NOTE: where there is logical notation refer to text.
6. The general form of the proposition is [P,E, N(E)].
This the general form of a proposition.
the form of a proposition is determined by its event
we cannot determine prior to use the form a proposition
we cannot determine prior to use the form of all propositions
what we can say is that the proposition is a proposal
but what this amounts to is to formally is to be found out
the general form of the proposition is unknown
if we are to go further - deeper and ask what is a proposal?
we can say in general it is an act
6.001. What this says is just that every proposition is a result of the successive
applications to elementary propositions of the operation N(E).
yes - if your theory of the proposition is that it is a structure based on elementary
propositions - that is the proposition is either an elementary proposition or the
conjunction /disjunction of elementary propositions - 'propositional strings' is my term
- then you can say that structurally speaking the operation that enables such a
construction is the successive application of the negation of all values of the
propositional variable E - as laid out in 5.51. - 'If E has only on value, then N(E) = -p
(not p); if it has two values, then N(E) = -p. -q (neither p nor q)'.
so what we are talking about here is a kind of proposition - and its logic - its structure
outlined -
we have here at least a type of proposition and propositional analysis
to suggest it is the only account of that proposition - that it displays the logic of all
propositional action is at the very least ambitious
6.002. If we are given the general form according to which propositions are
constructed, then with it we are also given the general form according to which one
proposition can be generated out of another by means of an operation.
yes if the form of the proposition is fixed in a sense all variables are therefore
controlled
and so from the template of such a form all propositional possibilities can be
generated
and indeed at some point in this kind of inquiry in practice decisions are made as to
how to proceed
that is it is the way of it to take a view of the general form
certainly within the tradition that Wittgenstein operates in
and it makes perfect sense given the tasks he is attempting to complete
this is meta pragmatics
it is possible just because there is no general form to propositions
that is there is no form existing independently of practice
and therefore none existing independently of practice
epistemologically we cannot pre-determine practice
therefore we cannot pre-determine form
but for issues of practice - of proceeding - it is necessary to assume that such is
possible
and what we have from Wittgenstein is one such theory worked out in detail
it is just that the claims he makes for this tool - for the 'substance' of it - the 'origin' of
it are fanciful
it is to claim that what we do can be determined a priori
the a priori dimension of knowledge is only ever an after thought - never a fore
thought
6.01. Therefore the general form of an operation O'(n) is [E,N(E)]'(n) (=[n,E,N(E)}).
This is the most general form of transition from one proposition to another.
any operation on any set of propositions is the negation of that set
the transition from one proposition to another is an operation
an operation is a negation
a proposition asserts - an operation alters the proposition
any alteration involves negation - for without negation there is no change in the
assertion
OK but is this an account of the form of the operation?
indeed every operation alters that which it acts upon
this is only to say the operation effects
and this is all there is to say of the nature of an operation
that it is - in whatever context - an act upon
if so it seems it has no particular form
the operation is formless - it is simply pure act
6.02. And this is how we arrive at numbers. I give the following definitions
x = Oo'xDef.,
O'Ov'x = Ov+1'x Def..
So in accordance with these rules, which deal with signs, we write the series
x, O'x, O'O'x, O'O'O'x, ...,
in the following way
Oo'x, Oo+1x, Oo+1+1+1'x, ...
Therefore, instead of '[x,E,O'E]',
I write [Oo'x,Ov'x,Ov+1'x]'.
And I give the following definitions
0+1 = 1 Def.,
0+1+1 = 2 Def.,
0+1+1+1 = 3 Def.,
(and so on).
the idea of an operation involves the concept of a series
a single operation can be performed that is not part of a series
however that is really just a decision to negate the series
and that negation can be undone
so the idea of series underlies that of operation
given a series in which operations are performed
the performance will always be successive
therefore it is operations on operations etc.
the marking of this activity is number theory
that is the signs (integers) are signs of successive operations within a series
operations on integers (constants)signify essential or basic - repeatable operations
what we are doing in mathematics is signifying and marking actions in a proposed
series
definitions of number simply state rules of practice
that is rules of operational signification
mathematics - operational theory - is based - is founded on succession
succession is time - the order of things
this metaphysical foundation though is not relevant to the practice of mathematics
it the ground mathematics flies above
6.021. A number is the exponent of an operation.
exactly correct
a number is just a sign for an operation in a series
6.022. The concept of number is simply what is common to all numbers, the general
form of a number.
The concept of the number is the variable number.
The concept of numerical equality is the general form of all particular cases of
numerical equality
(a)
this idea that 'the general form' is that which is common to all instances of number -
is just logically verbosity
metaphysical superfluousness
there is no need to postulate a form
the number is simply an operation in a series represented by a sign that signifies the
place of the operation in the series
the number is an expression of an operation
if we know this we have no need to ask what is common to numbers
it is not a relevant or useful question
all you do by answering such a question is speak about numbers in a non-functional
manner - and what is the point of that?
this general form issue is really only of interest to people with some hankering for a
mystical interpretation of number - it is Pythagoreanism
(b)
forget the concept of number
what you have is a sign of an operation - an action - in a series of (successive) actions
(c)
numerical equality is a correspondence of signs between two or more series
it is operational correspondence
6.03. The general form of the integer is [0,E,E + 1}.
operations signed as numbers - that is marked as successive operations within a series
are used to indicate in any other such operation - this is a decision based on economy
and utility
the whole number - the integer - is a sign of a class of operation
6.031. The theory of classes is completely superfluous in mathematics.
This is connected with the fact that the generality required in mathematics is not
accidental generality.
classes are not superfluous in the sense that operations need to be distinguished
the generality in mathematics is an operational generality
that is the operation performed in one series can be performed in any number of other
series
this fact is operational function
everything is 'accidental' until the decision to place it within a series
decsion is the key to mathematical generality
an it is finally the decision to perform a kind of operation
the theory of classes is just the theory of operational types
there is no necessity in this nor is there any accident
6.1. The propositions of logic are tautologies.
the propositions of logic are functions
the so called tautology is a misuse of logical function
it is a senseless combination in that it has no function
the point of an operation is the end point
the end point is a decision
the success of the operation (it's truth value) is a decision to stop or proceed
we operate entirely in the unknown
knowledge is a pragmatic decision
any value it has is simply decided value
that is there is no basis at all to any operation but the operation itself
and any operation is performed within a lager operational context
the utility of which must be assumed for the particular operation to proceed
6.11. Therefore the propositions of logic say nothing. (They are the analytic
propositions)
the propositions of logic are an operational record
they say what operations have been performed
they say what has been done
6.11. All theories that appear to make a proposition of logic have content are false.
one might think, for example, that the words 'true' and 'false' signified two properties
among other properties, and then it would seem 0o be a remarkable fact that every
proposition possessed one of these properties. On this theory it seems to be anything
but obvious, just as, for instance, "All roses are either yellow or red, would not sound
obvious even if it were true. Indeed, the logical proposition acquires all characteristics
of a proposition of natural science and this is the sure sign that it has been constructed
wrongly.
the overall assumption here is that we can separate out propositions of logic from
propositions of fact
this assumption is what needs to looked at and questioned
every statement of fact can be read as a proposition of logic
in that form what is being revealed is the operations that make up the proposition
in pure logic or mathematics - yes the focus is the theory of operations
and so given that focus it is practical to simply look at the issue of function
and the statements of empirical science form the simple observational to the highly
theoretical are indeed concerned with the facts of the world
this is not to say that such statements do not have a functional dimension
just that in empirical science that is not usually the focus
the thing is what we are dealing with in regard to propositions is both dimensions
the functional and empirical
a proposition per se is both
a so called 'logical proposition' is the functional dimension of a proposition
the so called 'empirical proposition' is the substantial dimension of a proposition
that is any proposition has an operational dimension and an empirical dimension
that we might choose to look at either dimension separately is not the point
6.112. The correct explanation of the propositions of logic must assign to them a
unique status among propositions.
I think it is best to drop the terms 'proposition of logic' 'proposition of fact'
the former is really just the functional /operational dimension of a proposition
the latter its empirical dimension
and so the proposition is a proposal that has these dimensions
its truth or falsity is a misnomer too
a proposition is neither true nor false
'true' and 'false' are decisions of use
and so what do we say of truth function?
truth function is the combining of elementary propositions
i.e. 'if p then q'
when p is true - we are saying it has utility
if 'p' is false that it has no utility
utility or its absence are the values of T or F
6.113. It is the peculiar mark of logical propositions that one can recognize that they
are true from the symbol alone, and this fact contains in itself the whole philosophy of
logic. And so too it is a very important fact that the truth or falsity of non-logical
propositions cannot be recognized from propositions alone.
the argument here is that logical propositions are tautologies - tautologies are always
true
this is a fundamental mistake
tautologies are useless propositional strings
the propositions of logic are operational propositions - that is they set out the
operations that can be performed in propositional assertion
and thus any well formed proposition will reflect an operational structure
logical propositions in this sense are projections of structural possibilities
and to the question of truth
truth as I have defined is utility
the question of truth of utility is a response to a proposition
a proposition does not assert its utility or lack of it
truth is a decision of use
a logical propositions - or what I call the functional dimension of a proposition
is thus neither true or false
a logical proposition is a description of the structure of a proposition
a structure determined by the operations that make it up
there is no question of truth or falsity at this level
a representation of an operation or operational possibilities is just a description of
operations performed or performable
it is a naturalistic account
6.12. The fact that the propositions of logic are tautologies shows the formal - logical
properties of language and the world.
The fact that a tautology is yielded by this particular way of connecting its
constituents characterizes the logic of its constituents.
If propositions are to yield a tautology when they are connected in a certain way, they
must have certain structural properties. So their yielding a tautology when combined
in this way shows that they posses these structural properties.
