Wittgenstein in the preface to the Tractatus says -
'Thus the aim of the book is to draw a limit to thought, or rather - not to
thought, but to the expression of thoughts: for in order to be able to draw
a limit to a thought, we should have to find both sides of the limit thinkable
(i.e. we should have to be able to think what cannot be thought)
It will therefore only be in language that the limit can be drawn, and what
lies on the other side will simply be non-sense.'
a limit to thought as the aim of the book -
firstly it is assumed that it makes some sense to speak of thought having a limit
OK - but why - what is the point here - even if this makes sense?
the idea that you draw in thought - a limit - and this cannot be done -
for it would be to think both sides of the limit - hence what cannot be thought
so what cannot be thought cannot be thought -
therefore what?
no limit to thought -
so - take up architecture?
if the problem is as stated - the question of the limit of thought - then
problem solved - no problem - thought has no limit - thought is limitless -
but no reason to break out the booze -
my question - if there is no limit - what sense limitlessness?
is not the question itself doubtful?
OK
thought setting limits to thought -
(in one way it seems pedagogical to me - and yet the Tractatus is written before
his stint as a primary school teacher - perhaps the question is can I be a good teacher if I am not a good logician - or - can you set limits to children?)
what goes on here?
thinking about - proposing a theory of what is not thought -
yes
well what is wrong with saying - that which does not think - cannot think -
i.e. - the non-conscious world -
if so the limit of thought is non-thought
it is not that one has to think non-thought
simply to recognize that thought ends where consciousness ends -
(I argue the external world - is indeed non-conscious - and thus - the limit of
consciousness)
I fail to see how else you can view it
Wittgenstein's argument is that for there to be a limit to thought -
you must invoke an absurdity - thinking what cannot be thought
when really it is just a question of basic metaphysical topography -
what regions exist - in the world -
and this is actually different to Wittgenstein's pedagogical approach -
what you can and cannot think
a strange idea
on the other side of thought is non-thought
but the question is the limit - the line of demarcation
it is simply isn't it a matter of logic?
x and ~x
x is limited by ~x
no contradiction here - a perfectly logical thought - perhaps the most fundamental
having stated his aim and just as quickly saying it can't be achieved
(and still we wonder why you would want to go there anyway)
the fall back position is in relation to language
sense and non-sense
OK
Wittgenstein is here declaring himself -
setting up the program
sense and non-sense
again - we could ask why?
perhaps perceived non-sense is really just a lack of understanding from the person
who so identifies it?
anyway
'It will therefore only be in language that the limit can be drawn'
what is this to say?
in language I put up a criterion of sense and non-sense
a statement which then divides language into sense and non-sense
what then is the status of this statement - of this criterion?
quite a question -
I think Wittgenstein argued somewhere latter down the track -
that the verifiability criterion - was not itself verifiable
OK
the situation here seems even more far reaching than that -
a line dividing sense and non-sense
a statement - a criterion - so doing
is what - is where?
is it on the sense side or the non-sense side?
on the face of it neither -
and so - how to characterize it?
a meta statement that is neither?
yes you could play around here with meta statements - and higher criteria
but really doesn't this point - call into question - the enterprise of drawing limits
and in the present context of drawing a limit to sense and non-sense in language
if language is either sensible or non-sensible - which seems to be Wittgenstein's idea
the criteria of this cannot be either
and is therefore - outside of language -
non-language -
and I don't think Wittgenstein wants to go there
perhaps this is where St. Augustine makes an entrance
