tractatus 7

Tractatus 7


7. What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.


silence is the ground of all speech

silence is the sound of the unknown

tractatus 6

NOTE: where there is logical notation refer to text.


6. The general form of the proposition is [P,E, N(E)].

This the general form of a proposition.


the form of a proposition is determined by its event

we cannot determine prior to use the form a proposition

we cannot determine prior to use the form of all propositions

what we can say is that the proposition is a proposal

but what this amounts to is to formally is to be found out

the general form of the proposition is unknown

if we are to go further - deeper and ask what is a proposal?

we can say in general it is an act


6.001. What this says is just that every proposition is a result of the successive
applications to elementary propositions of the operation N(E).


yes - if your theory of the proposition is that it is a structure based on elementary
propositions - that is the proposition is either an elementary proposition or the
conjunction /disjunction of elementary propositions - 'propositional strings' is my term
- then you can say that structurally speaking the operation that enables such a
construction is the successive application of the negation of all values of the
propositional variable E - as laid out in 5.51. - 'If E has only on value, then N(E) = -p
(not p); if it has two values, then N(E) = -p. -q (neither p nor q)'.

so what we are talking about here is a kind of proposition - and its logic - its structure
outlined -

we have here at least a type of proposition and propositional analysis

to suggest it is the only account of that proposition - that it displays the logic of all
propositional action is at the very least ambitious


6.002. If we are given the general form according to which propositions are
constructed, then with it we are also given the general form according to which one
proposition can be generated out of another by means of an operation.


yes if the form of the proposition is fixed in a sense all variables are therefore
controlled

and so from the template of such a form all propositional possibilities can be
generated

and indeed at some point in this kind of inquiry in practice decisions are made as to
how to proceed

that is it is the way of it to take a view of the general form

certainly within the tradition that Wittgenstein operates in

and it makes perfect sense given the tasks he is attempting to complete

this is meta pragmatics

it is possible just because there is no general form to propositions

that is there is no form existing independently of practice

and therefore none existing independently of practice

epistemologically we cannot pre-determine practice

therefore we cannot pre-determine form

but for issues of practice - of proceeding - it is necessary to assume that such is
possible

and what we have from Wittgenstein is one such theory worked out in detail

it is just that the claims he makes for this tool - for the 'substance' of it - the 'origin' of
it are fanciful

it is to claim that what we do can be determined a priori

the a priori dimension of knowledge is only ever an after thought - never a fore
thought


6.01. Therefore the general form of an operation O'(n) is [E,N(E)]'(n) (=[n,E,N(E)}).

This is the most general form of transition from one proposition to another.


any operation on any set of propositions is the negation of that set

the transition from one proposition to another is an operation

an operation is a negation

a proposition asserts - an operation alters the proposition

any alteration involves negation - for without negation there is no change in the
assertion

OK but is this an account of the form of the operation?

indeed every operation alters that which it acts upon

this is only to say the operation effects

and this is all there is to say of the nature of an operation

that it is - in whatever context - an act upon

if so it seems it has no particular form

the operation is formless - it is simply pure act


6.02. And this is how we arrive at numbers. I give the following definitions

x = Oo'xDef.,
O'Ov'x = Ov+1'x Def..

So in accordance with these rules, which deal with signs, we write the series

x, O'x, O'O'x, O'O'O'x, ...,

in the following way

Oo'x, Oo+1x, Oo+1+1+1'x, ...

Therefore, instead of '[x,E,O'E]',

I write [Oo'x,Ov'x,Ov+1'x]'.

And I give the following definitions

0+1 = 1 Def.,
0+1+1 = 2 Def.,
0+1+1+1 = 3 Def.,
(and so on).


the idea of an operation involves the concept of a series

a single operation can be performed that is not part of a series

however that is really just a decision to negate the series

and that negation can be undone

so the idea of series underlies that of operation

given a series in which operations are performed

the performance will always be successive

therefore it is operations on operations etc.

the marking of this activity is number theory

that is the signs (integers) are signs of successive operations within a series

operations on integers (constants)signify essential or basic - repeatable operations

what we are doing in mathematics is signifying and marking actions in a proposed
series

definitions of number simply state rules of practice

that is rules of operational signification

mathematics - operational theory - is based - is founded on succession

succession is time - the order of things

this metaphysical foundation though is not relevant to the practice of mathematics

it the ground mathematics flies above


6.021. A number is the exponent of an operation.


exactly correct

a number is just a sign for an operation in a series


6.022. The concept of number is simply what is common to all numbers, the general
form of a number.

The concept of the number is the variable number.

The concept of numerical equality is the general form of all particular cases of
numerical equality


(a)


this idea that 'the general form' is that which is common to all instances of number -
is just logically verbosity

metaphysical superfluousness

there is no need to postulate a form

the number is simply an operation in a series represented by a sign that signifies the
place of the operation in the series

the number is an expression of an operation

if we know this we have no need to ask what is common to numbers

it is not a relevant or useful question

all you do by answering such a question is speak about numbers in a non-functional
manner - and what is the point of that?

this general form issue is really only of interest to people with some hankering for a
mystical interpretation of number - it is Pythagoreanism


(b)


forget the concept of number

what you have is a sign of an operation - an action - in a series of (successive) actions


(c)


numerical equality is a correspondence of signs between two or more series

it is operational correspondence


6.03. The general form of the integer is [0,E,E + 1}.


operations signed as numbers - that is marked as successive operations within a series
are used to indicate in any other such operation - this is a decision based on economy
and utility

the whole number - the integer - is a sign of a class of operation


6.031. The theory of classes is completely superfluous in mathematics.

This is connected with the fact that the generality required in mathematics is not
accidental generality.


classes are not superfluous in the sense that operations need to be distinguished

the generality in mathematics is an operational generality

that is the operation performed in one series can be performed in any number of other
series

this fact is operational function

everything is 'accidental' until the decision to place it within a series

decsion is the key to mathematical generality

an it is finally the decision to perform a kind of operation

the theory of classes is just the theory of operational types

there is no necessity in this nor is there any accident


6.1. The propositions of logic are tautologies.


the propositions of logic are functions

the so called tautology is a misuse of logical function

it is a senseless combination in that it has no function

the point of an operation is the end point

the end point is a decision

the success of the operation (it's truth value) is a decision to stop or proceed

we operate entirely in the unknown

knowledge is a pragmatic decision

any value it has is simply decided value

that is there is no basis at all to any operation but the operation itself

and any operation is performed within a lager operational context

the utility of which must be assumed for the particular operation to proceed


6.11. Therefore the propositions of logic say nothing. (They are the analytic
propositions)


the propositions of logic are an operational record

they say what operations have been performed

they say what has been done


6.11. All theories that appear to make a proposition of logic have content are false.
one might think, for example, that the words 'true' and 'false' signified two properties
among other properties, and then it would seem 0o be a remarkable fact that every
proposition possessed one of these properties. On this theory it seems to be anything
but obvious, just as, for instance, "All roses are either yellow or red, would not sound
obvious even if it were true. Indeed, the logical proposition acquires all characteristics
of a proposition of natural science and this is the sure sign that it has been constructed
wrongly.


the overall assumption here is that we can separate out propositions of logic from
propositions of fact

this assumption is what needs to looked at and questioned

every statement of fact can be read as a proposition of logic

in that form what is being revealed is the operations that make up the proposition

in pure logic or mathematics - yes the focus is the theory of operations

and so given that focus it is practical to simply look at the issue of function

and the statements of empirical science form the simple observational to the highly
theoretical are indeed concerned with the facts of the world

this is not to say that such statements do not have a functional dimension

just that in empirical science that is not usually the focus

the thing is what we are dealing with in regard to propositions is both dimensions

the functional and empirical

a proposition per se is both

a so called 'logical proposition' is the functional dimension of a proposition

the so called 'empirical proposition' is the substantial dimension of a proposition

that is any proposition has an operational dimension and an empirical dimension

that we might choose to look at either dimension separately is not the point


6.112. The correct explanation of the propositions of logic must assign to them a
unique status among propositions.


I think it is best to drop the terms 'proposition of logic' 'proposition of fact'

the former is really just the functional /operational dimension of a proposition

the latter its empirical dimension

and so the proposition is a proposal that has these dimensions

its truth or falsity is a misnomer too

a proposition is neither true nor false

'true' and 'false' are decisions of use

and so what do we say of truth function?

truth function is the combining of elementary propositions

i.e. 'if p then q'

when p is true - we are saying it has utility

if 'p' is false that it has no utility

utility or its absence are the values of T or F


6.113. It is the peculiar mark of logical propositions that one can recognize that they
are true from the symbol alone, and this fact contains in itself the whole philosophy of
logic. And so too it is a very important fact that the truth or falsity of non-logical
propositions cannot be recognized from propositions alone.


the argument here is that logical propositions are tautologies - tautologies are always
true

this is a fundamental mistake

tautologies are useless propositional strings

the propositions of logic are operational propositions - that is they set out the
operations that can be performed in propositional assertion

and thus any well formed proposition will reflect an operational structure

logical propositions in this sense are projections of structural possibilities

and to the question of truth

truth as I have defined is utility

the question of truth of utility is a response to a proposition

a proposition does not assert its utility or lack of it

truth is a decision of use

a logical propositions - or what I call the functional dimension of a proposition

is thus neither true or false

a logical proposition is a description of the structure of a proposition

a structure determined by the operations that make it up

there is no question of truth or falsity at this level

a representation of an operation or operational possibilities is just a description of
operations performed or performable

it is a naturalistic account


6.12. The fact that the propositions of logic are tautologies shows the formal - logical
properties of language and the world.

The fact that a tautology is yielded by this particular way of connecting its
constituents characterizes the logic of its constituents.

If propositions are to yield a tautology when they are connected in a certain way, they
must have certain structural properties. So their yielding a tautology when combined
in this way shows that they posses these structural properties.