Wittgenstein here confuses the operational and substantial dimensions of the
proposition - and as far as I can tell so has everyone since at least Liebnitz
so called tautological truth cannot be explained in the same way as the substantial
assertion of a proposition
but all we are doing in laying out the logic of a proposition is showing the operations
performed that underlie the substantial dimension
and of course if you want to maintain the same standard in relation to the operational
dimension of a proposition as with the substantial dimension - yes you are left with an
absence of substance in logical propositions - and the resolution of tautology - a truth
with no substance
what I have argued above is that the tautology is not what it has been made out to be
a tautology is not a well formed proposition
a tautology is not a proposition
a tautology is a useless propositional string
that is not made less useless by giving it the status of a 'true'
which I hate to say has nothing to do with the proposition anyway
truth is matter of propositional response - propositional behaviour
what Wittgenstein calls truth function - if it is to have any use must be understood as
possibilities of propositional behaviour
the properties of language and the world -
in the first instance language is a response of consciousness to it's relation to that
which is outside of itself
in the second instance language can be a response to consciousness' relation to itself
language is in the world - that which is outside of consciousness is in the world
'the world' is just a description of all logical domains
so there is no relation between language and the world
or the non-conscious and the world
'the world' if you will - shows itself in language - shows itself in the object of
language
the world shows itself - everywhere
this is really to say Wittgenstein's idea of logical form is a metaphysical mis-casting
a deep confusion
6.1201. For example, the fact that the propositions 'p' and '-p' in the combination
'-(p.-p)' yield a tautology shows that they contradict one another. The fact that the
propositions 'p>q', 'p' and 'q', combined with one another in the form '(p.q) .(p):(q)',
yield a tautology shows that q follows from p and p>q. The fact that '(x). fx:>:fa' is a
tautology shows that fa follows from (x).fx. Etc. etc.
a tautology is so constructed that it amounts to leaving the assertion as it is
that is the apparent operation is no operation at all
a contradiction is a proposition in which the apparent operation is canceled
the result - there is no proposition - nothing has been asserted
6.1202. It is clear that one could achieve the same purpose by using contradictions
instead of tautologies.
a logical proposition is the operational dimension of a proposition
that is it charts the operations performed to make the proposition
it is a purely descriptive affair - the logical proposition asserts that such and such
operations have occurred
no different in principle to any scientific description of any complex event
tautologies and contradictions are the fantasies of logicians who would like to think
they have a foundation to their symbols that is outside of propositional behaviour
there is nothing mysterious or deeply significant about constructing a 'proposition' that
asserts nothing
the whole of modern logic is based on this mistake
6.1203. In order to recognize an expression as a tautology, in cases where no
generality-sign occurs in it, one can employ the following intuitive method: instead of
'p', 'q', 'r', etc. I write 'TpF', 'TqF', 'TrF', etc. Truth combinations I express by means of
brackets, e.g.
T p F T q F.
and I use lines to express the correlation of the truth or falsity of the whole proposition
with the truth combinations of its truth-arguments, in the following way
F
T p F T q F.
T
So this sign, for instance, would represent the proposition p > q. Now, by way of
example, I wish to examine the proposition -(p.-p) (the law of contradiction) in order
to determine whether it is a tautology. In our notation the form '-&' is written as
T
'T&F'
F
and the form '&.n' as
T
T & F T n F.
F
Hence the proposition -(p.-q) reads as follows
F
T
T
T q F T p F.
F
F
T
If we here substitute 'p' for 'q' and examine how the outermost T and F are connected with
the innermost ones ones, the result will be that the truth of the whole proposition is
correlated with all the truth values of its argument, and its falsity with none of the
truth combinations.
constructing a tautology out of a proposition is essentially a waste of time that has no
operational and hence logical significance
recognizing a tautology is recognizing a waste of time
a contradiction likewise is a construction that shuts up all operational possibilities of
an 'embedded' proposition
as a 'proposition' the contradiction is pointless -
it is the denial of propositional operation -
which is to say it negates the proposition -
the result is that there is no proposition at all
that is there is nothing to work with
the situation here is thus pre-propositional
Wittgenstein wishes to argue that the logical status of a logical proposition is that it is
a tautology
that all logical propositions are tautologous
and in this lies their guarantee - their logical foundation
in taking this line of thought Wittgenstein is mistaking substantial propositions for
operational propositions
a logical proposition reflects the operation in thought reflected in language which
results in the given proposition
for all intents and purposes the logical proposition is simply a statement of a particular
use of language
it is a reflection of the mechanics of that use
it is not a proposition in the sense of a statement that asserts what exists
it is in fact that dimension of a proposition that reflects the operations performed to
make a proposition
a workable proposition is one that can be worked on
and yes you can waste your time making tautologies and contradictions - constructing
them out of perfectly well functioning propositions - but this is just pointless fantasy
there is no truth in a tautology
there is no falsity in a contradiction
both forms are non-operational constructions
truth an falsity are operational responses to a proposition
a proposition does not determine its operational responses
the possibilities though at base are twofold
you proceed (truth) or you you do not (false)
truth and falsity are thus basic behavioural reponses to a proposition or to it's parts
with this approach you can still use truth functional calculation
it is best to understand logic at this level as being projective
no surprise that the tautology should figure prominently in a theory of logic that also
proposes solipsism
a tautology is a mirrored image of a proposition that can be in principle repeated
infinitely
6.121. The propositions of logic demonstrate the logical properties of propositions by
combining them so as to form propositions that say nothing.
This method could be called a zero method. In a logical proposition, propositions are
brought into equilibrium with one another, and the state of the equilibrium then
indicates what the logical constitution of these propositions must be.
the great confusion here is between the functional and substantial dimensions of a
proposition
logical propositions are functional
so it is not the case that they say nothing
(does anyone seriously put forward this view of logic?
yes - and it shows just how ridiculous philosophers can be)
what logical propositions say is what we do in the construction of a proposition
that is they display the operations performed in the propositions
the operations that give it its structure and formal characteristics
if you are looking for the substantial content of a logical proposition -
you will of course find nothing
but this is just to say you are looking at the logical proposition in the wrong way
the substantive claims of a proposition are only possible given the operations that
underlie - that provide the formal setting for substance
the 'zero- method' Wittgenstein identifies is the method you apply when you have a
zero conception of the nature of logic
this is really scandalous
it is the height of philosophical deception
it is more than this - it is perverse
at the base of it is some sick notion that only what appears on the surface of the world
is what is real
it is quite unbelievable that philosophers should peddle such garbage
6.122. It follows from this that we can actually do without logical propositions; for in
a suitable notation we can in fact recognize the formal properties of propositions by
mere inspection of the propositions themselves.
yes - this is so
and further we can probably do without propositions per se
the fact of it is thought that we don't because they are such useful tools
these 'formal properties' of propositions are in fact actions performed
you can depict these actions - that is the logical proposition -
or if you are not interested in the operations that create a propositional structure -
don't worry about it
the propositions is dimensional
in an ultimate sense it is unknown
in practice we identify a logical dimension and a substantive dimension
6.1221. If, for example, two propositions 'p' and 'q' in the combination 'p > q' yield a
tautology, then it is clear that q follows from p.
For example, we see from the two propositions themselves that 'q' follows from 'p > q.
p', but it is also possible to show it in this way: we combine them to form 'p > q. p: >
:q', and then show that this is a tautology.
if 'p then q' represents the inferential operation of material implication
it is an action
this operation is not tautologous - that is it is not superfluous
any logical operation can be constructed as a tautology
and this is just to reassert the proposition and mistakenly believe that the reassertion
guarantees the truth of the original
it is really no more than this
quite facile
what it hinges on is that the assertion and the re-assertion of a proposition - have a significant even special relation to each other
it is all done with mirrors
6.1222. This throws some light on the question why logical propositions cannot be
confirmed by experience any more than they can be refuted by it. Not only must a
proposition of logic be irrefutable by any possible experience, but it must be
unconfirmable by any possible experience.
logical operations set up a proposition
these operations can be represented in logical propositions
these 'propositions ' are the operational dimension of a proposition proper
they are just a record of actions performed to set up the proposition
there is no question of confirmation or refutation of experience in this
the experience is the external dimension of the proposition
the logical operations - its internal dimension
together they make a proposition - its function and its substance
the structure of a proposition should not be confused with its appearance
just as the frame of a house is not the appearance of the house
6.1222. Now it becomes clear why people have often felt as if it were for us to
'postulate' the 'truths of logic'. The reason is that we can postulate them in so far as we
can postulate an adequate notation.
notation is a function of operation
logical operation is primitive operation
primitive operation and its variation
the primitive operation of consciousness is negation
negation is the sign of operation
all logical operation are expressions of negation
e.g. quantification can only occur given the idea of restriction or its absence
all inference is an operation of inclusion and exclusion
the essential operation of consciousness is discrimination
we generalize this function in logic
the general characterization is negation
the notion of negation covers all forms of differentiation
any postulates of logic will reflect the operation of negation
negation is not a truth of reason
it is a fact of nature
it is the general characterization of consciousness operating
you could argue therefore that any operation of consciousness is an act of reason and
an act of nature
6.1224. It also becomes clear now why logic was called the theory of forms and of
inference.
logic is more aptly termed - the theory of operations
possible operations is the subject of logical inquiry
and the basic platform of the theory of operations is the identity of indiscernibles
this is the pre-operational position
operation begins from hereb and is an act of discernability
discernibility is a function of negation
or negation is the general sign of discernibility
6.123. Clearly the laws of logic cannot in their turn be subject to the laws of logic.
there is not as Russell thought, a special law of contradiction for each 'type'; one law
is enough, since it is not applied to itself.
primitive operation is just that - however one characterizes it
any theory of primitive operation is simply a description of the basic operation
what we are describing - however we describe - is the operation of consciousness in
relation to non-consciousness
the dialectic - the relation of assertion and denial is the given
is the ground of consciousness
it is the action of discrimination
it is simply a fact of nature
given the existence of consciousness
itself a fact of nature
and so we are not talking of laws of logic
rather description of primitive operation
it makes no sense to ask does an operation apply to itself?
justification is not a problem of logic
6.1231. The mark of a logical proposition is not general validity.
To be general means no more than to be accidentally valid for things. An
ungeneralized proposition can be tautological just as well as a generalized one.
validity is a feature of argument
in so far as a proposition is an argument we can ask the question - is it valid?
