tractatus 5 is here continued from Skeptikos II
skeptikos III.
Tractatus 5 continued
NOTE: where there is logical notation refer to the text.
5.46. If we introduce logical signs properly, then we should also have introduced at
the same time the sense of all combinations of them; i.e. not only 'p v p' but '-(p v-q)'
as well etc. etc. We should also have introduced at the same time the effect of all
possible combinations of brackets. And thus it would have been made clear that the
real general primitive signs are not 'p v q', '(Ex). fx' etc. but the most general form of
their combinations.
the idea being that a primitive sign such as 'p v q' is a propositional argument that has
general application - universal application -
yes this is the idea of such propositional arguments - it is the idea of such a logic
in fact any logic must have a generality to it - even let us say one that denies such an
application
the point of logic is the universal behind the particular
and what we are talking about here is conception
it is if you will the form of consciousness given to the world
(the world outside of consciousness is without form)
so the point is that the proposal of generality only has foundation given consciousness
and this is to say it has no foundation
the point of such nevertheless is that it organizes thought and enables action
this again is a fact of consciousness - human consciousness
the thing is - 'the general form of their combinations' is already given prior to the
introduction of the logical signs
it is given in the idea of such
the idea of it - the theory as such is presumed initially - it's detail - the fleshing out of
it is matter of analysis and labour - only then can you say 'then we should also have
introduced at the same time....'
that is there is no magic moment -
there is no actual sub specie aeternitatis
NB.
one assumption underlying this whole argument of Wittgenstein's and indeed most
theories of logic and language is that signs signify a reality
this is the substantial theory of logic
what we also need to consider here is the posssibility that signs only signify signs
that the assumption of a reality - a substance that signs point to is no more than a
fiction
the idea here is that signs signify signs - other signs -
let us say a specific sign i.e. points to a larger signs - that is a sign that has more
generality
the picture that emerges here is that the world itself is a sign
that our knowlege is only of the relations of signs
that beyond signs is nothing we can speak of
that is - if a reality - it is unknown
that all signs finally and ultimately signify the unknown
in the meantime we make surface connections
and produce surface arguments
5.461. Though it seems unimportant, it is in fact significant that the psuedo- relations
of logic, such as v and , need brackets - unlike real relations.
Indeed the use of brackets with these apparently primitive signs is itself an indication
that they are not the real primitive signs. And surely no one is going to believe that
brackest have an independent meaning.
v and are rightly seen as operative signs - signs of basic logical operations
lets be clear there is nothing essential about the notion of primitive signs
primitiveness is an operating decision that one should strictly speaking take witha
grain of salt
the idea cab suseful in certain structures - it can be pointless in others
brackets to my mind signify focus in a series of propositional signs
it can be argued I think that they represent - or point to the dimensional reality of
propositional language
that is they point to constructions within a propositional structure
it is not so much that brakets have a meaning - they are - or their use is the sign of an
opertaion
I would say in propositional signs they are a sign of an operation inside the
proposition - which is to say they point to propositional depth
5.4611. Signs for logical operations are punctuation marks.
firstlty
this is to define signs or logical operations in terms of other signs
these other signs it seems is assumed - and it must be the case - are signs of a more
general type to the ones (logical operations) being defined
the point is - and it is worth repeating - signs can only be defined in terms of other
signs
and that the must have a relation of particular to general
but on what basis is one class of sign defined in terms of another?
how does this connection get made?
well it only gets made if there is seen to be some need to make it
it is really like painting a picture - having a central figure - and pianting in some
background - and perhaps even some foreground
here I akm suggesting it is a kind of aesthetic matter
nevertheless - the point is crucial signs never leave the realm of sign
always yes - there is the assumption that the sign signifies something outside of the
realm of sign
this is not so much a metaphysical reality that is being proposed
it has more to do with the very purpose of the sign - its point
thta tit does signify somethintg else
now I am arguing that this is not the casee
however I am sure this is the point of signs
so what we really have is the issue of the psychology of signs
the need - if you like that signs meet
and this need is the belief that we signify something independent of consciousness
I say of this that it is best understood as the unknown
and here by unknown I mean a genuine reality - a category of the world
consciousness in the world brings into being its opposite - its negation if you like - the
non-conscious
thre non-conscious - by definition is unknown
however it is no less real for this fact
it is the dominant reality of conscious human beings -
secondly
marks are marks - one presumes they have meaning - this is the presumption -
and this is true of any mark - ie a mark in the non-conscious as well as the conscious
world
clearly though a matrk has meaning because of consciousness
the making of the mark and the making if the meaning are always one in the same
still we can distingusih the two dimensions of the act - for analytical purposes
and there is of course a natiural distinction in the non-conscious realm
a mark of nature - does only have mean ing once it is is given by consciousness
what is the meaning of a mark?