Wittgenstein here confuses the operational and substantial dimensions of the
proposition - and as far as I can tell so has everyone since at least Liebnitz

so called tautological truth cannot be explained in the same way as the substantial
assertion of a proposition

but all we are doing in laying out the logic of a proposition is showing the operations
performed that underlie the substantial dimension

and of course if you want to maintain the same standard in relation to the operational
dimension of a proposition as with the substantial dimension - yes you are left with an
absence of substance in logical propositions - and the resolution of tautology - a truth
with no substance

what I have argued above is that the tautology is not what it has been made out to be

a tautology is not a well formed proposition

a tautology is not a proposition

a tautology is a useless propositional string

that is not made less useless by giving it the status of a 'true'

which I hate to say has nothing to do with the proposition anyway

truth is matter of propositional response - propositional behaviour

what Wittgenstein calls truth function - if it is to have any use must be understood as
possibilities of propositional behaviour

the properties of language and the world -

in the first instance language is a response of consciousness to it's relation to that
which is outside of itself

in the second instance language can be a response to consciousness' relation to itself

language is in the world - that which is outside of consciousness is in the world

'the world' is just a description of all logical domains

so there is no relation between language and the world

or the non-conscious and the world

'the world' if you will - shows itself in language - shows itself in the object of
language

the world shows itself - everywhere

this is really to say Wittgenstein's idea of logical form is a metaphysical mis-casting

a deep confusion


6.1201. For example, the fact that the propositions 'p' and '-p' in the combination
'-(p.-p)' yield a tautology shows that they contradict one another. The fact that the
propositions 'p>q', 'p' and 'q', combined with one another in the form '(p.q) .(p):(q)',
yield a tautology shows that q follows from p and p>q. The fact that '(x). fx:>:fa' is a
tautology shows that fa follows from (x).fx. Etc. etc.


a tautology is so constructed that it amounts to leaving the assertion as it is

that is the apparent operation is no operation at all

a contradiction is a proposition in which the apparent operation is canceled

the result - there is no proposition - nothing has been asserted


6.1202. It is clear that one could achieve the same purpose by using contradictions
instead of tautologies.


a logical proposition is the operational dimension of a proposition

that is it charts the operations performed to make the proposition

it is a purely descriptive affair - the logical proposition asserts that such and such
operations have occurred

no different in principle to any scientific description of any complex event

tautologies and contradictions are the fantasies of logicians who would like to think
they have a foundation to their symbols that is outside of propositional behaviour

there is nothing mysterious or deeply significant about constructing a 'proposition' that
asserts nothing

the whole of modern logic is based on this mistake


6.1203. In order to recognize an expression as a tautology, in cases where no
generality-sign occurs in it, one can employ the following intuitive method: instead of
'p', 'q', 'r', etc. I write 'TpF', 'TqF', 'TrF', etc. Truth combinations I express by means of
brackets, e.g.


T p F T q F.


and I use lines to express the correlation of the truth or falsity of the whole proposition
with the truth combinations of its truth-arguments, in the following way

F

T p F T q F.


T

So this sign, for instance, would represent the proposition p > q. Now, by way of
example, I wish to examine the proposition -(p.-p) (the law of contradiction) in order
to determine whether it is a tautology. In our notation the form '-&' is written as

T

'T&F'

F

and the form '&.n' as


T

T & F T n F.

F


Hence the proposition -(p.-q) reads as follows


F

T

T

T q F T p F.

F
F
T

If we here substitute 'p' for 'q' and examine how the outermost T and F are connected with
the innermost ones ones, the result will be that the truth of the whole proposition is
correlated with all the truth values of its argument, and its falsity with none of the
truth combinations.


constructing a tautology out of a proposition is essentially a waste of time that has no
operational and hence logical significance

recognizing a tautology is recognizing a waste of time

a contradiction likewise is a construction that shuts up all operational possibilities of
an 'embedded' proposition

as a 'proposition' the contradiction is pointless -

it is the denial of propositional operation -

which is to say it negates the proposition -

the result is that there is no proposition at all

that is there is nothing to work with

the situation here is thus pre-propositional

Wittgenstein wishes to argue that the logical status of a logical proposition is that it is
a tautology

that all logical propositions are tautologous

and in this lies their guarantee - their logical foundation

in taking this line of thought Wittgenstein is mistaking substantial propositions for
operational propositions

a logical proposition reflects the operation in thought reflected in language which
results in the given proposition

for all intents and purposes the logical proposition is simply a statement of a particular
use of language

it is a reflection of the mechanics of that use

it is not a proposition in the sense of a statement that asserts what exists

it is in fact that dimension of a proposition that reflects the operations performed to
make a proposition

a workable proposition is one that can be worked on

and yes you can waste your time making tautologies and contradictions - constructing
them out of perfectly well functioning propositions - but this is just pointless fantasy

there is no truth in a tautology

there is no falsity in a contradiction

both forms are non-operational constructions

truth an falsity are operational responses to a proposition

a proposition does not determine its operational responses

the possibilities though at base are twofold

you proceed (truth) or you you do not (false)

truth and falsity are thus basic behavioural reponses to a proposition or to it's parts

with this approach you can still use truth functional calculation

it is best to understand logic at this level as being projective

no surprise that the tautology should figure prominently in a theory of logic that also
proposes solipsism

a tautology is a mirrored image of a proposition that can be in principle repeated
infinitely


6.121. The propositions of logic demonstrate the logical properties of propositions by
combining them so as to form propositions that say nothing.

This method could be called a zero method. In a logical proposition, propositions are
brought into equilibrium with one another, and the state of the equilibrium then
indicates what the logical constitution of these propositions must be.


the great confusion here is between the functional and substantial dimensions of a
proposition

logical propositions are functional

so it is not the case that they say nothing

(does anyone seriously put forward this view of logic?

yes - and it shows just how ridiculous philosophers can be)

what logical propositions say is what we do in the construction of a proposition

that is they display the operations performed in the propositions

the operations that give it its structure and formal characteristics

if you are looking for the substantial content of a logical proposition -

you will of course find nothing

but this is just to say you are looking at the logical proposition in the wrong way

the substantive claims of a proposition are only possible given the operations that
underlie - that provide the formal setting for substance

the 'zero- method' Wittgenstein identifies is the method you apply when you have a
zero conception of the nature of logic

this is really scandalous

it is the height of philosophical deception

it is more than this - it is perverse

at the base of it is some sick notion that only what appears on the surface of the world
is what is real

it is quite unbelievable that philosophers should peddle such garbage


6.122. It follows from this that we can actually do without logical propositions; for in
a suitable notation we can in fact recognize the formal properties of propositions by
mere inspection of the propositions themselves.


yes - this is so

and further we can probably do without propositions per se

the fact of it is thought that we don't because they are such useful tools

these 'formal properties' of propositions are in fact actions performed

you can depict these actions - that is the logical proposition -

or if you are not interested in the operations that create a propositional structure -
don't worry about it

the propositions is dimensional

in an ultimate sense it is unknown

in practice we identify a logical dimension and a substantive dimension


6.1221. If, for example, two propositions 'p' and 'q' in the combination 'p > q' yield a
tautology, then it is clear that q follows from p.

For example, we see from the two propositions themselves that 'q' follows from 'p > q.
p', but it is also possible to show it in this way: we combine them to form 'p > q. p: >
:q', and then show that this is a tautology.


if 'p then q' represents the inferential operation of material implication

it is an action

this operation is not tautologous - that is it is not superfluous

any logical operation can be constructed as a tautology

and this is just to reassert the proposition and mistakenly believe that the reassertion
guarantees the truth of the original

it is really no more than this

quite facile

what it hinges on is that the assertion and the re-assertion of a proposition - have a significant even special relation to each other

it is all done with mirrors


6.1222. This throws some light on the question why logical propositions cannot be
confirmed by experience any more than they can be refuted by it. Not only must a
proposition of logic be irrefutable by any possible experience, but it must be
unconfirmable by any possible experience.


logical operations set up a proposition

these operations can be represented in logical propositions

these 'propositions ' are the operational dimension of a proposition proper

they are just a record of actions performed to set up the proposition

there is no question of confirmation or refutation of experience in this

the experience is the external dimension of the proposition

the logical operations - its internal dimension

together they make a proposition - its function and its substance

the structure of a proposition should not be confused with its appearance

just as the frame of a house is not the appearance of the house


6.1222. Now it becomes clear why people have often felt as if it were for us to
'postulate' the 'truths of logic'. The reason is that we can postulate them in so far as we
can postulate an adequate notation.


notation is a function of operation

logical operation is primitive operation

primitive operation and its variation

the primitive operation of consciousness is negation

negation is the sign of operation

all logical operation are expressions of negation

e.g. quantification can only occur given the idea of restriction or its absence

all inference is an operation of inclusion and exclusion

the essential operation of consciousness is discrimination

we generalize this function in logic

the general characterization is negation

the notion of negation covers all forms of differentiation

any postulates of logic will reflect the operation of negation

negation is not a truth of reason

it is a fact of nature

it is the general characterization of consciousness operating

you could argue therefore that any operation of consciousness is an act of reason and
an act of nature


6.1224. It also becomes clear now why logic was called the theory of forms and of
inference.


logic is more aptly termed - the theory of operations

possible operations is the subject of logical inquiry

and the basic platform of the theory of operations is the identity of indiscernibles

this is the pre-operational position

operation begins from hereb and is an act of discernability

discernibility is a function of negation

or negation is the general sign of discernibility


6.123. Clearly the laws of logic cannot in their turn be subject to the laws of logic.

there is not as Russell thought, a special law of contradiction for each 'type'; one law
is enough, since it is not applied to itself.


primitive operation is just that - however one characterizes it

any theory of primitive operation is simply a description of the basic operation

what we are describing - however we describe - is the operation of consciousness in
relation to non-consciousness

the dialectic - the relation of assertion and denial is the given

is the ground of consciousness

it is the action of discrimination

it is simply a fact of nature

given the existence of consciousness

itself a fact of nature

and so we are not talking of laws of logic

rather description of primitive operation

it makes no sense to ask does an operation apply to itself?

justification is not a problem of logic


6.1231. The mark of a logical proposition is not general validity.

To be general means no more than to be accidentally valid for things. An
ungeneralized proposition can be tautological just as well as a generalized one.