validity is just a presentation
an arrangement of premises
it is nonetheless an operation
and as such an organization of what is to be included and what is not
how it is to be presented and how not
it is logic in the presentational mode
what Wittgenstein perhaps should have a called a picture
a very conservative one and classically drawn
6.1232. The general validity of logic might be called essential, in contrast with the
accidental general validity of such propositions as 'All men are mortal'. Propositions
like Russell's 'axiom of reducibility' are not logical propositions, and this explains our
feeling that, even if they were true, their truth could only be the result of a fortunate
accident.
validity is an argument - a presentation that reflects logic
validity is a product of logic
logic itself is not valid or invalid
logic is the operations that underlie human activity
that 'all x are y' is a template that can be applied
what it represents is a logical operation
that operation is an operation of consciousness
it is just a fact that consciousness performs this operation
in itself it has no special status
it is of a kind with the behaviour of any natural phenomenon
consciousness does perform this operation
it applies it to the empirical dimension
whether the application is correct or not
is just a matter of decision
simple as that
axioms are operational rules
an axiom of reducibility has a logical component
as indeed any action does
whether you wish to include it in a cannon of logical operations
is neither here nor there really
that is just a matter of defining domains
not an important matter really
6.1233. It is possible to imagine a world in which the axiom of reducibility is not
valid. It is clear, however, that logic has nothing to do with the question whether our
world really is like that or not.
logic is the theory of operation
and really there is not that much to the theory
we assert and deny -
these are the basic operations
all operations are expressions of this form
so
questions of content or substance are not the domain of logic
of operation
this is not to say they are not in the picture
for an operation to occur
something has to be operated on
yes
this though is not a question of logic
however the world is
so long as it is a world that has a place for operation
logic - or the theory of logic - proceeds
this does mean of course that for logic to have any sense or value
the assumption is that the world is operational
is this a metaphysical principle underlying logic?
yes and no
if you can't operate - perform operations -
if you can't act
then that is that
and I mean this in a metaphysical sense
in such a world the question of logic would not arise
and for that matter no question would
such a world - might I be so bold as to suggest
is world without consciousness
not recognizable to us
therefore of no import
6.124. The propositions of logic describe the scaffolding of the world, or rather they
represent it. They have no 'subject-matter'. They presuppose that names have meaning
and elementary propositions have sense; and that is their connection with the world. It
is clear that something about the world must be indicated by the fact that certain
combinations of symbols - whose essence involves the possession of a determinate
character - are tautologies. This contains the decisive point. We have said that some
things are arbitrary in the symbols that we use and that some things are not. in logic it
is only the latter that express: but that means that logic is not a field in which we
express what we wish with the help of signs, but rather one in which the nature of the
absolutely necessary signs speaks for itself. If we know the logical syntax of any sign-
language, then we have already been given all the propositions of logic.
logic does not describe the scaffolding of the world or represent it
the propositions of logic describe the operations of consciousness or represent them
it is true they have no subject matter in one sense - nevertheless they express the
possibility of action
from a logical point of view - that is an operational point of view - names are
operational points
they have - from a logical point of view no substance or meaning - they are simply
logical points in a field of operation
that is one name can be substituted for another - for any other - the operation is not
affected
logic has nothing to do with substance - though it does presuppose it
the connection of elementary propositions to the world is another matter altogether - it
is not a question of logic
the tautology is logical hot air
tautologies indicate irrelevant - badly formed (structured) propositions
logic has nothing to do with truth
truth does not reveal itself to itself - this is the kind of bad thinking that is or ends up
as mysticism
mysticism is a retreat from game - it is always a sign of rational defeat
the mystic though likes to take all his toys with him when he can no longer play with
the big boys
everything is arbitrary or it's not - that's logic
we have no need to involve logic in questions of freedom and necessity
it is not relevant
our symbols emerge from need - and their life is their utility
decisions we make about them are decisions on the ground
what stays what goes (that's logic again) is a question that can only be decided in the
act
logical syntax is always just an expression in one form or another of an operation
all operations are modifications of the negative
assertion and denial is the basic form of any set of operations
and thus all propositional syntax is an expression of this form
logical propositions are simply and only representations of actions performed or
performable
they are a record of moves made - under the appearance of the world
6.125 It is possible - indeed possible even according to the old conception of logic - to
give in advance a description of all 'true' logical propositions.
a true logical proposition -
a logical proposition expresses logical operations
the truth or falsity of a proposition is determined by how it is acted upon
assent signifies that the proposition is live
that is that it represents an operation or operations that can lead to further operations
- that is the proposition has utility
dissent stops it dead in its track - it is deemed not useful
the logical proposition simply displays what has or will occur
what operations have been performed or in a projective mode what it is anticipate can
occur
truth or falsity is not a characteristic of logical propositions
it is a characteristic of propositional behaviour
6.1251. Hence there can never be surprises in logic.
logic as the description of propositional operations is like any other descriptive
activity - after the fact
6.126. One can calculate whether a proposition belongs to logic, by calculating the
logical properties of the symbol.
And this what we do when we 'prove' a logical proposition. For, without bothering
about sense or meaning, we construct the logical proposition out of others by using
only rules that deal with signs.
The proof of logical propositions consists in the following process: we produce them
out of other logical propositions by successively applying certain operations that
always generate further tautologies out of the initial ones. (And in fact only
tautologies follow from a tautology.)
Of course this way of showing that the propositions of logic are tautologies is not at
all essential to logic, if only because the propositions from which the proof starts must
show without any proof that they are tautologies.
any proposition can be represented logically
there is no separate class of logical propositions
the signs of a logical proposition are the signs of primitive operations
there is no necessity to produce a logical proposition out of other logical propositions
any series of operations can be regarded as discrete
what is required is the syntax - the language of logical propositions
given this background any logical proposition can stand on its own
nothing follows from tautologies
tautologies are fake propositions
6.1261. In logic process and result are equivalent. (Hence the absence of surprise).
the process of an operation can be seen as the result of an operation
(if you are looking for surprise - it's the bearers of propositions you need to engage
with -
facts are the ultimate surprise -
one is surprised by their ability to jolt one's way of thinking
a fact may just be spanner in one's metaphysical conception
why and how of course is beyond knowing
that's the surprise)
6.1262. Proof in logic is merely a mechanical expedient to facilitate the recognition of
tautologies in complicated cases.
it is clear that the whole truth function argument of Wittgenstein here - rests on the
basis of the argument for the significance of the tautology
once you see through this argument
and understand that the tautology provided no basis at all for anything
that it is in fact a malformed proposition that should be disposed of - then the truth
function argument as put by Wittgenstein looses its force
we can still can use this method - on the understanding that 'T' and 'F' are responses to
propositions
that they are not - functions of proposition
yes we can still calculate - with understanding that 'T' and 'F' are actions performed
on propositions -
the actions of assent or dissent and the their consequences - proceed or not -
however if you accept my argument the guts falls out of Wittgenstein's theory
6.1263. Indeed, it would be altogether too remarkable if a proposition that had sense
could be proved logically from others, and so too could a logical proposition. It is
clear from the start that a logical proof of a proposition that has sense and a proof in
logic must be two entirely different things.
for Wittgenstein a proof in logic is a tautology
the truth is that the tautology makes no sense
if you follow Wittgenstein proof is only possible given 'propositions' that make no sense
and the fact is such 'propositions' are not propositions at all
they are deformities - harmless true - really in the category of idiocy
proof becomes on Wittgenstein's view nothing but the reassertion of a proposition
and the belief that such a reassertion has significance
when in fact all it is superfluity masquerading as a foundation
it comes from the desire to make propositions true independently of experience
it is clear to the proponents of this view that a tautology is not true or false relative to
experience
this fact is a logical cross road
either you face the fact that a tautology is without sense or significance
and that this is so because it is not a proposition
or you push on argue that there is a kind of truth that has nothing to do with anything
this is the bizarre result of thinking a senseless 'proposition' has sense
6.1264. A proposition that has sense states something, which is shown by its proof to
be so. In logic every proposition is the form of a proof.
Every proposition of logic is a modus ponens represented in signs. (And one cannot
express modus ponens by means of a proposition.)
modus ponens is just a version of the tautology argument
A > B A
__________
B
the inference A to B
is already established in the conditional A > B
modus ponens when used correctly is just an illustration of inference
it shows that a conditional can be rendered syllogistically
it's really just an argument about possibilities of rendering
it is about logical usage -
of no great import
6.1265. It is always possible to construe logic in such a way that every proposition is
its own proof.
yes - if the argument is that a proposition can be construed as a tautology and that
proof amounts to showing that a proposition is a tautology -
but seriously does anyone really think there is anything in such a proof but hot air?
a tautology just is the logic of solipsism applied to propositions
and proof only makes sense in relation to whiskey
6.127. All propositions of logic are of equal status: it is not the case that some of them
are essentially primitive propositions and others essentially derived propositions.