I would suggest it is in essence to stop the flow of time - or at least to create the
illusion of this
a punctuation mark for time?
now to this punctuation theory of the signs for logical operations
I think this idea is Wittgenstein being cute - and tricky
the idea being lets create a pretty vicious circle afor signs - signs - punctuation marks -
punctuatiuon marks signs - has the advantagve of cosiness - but really its bad thinking
and even if ypou give him the benefit of the doubt here - i.e. he is saying something
important instead of being flamboyant with the the truth - does it fit well with logical
operations
I think not
an operation is not a punctuation -
a punctuation is a reading of -
operations are acts - and it really doesn't matter what sign of symbol one use to
identify - just so lomng as the identification is clear well formed - established even -
and certainly accepted
but I still say - even so an operation is no a punctuation
though it is indeed tru that a punctuation is an operation
what counts as punctuation marks is - let's just get off the merry-go-round here - is
simply a matter of lexiographical convention -
5.47. It is clear that whatever we can say in advance about the form of all
propositions, we must be able to say all at once.
An elementary proposition really contains all logical operations in itself. For 'fa' says
the same thing as '(Ex) . fx . x = a'.
Wherever there is compositeness, argument and function are present, and where these
are present, we already have all all the logical constants.
One could say the sole logical constant was what all propositions, by their very nature,
had in common with one another.
But that is the general propositional form.
if a logical theory is complete it will contain all the known logical operations
that is all the operations required for the task of logical analysis - as it is practiced
the point is though - practise does not make perfect - practise makes inperfect
meaning what we do - our practise reveals - problems and ways of going - which may
not have been forcast - in such cases theory must adjust - and new variations
developed - therefore new operations perforemed
my point is we cannot say all at once
it is the delusion of omnipotence to suggest so
completeness is strictly speaking a false concept
how can it ever be known that a state of affairs is complete
of course you can decide this by fiat
but that is not to settle the issue - it is to negate it
the proper place for the notion of completeness is in the definition of practise -
a job is complete if certain tasks are performed
of course we my revise the plan - and as a result the job is deigned to be incomplete -
that is its definition is changed
so completeeness is at the servise of task
task itself is never absolutely fixed
the world is never fixed
what is it that all proposition have in common?
well that they are proposals - this is my suggestion
and I argue against Wittgenstein that there is a propositional form
my idea instead is that the propositional form is empty - is emptiness - if we are to
speak of 'the' propositional form
a propopoal is consciousness's imprint on the the non-conscious
it is thus a relation between twqo dimensions of being
how it it is expressed - is rather a matter of circumstance - contingency
form is possibility
5.471. The general propositional form is the essence of a proposition.
the essence of the proposition is unknown
there is no propositional form as such
the idea that the propositional form is that which the proposition and reality have in
common - is tro say nothing
yes everything has something in common - i.e. that it is real
however what the commonality is - is an open question
and it only has any real significance or value in terms of organizing tasks -
that is it is a heuristic concept that comes into play in the orgaization of action
of course it is legitimate to speculate on the ultimate nature of reality -
but once this question is raised - another must be -
and that is - why is the question raised - what is the point of it the purpose of it?
so it is not to understood as an essentialist matter - rather as an issue of function
here too lies the clue to the question of form
form is function
5.4711. To give the essence of a proposition means to give the essence of all
description, and thus the essence of the world.
yes the essence of anything is the essence of everything - no news here - an no use
here
there is no point in this line of argument
the suggestion seems to be that to understand the nature of a proposition is to
understand the nature of everything - a very handy short cut - and one that really
removes the need for any further thinking -
an outlook that is used by epistemological authoritarians and those with an anti-
science agenda
logicians with such views are better described as priests
whatever a proposition represents is essence - it's time to move on
5.472. The description of the most general propositional form is the description of the
one and only general primitive sign in logic.
this is philosophical fishing
if you want want to go down this path - the essentalist road - then yes by definition
there is something at the end of it - and that will be 'the one and only primitive sign in
logic'
to this point Wittgenstein hasn't given this discovery at the end of the yellow brick
road a sign a pictorial representation
why is that I wonder?
5.473. Logic must look after itself.
If a sign is possible, then it must also be capable of signifying. Whatever is possible is
also permitted. (The reason why 'Socrates is identical' means nothing is that there is
no propoerty called 'identical'. The proposition is nonsensical because we have failed
to make an arbitrary determination. and not because the symbol, itself, would be
illegitimate.)