validity is a feature of argument

in so far as a proposition is an argument we can ask the question - is it valid?

validity is just a presentation

an arrangement of premises

it is nonetheless an operation

and as such an organization of what is to be included and what is not

how it is to be presented and how not

it is logic in the presentational mode

what Wittgenstein perhaps should have a called a picture

a very conservative one and classically drawn


6.1232. The general validity of logic might be called essential, in contrast with the
accidental general validity of such propositions as 'All men are mortal'. Propositions
like Russell's 'axiom of reducibility' are not logical propositions, and this explains our
feeling that, even if they were true, their truth could only be the result of a fortunate
accident.


validity is an argument - a presentation that reflects logic

validity is a product of logic

logic itself is not valid or invalid

logic is the operations that underlie human activity

that 'all x are y' is a template that can be applied

what it represents is a logical operation

that operation is an operation of consciousness

it is just a fact that consciousness performs this operation

in itself it has no special status

it is of a kind with the behaviour of any natural phenomenon

consciousness does perform this operation

it applies it to the empirical dimension

whether the application is correct or not

is just a matter of decision

simple as that

axioms are operational rules

an axiom of reducibility has a logical component

as indeed any action does

whether you wish to include it in a cannon of logical operations
is neither here nor there really

that is just a matter of defining domains

not an important matter really


6.1233. It is possible to imagine a world in which the axiom of reducibility is not
valid. It is clear, however, that logic has nothing to do with the question whether our
world really is like that or not.


logic is the theory of operation

and really there is not that much to the theory

we assert and deny -

these are the basic operations

all operations are expressions of this form

so

questions of content or substance are not the domain of logic

of operation

this is not to say they are not in the picture

for an operation to occur

something has to be operated on

yes

this though is not a question of logic

however the world is

so long as it is a world that has a place for operation

logic - or the theory of logic - proceeds

this does mean of course that for logic to have any sense or value

the assumption is that the world is operational

is this a metaphysical principle underlying logic?

yes and no

if you can't operate - perform operations -

if you can't act

then that is that

and I mean this in a metaphysical sense

in such a world the question of logic would not arise

and for that matter no question would

such a world - might I be so bold as to suggest

is world without consciousness

not recognizable to us

therefore of no import


6.124. The propositions of logic describe the scaffolding of the world, or rather they
represent it. They have no 'subject-matter'. They presuppose that names have meaning
and elementary propositions have sense; and that is their connection with the world. It
is clear that something about the world must be indicated by the fact that certain
combinations of symbols - whose essence involves the possession of a determinate
character - are tautologies. This contains the decisive point. We have said that some
things are arbitrary in the symbols that we use and that some things are not. in logic it
is only the latter that express: but that means that logic is not a field in which we
express what we wish with the help of signs, but rather one in which the nature of the
absolutely necessary signs speaks for itself. If we know the logical syntax of any sign-
language, then we have already been given all the propositions of logic.


logic does not describe the scaffolding of the world or represent it

the propositions of logic describe the operations of consciousness or represent them

it is true they have no subject matter in one sense - nevertheless they express the
possibility of action

from a logical point of view - that is an operational point of view - names are
operational points

they have - from a logical point of view no substance or meaning - they are simply
logical points in a field of operation

that is one name can be substituted for another - for any other - the operation is not
affected

logic has nothing to do with substance - though it does presuppose it

the connection of elementary propositions to the world is another matter altogether - it
is not a question of logic

the tautology is logical hot air

tautologies indicate irrelevant - badly formed (structured) propositions

logic has nothing to do with truth

truth does not reveal itself to itself - this is the kind of bad thinking that is or ends up
as mysticism

mysticism is a retreat from game - it is always a sign of rational defeat

the mystic though likes to take all his toys with him when he can no longer play with
the big boys

everything is arbitrary or it's not - that's logic

we have no need to involve logic in questions of freedom and necessity

it is not relevant

our symbols emerge from need - and their life is their utility

decisions we make about them are decisions on the ground

what stays what goes (that's logic again) is a question that can only be decided in the
act

logical syntax is always just an expression in one form or another of an operation

all operations are modifications of the negative

assertion and denial is the basic form of any set of operations

and thus all propositional syntax is an expression of this form

logical propositions are simply and only representations of actions performed or
performable

they are a record of moves made - under the appearance of the world


6.125 It is possible - indeed possible even according to the old conception of logic - to
give in advance a description of all 'true' logical propositions.


a true logical proposition -

a logical proposition expresses logical operations

the truth or falsity of a proposition is determined by how it is acted upon

assent signifies that the proposition is live

that is that it represents an operation or operations that can lead to further operations
- that is the proposition has utility

dissent stops it dead in its track - it is deemed not useful

the logical proposition simply displays what has or will occur

what operations have been performed or in a projective mode what it is anticipate can
occur

truth or falsity is not a characteristic of logical propositions

it is a characteristic of propositional behaviour


6.1251. Hence there can never be surprises in logic.


logic as the description of propositional operations is like any other descriptive
activity - after the fact


6.126. One can calculate whether a proposition belongs to logic, by calculating the
logical properties of the symbol.

And this what we do when we 'prove' a logical proposition. For, without bothering
about sense or meaning, we construct the logical proposition out of others by using
only rules that deal with signs.

The proof of logical propositions consists in the following process: we produce them
out of other logical propositions by successively applying certain operations that
always generate further tautologies out of the initial ones. (And in fact only
tautologies follow from a tautology.)

Of course this way of showing that the propositions of logic are tautologies is not at
all essential to logic, if only because the propositions from which the proof starts must
show without any proof that they are tautologies.


any proposition can be represented logically

there is no separate class of logical propositions

the signs of a logical proposition are the signs of primitive operations

there is no necessity to produce a logical proposition out of other logical propositions

any series of operations can be regarded as discrete

what is required is the syntax - the language of logical propositions

given this background any logical proposition can stand on its own

nothing follows from tautologies

tautologies are fake propositions


6.1261. In logic process and result are equivalent. (Hence the absence of surprise).


the process of an operation can be seen as the result of an operation

(if you are looking for surprise - it's the bearers of propositions you need to engage
with -

facts are the ultimate surprise -

one is surprised by their ability to jolt one's way of thinking

a fact may just be spanner in one's metaphysical conception

why and how of course is beyond knowing

that's the surprise)


6.1262. Proof in logic is merely a mechanical expedient to facilitate the recognition of
tautologies in complicated cases.


it is clear that the whole truth function argument of Wittgenstein here - rests on the
basis of the argument for the significance of the tautology

once you see through this argument

and understand that the tautology provided no basis at all for anything

that it is in fact a malformed proposition that should be disposed of - then the truth
function argument as put by Wittgenstein looses its force

we can still can use this method - on the understanding that 'T' and 'F' are responses to
propositions

that they are not - functions of proposition

yes we can still calculate - with understanding that 'T' and 'F' are actions performed
on propositions -

the actions of assent or dissent and the their consequences - proceed or not -

however if you accept my argument the guts falls out of Wittgenstein's theory


6.1263. Indeed, it would be altogether too remarkable if a proposition that had sense
could be proved logically from others, and so too could a logical proposition. It is
clear from the start that a logical proof of a proposition that has sense and a proof in
logic must be two entirely different things.


for Wittgenstein a proof in logic is a tautology

the truth is that the tautology makes no sense

if you follow Wittgenstein proof is only possible given 'propositions' that make no sense

and the fact is such 'propositions' are not propositions at all

they are deformities - harmless true - really in the category of idiocy

proof becomes on Wittgenstein's view nothing but the reassertion of a proposition

and the belief that such a reassertion has significance

when in fact all it is superfluity masquerading as a foundation

it comes from the desire to make propositions true independently of experience

it is clear to the proponents of this view that a tautology is not true or false relative to
experience

this fact is a logical cross road

either you face the fact that a tautology is without sense or significance

and that this is so because it is not a proposition

or you push on argue that there is a kind of truth that has nothing to do with anything

this is the bizarre result of thinking a senseless 'proposition' has sense


6.1264. A proposition that has sense states something, which is shown by its proof to
be so. In logic every proposition is the form of a proof.

Every proposition of logic is a modus ponens represented in signs. (And one cannot
express modus ponens by means of a proposition.)


modus ponens is just a version of the tautology argument

A > B A
__________

B

the inference A to B

is already established in the conditional A > B

modus ponens when used correctly is just an illustration of inference

it shows that a conditional can be rendered syllogistically

it's really just an argument about possibilities of rendering

it is about logical usage -

of no great import


6.1265. It is always possible to construe logic in such a way that every proposition is
its own proof.


yes - if the argument is that a proposition can be construed as a tautology and that
proof amounts to showing that a proposition is a tautology -

but seriously does anyone really think there is anything in such a proof but hot air?

a tautology just is the logic of solipsism applied to propositions

and proof only makes sense in relation to whiskey


6.127. All propositions of logic are of equal status: it is not the case that some of them
are essentially primitive propositions and others essentially derived propositions.