Every tautology show that it is a tautology.
logical propositions represent the basic operations of consciousness - assertion and
denial and their modifications
and yes finally an operation is an operation - strictly speaking an assertive action has
no essential characteristic that distinguishes it from an action of denial -
an action is an action
context is the question - context in the broadest sense
and the relation of actions - which may just mean their sequence - what follows what - decides what is to be assertion and what is to be denial
the truth about the tautology is just that you can understand logic very well without it
and even if you were to leave the tautology in - all you would have is a mirror image
or a duplication of what is already there
nothing is effected by the tautology
and it is the tautology I think Oakum had in mind - even if he didn't realize it
6.1271. It is clear that the number of the 'primitive propositions of logic' is arbitrary,
since one could derive logic from a single primitive proposition, e.g. by simply
constructing the logical product of Frege's primitive propositions. (Frege would
perhaps say then we should then no longer have an immediately self-evident primitive
proposition. But it is remarkable that a thinker as rigorous as Frege appealed to the
degree of self evidence as the criterion of a logical proposition.)
one's starting point and its description or representation is primitive
one's starting point is an act - an action of thought and what follows - it's expression
outside of thought
an act is never an original act -
any act is a response to - should be seen in the context of - other acts
the idea of the primitive is at best an organizing principle
at worst a belief in a first cause
in a sense all acts are self evident
in that the evidence of any act is the act itself
the idea that evidence for an act (proposition) could be outside of the act (proposition)
is a failure to see what is evident
the fact that one act or one proposition is held to be evidence for another is just not
seeing what is there
in relation to the question of evidence no act is related to another - no proposition is
related to another -
again argument is really just organization for action
6.13. Logic is not a body of doctrine, but a mirror image of the world.
Logic is transcendental.
logic is a description of the operations of consciousness in the world
there is no mirror image of the world
logic is a description of operational function
it is a description that enables - that facilitates - certain other operations
an operational description of consciousness in the world is not the only description
possible
it is not the fundamental description
there is no fundamental description
a fundamental description would exhaust all possible description
possibility cannot be exhausted
any activity can be analyzed operationally
consciousness in the world is not just a matter of operational behaviour
logic is just an account of basic operations
transcendentalism in a Kantian sense is the fiction that necessary presuppositions to
knowledge can be established
this is really just a species of philosophical flight
flight that is from the reality of contingency
and the preposterous notion that knowledge is a non-natural phenomenon
that in some sense it stands outside contingent reality
this really comes back to not understanding the nature of consciousness
consciousness reflects
reflection is therefore a natural characteristic of consciousness
knowledge is reflection
reflection has no basis outside of the fact of consciousness in the world
logic is anything but transcendental
it is description among many of what happens - what occurs
6.2. Mathematics is logical method.
The propositions of mathematics are equation, and therefore pseudo-propositions.
logic is the theory of operation
mathematics is a mode of operation
in so far as mathematical propositions are equations mathematics is the mode of
operation that is calculation
to calculate is to operate mathematically
calculations are genuine operations
equations are platforms for action
if x = y then x has the same utility value as y
such proposals are metaphysically false
x = x
the need to transact - a form of motion from a to b is the pragmatic basis of equation
mathematics is thus a denial of reality
a denial that is necessary f there is to be movement
if there is to be operation
action always defies reality - and in so doing - transforms it
6.21. A proposition of mathematics does not express a thought.
a proposition of mathematics expresses an operation
(the event of the proposition itself - is an operation)
the operation expressed is an operation or operations of consciousness
consciousness is thought
an operation of consciousness is a thought
a thought is an operation
an event - outside of consciousness is not an operation
i.e. an event in non-conscious nature is not an operation
6.211. Indeed in real life a mathematical proposition is never what we want. Rather
we make use of mathematical propositions only in inferences from propositions that
do not belong to mathematics to others that likewise do not belong to mathematics.
(In philosophy the question, 'What do we actually use this word or this proposition
for?' repeatedly leads to valuable insights.)
if we want to know how to get from one proposition to another a mathematical
proposition may be just what we do want
inference is a process of conscious life - it is the thought behind any movement of
body or soul
this idea that in some sense philosophers and mathematicians are not dealing with the
real world is - is either a failure on their part to understand what they are doing or it is
some kind of vain and stupid attempt to place themselves above others
philosophers are neither above nor below their fellow travellers
6.22. The logic of the world, which is shown in tautologies by propositions of logic, is
shown in equations by mathematics.
there is no logic of the world - logic is a purely human creation - and as such simply a
response to the unknown - tautologies are fool's gold
mathematical equations are assertions of equity
the world does not support any such assertion
human need demands equations
equations are constructs of consciousness
and necessary for its operations
consciousness like an eagle flies above the ground with an eye to the detail below
6.23. If two expressions are combined by means of the sign of equality, that means
that they can be substituted for one another. But it must be manifest in the two
expressions themselves whether this is the case or not.
When two expressions can be substituted for one another, that characterizes their
logical form.
it is the assertion of equality that combines the two expressions
it is the assertion of equality that says they can be substituted for one another
the two expressions themselves do not manifest equality
equality is a proposal of relation between expressions
it is not a characteristic of the individual expression
when two expressions are substituted for one another that characterizes their use
6.231. It is a property of affirmation that it can be construed as double negation.
It is a property of '1+1+1+1' that it can be construed as '(1+1) + (1+1)'.
the fact that affirmation can be constructed as a double negation shows the essential
operational nature of logical propositions
a logical /mathematical proposition is an operation
propositional signs are the subject of logical operation
logical constants define the domain of logical operation
the basic operation of logical propositions is negation
all logical operations are forms of negation
the property noted above is an operational property
it indicates that the essential nature of mathematics is operational
that is what we do in mathematics is perform operations
and that is all we do
mathematics tells you nothing about the nature of the world
only how we do and can operate in it
6.232. Frege says that the two expressions have the same meaning but different
senses.
But the essential point about an equation is that it is not necessary in order to show
that the two expressions connected by the sign of equality have the same meaning,
since this can be seen from the two expressions themselves.
two expressions can represent two operations that have the same result but are
different paths to that result
two expressions / operations connected with the sign of equality are because of that
sign determined to be operations with same result
it is the sign of equality that asserts the relation between the two
whether the relation holds depends on the result of the operations
therefore the equality sign is a proposal
yes it is asserted but its status is provisional
meaning is not the issue
the issue is function
6.2321. And the possibility of proving the propositions of mathematics means simply
that their correctness can be perceived without it being necessary that what they
express should itself be compared with the facts in order to determine its correctness.
in a sense any operation is true in itself
any statement of operation is a fact
the question is whether the operation performs as expressed in the statement
here the issue is one of argument
argument about the proposed end result
and argument about the relation of the operation to that end result
ultimately the issue is undetermined by thought or its expressions
there are always questions
we make decisions and proceed despite the indeterminateness of our knowledge
you could hence argue that knowledge is irrelevant
the thing is though we need propositions to get us into the game
they are finally only tools
and their appropriateness - whether they fit the task or not - is only settled by act
and even then doubts will remain
it is these doubts that are the source of further effort and creativity
6.2322. It is impossible to assert the identity of meaning of two expressions. For in
order to be able to assert anything about their meaning, I must know their meaning,
and I cannot know their meaning without knowing whether what they mean is the
same or different.
this is indeed where it is clear the proper characterization of a proposition - and here I
mean any proposition - is that it is a proposal
first up the equals sign is a proposal to identify
it functions as an assertion
though strictly speaking no such thing can be asserted
but it functions as such and what this means is that it acts as such
now the success or failure of the action is what is up for grabs
is what is to be seen
the issue is entirely pragmatic
consciousness by its nature is indeterminate - that is it is not fixed - it is fluid
therefore it reach beyond the bounds of the given - or if you like the determinate
this is the point of it
the function of it
therefore its propositions are not necessarily reflections of the given
therefore in the non-given mode they are not assertions
when consciousness reaches beyond the given
its propositions quite plainly are proposals
proposals - not for what is but rather for what can be
what can be - can be determined by what is needed
equations are such a propositional bridge
6.2323. An equation merely marks the point of view from which I consider the two
expressions: it marks their equivalence in meaning.
an equation is a proposal for the two expressions - it is the point of view from which
they are considered
it is a proposal of function - it is the proposal for different approaches to the one result
6.233. The question whether intuition is needed for the solution of mathematical
problems must be given the answer that in this case language itself provides the
necessary intuition.
yes - this is so
language is the form of intuition
language is an operation
intuition is the knowing that the operation of language - of syntax - will reveal
6.2331. The process of calculating serves to bring about the intuition.
Calculation is not an experiment.
actually language is the ground of intuition
the intuition is thus prior to the calculation
the calculation - the operation - reveals
calculation is not an experiment
calculation gives ground to intuition
calculation shows us that intuition is in fact an operational outcome
6.234. Mathematics is a method of logic.
mathematics is an operational theory
the operational focus of mathematics is calculation
(not all operations are calculations
though any operation can be regarded as an operation
hence the universal applicability of mathematics)
mathematical propositions are proposal of equality
equations are the mode of mathematics
equations bring ideality into the world in an operational form
the notion of equality is an ideal notion
that is it is not found in the order of things
it is always a proposal
the point of the proposal is transaction
it is the transference of one category of thought to another
such an act is always diabolical
that is it is always a challenge and reorganization of the natural order of things
it is nevertheless essential and necessary
mathematics imposes on reality
consciousness imposes on reality
mathematics is one of its tools
6.2341. It is the essential characteristic of mathematical method that it employs
equations. For it is because of this method that every proposition of mathematics must
go without saying.
equations are the form of mathematical discourse
mathematics is the description of the operations within this form
the equation is an ideal proposal
its point is utility - it's action is transformation
mathematics is the theory of fundamental motion
6.24. The method by which mathematics arrives at its equations is the method of
substitution.
For equations express the substitutability of two expressions and, starting from a
number of equations, we advance to new equations by substituting different
expressions in accordance with the equations.
equations are proposals
any two expressions can be related by the '=' sign
this is the bottom line -
there is no necessity in the equation relation
what is to be equated is a simply a decision
the idea of any such decision is that the expressions are to be substituted
that is to say it is proposed that the propositions equated express operations that have
the same result
the expressions are thus different paths to the one end
what I want to make clear is that always here we are dealing with a proposal
a proposal for action
there is - that is no certainty in any such proposal
and it may in fact be the case that in fact the expressions do not have identical
outcomes
the expressions may only have similar outcomes
this does not invalidate the equation
the equation is a proposal for identity -
even if that identity is never in fact realized
the operation is nevertheless of value from a heuristic point of view
it is that is the discovery of new ways
in any transformation something is lost - in order for their to be something gained
what this amounts to is that in reality there are no actual equations
what you have in the equation is a transformation proposal
*6.241. Thus the proof of the proposition 2 x 2 = 4 runs as follows:
(NB. I do not have the symbols to represent the text here. Please consult the text.)
