15.1.07

consciousness as a logical point

consciousness as a logical point

that has an internal and external

capacity

this is to give a purely operational definition of consciousness

operational as distinct from substantial definition

a substantial definition tells us what x is

a capacity / operational definition tells us what x does -

what it is capable of - how it operates

as to the substantial question -

we can't say what consciousness is

there is no outer consciousness view of consciousness

so we can never know what it is

that it is

is to say what about it substantially?

that it is - and its nature can only be ascertained dispositionally -

the contents of consciousness can be described and so defined

the objects - outside of consciousness - can be described and so defined -

the world can de defined

but consciousness - cannot be known in this way

but again for this to happen - consciousness would need to be its own object

consciousness is subjectivity

it is that which perceives / conceives object

therefore

subject

so perhaps we need to think of consciousness as an ideal point - a transcendent
category

transcendent that is to its functions

its functions of subjectivity -

and objectivity

in itself - it is unknowable

a Kantian noumenon?

as I see it

such a view avoids - both idealism and materialism

as these conceptions / realities

are functions of consciousness

and cannot therefore be characterizations of it

rather than noumenon I prefer the description / idea of a logical point

a point that transcends subjective and objective realities

and all we can say here is that it is

no further description is possible

a consequence of this I think is that therefore consciousness is not to be regarded as a substance of any kind -

it is not substantial - it is substanceless

the question - what is the mind is therefore the wrong question

the mind as a what - does not exist