Every tautology show that it is a tautology.


logical propositions represent the basic operations of consciousness - assertion and
denial and their modifications

and yes finally an operation is an operation - strictly speaking an assertive action has
no essential characteristic that distinguishes it from an action of denial -

an action is an action

context is the question - context in the broadest sense

and the relation of actions - which may just mean their sequence - what follows what - decides what is to be assertion and what is to be denial

the truth about the tautology is just that you can understand logic very well without it

and even if you were to leave the tautology in - all you would have is a mirror image
or a duplication of what is already there

nothing is effected by the tautology

and it is the tautology I think Oakum had in mind - even if he didn't realize it


6.1271. It is clear that the number of the 'primitive propositions of logic' is arbitrary,
since one could derive logic from a single primitive proposition, e.g. by simply
constructing the logical product of Frege's primitive propositions. (Frege would
perhaps say then we should then no longer have an immediately self-evident primitive
proposition. But it is remarkable that a thinker as rigorous as Frege appealed to the
degree of self evidence as the criterion of a logical proposition.)


one's starting point and its description or representation is primitive

one's starting point is an act - an action of thought and what follows - it's expression
outside of thought

an act is never an original act -

any act is a response to - should be seen in the context of - other acts

the idea of the primitive is at best an organizing principle

at worst a belief in a first cause

in a sense all acts are self evident

in that the evidence of any act is the act itself

the idea that evidence for an act (proposition) could be outside of the act (proposition)
is a failure to see what is evident

the fact that one act or one proposition is held to be evidence for another is just not
seeing what is there

in relation to the question of evidence no act is related to another - no proposition is
related to another -

again argument is really just organization for action


6.13. Logic is not a body of doctrine, but a mirror image of the world.

Logic is transcendental.


logic is a description of the operations of consciousness in the world

there is no mirror image of the world

logic is a description of operational function

it is a description that enables - that facilitates - certain other operations

an operational description of consciousness in the world is not the only description
possible

it is not the fundamental description

there is no fundamental description

a fundamental description would exhaust all possible description

possibility cannot be exhausted

any activity can be analyzed operationally

consciousness in the world is not just a matter of operational behaviour

logic is just an account of basic operations

transcendentalism in a Kantian sense is the fiction that necessary presuppositions to
knowledge can be established

this is really just a species of philosophical flight

flight that is from the reality of contingency

and the preposterous notion that knowledge is a non-natural phenomenon

that in some sense it stands outside contingent reality

this really comes back to not understanding the nature of consciousness

consciousness reflects

reflection is therefore a natural characteristic of consciousness

knowledge is reflection

reflection has no basis outside of the fact of consciousness in the world

logic is anything but transcendental

it is description among many of what happens - what occurs


6.2. Mathematics is logical method.

The propositions of mathematics are equation, and therefore pseudo-propositions.


logic is the theory of operation

mathematics is a mode of operation

in so far as mathematical propositions are equations mathematics is the mode of
operation that is calculation

to calculate is to operate mathematically

calculations are genuine operations

equations are platforms for action

if x = y then x has the same utility value as y

such proposals are metaphysically false

x = x

the need to transact - a form of motion from a to b is the pragmatic basis of equation

mathematics is thus a denial of reality

a denial that is necessary f there is to be movement

if there is to be operation

action always defies reality - and in so doing - transforms it


6.21. A proposition of mathematics does not express a thought.


a proposition of mathematics expresses an operation

(the event of the proposition itself - is an operation)

the operation expressed is an operation or operations of consciousness

consciousness is thought

an operation of consciousness is a thought

a thought is an operation

an event - outside of consciousness is not an operation

i.e. an event in non-conscious nature is not an operation


6.211. Indeed in real life a mathematical proposition is never what we want. Rather
we make use of mathematical propositions only in inferences from propositions that
do not belong to mathematics to others that likewise do not belong to mathematics.

(In philosophy the question, 'What do we actually use this word or this proposition
for?' repeatedly leads to valuable insights.)


if we want to know how to get from one proposition to another a mathematical
proposition may be just what we do want

inference is a process of conscious life - it is the thought behind any movement of
body or soul

this idea that in some sense philosophers and mathematicians are not dealing with the
real world is - is either a failure on their part to understand what they are doing or it is
some kind of vain and stupid attempt to place themselves above others

philosophers are neither above nor below their fellow travellers


6.22. The logic of the world, which is shown in tautologies by propositions of logic, is
shown in equations by mathematics.


there is no logic of the world - logic is a purely human creation - and as such simply a
response to the unknown - tautologies are fool's gold

mathematical equations are assertions of equity

the world does not support any such assertion

human need demands equations

equations are constructs of consciousness

and necessary for its operations

consciousness like an eagle flies above the ground with an eye to the detail below


6.23. If two expressions are combined by means of the sign of equality, that means
that they can be substituted for one another. But it must be manifest in the two
expressions themselves whether this is the case or not.

When two expressions can be substituted for one another, that characterizes their
logical form.


it is the assertion of equality that combines the two expressions

it is the assertion of equality that says they can be substituted for one another

the two expressions themselves do not manifest equality

equality is a proposal of relation between expressions

it is not a characteristic of the individual expression

when two expressions are substituted for one another that characterizes their use


6.231. It is a property of affirmation that it can be construed as double negation.

It is a property of '1+1+1+1' that it can be construed as '(1+1) + (1+1)'.


the fact that affirmation can be constructed as a double negation shows the essential
operational nature of logical propositions

a logical /mathematical proposition is an operation

propositional signs are the subject of logical operation

logical constants define the domain of logical operation

the basic operation of logical propositions is negation

all logical operations are forms of negation

the property noted above is an operational property

it indicates that the essential nature of mathematics is operational

that is what we do in mathematics is perform operations

and that is all we do

mathematics tells you nothing about the nature of the world

only how we do and can operate in it


6.232. Frege says that the two expressions have the same meaning but different
senses.

But the essential point about an equation is that it is not necessary in order to show
that the two expressions connected by the sign of equality have the same meaning,
since this can be seen from the two expressions themselves.


two expressions can represent two operations that have the same result but are
different paths to that result

two expressions / operations connected with the sign of equality are because of that
sign determined to be operations with same result

it is the sign of equality that asserts the relation between the two

whether the relation holds depends on the result of the operations

therefore the equality sign is a proposal

yes it is asserted but its status is provisional

meaning is not the issue

the issue is function


6.2321. And the possibility of proving the propositions of mathematics means simply
that their correctness can be perceived without it being necessary that what they
express should itself be compared with the facts in order to determine its correctness.


in a sense any operation is true in itself

any statement of operation is a fact

the question is whether the operation performs as expressed in the statement

here the issue is one of argument

argument about the proposed end result

and argument about the relation of the operation to that end result

ultimately the issue is undetermined by thought or its expressions

there are always questions

we make decisions and proceed despite the indeterminateness of our knowledge

you could hence argue that knowledge is irrelevant

the thing is though we need propositions to get us into the game

they are finally only tools

and their appropriateness - whether they fit the task or not - is only settled by act

and even then doubts will remain

it is these doubts that are the source of further effort and creativity


6.2322. It is impossible to assert the identity of meaning of two expressions. For in
order to be able to assert anything about their meaning, I must know their meaning,
and I cannot know their meaning without knowing whether what they mean is the
same or different.


this is indeed where it is clear the proper characterization of a proposition - and here I
mean any proposition - is that it is a proposal

first up the equals sign is a proposal to identify

it functions as an assertion

though strictly speaking no such thing can be asserted

but it functions as such and what this means is that it acts as such

now the success or failure of the action is what is up for grabs

is what is to be seen

the issue is entirely pragmatic

consciousness by its nature is indeterminate - that is it is not fixed - it is fluid

therefore it reach beyond the bounds of the given - or if you like the determinate

this is the point of it

the function of it

therefore its propositions are not necessarily reflections of the given

therefore in the non-given mode they are not assertions

when consciousness reaches beyond the given

its propositions quite plainly are proposals

proposals - not for what is but rather for what can be

what can be - can be determined by what is needed

equations are such a propositional bridge


6.2323. An equation merely marks the point of view from which I consider the two
expressions: it marks their equivalence in meaning.


an equation is a proposal for the two expressions - it is the point of view from which
they are considered

it is a proposal of function - it is the proposal for different approaches to the one result


6.233. The question whether intuition is needed for the solution of mathematical
problems must be given the answer that in this case language itself provides the
necessary intuition.


yes - this is so

language is the form of intuition

language is an operation

intuition is the knowing that the operation of language - of syntax - will reveal


6.2331. The process of calculating serves to bring about the intuition.

Calculation is not an experiment.


actually language is the ground of intuition

the intuition is thus prior to the calculation

the calculation - the operation - reveals

calculation is not an experiment

calculation gives ground to intuition

calculation shows us that intuition is in fact an operational outcome


6.234. Mathematics is a method of logic.


mathematics is an operational theory

the operational focus of mathematics is calculation

(not all operations are calculations

though any operation can be regarded as an operation

hence the universal applicability of mathematics)

mathematical propositions are proposal of equality

equations are the mode of mathematics

equations bring ideality into the world in an operational form

the notion of equality is an ideal notion

that is it is not found in the order of things

it is always a proposal

the point of the proposal is transaction

it is the transference of one category of thought to another

such an act is always diabolical

that is it is always a challenge and reorganization of the natural order of things

it is nevertheless essential and necessary

mathematics imposes on reality

consciousness imposes on reality

mathematics is one of its tools


6.2341. It is the essential characteristic of mathematical method that it employs
equations. For it is because of this method that every proposition of mathematics must
go without saying.


equations are the form of mathematical discourse

mathematics is the description of the operations within this form

the equation is an ideal proposal

its point is utility - it's action is transformation

mathematics is the theory of fundamental motion


6.24. The method by which mathematics arrives at its equations is the method of
substitution.

For equations express the substitutability of two expressions and, starting from a
number of equations, we advance to new equations by substituting different
expressions in accordance with the equations.


equations are proposals

any two expressions can be related by the '=' sign

this is the bottom line -

there is no necessity in the equation relation

what is to be equated is a simply a decision

the idea of any such decision is that the expressions are to be substituted

that is to say it is proposed that the propositions equated express operations that have
the same result

the expressions are thus different paths to the one end

what I want to make clear is that always here we are dealing with a proposal

a proposal for action

there is - that is no certainty in any such proposal

and it may in fact be the case that in fact the expressions do not have identical
outcomes

the expressions may only have similar outcomes

this does not invalidate the equation

the equation is a proposal for identity -

even if that identity is never in fact realized

the operation is nevertheless of value from a heuristic point of view

it is that is the discovery of new ways

in any transformation something is lost - in order for their to be something gained

what this amounts to is that in reality there are no actual equations

what you have in the equation is a transformation proposal


*6.241. Thus the proof of the proposition 2 x 2 = 4 runs as follows:

(NB. I do not have the symbols to represent the text here. Please consult the text.)