2 x 2 is an operation that has as its subjects operations ('2' and '2' repeated)
multiplication is the operation applied to the these operations
multiplication is an operation on operations
the result of this operation is signified by the sign '4'
'4' is an operation - or like '2' - a series of operations
in this context is an operation that is the result of an operation
an operation that has as its subjects - operations
'4' thus becomes in this proposition the sign for the operation of '2 x 2'
2 x 2 is itself a sign for the operation of multiplication of '2' and '2'
multiplication is a method of addition
what this shows is that numbers have no significance as stand alone expressions
that is e.g. '2' or '4' only have value in an operational context
and operational here means propositional
'2 x 2 = 4' is a proposition that states that the expression to the left of the '=' sign is an
operation that can be expressed as the sign to the right of the equals sign
in this expression an operation is named
the operation '2 x 2' is named as '4'
the name thus is the operation signed
again the sign '4' has no significance outside of a propositional context
that is to say there are no such things as numbers
6.3. The exploration of logic means the exploration of everything that is subject to
law. And outside logic everything is accidental.
the operation that is consciousness imposed on the non-conscious results in
propositions
propositions are expressions of the relation of the conscious and the non-conscious
propositions are operations
logic is a depiction of the operation of propositions - the internal relations and the
external (inter-propositional) relations
it is the representation of operations
and as such an operation or series of operations - in itself
the attempt to provide a theory of propositional operations
that is to describe the possibilities of operation -
is the attempt to provide a theory of logic
there are no laws outside of theory
there is no one theory of logic
that is logic like any supposed body of knowledge is open to question
this really should not need to be said
as to the accidental nature of things
being law governed only means being within the domain of a theory
that which is outside of theory is just not law governed within that theory
it has nothing to do with whether the phenomenon is accidental or not
an accidental state of affairs can well be covered by some theory
in physics quantum theory does just this
6.31. The so called law of induction cannot possibly be a law of logic, since it is
obviously a proposition with sense - Nor therefore, can it be a priori.
induction is an inference
whether it is regarded as a valid inference or not depends on one's epistemological
perspective
irrespective of this matter inductive inference is an operation
it is an operation that relates propositions
this is all that is required for it to be regarded as logical
that is it is a propositional operation
it is a logical action
whether it has sense - or is understood as a prior or not - is not an issue of logic
any action proposed (proposition) is a matter for logic
6.32. The law of causality is not a law but the form of a law.
the 'law' of causality is a proposal of external relations
laws of anything are the decrees of legislators
who has the authority to legislate?
6.321. 'Law of causality' - that is a general name. And just as in mechanics, for
example, there are 'minimum-principles', such as the law of least action, so too in
physics there are causal laws, laws of the causal form.
causality is an operation
how it is described depends on one's epistemology and ontology
it is general in the sense that we can speak of the operation that is causality in the
conscious (the operation of mind - idea to idea) and non-conscious (the operation of
nature - matter to matter) and even in the relation between the two (mind and matter -
mind to matter / matter to mind)
again - all this is metaphysically loaded
but the history of the use of the notion of causality demonstrates as a matter of fact its
general applicability
really it is a primitive way of relating events
it is a starting point for science and non-science
it is a primitive theory of operation
6.3211. Indeed people even surmised that there must be a 'law of least action', before
they knew exactly how it went. (There as always, what is certain a priori proves to be
something purely logical.)
'before they knew how it went' means prior to description - prior to formulation
what is 'known' prior to description is unknown
the very reason for description - for formulation is to give the unknown character - to
bring it out of the darkness
it is then we can say what it was we didn't know
the unknown is the ultimate source
Wittgenstein incorrectly names the unknown - 'a priori'
as if the absence of knowledge is some kind of certainty
very strange
it comes from not understanding the epistemological significance of the unknown
it comes from regarding it negatively - as 'not-knowledge'
this has been the way of things in western philosophy from Socrates onward
my view is that skepticism is a positive doctrine
that the absence of knowledge is a positive state of affairs
in that it is the force that underlies all attempts at knowledge
it is the reason behind all knowledge
6.33. We don have a priori belief in a law of conservation, but rather a priori
knowledge of the possibility of a logical form.
the law of conservation of energy or mass in its general or philosophical sense is an
explanation or hypothesis
it is an advance on the idea of the regularity of nature
it is designed to account for the possibility of action
that is it is a theory of the ground of operation
if it was a priori knowledge - it would be knowledge that exists - has currency
independent of any relation of consciousness to the non-conscious
for it is this relation that is experience
whatever one's view of knowledge - the fact is it only exists given such a relationship
the alternative is to put that there is knowledge in a world without consciousness
any theory of how the world is - is a theory of reflective consciousness
it is the conscious imperative - to ground experience
what we are talking about here is not the possibility of logical form -
rather the possibility of explanation
and further - really the need for explanation
and the fact that conscious will naturally seek explanation
as natural as water finding its own level
6.34. All such propositions including the principle of sufficient reason, the laws of
continuity in nature and of least effort in nature, etc. etc. - all these are a priori insights
about the forms in which the propositions of science can be cast.
the forms in which the propositions of science can be cast -
Wittgenstein I think uses the notion of form to pretty much cover every base in the
diamond - the ground itself - the stadium and what is beyond
it is an all purpose concept - as it was for Plato -
and with such a use it appears to be comprehensive - the question though is does have
any real meaning when used at every turn?
anyway -
the principle of sufficient reason, laws of continuity in nature and of least effort etc. -
are basically reflections on experience -
attempts to ground it - give it explanation
they are in terms of giving sense to experience - useful tools -
they are no more than proposals of view
ways of seeing the world - that enable us to operate effectively in it
6.341. Newtonian mechanics, for example, imposes a unified form on the descriptions
of the world. let us imagine a white surface with irregular black spots on it. We then
say whatever kind of picture these make, I can always approximate as closely as I
wish to the description of it by covering the surface with a sufficiently fine square
mesh, and then saying of every square whether it is black or white. In this way shall I
have imposed a unified form on the description of the surface. The form is optional,
since I could have achieved the same result by using a net with a triangular or
hexagonal mesh. Possibly the use of a triangular mesh would have made the
description simpler: that is to say, it might be that we could describe the surface more
accurately with a course triangular mesh than with a fine square mesh (or conversely)
and so on. The different nets correspond to different systems for describing the world.
Mechanics determines one form of description of the world by saying that all
propositions used in the description of the world must be obtained in a given way
from a set of propositions - the axioms of mechanics. It thus supplies the bricks for
building the edifice of science, and it says, 'Any building that you want to erect,
whatever it may be, must somehow be constructed with these bricks, and with these
alone.'
(Just as with the number-system we must be able to write down any number we wish,
so with the system of mechanics we must be able to write down any proposition of
physics that we wish.)
(a) the form is optional -
that is the description that we use is not determined by the phenomenon described
in fact the phenomenon is determined by the description - by the form
pre-description - pre-form the phenomenon is technically unknown
of course we always come to the world with formality
there are no blanks - no dead spots requiring formalization
this though is unreflective experience
in the act of reflect - if it is performed correctly - everything is held - must be held
open
what reflective description is used is metaphysically optional - yes
it is necessity though that determines the option
the necessity to act - to be able to act
this by the way is not to say we know the end point of such with any certainty
it is just to say we operate as if we do - until we have reason to change our view
the possibility of description of descriptive systems is really a question of creativity
and inventiveness
but this is so just because the final point is that there is no one comprehensive
description that fulfills all tasks at all times in all places
the idea of such - has some heuristic value
their security in universality
in fact security is the point - the reason for the pursuit of universality
it is in another sense - a deep all pervading desire
(b) the test of the form is it's universality within a greater form
any conception of consciousness - for this just what a form is -
functions within the context of forms already in play
either that or it transforms what is in play - this is the origin of revolution
decisions about the place of forms in a formal setting will always be guided by the
question of how to act
there are nevertheless internal formal issues - issues of logic if you will
the relations of forms
their interconnectedness - and their hierarchical structure - are all matters relevant to
outcome
they are ultimately functional issues
a theoretical system is only functional if it is integrated
the ideal is deductive
the picture is a Russian doll
(c)
a number system is just a script for essential operations
mechanics is just one theory of physics
6.342. And now we can see the relative position of logic and mechanics. (The net may
also consist of more than one kind of mesh: e.g. we could use both triangles and
hexagons.) The possibility of describing a picture like the one mentioned above with
the net of a given form tells us nothing about the picture. (For that is true of all such
pictures). But what does characterize the picture is that it can be described completely
by a particular net with a particular size of mesh.
Similarly the possibility of describing the world by means of Newtonian mechanics
tells us nothing about the world: but what does tell us something about it is the precise
way in which it is possible to describe it by these means. We are also told something
about the world by the fact that it can be described more simply with one system of
mechanics than with another.
(a)
the possibility of describing a picture (created by a form) tells us nothing about the
picture -
the picture is a proposal for how to regard the object - (it is a picture of the object - we
would normally say)
the picture is an epistemological proposal
before the picture there is no knowledge of the object
so the nature of the picture is not the issue
however the nature of the picture can be an issue
we can want to describe the picture - this is a meta question
any such description is just the placing of the picture in a theoretical context
a larger mesh to continue Wittgenstein's metaphor
you have to decide here what you are doing
picturing the world (or some aspect of it)
or picturing the picture
the two can be done - but they should not be confused
Wittgenstein wants to say I think - we begin with a picture -
and yes we always begin with a phenomena
what I say is that the picturing just is the formalization of the phenomena
it is in short when the unknown is made known
it is the picture that makes known
the form that makes known
what this is leading to is that the idea of 'picture' here is irrelevant to the analysis
what you have is phenomena (unknown)
and the formalization of the phenomena - the making known
thus - the form is the picture
so I would re-write to: 'what does characterize the phenomena is that it can be
described completely by a particular net with a particular size of net'
look to cut to the chase here - what this means is that we decide that a particular form
just does characterize / describe completely
it may or may not as a matter of fact - but the making of the formalization of the
phenomena can be made with the idea of completion -
it's a question of the use of universality
not all human practices require it -
and in fact it is only ever an endeavour
its value is perhaps heuristic -
but in epistemological terms it is a fake -
we can never know if a form completely describes
for we have no way of determining what any complete description would amount to
the idea is really an old testament hangover
and a hard line view of the belief that we are made in the image of God
you could even say it is another view of the origin of idolatry
or just simply foolishness
(b)
the possibility of describing the world by means of Newtonian mechanic tells us
nothing about the world -
the world is not something we are outside of
we do not ever give an account of the world
we can make piecemeal offerings
we are in the world
that is consciousness is in the non-conscious
this is our reflective reality
Newtonian mechanics enables us to operate within this reflective reality
it is thus a theory of this reflective reality
if by the world we mean the conscious and non-conscious dimensions of reality
the reflective and the non-reflective - and the relation of the two
what this relation creates -
if this is the world
the Newtonian mechanics gives us a stratagem for operating within this reality
it tells us about our world
that we can operate in a certain way
this at least is the proposal
(c)
what it does tell us something about is the precise way it is possible to describe it by
these means?