In a certain sense we cannot make mistakes in logic.
the fact of consciousness in the world - and however you wish to describe this -
is the the foundation of logic - it is the fact out of which logic emerges
the fact - the only fact it addresses
logic is based on this relation - consciousness and the non-conscious
and therefore logic is just this - the theory of relations
what relations can and cannot hold
and this - the theory of this - is no more than - is just a description of what is - of the
world -
from the inside (of the world)
5.4731. Self-evidence, which Russell talked about so much, can become dispensible
in logic, only because language itself prevents every logical mistake - What makes
logic apriori is the impossibility of illogical thought.
everything that exists is self-evident
description always fails - it always leaves everything out -
what is described is thus absolutely problematic
the description of the realtion consciousness and non consciousness can never be
stable or objective
logic must confine itself to paper work - while the war goes on
the point is not that nothing can be decided - it is rather that everything else must be
put in brakets
logic operates within its own description
5.4732. We cannot give a sign the wrong sense.
any sign can hold any sense
the ign is just packaging for sense - sense can be wrapped in any number of ways
there is a metaphysical anarchism or determinism at the heart of this
it is the window of true freedom that is at the heart of any sign
the day to day reality is that we fit in with what is there - at least initially
what is there is there for a reason - if it stays in play it is of use
nothing is unrevisable - but by the same token there is never good reason to revise
everything - or to think that you can
here is the origin of politics
5.47321. Occam's maxim is of course, not an arbitrary rule, nor one that is justified by
it's success in practice; its point is that unnecessary units in a sign-language mean
nothing.
Signs that serve one purpose are logically equivalent, and signs that serve none are
logically meaningless.
so what decides necessity?
either a sign signifies - has a function or it does not
if not it is not a sign in the language being used
and purpose?
the only purpose is signification
the purposes of signification may be many and varied
the fact that a sign signifies does not mean that it has a purpose
signs do not serve purposes
(they signify - signification is a logical relation - purpose is not)
if a logically meaningless sign is one that does not serve a purpose
then all signs are logically meaningless
5.4733. Frege says that legitimately constructed propositions must have a sense. And I
say that any possible proposition is legitimately constructed, and , if it has no sense,
that can only be because we have failed to give meaning to some of its constituents.
(Even if we think that we have done so.)
Thus the reason why 'Socrates is identical' says nothing is that we have not given any
adjectival meaning to the word 'identical'. For when it appears as a sign for identity, it
symbolizes in an entirely different way - the signifying relation is a different one -
therefore the symbols also are entirely different in the two cases: the two symbols
have only the sign in common, and that is an accident.
the issue of practice is not some incidental addendum in this matter
in practice signs come with meaning
the meaning logically speaking in general is given prior to the sign - as a sign in itself
has no meaning it is a mark
the issue of failing 'to give meaning to some of its constituents' characteristically
occurs when one language user is not familiar with the specific use of string of
symbols - though he can identify the use and some of the constituents
it's just about being in the loop
perhaps poets can be accused of constructing a propositional string that hitherto has
not appeared - and prime facie has no meaning -
the same could be said of other artistic productions
the point here - or the focus here is not the signs - but rather the state of the artistic
endeavour or dialogue
to know what is meant one will have to be inducted to some extent into the artistic
argument that the unknown propositional string is an outcome of
i.e. perhaps a propositional string may have some significance when understood
as a reaction to a current fashion of realism
yes so always the issue of giving meaning to signs
the point though is that the giving of meaning is always connecting with a community
usage
it is true that someone proposed usage - but it is never without background
a case in point is the example given above - 'Socrates is identical'
Wittgenstein uses this proposition as an example of a meaningless proposition to
illustrate is theory of logic -
therefore in this context and against the background of his argument - the proposition
has sense
Wittgenstein seems to think language occurs in a logical vacuum -
that its appearance in the world is some mystical / magical act - that it all happens as
he says 'all at once'
his argument is that in the case of symbols having the same sign in common - what we
have is an accident
strictly speaking there are no accidents in nature
no accidents in the world
the issue is always a question of understanding
and what this points to is that there are no meaningless propositions
it is always a question of knowledge - why and how such a usage has emerged
it is a matter finally of science
5.474. The number of fundamental operations that are necessary depends solely on our
notation.
once the parameters of discourse are set - i.e. a sign language is proposed - then
what is possible within that framework (the operations) is set by the sign language
this is a decision of discipline - the decision to work within a framework -
it is an attitude -
not I would suggest the philosophical attitude
it is more in the line of a craftsman's or tradesman's approach to the world
be that as it may - it is not a matter of logic - that we regard logical systems in such a
way
but in all truth the argument of 5.4744 is arse about
operational signs are developed out of the desire to represent operations
that is the operation is proposed in thought - and given physical expression in a sign -
a mark
a system of logical signs can only be regarded as a the basis of thought or
understanding if it is decided that it is to have such a function
that is logical systems - like the signs that are contained within them only have
meaning if the meaning is given
5.475. All that is required is that we should construct a system of signs with a
particular number of dimensions - with a particular mathematical multiplicity.