2 x 2 is an operation that has as its subjects operations ('2' and '2' repeated)

multiplication is the operation applied to the these operations

multiplication is an operation on operations

the result of this operation is signified by the sign '4'

'4' is an operation - or like '2' - a series of operations

in this context is an operation that is the result of an operation

an operation that has as its subjects - operations

'4' thus becomes in this proposition the sign for the operation of '2 x 2'

2 x 2 is itself a sign for the operation of multiplication of '2' and '2'

multiplication is a method of addition

what this shows is that numbers have no significance as stand alone expressions

that is e.g. '2' or '4' only have value in an operational context

and operational here means propositional

'2 x 2 = 4' is a proposition that states that the expression to the left of the '=' sign is an
operation that can be expressed as the sign to the right of the equals sign

in this expression an operation is named

the operation '2 x 2' is named as '4'

the name thus is the operation signed

again the sign '4' has no significance outside of a propositional context

that is to say there are no such things as numbers


6.3. The exploration of logic means the exploration of everything that is subject to
law. And outside logic everything is accidental.


the operation that is consciousness imposed on the non-conscious results in
propositions

propositions are expressions of the relation of the conscious and the non-conscious

propositions are operations

logic is a depiction of the operation of propositions - the internal relations and the
external (inter-propositional) relations

it is the representation of operations

and as such an operation or series of operations - in itself

the attempt to provide a theory of propositional operations

that is to describe the possibilities of operation -

is the attempt to provide a theory of logic

there are no laws outside of theory

there is no one theory of logic

that is logic like any supposed body of knowledge is open to question

this really should not need to be said

as to the accidental nature of things

being law governed only means being within the domain of a theory

that which is outside of theory is just not law governed within that theory

it has nothing to do with whether the phenomenon is accidental or not

an accidental state of affairs can well be covered by some theory

in physics quantum theory does just this


6.31. The so called law of induction cannot possibly be a law of logic, since it is
obviously a proposition with sense - Nor therefore, can it be a priori.


induction is an inference

whether it is regarded as a valid inference or not depends on one's epistemological
perspective

irrespective of this matter inductive inference is an operation

it is an operation that relates propositions

this is all that is required for it to be regarded as logical

that is it is a propositional operation

it is a logical action

whether it has sense - or is understood as a prior or not - is not an issue of logic

any action proposed (proposition) is a matter for logic


6.32. The law of causality is not a law but the form of a law.


the 'law' of causality is a proposal of external relations

laws of anything are the decrees of legislators

who has the authority to legislate?


6.321. 'Law of causality' - that is a general name. And just as in mechanics, for
example, there are 'minimum-principles', such as the law of least action, so too in
physics there are causal laws, laws of the causal form.


causality is an operation

how it is described depends on one's epistemology and ontology

it is general in the sense that we can speak of the operation that is causality in the
conscious (the operation of mind - idea to idea) and non-conscious (the operation of
nature - matter to matter) and even in the relation between the two (mind and matter -
mind to matter / matter to mind)

again - all this is metaphysically loaded

but the history of the use of the notion of causality demonstrates as a matter of fact its
general applicability

really it is a primitive way of relating events

it is a starting point for science and non-science

it is a primitive theory of operation


6.3211. Indeed people even surmised that there must be a 'law of least action', before
they knew exactly how it went. (There as always, what is certain a priori proves to be
something purely logical.)


'before they knew how it went' means prior to description - prior to formulation

what is 'known' prior to description is unknown

the very reason for description - for formulation is to give the unknown character - to
bring it out of the darkness

it is then we can say what it was we didn't know

the unknown is the ultimate source

Wittgenstein incorrectly names the unknown - 'a priori'

as if the absence of knowledge is some kind of certainty

very strange

it comes from not understanding the epistemological significance of the unknown

it comes from regarding it negatively - as 'not-knowledge'

this has been the way of things in western philosophy from Socrates onward

my view is that skepticism is a positive doctrine

that the absence of knowledge is a positive state of affairs

in that it is the force that underlies all attempts at knowledge

it is the reason behind all knowledge


6.33. We don have a priori belief in a law of conservation, but rather a priori
knowledge of the possibility of a logical form.


the law of conservation of energy or mass in its general or philosophical sense is an
explanation or hypothesis

it is an advance on the idea of the regularity of nature

it is designed to account for the possibility of action

that is it is a theory of the ground of operation

if it was a priori knowledge - it would be knowledge that exists - has currency
independent of any relation of consciousness to the non-conscious

for it is this relation that is experience

whatever one's view of knowledge - the fact is it only exists given such a relationship

the alternative is to put that there is knowledge in a world without consciousness

any theory of how the world is - is a theory of reflective consciousness

it is the conscious imperative - to ground experience

what we are talking about here is not the possibility of logical form -

rather the possibility of explanation

and further - really the need for explanation

and the fact that conscious will naturally seek explanation

as natural as water finding its own level


6.34. All such propositions including the principle of sufficient reason, the laws of
continuity in nature and of least effort in nature, etc. etc. - all these are a priori insights
about the forms in which the propositions of science can be cast.


the forms in which the propositions of science can be cast -

Wittgenstein I think uses the notion of form to pretty much cover every base in the
diamond - the ground itself - the stadium and what is beyond

it is an all purpose concept - as it was for Plato -

and with such a use it appears to be comprehensive - the question though is does have
any real meaning when used at every turn?

anyway -

the principle of sufficient reason, laws of continuity in nature and of least effort etc. -

are basically reflections on experience -

attempts to ground it - give it explanation

they are in terms of giving sense to experience - useful tools -

they are no more than proposals of view

ways of seeing the world - that enable us to operate effectively in it


6.341. Newtonian mechanics, for example, imposes a unified form on the descriptions
of the world. let us imagine a white surface with irregular black spots on it. We then
say whatever kind of picture these make, I can always approximate as closely as I
wish to the description of it by covering the surface with a sufficiently fine square
mesh, and then saying of every square whether it is black or white. In this way shall I
have imposed a unified form on the description of the surface. The form is optional,
since I could have achieved the same result by using a net with a triangular or
hexagonal mesh. Possibly the use of a triangular mesh would have made the
description simpler: that is to say, it might be that we could describe the surface more
accurately with a course triangular mesh than with a fine square mesh (or conversely)
and so on. The different nets correspond to different systems for describing the world.
Mechanics determines one form of description of the world by saying that all
propositions used in the description of the world must be obtained in a given way
from a set of propositions - the axioms of mechanics. It thus supplies the bricks for
building the edifice of science, and it says, 'Any building that you want to erect,
whatever it may be, must somehow be constructed with these bricks, and with these
alone.'

(Just as with the number-system we must be able to write down any number we wish,
so with the system of mechanics we must be able to write down any proposition of
physics that we wish.)


(a) the form is optional -


that is the description that we use is not determined by the phenomenon described

in fact the phenomenon is determined by the description - by the form

pre-description - pre-form the phenomenon is technically unknown

of course we always come to the world with formality

there are no blanks - no dead spots requiring formalization

this though is unreflective experience

in the act of reflect - if it is performed correctly - everything is held - must be held
open

what reflective description is used is metaphysically optional - yes

it is necessity though that determines the option

the necessity to act - to be able to act

this by the way is not to say we know the end point of such with any certainty

it is just to say we operate as if we do - until we have reason to change our view

the possibility of description of descriptive systems is really a question of creativity
and inventiveness

but this is so just because the final point is that there is no one comprehensive
description that fulfills all tasks at all times in all places

the idea of such - has some heuristic value

their security in universality

in fact security is the point - the reason for the pursuit of universality

it is in another sense - a deep all pervading desire


(b) the test of the form is it's universality within a greater form


any conception of consciousness - for this just what a form is -

functions within the context of forms already in play

either that or it transforms what is in play - this is the origin of revolution

decisions about the place of forms in a formal setting will always be guided by the
question of how to act

there are nevertheless internal formal issues - issues of logic if you will

the relations of forms

their interconnectedness - and their hierarchical structure - are all matters relevant to
outcome

they are ultimately functional issues

a theoretical system is only functional if it is integrated

the ideal is deductive

the picture is a Russian doll


(c)


a number system is just a script for essential operations

mechanics is just one theory of physics


6.342. And now we can see the relative position of logic and mechanics. (The net may
also consist of more than one kind of mesh: e.g. we could use both triangles and
hexagons.) The possibility of describing a picture like the one mentioned above with
the net of a given form tells us nothing about the picture. (For that is true of all such
pictures). But what does characterize the picture is that it can be described completely
by a particular net with a particular size of mesh.

Similarly the possibility of describing the world by means of Newtonian mechanics
tells us nothing about the world: but what does tell us something about it is the precise
way in which it is possible to describe it by these means. We are also told something
about the world by the fact that it can be described more simply with one system of
mechanics than with another.