yes precision -
a very relative notion
with only the less precise to guide us
we assume it is precise
that is until a so called more precise model is proposed
what we know - is that we do describe
that description is a mode of reflective consciousness
'precision' is an argument for preference
like an estate agent's argument for the vista of a property
it's a proposed selling point
(it depends on how you see it)
6.434. Mechanics is an attempt to construct according to a single plan all the true
propositions that we need for the description of the world.
mechanics is a theory of consciousness - a theory of operation - operation in the non-
conscious dimension of reality - that is a theory of the operation and function of the
outside world - true propositions are descriptions of or statements of performed or
performable operations -
what is done and what can be done is the subject of any theory
the proof of the pudding is in the eating as my mother would say
6.3431. The laws of physics, with all their logical apparatus, still speak, however
indirectly, about the objects of the world.
the laws of physics speak about the relationship of the consciousness dimension of
reality to the non-conscious dimension of reality
objects are constructs of this relationship
6.3432. We ought not to forget that any description of the world by means of
mechanics will be of the completely general kind. For example, it will never mention
particular point-masses; it will only talk about any point masses whatsoever.
a point mass is an operational domain
an operational domain is ultimately a theory operation
to put it generally - under these circumstances with these resources these actions can
be performed
physics is not about substance
it is about operation
6.35. Although the spots in our picture are geometrical figures, nevertheless
geometry can obviously say nothing at all about the actual form and position. The
network, however, is purely geometrical; all its properties can be give a priori.
Laws like the principle of sufficient reason, etc. are about the net and not about what
the net describes.
geometry represents
what is 'actual form and position' is I presume based on an observation
an observation only has epistemic content in a representational / propositional form
beyond this or beneath this - is the unknown
our knowledge - what we say is - is a complex of forms - that has no necessary
stability (stability is pragmatic - a decision to stop)
there is no fixed - eternal form - all forms refer to or are an expression of - or
outcomes of
to understand forms look to the wind
6.36. If there were a law of causality, it might be put in the following way: There are
laws of nature.
But of course this cannot be said; it makes itself manifest.
in consciousness' relation to the non-conscious regularities are manifest
the world is this relation
that is the world of the human animal is this relation
we can well understand the world could be otherwise to other forms of nature
and it is clear that in a final sense - we cannot say
we have no way of comprehending the world outside of a perspective on it
and we only have the human perspective in fact
in logic we can imagine other possibilities
but these imaginations are never positive
any such 'imagining' is - what is not known
6.361. One might say using Hertz's terminology, the only connections that are subject
to law are thinkable.
connections - associations - in general begin as anomalous events
and the question then is how to place them within given theoretical frameworks
that is to place them in a law like context
this may or may not happen
science can tolerate anomalous phenomena - with an eye to incorporating within
current theory - or seeing it as a reason to question reigning hegemony
whatever the case
such connections are thinkable
in general we assume all phenomena - all connections - are subject to law
this though is more a methodological - procedural assumption - than a fact about the
nature of things
certainly we proceed as if
however if we had no reason to doubt - at any level of the theoretical endeavour -
there would be no growth of knowledge
doubt is the force behind knowledge
6.3611. We cannot compare a process with 'the passage of time' - there is no such
thing - but only with another process (such as the working of a chronometer).
Hence we can describe the lapse of time only by relying on some other process.
Something exactly analogous applies to space: e.g. when people say that neither of
two events (which exclude one another) can occur because their is nothing to cause
the one to occur rather than the other, it is really a matter of being unable to describe
one of the two events unless there is some sort of asymmetry to be found. And if such
an asymmetry is to be found, we can regard it as the cause of the occurrence of the
one and the non-occurrence of the other.
(a)
the passage of time is a process
a process is identified as temporal by being related to the passage of time
measurement of time is a decision to regard a particular process as the standard
(i.e. the revolutions of the earth against the sun)
against this other temporal processes are measured
the point is we cannot conceive of any process without the presumption of the
passage of time
there is no process outside of time
any process represents time
time is the essence of process
process the expression of time
(b)
the nature of process is temporal
a lapse of time is the 'space between' two points in an ongoing process
(c)
in relation to space -
events are distinguished by asymmetry -
really we have no concept of symmetry unless we have the notion of separate events
and the same obviously follows regarding asymmetry
symmetry is a relation of shapes - plural
asymmetry is a relation of shapes
the notion of an event - presumes position in space
we can only have the concept of an event if we have the idea of space
an event is distinguishable from another event in terms of its position in space
an event is a unique position relative to another event
if nothing else distinguishes two events - position in space does
symmetrical objects are the case in point
6.36111. Kant's problem about the right hand and the left hand, which cannot be made
to coincide, exists even in two dimensions. Indeed, it exists in one-dimensional space
- - - - o------x - - x------o - - - -
a b
in which the two congruent figure, a and b, cannot be made to coincide unless they are
moved out of this space. The right hand and the left hand are in fact completely
congruent. It is quite irrelevant that they cannot be made to coincide.
A right hand glove could be put on the left hand, if it could be turned around in four
dimensional space.
(a)
the fact that a right hand and a left hand cannot fill the same space - is something of a
false problem -
if the right hand and the left hand were of identical shape - they still could not occupy
the same space
if nothing else what distinguishes entities is their position in space
and this is no more than a version of the identify of indiscernibles argument
or perhaps more to the point the non-identity of discernibles
(b)
time is the operation of sequence
space is the operation of position
6.362. What can be described can happen too: and what the law of causality is meant
to exclude cannot even be described.
description is about what is
hypothesis is about what can be
what is possible may or may not occur
the law of causality is not necessary
un-caused events are conceivable
reality itself can be viewed as un-caused
re: Spinoza's argument for God that substance is sui causa
what can be described is not determined by the law of causality
the law of causality is a description
it is a description that has proven to be operationally fruitful
this does not amount to necessity
as a matter of fact - nothing does
and I mean nothing
reality is open an question
description of reality is never complete
we work with what is useful
a great many things are useful
6.363. The procedure for induction consists in accepting as true the simplest law that
can be reconciled with our experiences.
induction is an expectation
it is the expectation that what is experienced will continue to occur
as an inference from a particular instance to a general conclusion
there is no such thing -
that is there is no such inference
the argument that there is is simply a vain attempt to formalize expectation
it is a worthy effort but a waste of time
as to simplicity -
well I guess it will be argued that any generalization by its form will be simpler than
any number of unconnected and unrelated particular observations -
though you might argue too that there is a simplicity in the particular that can never
be found in a generalization
is not the generalization regardless of its function an added layer - a superimposing on
particular instances?
and if so the argument for simplicity of generalization might seem to come at the cost
of the simplicity of particularity
my point is that simplicity is an issue independent of induction
and simplicity is not a straightforward matter - it is theory dependent like any other
functioning concept
we can discuss induction without simplicity
simplicity is not the key concept in induction
6.3631. The procedure, however, has no logical justification but only a psychological
one.
It is clear that there are no grounds for believing that the simplest eventuality will in
fact be realized.
again this is not an issue of simplicity
who is to say that the sun will rise tomorrow is the simplest eventuality?
simplicity - if you want to make this concept central - is a notion defined within one['s
metaphysical framework -
it is not something you can just point to
the inductive expectation though is not without argument -
human expectations - simply because they are natural in a natural in a natural world -
will have some basis in utility -
granted we can never be certain about anything -
it may well be argued that nevertheless our expectations exist for good practical
reasons
and that therefore there is some sense in which they do connect with the way the
world is
simply because they are features of the world - of the natural world
6.36311. It is an hypothesis that the sun will rise tomorrow; and this means that we do
not know that it will rise.
yes - it is an hypothesis -
but what is it to know anything?
knowledge is consciousness' embrace of reality
the non-conscious reality - and the reality of consciousness
essentially knowledge is awareness
as regards its basis - there is none
as to the status of expectation -
clearly it has a function and an important function in conscious life
consciousness reaches beyond itself - beyond awareness -
and deals in possibility
possibility is a function of consciousness
it gives awareness - parameters
it gives awareness place
and by 'place' here we mean logical place
possibility is the logical space of consciousness
consciousness asserts that awareness can be expected
expectation is thus a function of consciousness' sense of place
it is to do with how consciousness operates
how it functions
and all this is really an empirical issue
it is about how conscious human entities operate
the theory of inference - as a feature of the theory of logic -
is a reflection of consciousness on its operations
it is an aspect of consciousness' search for knowledge of itself -
that is consciousness' reflection on the nature of its operations
6.37. There is no compulsion making one thing happen because another has happened.
the only necessity that exists is logical necessity.
we do not know why things happen
logical necessity is neither logical nor necessary
(in magic it's the false bottom trick)
6.371. The whole modern conception of the world is founded on the illusion that the
so-called laws of nature are the explanations of natural phenomena.
what is to count as 'the whole modern conception'?
depends where you are - and who you are
there are more things in heaven and earth than in your conception Mr.Wittgenstein
even so
empirical science works -
if an illusion - it is nevertheless a fruitful illusion
and as to illusion -
reality is the chosen one
6.372. Thus people today stop at the laws of nature, treating them as something
inviolable, just as God and Fate were treated in past ages.