constructing an ideal language -
the notions of dimensions of a language and its range of sign functionality -
it is in general a theory of language that is being put here
on what is such based?
clearly the idea is that all languages have these capacities
therefore
we can use these characteristics - dimensions - sign functionality (mathematical
multiplicity) - as characteristics of any language - natural or artificial
the use of language suggests these characteristics
and then the question of purpose
why is such a language requires - what end does it serve?
what is the purpose of logic?
we might answer this by saying logic is about being clear about what is being said
and another question - not often asked - are we really talking about a language when
we speak of logic?
is not logical analysis just what does occur in language use -
and what we term logic - like a supplementary that can enable us to cut to the chase -
if that is required?
so it is really just a way of thinking about language
thinking about it from the inside
and to do that in a definitive and forceful manner we develop a script a short hand -
which if precise enables such a task to proceed expeditiously
logic on such a view is a subset of natural languages
its bases and its operations and its theories come from the practice of natural
language
logic is reflection within language about language
5.476. It is clear that this is not a question of a number of primitive ideas that have to
be signified, but rather the expression of a rule.
what we are dealing with here is primitive operations
ideas in this context are really dead in the water
now as to rules
a rule is a description of an operation
an operation is a composite act or event
that is it can be analyzed
a rule as a description is a direction
a rule can be based on authority or knowledge
that is you can be directed or direct yourself to follow a rule that you don't understand
you may understand the reason for it
nevertheless such is an action in ignorance
or you may know a rule and follow it
that is you may understand the operation independently of its description as a rule
in such a case the rule is irrelevant
that is it is in Wittgenstein's terms in the same class as unnecessary units in sign
language
really has no place in logic
the best you can say is that it is a shorthand (description) of an operation
if you already understand the operation - it has no place
if you don't understand the operation it is of no use
the only basis for rules is authoritarianism - which is an anathema to reason
there is no doubt that rules in certain contexts function - but their basis is always
insufficient
rules are signs of lack of development
5.5. Every truth-function is a result of successive applications to elementary
propositions of the operation
'(-----T)(&, ....)'.
This operation negates all propositions in the right-hand pair of brackets, and I call it
the negation of those propositions.
all very well but this does not elucidate negation - it simply states that negation is
represented in this way - and even here at the level of representation we could ask
why?
Wittgenstein wants us to see logical operations in terms of depiction - pictures of
signs
it is the kind of approach that is useful if you don't actually know what is behind the
pictures - that is what they represent
it is a picture account of reason
and in this case the golliwog is on the right hand page
5.501. When a bracketed expression has propositions as its terms - and the order of
the terms inside the brackets is indifferent - then I indicate it by the sign of the form
'(&)'. '&' is a variable and the bar over the variable indicates that it is representative of
all its values in the brackets.
(E.G. if & has the three values P, Q, R, then (&) = (P, Q, R).)
What the values of the variable are is something that is stipulated.
The stipulation is a description of the propositions that have the variable as their
representative.
How the description of the terms of the bracketed expression is produced is not
essential.
We can distinguish three kinds of description: 1. direct enumeration, in which case we
can simply substitute for the variable the constants that are its values; 2. giving a
function fx whose values for all values of x are the propositions to be described; 3.
giving a formal law that governs the construction of the propositions, in which case
the bracketed expression has as its members all the terms of a series of forms.
this is to represent propositions - as a sign (&) - and then further to represent the
propositions (P,Q,R) as all the propositions to be considered by a sign i.e. &
this is an argument of notation - or just definition -
and as Wittgenstein says how these stipulations are produced is not essential
that is the signing for propositional representation is arbitrary -
the argument for these signs - for this syntax is contained in the proposition (s) of
5.501.
this proposition (like all propositions) as is a description of use - in this case how
certain logical syntax is to be understood
the signs have no meaning outside of their 'underlying' propositional argument
the three kinds of description listed are arguments for this kind of propositional
construction
these function as the theory of stipulation of propositions that have the variable as
their representative
the point is logic like any other construction has sense in terms of the use that it is to
be put
it's theory (if it is constructed correctly) is tailored to this end
the literal value of a theory lies in its fitting a desired or premeditated end or usage
the difficulty in assessing logic - even once such a view is accepted - is that the end
really only has definition in terms of the theory proposed
that is there is no objective - or extra-theoretical way of determining the value of the
theory
i.e. if the end is 'clarity' - how do we know if the theory serves this end -
what is to count as clarity is not given before the theory is proposed
no doubt there is some idea - that is not the point - the point is what this 'some idea'
comes to
only the theory advanced has that solution
we can look at the theory in terms of construction - bases - argument - consistency etc.
but all this finally is 'in house' - or internal
and where does this leave us?
