?
what is the method - what is the process?
faith - it seems - and a conspiracy of believers
just a point
but why distinguish emotion and feeling
Damasio is incurably a biologist
too much time in the garden
(although Voltaire did think this was the way to go)
feelings for Damasio it sems - are something like the
(internal) observables of emotion
the flowerings
the buds
so we need this machinery
this biology of emotion
Spinoza did not think so
from the lofty heights of sub specie aeternitatis
he saw emotions very unemotionally
a change in potency
couldn't be more scientific than that
pleasure is the expression of an increase in potency
pain the expression of decrease
I am not against the great tree of emotion grown and
nurtured by Damasio - but I fail to see what is gained
with all the stages - dimensions and flowerings
a rock in the field tells us as much
and less