And in fact both are right and wrong: though the view of the ancients is clearer in so
far as they have a clear terminus, while the modern system tries to make it look as if
everything were explained.
something of a sociological theory and evaluation here -
we need evidence for this view that 'people today.....'
the need for metaphysical security cannot be argued away
such matters though have nothing to do with the epistemological status of science
it is clear that whatever one's view here
we need to keep an open mind - even in relation to our most noble endeavours
wisdom is seeing what you do not know
and you do not have to look far to see
6.373. The world is independent of my will.
my will is in the world
that is my will as an expression of consciousness my will is inside the world
therefore it is a feature of the world
my will is not independent of the world
it is an expression of the world
'the world' here I assume is all that is
consciousness is I argue a dimension of the world
it is the internal dimensions
consciousness is internality
to suggest that the world is only that which is not conscious
is a ridiculous view
which might have something to do with the 'modern conception of the world' as put
forward by philosophical retards
I have in mind here any view of the world that does not recognize it's internal
dimension
that is any view that attempts to make the inside an outside and to thus put that the
world is one dimensional
such a position I think is argued for by Wittgenstein
and it was certainly advanced by the Positivists that took heart from the argument of
the 'Tractatus'
6.374. Even if all we wish for were to happen, still this would only be a favour
granted by fate, so to speak: for there is no logical connection between the will and the
world, which would guarantee it, and the supposed physical connection is surely not
something that we could will.
wishing is just a form of imagination
what we will and what we imagine are two different things
the two should not be confused
the will and the world -
a logical connection?
what is meant here?
my will is an expression of a conscious operation in the world
the outcome of any such operation - that is its result
may or may not be what was desired
this is quite different from saying there is no connection between the two
clearly there is a connection in consciousness
the outcome is affirmed relative to the intent
or it is not -
p v ~p
6.375. Just as the only necessity that exists is logical necessity, so too the only
impossibility that exists is logical impossibility.
logical impossibility is what cannot be done
logical possibility is what can be done
therefore logical necessity is what is done
or to put it in another way -
logical impossibility is what cannot be
logical necessity - what must be
what must be is what is
6.3751. For example, the simultaneous presence of two colours at the same place in
the visual field is impossible, in fact logically impossible, since it is ruled out by the
logical structure of colour.
Let us think how this contradiction appears in physics: more or less as follows - a
particle cannot have two velocities at the same time; that is to say, it cannot be in two
places at the same time; that is to say particles that are in different places at the same
time cannot be identical.
(It is clear that the logical product of two elementary propositions can neither be a
tautology nor a contradiction. The statement that a point in the visual field has two
different colours at the same time is a contradiction.)
the phenomenon of two colours in the same place in the visual field at the same time -
does not occur -
for a colour to be it must occupy a place
this is to say the colour has a spacial dimension
an entity to exist must be in space
space is an attribute of the existing entity
it is an existential attribute
there is no question of one entity occupying the same place as another
for if it did the second entity would have the same spacial attribute as the first
there would be no distinction (between the 'two')
in such a case nothing would exist
for things to exist they must exist in a world where they are distinguished
we distinguish things in terms of their place
but this is really nothing more than to say they are distinguished
for there is no place but that occupied by an existing thing
therefore the totality of existing things (distinguishable entities) is space
in a 'world' where nothing existed there would be no space
like Aristotle and nature - I abhor a void
6.4. All propositions are of equal value.
a propositions value is its utility
we can give a useful proposition the value '1'
a useless proposition the value '0'
value is given to propositions
it could be said the proposition itself has no value
the point is a proposition only comes into being as a proposal for action
so yes - perhaps there is an intrinsic value to any proposition
what that value is depends on the circumstance the proposition is placed in
in one set of circumstances a proposition may have no value
in another context the same proposition may be of use
a proposition's value is its utility relative to a proposed outcome
6.41. The sense of the world must lie outside the world. In the world everything is as
it is, and everything happens as it does happen: in it no value exists - and if it did
exist, it would have no value.
If there is any value that does have value, it must lie outside the whole sphere of what
happens and is the case. For all that happens and is the case is accidental.
What makes it non-accidental cannot lie within the world, since if it did it would itself be accidental.
It must lie outside the world.
consciousness is the source of the sense of the world
consciousness is the inside of the world
the source of the sense of the world is inside the world
on the surface of the world everything is as it is
there is no value on the surface
value is an internal property
to understand value you need to appreciate it is a function of consciousness
every act of consciousness is a reaching beyond what is to what might be
the possibilities in any situation are determined by consciousness in the situation it
finds itself
valuation is assessment of possibilities
any act to a chosen end is 'good' if it leads to that end
the anticipation that it will is expressed in the proposition that the act is good
all acts of consciousness in so far as they anticipate a future state of affairs are acts of
value
value is not fact
value is the anticipation of fact
it is the anticipation that action will bring about a chosen state of affairs
6.42. So too it is impossible for there to be propositions of ethics.
Propositions can express nothing that is higher.
this is a bottom of the barrel argument
higher than what?
an ethical proposition asserting that a certain act is good -
is really shorthand for say that someone desires a certain outcome - and presumably
will act in such a way as to bring it about
we are not dealing with something higher or for that matter lower
ethical propositions state that a conscious agent desires an outcome - and through
whatever action anticipates its occurrence
it is what Kierkegaard termed a leap of faith -
in that one can never know what the outcome will be
one can only act to bring it about
such an act is really always in the darkness
6.421. It is clear that ethics cannot be put into words.
Ethics is transcendental.
(Ethics and aesthetics are one in the same.)
a desired outcome an anticipated state of affairs -
am I speaking another language?
also tell people who have nothing and are being oppressed that ethics cannot be put
into words
tell them that is to shut up
really -
for a start there is no transcendental
there is only this world - and the problem of surviving in it
ethical propositions are a strategy for survival
the human being just does think in terms of desirable and undesirable outcomes
it is of the nature of the beast
we do anticipate and act to bring about desired states of affairs
it is what we do
it is that is an empirical fact of the animal
aesthetics is the projection of desired states upon the non-conscious
it is the assertion of desire as an objective fact of the world
I desire what is beautiful - what is beautiful is what I desire
ethics and aesthetics are quite different
6.422. When an ethical law of the form, 'Thou shalt....', is laid down, one's first
thought is, 'And what if I do not do it? It is clear, however that ethics has nothing to
do with punishment and reward in the usual sense of the terms. So our question about
the consequences of an action must be unimportant - At least those consequences
should not be events. There must indeed be some kind of ethical reward and ethical
punishment, but they must reside in the action itself.
(And it is also clear that reward must be something pleasant and the punishment
something unpleasant)
there are no ethical laws
it suits certain interests that wish to control people's actions to maintain that there are ethical laws
what you are dealing with there is control - power over others
fear of punishment - and the bribery of reward are methods of control
you cannot speak of actions and not include discussion of consequences
there is a sense in which the meaning of an act is just its consequence
and that consequence may well be an event
to negate consequences is to negate the act
an act is regarded as good if it achieves the desired end
perhaps that amounts to success - and that such success is reward
punishment and reward though are an unnecessary overlay
the act works or it doesn't the fact that an anticipated state of affairs is not the result of
an act is not a punishment -
it is simply a fact that what was desired was not achieved with the action performed
if the desired end remains the same then obviously another course of action is required
to bring about the result
the idea that ethical reward or punishment is in the act is quite confused -
it takes no account of the fact that an act only has meaning in a particular context
one act in one context may well be successful
the same act in another may well result in failure
on Wittgenstein's view we are to understand an act outside of any context
therefore the one act must contain both reward and punishment
if this is so these concepts are rendered meaningless for they cannot be distinguished
by the act itself
pleasant and unpleasant - a very refined can I say English upper class twit view of
morality
morality for genteel society
not of any use at all in a world gone wrong
unless you wish to say that discrimination deprivation and violence are 'unpleasant'
6.423. It is impossible to speak of the will in so far as it is the subject of ethical
attributes.
And the will as a phenomenon is of interest only to psychology.
'the will' is a description of the action of consciousness
the will exists to effect conscious intent
'ethical attributes' are descriptions of the results of conscious action
we cannot speak in absolute terms here
(there are no absolute terms)
results are arguments regarding satisfaction
to view an act as successful is to say what?
a good result - yes
an unsuccessful action - that which did not achieve the desired result -
a bad result?
again it depends on the circumstances - the context
and this goes to the importance of the act -
how significant the desired end is regarded
and this is about the relative importance of actions and ends
there is no standard we can appeal to here
we make it up as we go
and in the main have only a superficial understanding of why we value some actions
higher or lower than others
this is about ends - and their organization in a life
invariably there is some kind of hierarchy
and various meta theories to account for such
i.e. an obvious one is the argument that we act in our perceived best interest in order
to maintain our existence
as to psychology -
there really is no such thing
as practiced today it is a poor man's philosophy -
it's the idea that you can understand human behaviour without addressing
metaphysical issues
that in some way these matters have been settled - and then you get on with the job
the reason there is little success in any psychology is just that the central issues that
need to be addressed - the issues of philosophy - of metaphysics - are not tackled
as a result all you get is window dressing
and the inevitable sense of failure
(this of course has generated a thriving industry of frauds)
6.43. If the good or bad exercise of the will does alter the world, it can alter only the
limits of the world, not the facts - not what can be expressed by means of language.
In short the effect must be that it becomes an altogether different world. It must, so
to speak, wax and wane as a whole.
The world of a happy man is a different one from that of a unhappy man.
to say the exercise of will - does not alter the world is either an argument for non-
action - or in the moral realm and argument for amorality
the world is eternally different - regardless of our actions
though our action - like any other motion effects change
there is no unchanging reality
reality is in motion
the world of the happy man compared to that of the unhappy man is like the difference
between red and green
both colours have a natural place in the natural world
the world of the happy man and the world of the unhappy man are identical in that
happiness and unhappiness are without explanation beyond their presentations
6.431. So too at death the world does not alter, but comes to an end.
consciousness is the light
death is the return to darkness
6.4311. Death is not an event in life: we do not live to experience death.
If we take eternity to mean not infinite temporal duration but timelessness, then
eternal life belongs to those who live in the present.