proposal put forward and developed with passion and intelligence
the object of these proposal - is just what these proposal dress
the appropriateness of the dress may be a question we ask - but it is not a question the
world answers
if there is any answer it is silence
the world in itself as the object of consciousness is always unknown
the answer of the unknown is silence
here though we are dealing with things on a meta level
Wittgenstein is primarily concerned with the articulation of a theory of logic
and though what I have said regarding ultimate foundations finally applies here too
Wittgenstein in the development of his theory of propositional signs is really dealing
with the construction of a language or system of signs in the context of pre-existing
(natural) language
I think he wants to say the foundation of his theory of logic is the theory of logical
marks that is his system of propositional signs
this would be to put that logic is founded on its depiction - on its signs - on its pictures
and that amounts to saying the foundation of logic - is its expression
this is to give no foundation - no bases to logic
it is either a clever idea that fails - or a cover for putting one's head in the sand
Wittgenstein does not I think address the issue of the foundation of logic
perhaps because he understood it has no foundation but itself
to run with this requires blind courage - and not a bad thing either
but it is what it is
5.502. So instead of '(-----T)(&,....)', I write 'N(&)'.
N(&) is the negation of all the values of the propositional value &.
this is quite OK
it is just the making of decisions regarding propositional operations and how they are
represented
what needs to be pointed out here is that propositional representation signifies
propositional dimensions -
that is i.e., brackets within a propositional statement essentially point to the internal dimension of that proposition - or logic is not a flatline theory -
even Wittgenstein's own theory of propositional signs points to the fact that propositional
thinking is dimensional
that is it represents fundamental meta dimensions
the internal and the external
and the infinite number of combinations of expressions that these dimensions can
generate
5.503. It is obvious that we can easily express how propositions may be constructed
with this operation, and how they may not be constructed with it; so it must be
possible to find an exact expression for this.
the point is negation has already been introduced as the primitive propositional
operation - or operational possibility
any argument begins on this understanding
is Wittgenstein still going to say there are no primitive idea in logic?
all logic - all formal logic derives from negation
and negation itself from the given relationship of the conscious and the non-conscious
negation is a fundamental awareness
we can only operate - move in this world given the understanding of negation
therefore language of course natural and artificial - if it is to have any power reflects
this primitive fact of logic - of human (self-conscious) reality
as far as I can tell Wittgenstein gives no account of negation
it simply appears in his system
it is like the unknown parent that you know is always there somewhere - and one day
there is a knock on the door - as if from nowhere
Wittgenstein denies primitive ideas of logic - and tries to account for everything in
terms of his sign language - as some kind of substitute for argument - meta argument
which is all very well in my view so long as you understand that in putting such a
view you are arguing the sceptics understanding of the matter
5.51. If & has only one value, then N(&) = -p (not p); if it has two values, then N(&) =
-p . -q (neither p nor q).
it is difficult to see the point of &
& is a variable whose values are the terms of the bracketed expression
somewhere the terms of the bracketed expression (e.g. P,Q,R) have to be stated
the thing is a variable is just that anything and everything -
the variable is in terms of propositional logic - the unknown
which is all very well
I have argued that then propositional form is actually an empty logical space
the variable I suppose is a sign of this
but what is its use?
except perhaps to show that ultimately there is no logic to this theory of logic -
or perhaps more correctly - no content
that's OK too but what of Oakum's principle - is not this 'variable' (&) in fact an
unnecessary sign?
5.511. How can logic - all embracing logic, which mirrors the world - use such
peculiar crotchets and contrivances? Only because they are all connected with one
another in an infinitely fine network, the great mirror
mirroring the world -
an image of the world - via what?
what is the mirror - that is the first question
language you say
the difficulty here is that language is not outside of the world
so how is it to be a mirror
and for the matter of that - unless you have some Platonistic like metaphysic (which is
that the world is not the world ) - what could function as a mirror of the world?
putting it in a somewhat Spinozistic manner - what is outside of the world
any mirror in the world will only reflect a part thereof
reflections occur in the world
the world is not mirrored in anything
to suggest such is to misunderstand mirrors and / or the world
an image of the world would have to correspond to the world but it could not be
outside of the world therefore no correspondence
so to logic - all embracing logic -
how do we know logic is all embracing?
one would think again that you would need to be able to hold the world as an object
that is be outside of it - for it to be embraced - by anything
and to cut to the chase here -
the world?
presumably the totality - yes we have terms to describe
but what do they point to?
they point to what it is we do not know
that is all
that is the world
it is logically speaking a negative concept
and it is as negative as you can get
this fact is really where mysticism comes from
and it is the concept out of which religion has emerged
p.s.
from a linguistic point of view what this tells us is that language - terms - words -
concepts - do not in order to function necessarily have a referent
a sign that is foes not necessarily signify - in a positive sense
and perhaps if a positive sense of signification is all there is to one's theory of signs
then
a sign does not need to signify to be meaningful
does a sign have to have sense to signify?
if you signify what you do not know - what in fact is the sense of your sign?
how does one answer that?
well - to say the unknown has sense - yes
but the other possibility is just as valid - that the unknown is the unknown because it
does not have sense
signs without sense -
propositions without sense?
who would have thought?