(a)


the possibility of describing a picture (created by a form) tells us nothing about the
picture -

the picture is a proposal for how to regard the object - (it is a picture of the object - we
would normally say)

the picture is an epistemological proposal

before the picture there is no knowledge of the object

so the nature of the picture is not the issue

however the nature of the picture can be an issue

we can want to describe the picture - this is a meta question

any such description is just the placing of the picture in a theoretical context

a larger mesh to continue Wittgenstein's metaphor

you have to decide here what you are doing

picturing the world (or some aspect of it)

or picturing the picture

the two can be done - but they should not be confused

Wittgenstein wants to say I think - we begin with a picture -

and yes we always begin with a phenomena

what I say is that the picturing just is the formalization of the phenomena

it is in short when the unknown is made known

it is the picture that makes known

the form that makes known

what this is leading to is that the idea of 'picture' here is irrelevant to the analysis

what you have is phenomena (unknown)

and the formalization of the phenomena - the making known

thus - the form is the picture

so I would re-write to: 'what does characterize the phenomena is that it can be
described completely by a particular net with a particular size of net'

look to cut to the chase here - what this means is that we decide that a particular form
just does characterize / describe completely

it may or may not as a matter of fact - but the making of the formalization of the
phenomena can be made with the idea of completion -

it's a question of the use of universality

not all human practices require it -

and in fact it is only ever an endeavour

its value is perhaps heuristic -

but in epistemological terms it is a fake -

we can never know if a form completely describes

for we have no way of determining what any complete description would amount to

the idea is really an old testament hangover

and a hard line view of the belief that we are made in the image of God

you could even say it is another view of the origin of idolatry

or just simply foolishness


(b)


the possibility of describing the world by means of Newtonian mechanic tells us
nothing about the world -


the world is not something we are outside of

we do not ever give an account of the world

we can make piecemeal offerings

we are in the world

that is consciousness is in the non-conscious

this is our reflective reality

Newtonian mechanics enables us to operate within this reflective reality

it is thus a theory of this reflective reality

if by the world we mean the conscious and non-conscious dimensions of reality

the reflective and the non-reflective - and the relation of the two

what this relation creates -

if this is the world

the Newtonian mechanics gives us a stratagem for operating within this reality

it tells us about our world

that we can operate in a certain way

this at least is the proposal


(c)


what it does tell us something about is the precise way it is possible to describe it by
these means?


yes precision -

a very relative notion

with only the less precise to guide us

we assume it is precise

that is until a so called more precise model is proposed

what we know - is that we do describe

that description is a mode of reflective consciousness

'precision' is an argument for preference

like an estate agent's argument for the vista of a property

it's a proposed selling point

(it depends on how you see it)


6.434. Mechanics is an attempt to construct according to a single plan all the true
propositions that we need for the description of the world.


mechanics is a theory of consciousness - a theory of operation - operation in the non-
conscious dimension of reality - that is a theory of the operation and function of the
outside world - true propositions are descriptions of or statements of performed or
performable operations -

what is done and what can be done is the subject of any theory

the proof of the pudding is in the eating as my mother would say


6.3431. The laws of physics, with all their logical apparatus, still speak, however
indirectly, about the objects of the world.


the laws of physics speak about the relationship of the consciousness dimension of
reality to the non-conscious dimension of reality

objects are constructs of this relationship


6.3432. We ought not to forget that any description of the world by means of
mechanics will be of the completely general kind. For example, it will never mention
particular point-masses; it will only talk about any point masses whatsoever.


a point mass is an operational domain

an operational domain is ultimately a theory operation

to put it generally - under these circumstances with these resources these actions can
be performed

physics is not about substance

it is about operation


6.35. Although the spots in our picture are geometrical figures, nevertheless
geometry can obviously say nothing at all about the actual form and position. The
network, however, is purely geometrical; all its properties can be give a priori.

Laws like the principle of sufficient reason, etc. are about the net and not about what
the net describes.


geometry represents

what is 'actual form and position' is I presume based on an observation

an observation only has epistemic content in a representational / propositional form

beyond this or beneath this - is the unknown

our knowledge - what we say is - is a complex of forms - that has no necessary
stability (stability is pragmatic - a decision to stop)

there is no fixed - eternal form - all forms refer to or are an expression of - or
outcomes of

to understand forms look to the wind


6.36. If there were a law of causality, it might be put in the following way: There are
laws of nature.

But of course this cannot be said; it makes itself manifest.


in consciousness' relation to the non-conscious regularities are manifest

the world is this relation

that is the world of the human animal is this relation

we can well understand the world could be otherwise to other forms of nature

and it is clear that in a final sense - we cannot say

we have no way of comprehending the world outside of a perspective on it

and we only have the human perspective in fact

in logic we can imagine other possibilities

but these imaginations are never positive

any such 'imagining' is - what is not known


6.361. One might say using Hertz's terminology, the only connections that are subject
to law are thinkable.


connections - associations - in general begin as anomalous events

and the question then is how to place them within given theoretical frameworks

that is to place them in a law like context

this may or may not happen

science can tolerate anomalous phenomena - with an eye to incorporating within
current theory - or seeing it as a reason to question reigning hegemony

whatever the case

such connections are thinkable

in general we assume all phenomena - all connections - are subject to law

this though is more a methodological - procedural assumption - than a fact about the
nature of things

certainly we proceed as if

however if we had no reason to doubt - at any level of the theoretical endeavour -

there would be no growth of knowledge

doubt is the force behind knowledge


6.3611. We cannot compare a process with 'the passage of time' - there is no such
thing - but only with another process (such as the working of a chronometer).

Hence we can describe the lapse of time only by relying on some other process.

Something exactly analogous applies to space: e.g. when people say that neither of
two events (which exclude one another) can occur because their is nothing to cause
the one to occur rather than the other, it is really a matter of being unable to describe
one of the two events unless there is some sort of asymmetry to be found. And if such
an asymmetry is to be found, we can regard it as the cause of the occurrence of the
one and the non-occurrence of the other.


(a)


the passage of time is a process

a process is identified as temporal by being related to the passage of time

measurement of time is a decision to regard a particular process as the standard
(i.e. the revolutions of the earth against the sun)

against this other temporal processes are measured

the point is we cannot conceive of any process without the presumption of the
passage of time

there is no process outside of time

any process represents time

time is the essence of process

process the expression of time


(b)


the nature of process is temporal

a lapse of time is the 'space between' two points in an ongoing process


(c)


in relation to space -

events are distinguished by asymmetry -

really we have no concept of symmetry unless we have the notion of separate events

and the same obviously follows regarding asymmetry

symmetry is a relation of shapes - plural

asymmetry is a relation of shapes

the notion of an event - presumes position in space

we can only have the concept of an event if we have the idea of space

an event is distinguishable from another event in terms of its position in space

an event is a unique position relative to another event

if nothing else distinguishes two events - position in space does

symmetrical objects are the case in point


6.36111. Kant's problem about the right hand and the left hand, which cannot be made
to coincide, exists even in two dimensions. Indeed, it exists in one-dimensional space

- - - - o------x - - x------o - - - -
a b

in which the two congruent figure, a and b, cannot be made to coincide unless they are
moved out of this space. The right hand and the left hand are in fact completely
congruent. It is quite irrelevant that they cannot be made to coincide.

A right hand glove could be put on the left hand, if it could be turned around in four
dimensional space.


(a)


the fact that a right hand and a left hand cannot fill the same space - is something of a
false problem -

if the right hand and the left hand were of identical shape - they still could not occupy
the same space

if nothing else what distinguishes entities is their position in space

and this is no more than a version of the identify of indiscernibles argument

or perhaps more to the point the non-identity of discernibles


(b)


time is the operation of sequence

space is the operation of position


6.362. What can be described can happen too: and what the law of causality is meant
to exclude cannot even be described.


description is about what is

hypothesis is about what can be

what is possible may or may not occur

the law of causality is not necessary

un-caused events are conceivable

reality itself can be viewed as un-caused

re: Spinoza's argument for God that substance is sui causa

what can be described is not determined by the law of causality

the law of causality is a description

it is a description that has proven to be operationally fruitful

this does not amount to necessity

as a matter of fact - nothing does

and I mean nothing

reality is open an question

description of reality is never complete

we work with what is useful

a great many things are useful


6.363. The procedure for induction consists in accepting as true the simplest law that
can be reconciled with our experiences.


induction is an expectation

it is the expectation that what is experienced will continue to occur

as an inference from a particular instance to a general conclusion

there is no such thing -

that is there is no such inference

the argument that there is is simply a vain attempt to formalize expectation

it is a worthy effort but a waste of time

as to simplicity -

well I guess it will be argued that any generalization by its form will be simpler than
any number of unconnected and unrelated particular observations -

though you might argue too that there is a simplicity in the particular that can never
be found in a generalization

is not the generalization regardless of its function an added layer - a superimposing on
particular instances?

and if so the argument for simplicity of generalization might seem to come at the cost
of the simplicity of particularity

my point is that simplicity is an issue independent of induction

and simplicity is not a straightforward matter - it is theory dependent like any other
functioning concept

we can discuss induction without simplicity

simplicity is not the key concept in induction


6.3631. The procedure, however, has no logical justification but only a psychological
one.

It is clear that there are no grounds for believing that the simplest eventuality will in
fact be realized.


again this is not an issue of simplicity

who is to say that the sun will rise tomorrow is the simplest eventuality?

simplicity - if you want to make this concept central - is a notion defined within one['s
metaphysical framework -

it is not something you can just point to

the inductive expectation though is not without argument -

human expectations - simply because they are natural in a natural in a natural world -
will have some basis in utility -

granted we can never be certain about anything -

it may well be argued that nevertheless our expectations exist for good practical
reasons

and that therefore there is some sense in which they do connect with the way the
world is

simply because they are features of the world - of the natural world


6.36311. It is an hypothesis that the sun will rise tomorrow; and this means that we do
not know that it will rise.


yes - it is an hypothesis -

but what is it to know anything?

knowledge is consciousness' embrace of reality

the non-conscious reality - and the reality of consciousness

essentially knowledge is awareness

as regards its basis - there is none

as to the status of expectation -

clearly it has a function and an important function in conscious life

consciousness reaches beyond itself - beyond awareness -

and deals in possibility

possibility is a function of consciousness

it gives awareness - parameters

it gives awareness place

and by 'place' here we mean logical place

possibility is the logical space of consciousness

consciousness asserts that awareness can be expected

expectation is thus a function of consciousness' sense of place

it is to do with how consciousness operates

how it functions

and all this is really an empirical issue

it is about how conscious human entities operate

the theory of inference - as a feature of the theory of logic -

is a reflection of consciousness on its operations

it is an aspect of consciousness' search for knowledge of itself -

that is consciousness' reflection on the nature of its operations


6.37. There is no compulsion making one thing happen because another has happened.
the only necessity that exists is logical necessity.


we do not know why things happen

logical necessity is neither logical nor necessary

(in magic it's the false bottom trick)


6.371. The whole modern conception of the world is founded on the illusion that the
so-called laws of nature are the explanations of natural phenomena.


what is to count as 'the whole modern conception'?

depends where you are - and who you are

there are more things in heaven and earth than in your conception Mr.Wittgenstein

even so

empirical science works -

if an illusion - it is nevertheless a fruitful illusion

and as to illusion -

reality is the chosen one


6.372. Thus people today stop at the laws of nature, treating them as something
inviolable, just as God and Fate were treated in past ages.

