the proposal - the definition of substance - as 'that which is in itself and conceived
through itself'
states quite boldly - brazenly perhaps that
(i) there is something that is in itself
(ii) that such conceives through itself
so first up we have an equivalence of domain between that which is - and that which
conceives
substance - exists in its own right
and conceives itself
one might ask
isn't conception an act of the mind?
and for it to be complete
the conception has an object
that which is conceived
so conception and its object - two distinct categories
for x to conceive through itself
suggests x is conception
conceiving itself
thought thinking itself
good definition of God - but where is the world?
Spinoza says - substance is in itself
i.e. it is not a part of anything else
it is thus in some sense existence per se
everything that exists
and is conceived through itself
well yes -
there is nothing else - from which to conceive substance
but is substance conceived
can it be conceived?
presumably if it is conceived through itself
the conception
is within substance
if so
how can the part embrace the whole?
surely on this view
thought - conception is some function within
there cannot that is be an objective conception
a conception from outside
so how can substance - ever be an object
how can it be an object of conception?
so what I am questioning here is the idea - that x can conceive x
on such a view there is no distinction between subject and object
an essential distinction to be drawn if any conception is to take place
that which conceives cannot be that which is conceived
on such an arrangement we cannot say what the conception is -
(except perhaps itself)
and we cannot say what the object of conception is
to go down this track leads to the destruction of sense
the collapse of epistemology
and ontology here is about nothing