Our life has no end in just the way in which our visual field has no limits.
(a)
life is a form of existence
death is the limit of the form
the reason for forms and their existence or non-existence is beyond knowledge
logic is the primitive assertion of forms and their limits (p v ~p)
existence is the constant 'v'
(b)
eternity is existence from the point of view of time
timelessness is existence without consciousness
timelessness is the unknown
timelessness is an imagination
time is a form of existence given the existence of consciousness
time is a form of consciousness
there is no measurement outside of consciousness
duration is a measurement
without consciousness there is no light
we can assume that without the form of consciousness existence is darkness
it cannot be seen
6.4312. Not only is there no guarantee of the temporal immortality of the human soul,
that is to say of its eternal survival after death; but, in any case, this assumption
completely fails to accomplish the purpose for which it has been intended. Or is some riddle solved by my surviving for ever? Is not eternal life as much of a riddle as our present life? The solution of the riddle in space and time lies outside of space and time.
(It is certain;ly not the solution of any problems of natural science that is required.)
the argument of immortality is a species of the argument for eternal forms
it has more to do with vanity than logic or rationality
our knowledge of forms - our direct experience is that - is that forms alter and indeed
cease to be
if by the human soul Wittgenstein means consciousness -
what we know is that individual consciousness is a natural phenomenon that comes
into being - exists and then ceases to be
there is no reason to believe that consciousness survives death
we have no evidence for believing that life survives for ever - or for that matter that
any form of existence survives for ever
the notion of eternal life is at the best a misuse of logic
the argument is of the form 'p and ~p'
the opposite of life is not-life
the opposite of life is not immortality
that is the negation of life is not eternal life - it is the absence of life
eternal life if it was to exist would exist as a form of life - not its negation
to argue for immortality you must deny the reality of death
the argument would then be of the form 'p and p'
this is simply to assert life
to assert life is no argument for immortality
the riddle of life?
whatever this means the solution can only be in life
for by definition - outside of life there is no riddle
and furthermore the outside of space and time -
is the outside of the relation of consciousness to non-consciousness
space and time are forms of this relation
outside of this relation there is no knowledge of anything
therefore we cannot speak of the outside of space and time
6.432. How things are in the world is a matter of complete indifference for what is
higher. God does not reveal himself in the world.
the world is revelation
if it is not revealed it does not exist
height is a concept of measurement
to say x is higher than y
is to measure two entities relative to each other in terms of vertical extension
the measurement of a natural phenomenon can only be in relation to another natural
phenomenon
if by the world we mean the physical world
it is clear it cannot be measured in relation to another entity
as there are no other entities
all measurement here is an internal relation
if you were to postulate another world -
and persist with 'higher than'
for such to go ahead the 'other world' would have to be physical
in that case it would not be another world
if the other world was thought to be of another nature
again we would not be talking about another world
rather a split world
something like what Descartes had in mind
even so - 'the higher than relation' could not apply
the real point is that this is sloppy thinking on Wittgenstein's part
really quite disgraceful
and I wonder just how intellectually honest it can be
6.4321. The facts all contribute to the setting of the problem, not its solution.
there is no problem in external reality - if we can imagine it for a moment as separate
from consciousness
any problem is only the problem of consciousness' relation to the outside world
why is this a problem - or the source of the problematic?
just because consciousness' sense of consciousness (the inside) is at variance with its
sense of the reality that is outside of itself
consciousness knows itself as indeterminate
it knows the world outside of itself as determinate
the relation between these two dimensions is the problematic
and it is only a problematic - because of the existence of consciousness
or more correctly because of the existence of the relation - conscious / non-conscious
and in my opinion the problematic is what is essential to human life
that is it cannot be solved
6.44. It is not how things are in the world that is mystical, but that it exists.
yes
however the mysticism here is only a result of assuming there is a causal explanation
for the existence of the world
when it is clear that logically speaking such a view makes no sense
so what do you do?
you can take the intellectually honest route and say we have no knowledge here
and that really is the end of it
this though is a skeptical analysis
the worry for someone like Wittgenstein is that if he goes skeptical here what is to
stop this conclusion rushing all the way from the origin of the world to his kitchen
table?
mysticism is just skepticism with lip gloss
6.45. To view the world sub specie aeterni is to view it as a whole - a limited whole.
Feeling the world as a limited whole - it is this that is mystical.
(a)
a limited whole -
is like viewing an object -
a limitless whole?
that which has no limit
- the world -
but the world is what?
obviously not like an object
(if the object is limited and the world is not)
viewing the world as a limited whole -
as an object -
does this make sense?
to conceive of limitlessness -
can only be a negative conception
that which is not limited
or
to simply deny the object-ive (limited) world -
to conceive of that which has no limits -
must be a denial of what is experienced -
can only be that which is not experienced -
that which is not known
(b)
feeling the world as a limited whole -
the world as limited whole - does not make sense to me
what is on the other side of the limit?
more world?
the world - the idea of it only makes initial sense if seen as limitless
and what is it to feel the world
it is to imagine - isn't it?
one's feelings are limited
it is to imagine you can feel without limitation
or
given that one's feelings are specific or particular
it is to imagine you can feel in a non-specific or a non-particular manner
that is you can have a feeling that has as its object the universal
(which is just the non-particular)?
perhaps it is just to say you can feel for the unknown?
6.5. When the answer cannot be put into words, neither can the question be put into
words.
The riddle does not exist.
If a question can be framed at all, it is also possible to answer it.
to put that philosophical issues are riddles is to view philosophy as a light weight
activity -
how one should live and how one is to understand the world is the problem of being
human - and there is no solution - the problem just manifests - the manifestation is life
words are a means of addressing the problem of the human condition
words are not the only means -
creative art in all its non-verbal forms is an essential response to the problem of being
human
a philosophical question is a verbal formulation of the problem
the answer may not be adequate and in fact may not be there at all
nevertheless the question id real and valid
that a question can be framed is no guarantee that an answer will be found
6.51. Scepticism is not irrefutable, but obviously nonsensical, when it tries to raise
doubts where no questions can be asked.
For doubt can only exist where a question exists, and an answer only where something
can be said.
this is the argument you are having when you have no argument - no argument at all
there is no doubt where no question can be asked -
sounds right
however what Wittgenstein doesn't do is say under what conditions no question can be
asked
would that be because there are no such conditions - unless of course you are dead
skepticism is a serious response to a proposition
it is the questioning of its bases and its scope
any proposition can be doubted
the essence of a proposition is that it is doubtable
why though would you doubt?
that depends on the use the proposition is being put to -
that is the circumstances under which it has been proposed
there is always a question of fit
how appropriate is this proposition in this circumstance?
so skepticism is just thinking out the relation of a proposition to its proposed context
this is no more than rationality and intelligence at work
as to the philosophical claim that there is no basis to knowledge
what you might call skepticism proper
such a view threatens everything Wittgenstein has proposed
what he has said above leaves the issue untouched
he hasn't - that is - laid a glove on philosophical skepticism
6.52. We feel that even when all possible scientific questions have been answered, the
problems of life remain completely untouched. of course there are no questions left,
and this itself is the answer.
this is a rather pathetic view of life
there are always questions - to wish to close down thought is no answer to the
problems facing human beings
and to suggest that all scientific issues can be settled reveals a facile and entirely
erroneous view of science
at this point one gets the impression that Wittgenstein is advocating denial as a
philosophy of life
shame he never ran into Freud
would have made no difference to philosophy
might have cured Ludwig of himself if not the world
6.521. The solution of the problem of life is seen in the vanishing of the problem.
(Is not this the reason why those who have found after a long period of doubt that the
sense of life became clear to them have then been unable to say what constituted that
sense?)
wisdom is to see that the problem of life is not solved - nor does it vanish
doubt is the source of this wisdom
6.522. There are indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They make themselves
manifest. They are what is mystical.
language is a representation of what is
language is like a reflection in the lake
it is not that reflected
the world without the reflection of language is manifest
it is nature - it is the external world
language as a phenomenon of the external world
is the mark of a conscious animal
what cannot be put into words is the unknown
the unknown does not manifest itself
it is the logical space of consciousness
the unknown is not revealed
it is omnipresent
6.53.The correct method in philosophy would really be the following: to say nothing
except what can be said, i.e. the propositions of natural science - i.e. something that
has nothing to do with philosophy - and then, whenever someone else wanted to say
something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had failed to give a meaning to
certain signs in his propositions. Although it would not be satisfying to the other
person - he would not have the feeling that we were teaching him philosophy - this
method would be the only strictly correct one.
Wittgenstein here mistakes method for conclusion
the argument of one view of the nature of philosophy and science is not a description
of philosophical method -
if by method you mean how philosophers proceed
and how do philosopher proceed?
well you have to see what they do - and how they go about it -
perhaps we cannot draw a final conclusion here - that fits all philosophers and all
forms of philosophical inquiry -
we can however say the method of philosophy is critical -
and I would suggest that from this follows that any critical activity is an example of
philosophical method
this view of course means that science in so far as it is performed critically - and of
course it is - if its any good) - is an expression of philosophical method
the conversation between the green grocer and the housewife if it is of a critical nature
likewise is philosophical method at work
non-critical 'argument' on the other hand is propaganda
it is the product of a dogmatic mind set -
and what do we say of Wittgenstein here?
he uses the critical method but never acknowledges it
again it seems he is in denial - denial regarding his own activity
perhaps this is the fear of skepticism
the idea that if a critical method is revealed and placed on the table -
it will be clear that what is being proposed can be regarded as provisional -
in that it is critisizable and hence revisable -
one also suspects that he is really just pushing a line here
that he knows his conclusion is not his method -
but is nevertheless prepared to engage in philosophical propaganda
the message is not the method
6.54. My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who
understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them -
as steps - to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after
he has climbed up it.)
He must transcend these propositions, and them he will see the world aright.
this is an 'pro hominem' argument -
if you understand me you understand the world -
you see things right -
it is the only position available for a dogmatist -
it is a pre-rational view
it is the argument from ignorance
and for the authority of ignorance
a sad way to end up