And in fact both are right and wrong: though the view of the ancients is clearer in so
far as they have a clear terminus, while the modern system tries to make it look as if
everything were explained.


something of a sociological theory and evaluation here -

we need evidence for this view that 'people today.....'

the need for metaphysical security cannot be argued away

such matters though have nothing to do with the epistemological status of science

it is clear that whatever one's view here

we need to keep an open mind - even in relation to our most noble endeavours

wisdom is seeing what you do not know

and you do not have to look far to see


6.373. The world is independent of my will.


my will is in the world

that is my will as an expression of consciousness my will is inside the world

therefore it is a feature of the world

my will is not independent of the world

it is an expression of the world

'the world' here I assume is all that is

consciousness is I argue a dimension of the world

it is the internal dimensions

consciousness is internality

to suggest that the world is only that which is not conscious

is a ridiculous view

which might have something to do with the 'modern conception of the world' as put
forward by philosophical retards

I have in mind here any view of the world that does not recognize it's internal
dimension

that is any view that attempts to make the inside an outside and to thus put that the
world is one dimensional

such a position I think is argued for by Wittgenstein

and it was certainly advanced by the Positivists that took heart from the argument of
the 'Tractatus'


6.374. Even if all we wish for were to happen, still this would only be a favour
granted by fate, so to speak: for there is no logical connection between the will and the
world, which would guarantee it, and the supposed physical connection is surely not
something that we could will.


wishing is just a form of imagination

what we will and what we imagine are two different things

the two should not be confused

the will and the world -

a logical connection?

what is meant here?

my will is an expression of a conscious operation in the world

the outcome of any such operation - that is its result

may or may not be what was desired

this is quite different from saying there is no connection between the two

clearly there is a connection in consciousness

the outcome is affirmed relative to the intent

or it is not -

p v ~p


6.375. Just as the only necessity that exists is logical necessity, so too the only
impossibility that exists is logical impossibility.


logical impossibility is what cannot be done

logical possibility is what can be done

therefore logical necessity is what is done

or to put it in another way -

logical impossibility is what cannot be

logical necessity - what must be

what must be is what is


6.3751. For example, the simultaneous presence of two colours at the same place in
the visual field is impossible, in fact logically impossible, since it is ruled out by the
logical structure of colour.

Let us think how this contradiction appears in physics: more or less as follows - a
particle cannot have two velocities at the same time; that is to say, it cannot be in two
places at the same time; that is to say particles that are in different places at the same
time cannot be identical.

(It is clear that the logical product of two elementary propositions can neither be a
tautology nor a contradiction. The statement that a point in the visual field has two
different colours at the same time is a contradiction.)


the phenomenon of two colours in the same place in the visual field at the same time -
does not occur -

for a colour to be it must occupy a place

this is to say the colour has a spacial dimension

an entity to exist must be in space

space is an attribute of the existing entity

it is an existential attribute

there is no question of one entity occupying the same place as another

for if it did the second entity would have the same spacial attribute as the first

there would be no distinction (between the 'two')

in such a case nothing would exist

for things to exist they must exist in a world where they are distinguished

we distinguish things in terms of their place

but this is really nothing more than to say they are distinguished

for there is no place but that occupied by an existing thing

therefore the totality of existing things (distinguishable entities) is space

in a 'world' where nothing existed there would be no space

like Aristotle and nature - I abhor a void


6.4. All propositions are of equal value.


a propositions value is its utility

we can give a useful proposition the value '1'

a useless proposition the value '0'

value is given to propositions

it could be said the proposition itself has no value

the point is a proposition only comes into being as a proposal for action

so yes - perhaps there is an intrinsic value to any proposition

what that value is depends on the circumstance the proposition is placed in

in one set of circumstances a proposition may have no value

in another context the same proposition may be of use

a proposition's value is its utility relative to a proposed outcome


6.41. The sense of the world must lie outside the world. In the world everything is as
it is, and everything happens as it does happen: in it no value exists - and if it did
exist, it would have no value.

If there is any value that does have value, it must lie outside the whole sphere of what
happens and is the case. For all that happens and is the case is accidental.

What makes it non-accidental cannot lie within the world, since if it did it would itself be accidental.

It must lie outside the world.


consciousness is the source of the sense of the world

consciousness is the inside of the world

the source of the sense of the world is inside the world

on the surface of the world everything is as it is

there is no value on the surface

value is an internal property

to understand value you need to appreciate it is a function of consciousness

every act of consciousness is a reaching beyond what is to what might be

the possibilities in any situation are determined by consciousness in the situation it
finds itself

valuation is assessment of possibilities

any act to a chosen end is 'good' if it leads to that end

the anticipation that it will is expressed in the proposition that the act is good

all acts of consciousness in so far as they anticipate a future state of affairs are acts of
value

value is not fact

value is the anticipation of fact

it is the anticipation that action will bring about a chosen state of affairs


6.42. So too it is impossible for there to be propositions of ethics.

Propositions can express nothing that is higher.


this is a bottom of the barrel argument

higher than what?

an ethical proposition asserting that a certain act is good -

is really shorthand for say that someone desires a certain outcome - and presumably
will act in such a way as to bring it about

we are not dealing with something higher or for that matter lower

ethical propositions state that a conscious agent desires an outcome - and through
whatever action anticipates its occurrence

it is what Kierkegaard termed a leap of faith -

in that one can never know what the outcome will be

one can only act to bring it about

such an act is really always in the darkness


6.421. It is clear that ethics cannot be put into words.

Ethics is transcendental.

(Ethics and aesthetics are one in the same.)


a desired outcome an anticipated state of affairs -

am I speaking another language?

also tell people who have nothing and are being oppressed that ethics cannot be put
into words

tell them that is to shut up

really -

for a start there is no transcendental

there is only this world - and the problem of surviving in it

ethical propositions are a strategy for survival

the human being just does think in terms of desirable and undesirable outcomes

it is of the nature of the beast

we do anticipate and act to bring about desired states of affairs

it is what we do

it is that is an empirical fact of the animal

aesthetics is the projection of desired states upon the non-conscious

it is the assertion of desire as an objective fact of the world

I desire what is beautiful - what is beautiful is what I desire

ethics and aesthetics are quite different


6.422. When an ethical law of the form, 'Thou shalt....', is laid down, one's first
thought is, 'And what if I do not do it? It is clear, however that ethics has nothing to
do with punishment and reward in the usual sense of the terms. So our question about
the consequences of an action must be unimportant - At least those consequences
should not be events. There must indeed be some kind of ethical reward and ethical
punishment, but they must reside in the action itself.

(And it is also clear that reward must be something pleasant and the punishment
something unpleasant)


there are no ethical laws

it suits certain interests that wish to control people's actions to maintain that there are ethical laws

what you are dealing with there is control - power over others

fear of punishment - and the bribery of reward are methods of control

you cannot speak of actions and not include discussion of consequences

there is a sense in which the meaning of an act is just its consequence

and that consequence may well be an event

to negate consequences is to negate the act

an act is regarded as good if it achieves the desired end

perhaps that amounts to success - and that such success is reward

punishment and reward though are an unnecessary overlay

the act works or it doesn't the fact that an anticipated state of affairs is not the result of
an act is not a punishment -

it is simply a fact that what was desired was not achieved with the action performed

if the desired end remains the same then obviously another course of action is required
to bring about the result

the idea that ethical reward or punishment is in the act is quite confused -

it takes no account of the fact that an act only has meaning in a particular context

one act in one context may well be successful

the same act in another may well result in failure

on Wittgenstein's view we are to understand an act outside of any context

therefore the one act must contain both reward and punishment

if this is so these concepts are rendered meaningless for they cannot be distinguished
by the act itself

pleasant and unpleasant - a very refined can I say English upper class twit view of
morality

morality for genteel society

not of any use at all in a world gone wrong

unless you wish to say that discrimination deprivation and violence are 'unpleasant'


6.423. It is impossible to speak of the will in so far as it is the subject of ethical
attributes.

And the will as a phenomenon is of interest only to psychology.


'the will' is a description of the action of consciousness

the will exists to effect conscious intent

'ethical attributes' are descriptions of the results of conscious action

we cannot speak in absolute terms here

(there are no absolute terms)

results are arguments regarding satisfaction

to view an act as successful is to say what?

a good result - yes

an unsuccessful action - that which did not achieve the desired result -

a bad result?

again it depends on the circumstances - the context

and this goes to the importance of the act -

how significant the desired end is regarded

and this is about the relative importance of actions and ends

there is no standard we can appeal to here

we make it up as we go

and in the main have only a superficial understanding of why we value some actions
higher or lower than others

this is about ends - and their organization in a life

invariably there is some kind of hierarchy

and various meta theories to account for such

i.e. an obvious one is the argument that we act in our perceived best interest in order
to maintain our existence

as to psychology -

there really is no such thing

as practiced today it is a poor man's philosophy -

it's the idea that you can understand human behaviour without addressing
metaphysical issues

that in some way these matters have been settled - and then you get on with the job

the reason there is little success in any psychology is just that the central issues that
need to be addressed - the issues of philosophy - of metaphysics - are not tackled

as a result all you get is window dressing

and the inevitable sense of failure

(this of course has generated a thriving industry of frauds)


6.43. If the good or bad exercise of the will does alter the world, it can alter only the
limits of the world, not the facts - not what can be expressed by means of language.

In short the effect must be that it becomes an altogether different world. It must, so
to speak, wax and wane as a whole.

The world of a happy man is a different one from that of a unhappy man.


to say the exercise of will - does not alter the world is either an argument for non-
action - or in the moral realm and argument for amorality

the world is eternally different - regardless of our actions

though our action - like any other motion effects change

there is no unchanging reality

reality is in motion

the world of the happy man compared to that of the unhappy man is like the difference
between red and green

both colours have a natural place in the natural world

the world of the happy man and the world of the unhappy man are identical in that
happiness and unhappiness are without explanation beyond their presentations


6.431. So too at death the world does not alter, but comes to an end.


consciousness is the light

death is the return to darkness


6.4311. Death is not an event in life: we do not live to experience death.

If we take eternity to mean not infinite temporal duration but timelessness, then
eternal life belongs to those who live in the present.