(anyone but a philosopher)
5.512. '-p' is true if 'p' is false. Therefore, in the proposition '-p', when it is true, 'p' is a
false proposition. How then can the stroke '-' make it agree with reality?
But in '-p' it is not '-' that negates; it is rather what is common to all the signs of this
notation that negate p.
That is to say the common rule that the construction of '-p', '---p', '-p v -p, '-p, -p, etc.
etc. (ad infin.). And this common factor mirrors negation.
(a)
first up in the case put above the stroke '-' does not make it (-p) agree with reality
strictly speaking any well formed proposition (in my view) can agree with reality - so
what I am suggesting is that the terms 'true' and 'false' are not about agreement with
reality - what they refer to is a decision of utility
and that decision will be circumstantial - i.e. 'p' is T - that is we can use or work with
this proposition under these circumstances (whatever they are) - or 'p' is F - i.e. the
proposition has no applicability under this set of circumstances
agreement with reality is a question of the right fit at the right time and place
the general logical point is that no proposition can be constructed that is 'outside of
reality' - for this is the only legitimate sense of 'not agreeing with reality'
all propositions reflect some aspect of reality - the question is what?
really at the basis of any propositional assertion is the unknown - that is the question
what place does this proposition have in any view of reality?
'any view of reality' - will of necessity be a propositional argument - and the subject
proposition will have its place within this argument
that is to say the sense of proposition in question is to be found in the propositional
argument of which it is an expression
given this view it is clear that the sense of a proposition can and does change given
the circumstances of its application
and given the possibilities for flexibility within the propositional argument -
and this ultimately leads to the arguments within arguments - finally really
metaphysics - world views
nothing though is ever fixed or stable it is all fluid - and the possibility of collapse is
ever present - what puts the fix in is decision
and it's interesting - decision is really that moment of understanding when we do not
know but we have to proceed - and we proceed definitively - without knowing
we like to think decisions are firmly based on something - and indeed in practice you
will find this asserted confidently - but the logic of decision is quite different matter -
and the truth is logic does not provide any basis at all - what it does is point to the
absence of basis
here is not despair (although some have thought so) - rather what you have here
is possibility
possibility you will see cannot be fixed
(must not be - that's a philosophical joke ha ha)
and it is the necessary underpinning for action - for action (human action) is never
predetermined at the level of consciousness
in fact it is only possible given the absence of determination
such is the reality of mind in the world
(b)
negation -
Wittgenstein says it is a rule that governs negation
this quite straight up - is just not a good analysis - it is weak
indeed in the depiction is logical signage and syntax - rules can be and are applied
this is just the practice of the art
the question though is really to do with the nature of negation
and Wittgenstein has absolutely nothing to say here
nothing about the origin of this sign - this operation
and for that matter nothing about the origin of any other sign -
and hence ultimately no theory of logic
(what you have with Wittgenstein is the 'magical appearance' of logic and then its
discussion - no account of its bases)
so negation -
I think negation is the primitive concept of logic
that is it is fundamental
not to say that it is primary -
negation is only possible given assertion
but assertion has no significance without negation
this is the fundamental of negation
the fact that it underlying source of an assertion's significance
and this is true of all assertions - elementary existential and universal - and all
combinations
the whole of mathematics - number theory is based on the operations of negation
OK
so what do we make of negation?
what is it?
I say it is essentially an expression of the relation of consciousness and non-
consciousness
consciousness and the world
its a construction of consciousness - about consciousness - and its relation to the non-
consciousness
consciousness recognizes itself and its outside
that is consciousness recognizes itself as internality and contrasts this with externality
this is where we begin - with this recognition
beyond this there is no explanation - this is the base line
what is outside of consciousness is what it is not
what is inside non-consciousness is what it is not
negation is the primitive term of any account of the nature of human reality
without negation - there is no description -
without negation there is no reality as we know it
negation is the essential concept of human consciousness
now finally the point is - we don't know
we can't go beyond this in our analysis
what we do know though is that we can and do operate with negation
it is the fundamental operation of conscious life
and it enables us to operate as conscious operators
how the world is - is how it operates
operation is reality
(c)
Wittgenstein is keen on the idea of a mirror and the idea of reflection - the thing is his
account has no mirror in it - it is non-existent - there is no explanation of the mirror -
just the use of the idea - and the reason for all this is just that he does not - for
whatever reason want to acknowledge the place of mind - of consciousness in the
world
NB.
