substance

that which is conceived through itself - can only be that which conceives itself -
is this possible - and what is it to do this?

Spinoza says of substance - that which is in itself - and is conceived through itself

in other words - the conception of which does not need the conception of another
thing - from which it must be formed

that which is in itself is that which is not in anything else - straight up - you might say
- is everything

and it can only be conceived through itself or as itself?

there is no other way to conceive it no other concept required -

the idea of x is x - there is no ~x - we cannot here conceive ~x

OK - but the conception that does not require any other conception?

yes - it's 'the conceived through itself' that instructs one here

is this really the source of his double aspect theory - a body - the body that conceives
itself - a universal mind as it were that corresponds with the universal body?

I think so - however you could have one without the other -

Spinoza though is going for both - and right from the get go -

the idea - that the physical world - the totality does conceive itself -

and further - it is essential - to the notion of substance - from Spinoza's point of view -
that it does -

mind is substance conceiving itself - extension is substance as the object of mind
- the physical world as the extended expression of substance

mind as substance conceiving itself - as substance conceived -

and the thing is the whole issue is objective

objective - in the sense that mind is a characteristic of reality - even if - i.e. - there are
no human beings - the world thinks - we just happen to be expressions of this fact
- instances of the fact

this though gives us no special status - it is true of every thing that exists

subjectivity as we might call it is an objective reality -

there is only objective reality - at this point you might ask - well how then do you
distinguish extension and mind?

good question - mind is extension conceived - extension is mind extended

strictly speaking - for Spinoza - the question does not arise -

so it's not that we conceive substance - it is rather that substance - conceives us -
- this is how you need to think to get Spinoza - it's top down -

so existing in itself - and conceived through itself -

my question is - does it make any sense to speak of the thing in itself - that which
exists without being dependent?

existential dependents -

does it make any real sense to speak of everything?

if it does Spinoza's argument seems to go through

existence as such - we speak of it - but can we really conceive it - is it in fact a
sensible notion?

Kant was spot on - existence is no predicate - it is not a characteristic - it is the ground
- but what is this?

just a conception - to ground predicates - characteristics?

(have to be careful here - a step to the left - a step to the right - nihilism)

existence is no predicate - perhaps the most subversive statement ever made

could we dispense with existential statements - entirely and just have predicates
- predicates that strictly speaking do not refer to anything - actually refer to nothing -
have no referents - no ground - a world of characteristics that - characterize nothing?

Lewis Carroll might get on board here - with his cat - or what's left of it - in such a
world - there would be no substance - only expressions of interest -

and grins