Our life has no end in just the way in which our visual field has no limits.


(a)


life is a form of existence

death is the limit of the form

the reason for forms and their existence or non-existence is beyond knowledge

logic is the primitive assertion of forms and their limits (p v ~p)

existence is the constant 'v'


(b)


eternity is existence from the point of view of time

timelessness is existence without consciousness

timelessness is the unknown

timelessness is an imagination

time is a form of existence given the existence of consciousness

time is a form of consciousness

there is no measurement outside of consciousness

duration is a measurement

without consciousness there is no light

we can assume that without the form of consciousness existence is darkness

it cannot be seen


6.4312. Not only is there no guarantee of the temporal immortality of the human soul,
that is to say of its eternal survival after death; but, in any case, this assumption
completely fails to accomplish the purpose for which it has been intended. Or is some riddle solved by my surviving for ever? Is not eternal life as much of a riddle as our present life? The solution of the riddle in space and time lies outside of space and time.

(It is certain;ly not the solution of any problems of natural science that is required.)


the argument of immortality is a species of the argument for eternal forms

it has more to do with vanity than logic or rationality

our knowledge of forms - our direct experience is that - is that forms alter and indeed
cease to be

if by the human soul Wittgenstein means consciousness -

what we know is that individual consciousness is a natural phenomenon that comes
into being - exists and then ceases to be

there is no reason to believe that consciousness survives death

we have no evidence for believing that life survives for ever - or for that matter that
any form of existence survives for ever

the notion of eternal life is at the best a misuse of logic

the argument is of the form 'p and ~p'

the opposite of life is not-life

the opposite of life is not immortality

that is the negation of life is not eternal life - it is the absence of life

eternal life if it was to exist would exist as a form of life - not its negation

to argue for immortality you must deny the reality of death

the argument would then be of the form 'p and p'

this is simply to assert life

to assert life is no argument for immortality

the riddle of life?

whatever this means the solution can only be in life

for by definition - outside of life there is no riddle

and furthermore the outside of space and time -

is the outside of the relation of consciousness to non-consciousness

space and time are forms of this relation

outside of this relation there is no knowledge of anything

therefore we cannot speak of the outside of space and time


6.432. How things are in the world is a matter of complete indifference for what is
higher. God does not reveal himself in the world.


the world is revelation

if it is not revealed it does not exist

height is a concept of measurement

to say x is higher than y

is to measure two entities relative to each other in terms of vertical extension

the measurement of a natural phenomenon can only be in relation to another natural
phenomenon

if by the world we mean the physical world

it is clear it cannot be measured in relation to another entity

as there are no other entities

all measurement here is an internal relation

if you were to postulate another world -

and persist with 'higher than'

for such to go ahead the 'other world' would have to be physical

in that case it would not be another world

if the other world was thought to be of another nature

again we would not be talking about another world

rather a split world

something like what Descartes had in mind

even so - 'the higher than relation' could not apply

the real point is that this is sloppy thinking on Wittgenstein's part

really quite disgraceful

and I wonder just how intellectually honest it can be


6.4321. The facts all contribute to the setting of the problem, not its solution.


there is no problem in external reality - if we can imagine it for a moment as separate
from consciousness

any problem is only the problem of consciousness' relation to the outside world

why is this a problem - or the source of the problematic?

just because consciousness' sense of consciousness (the inside) is at variance with its
sense of the reality that is outside of itself

consciousness knows itself as indeterminate

it knows the world outside of itself as determinate

the relation between these two dimensions is the problematic

and it is only a problematic - because of the existence of consciousness

or more correctly because of the existence of the relation - conscious / non-conscious

and in my opinion the problematic is what is essential to human life

that is it cannot be solved


6.44. It is not how things are in the world that is mystical, but that it exists.


yes

however the mysticism here is only a result of assuming there is a causal explanation
for the existence of the world

when it is clear that logically speaking such a view makes no sense

so what do you do?

you can take the intellectually honest route and say we have no knowledge here

and that really is the end of it

this though is a skeptical analysis

the worry for someone like Wittgenstein is that if he goes skeptical here what is to
stop this conclusion rushing all the way from the origin of the world to his kitchen
table?

mysticism is just skepticism with lip gloss


6.45. To view the world sub specie aeterni is to view it as a whole - a limited whole.

Feeling the world as a limited whole - it is this that is mystical.


(a)


a limited whole -

is like viewing an object -

a limitless whole?

that which has no limit

- the world -

but the world is what?

obviously not like an object

(if the object is limited and the world is not)

viewing the world as a limited whole -

as an object -

does this make sense?

to conceive of limitlessness -

can only be a negative conception

that which is not limited

or

to simply deny the object-ive (limited) world -

to conceive of that which has no limits -

must be a denial of what is experienced -

can only be that which is not experienced -

that which is not known


(b)


feeling the world as a limited whole -

the world as limited whole - does not make sense to me

what is on the other side of the limit?

more world?

the world - the idea of it only makes initial sense if seen as limitless

and what is it to feel the world

it is to imagine - isn't it?

one's feelings are limited

it is to imagine you can feel without limitation

or

given that one's feelings are specific or particular

it is to imagine you can feel in a non-specific or a non-particular manner

that is you can have a feeling that has as its object the universal

(which is just the non-particular)?

perhaps it is just to say you can feel for the unknown?


6.5. When the answer cannot be put into words, neither can the question be put into
words.

The riddle does not exist.

If a question can be framed at all, it is also possible to answer it.


to put that philosophical issues are riddles is to view philosophy as a light weight
activity -

how one should live and how one is to understand the world is the problem of being
human - and there is no solution - the problem just manifests - the manifestation is life

words are a means of addressing the problem of the human condition

words are not the only means -

creative art in all its non-verbal forms is an essential response to the problem of being
human

a philosophical question is a verbal formulation of the problem

the answer may not be adequate and in fact may not be there at all

nevertheless the question id real and valid

that a question can be framed is no guarantee that an answer will be found


6.51. Scepticism is not irrefutable, but obviously nonsensical, when it tries to raise
doubts where no questions can be asked.

For doubt can only exist where a question exists, and an answer only where something
can be said.


this is the argument you are having when you have no argument - no argument at all

there is no doubt where no question can be asked -

sounds right

however what Wittgenstein doesn't do is say under what conditions no question can be
asked

would that be because there are no such conditions - unless of course you are dead

skepticism is a serious response to a proposition

it is the questioning of its bases and its scope

any proposition can be doubted

the essence of a proposition is that it is doubtable

why though would you doubt?

that depends on the use the proposition is being put to -

that is the circumstances under which it has been proposed

there is always a question of fit

how appropriate is this proposition in this circumstance?

so skepticism is just thinking out the relation of a proposition to its proposed context

this is no more than rationality and intelligence at work

as to the philosophical claim that there is no basis to knowledge

what you might call skepticism proper

such a view threatens everything Wittgenstein has proposed

what he has said above leaves the issue untouched

he hasn't - that is - laid a glove on philosophical skepticism


6.52. We feel that even when all possible scientific questions have been answered, the
problems of life remain completely untouched. of course there are no questions left,
and this itself is the answer.


this is a rather pathetic view of life

there are always questions - to wish to close down thought is no answer to the
problems facing human beings

and to suggest that all scientific issues can be settled reveals a facile and entirely
erroneous view of science

at this point one gets the impression that Wittgenstein is advocating denial as a
philosophy of life

shame he never ran into Freud

would have made no difference to philosophy

might have cured Ludwig of himself if not the world


6.521. The solution of the problem of life is seen in the vanishing of the problem.

(Is not this the reason why those who have found after a long period of doubt that the
sense of life became clear to them have then been unable to say what constituted that
sense?)


wisdom is to see that the problem of life is not solved - nor does it vanish

doubt is the source of this wisdom


6.522. There are indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They make themselves
manifest. They are what is mystical.


language is a representation of what is

language is like a reflection in the lake

it is not that reflected

the world without the reflection of language is manifest

it is nature - it is the external world

language as a phenomenon of the external world

is the mark of a conscious animal

what cannot be put into words is the unknown

the unknown does not manifest itself

it is the logical space of consciousness

the unknown is not revealed

it is omnipresent


6.53.The correct method in philosophy would really be the following: to say nothing
except what can be said, i.e. the propositions of natural science - i.e. something that
has nothing to do with philosophy - and then, whenever someone else wanted to say
something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had failed to give a meaning to
certain signs in his propositions. Although it would not be satisfying to the other
person - he would not have the feeling that we were teaching him philosophy - this
method would be the only strictly correct one.


Wittgenstein here mistakes method for conclusion

the argument of one view of the nature of philosophy and science is not a description
of philosophical method -

if by method you mean how philosophers proceed

and how do philosopher proceed?

well you have to see what they do - and how they go about it -

perhaps we cannot draw a final conclusion here - that fits all philosophers and all
forms of philosophical inquiry -

we can however say the method of philosophy is critical -

and I would suggest that from this follows that any critical activity is an example of
philosophical method

this view of course means that science in so far as it is performed critically - and of
course it is - if its any good) - is an expression of philosophical method

the conversation between the green grocer and the housewife if it is of a critical nature
likewise is philosophical method at work

non-critical 'argument' on the other hand is propaganda

it is the product of a dogmatic mind set -

and what do we say of Wittgenstein here?

he uses the critical method but never acknowledges it

again it seems he is in denial - denial regarding his own activity

perhaps this is the fear of skepticism

the idea that if a critical method is revealed and placed on the table -

it will be clear that what is being proposed can be regarded as provisional -

in that it is critisizable and hence revisable -

one also suspects that he is really just pushing a line here

that he knows his conclusion is not his method -

but is nevertheless prepared to engage in philosophical propaganda

the message is not the method


6.54. My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who
understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them -
as steps - to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after
he has climbed up it.)

He must transcend these propositions, and them he will see the world aright.


this is an 'pro hominem' argument -

if you understand me you understand the world -

you see things right -

it is the only position available for a dogmatist -

it is a pre-rational view

it is the argument from ignorance

and for the authority of ignorance

a sad way to end up