the negation sign refers to what?
it refers to - points to difference
the difference between x and that which x is differentiated from
negation refers to differentiation in the clearest terms
that which is different from x is that which is not x
negation in logic precisely defines the difference
which is to say it draws the difference sharply
we cannot really avoid an ontological dimension here
entities are being differentiated
though this is not to say anything at all substantial about what is being differentiated -
just that there is a differentiation -
the entity here is really a form I suppose
the negation sign ' -' separates forms
separation and differentiation are the underlying notions here - but negation is a
precise application
it is precise simply because it has no content - and doesn't really point to any content
it is just a sharp drawing of the line
it is strictly a formal act
a formal act I would suggest reflects a metaphysical reality
and that is the reality of consciousness in the world
consciousness - awareness
and awareness in this case is human awareness which is self-awareness
that is awareness of and awareness of not
this is the initial state of consciousness
it is the origin of binary logic
negation is the principle of awareness
the fundamental principle of consciousness
5.513. We might say that what is common to all symbols that affirm both p and q is
the proposition 'p.q'; and that what is common to all symbols that affirm either p or q
is the proposition 'p v q'.
And similarly we can say that two propositions are opposed to one another if they
have nothing in common with one another, and that every proposition has only one
negative, since there is only one proposition that lies completely outside it.
Thus in Russell's notation too it is manifest that 'q: p v -p' says the same thing as 'q',
that 'p v -p' says nothing.
does 'p v -p' say nothing?
yes - however it is not without sense
such a propositional statement in fact reveals logical space
it is a way of revealing logical space
which is to say it points to - or even states the ground of propositional logic
it is a statement of what is possible and it says nothing about what exists
it is a statement of modal logic
5.514. Once a notation has been established, there will be in it a rule governing the
construction of all propositions that negate p, and a rule governing the construction of
all propositions that affirm p or q; and so on. These rules are equivalent to the
symbols; and in them their sense is mirrored.
yes rules are just descriptions of operations
if you understand the operation you know - or have no use for the rule
the rules being refereed to here in my view have no logical significance at all
Wittgenstein I think wants to base his theory on some kind of essentialism
and so rules (he thinks) have some significance in negotiating essence
the fact of it is propositions are operations
and their relationship operational
this you might say is a far more pragmatic view of the matter
and to my mind far more 'hands on' and without a lot of metaphysical obscurantism
5.515. It must be manifest in our symbols that it can only be propositions that can be
combined with one another by 'v', ' .', etc.
And this is indeed the case, since the symbol in 'p' and 'q' itself presupposes 'v' '-'. etc.
If the sign 'p' in 'pvq' does not stand for a complex sign, then it cannot have sense by
itself; but in that case the signs 'pvq', 'p.p' etc., which have the same sense as p, must
also lack sense. But if 'pvp' has no sense, then 'pvq' cannot have sense either.
what sense is there in 'pvq'?
'pvq' - in the context of this logical argument - one assume represents a logical
operation -
the operation of disjunction
it is a statement in syntactical form of what disjunction is
a representation of it
it is to say we can legitimately place propositions in the relation of disjunction
it is this assertion
so 'pvq' then expresses the possibility of a state of affairs in propositional logic
'p' and 'q' (in this argument) represent propositions - different propositions
'v' - tells us that these propositions can be placed in a relation of disjunction
so 'pvq' really is a statement of a ground of sense
the sense that is being proposed here is 'logical sense' (which is the ground of actual
sense)
so yes logical sense is presupposed in any statement or proposition of sense
pvq here is a statement - a proposition of that logical ground
it refers to such a logical state of affairs - it states the possibility
the syntactical representation has little or nothing to do with the issue
the point could e made in any language
NB.
there is no such thing as a proposition free proposition - that is a proposition will only
have sense in terms of the propositional argument (the system of propositions) it
represents
and what it represents - will depend on how it is used
i.e. if your interest is logic - the logical analysis of a proposition will involve logical
propositions
if it is empirical then empirical propositions will be contained in it - for it's
comprehensive elucidation
look it depends really on where you point the proposition
that is it is a question of direction - meta direction if you like
the possibility of sense is given in structure
the nature of sense is to be found in the direction that structure is used in - the
direction it is pointed in
therefore the sense of proposition is never to be found in the proposition - in its
structure - it is only found in its use
5.5151. Must the sign of a negative proposition be constructed with that of the
positive proposition? Why should it not be possible to express a negative proposition
by means of a negative fact? (E.g. suppose that 'a' does not stand in a certain relation
to 'b'; then this might be used to say that aRb was not the case.)
But really in this case the negative proposition is constructed by an indirect use of the
positive.
The positive proposition necessarily presupposes the existence of the negative
proposition and visa versa.
one can always apply the '-' sign to negate a proposition - this is an operational issue
the positive proposition does not presuppose anything
it is an assertion
also not sure about the idea of a negative fact -
my instinct here is to say the world is made of facts - that is positive facts -
the assertion of a so called negative fact is just the assertion that a positive fact does
hold
that is - it is not as if we are pointing to a negative fact - a non-fact and saying 'there -
that (non-existent state of affairs) exists'
the denial of a positive fact is not an assertion of a negative fact -
the world is not lacking - so there are no absences to point to
a negative assertion - asserts what?
that a positive fact does not hold
that is a negative assertion is an assertion not about the world but about a (positive)
proposition
if this is so then continents of European metaphysics disappear overnight
what is clear though is that positive and negative assertions are not of the same type
a negative denies a positive assertion - that is proposition -
a positive proposition asserts a state of affairs
the negative proposition is an operation on the positive proposition
it has no content - it does not assert - it is a propositional operation
but what is it to deny?
it is to perform the most fundamental logical operation
negation enables the generation of propositional strings and propositional forms
it is as I have put above the essential awareness -
the primary awareness of consciousness
it is the operation of consciousness that gives us self-consciousness
'I am' can only be determined by it's negation
it's negation is the world -
what underlies this though is a metaphysical reality -
the actual being of consciousness
and consciousness is not like anything else
and here it is seen - that this is how consciousness id defined - in terms of what it is
not -
the non-conscious
the existence of these opposites is the foundation of logic
5.52. If & has as its values all the values of a function fx for all values of x, then N(&)
= -(Ex).fx.
if & represents all the values of fx - then - N(&) denies that x is a function
in the argument here Wittgenstein avoids the universal (all) and argues the case in
terms of the existential (there exists)
you could say the denial of the existential - covers the issue of the denial of a
universal - i.e. - the result is the same
what about a universal assertion - 'all' and 'every'?
I really don't know how any such a statement can be made - at least in an empirical
context
different matter when we are dealing with the finite number of members of a set
anyway
5.521. I dissociate the concept all from truth-functions.
Frege and Russell introduced generality in association with logical product or sum.
This made it difficult to understand the propositions '(Ex).fx' and '(x).fx', in which both
ideas are embedded.
Wittgenstein puts that the concept of all is not to be associated with truth functions
this makes sense - truth functional analysis is the calculation of truth values for
elementary propositions
the concept of all does not appear in any such operation and is not relevant to it
generality and sum or logical product -
(a)
I really don't see why you can't dispense with sum or logical product in the
interpretation of the above proposition
the universal proposition need not be regarded as an expression of sum or logical
product
that is 'all' can simply refer to 'the state of affairs'
that is the universal in an ontological sense
(b)
(i) there exists an x such that x is a function
(ii) for all x - x is a function
very different propositions -
the universal proposition asserts effectively that fx is a member of a class and that all
members of this class are functions
different to saying x exists and is a function
in this case x is left undefined
the universal gives definition
the existential leaves its subject as undefined
5.522. What is peculiar to the generality-sign is first, that it indicates a logical
prototype, and secondly, that it gives prominence to constants.
yes the generality indicates a basic conceptual category
the point is that the universal has no power outside of its manipulation with constants
- that is it is essentially an operative concept - its assertion only begs the question of
what is to happen
the existential on the other hand does not invite operation
that is it is complete in itself
I think we need to regard the universal as a purely operative notion
a concept that we can get some work done with
the existential on the other hand is the work done
an operative view of the universal and universal sign might just be the best way to
understand it
that is the view that the universal does not signify
it just operates - it's a conceptual operation - that is clearly useful in a deductive
context - that is a 'top down' analysis - where the field of variables is decided - for the
argument
5.523. The generality sign occurs as an argument.
well not quite -
it's more in the line of a tool that is a tool for arguments
or perhaps we could say an argument form
that is a form in which a certain kind of argument can proceed
but even so it is a logical tool that enables certain logical processes - and thus
outcomes
5.524. If objects are given, then at the same time we are given all objects.
If elementary propositions are given, then at the same time all elementary propositions
are given.
a sign for an object - is a sign for all objects -
'object' is a universal concept - a logical sign reflects this fact
the same is true of elementary propositions
it is clear isn't it that such signs are signs of concepts
and if you wish to follow the trail -
signs of consciousness?
consciousness at work
and it is clear that we really cannot separate our understanding of concepts from what
they are conceptions of
we may for analytical purposes distinguish consciousness from its object(s)
however the reality is an indissoluble unity at the level of the given
(Kant put this much better as 'the unity of aperception')
in my view the proposition represents this unity
and the really extraordinary thing is that outside of analysis - this unity can only be
described as unknown
5.525. It is incorrect to render the proposition '(Ex).fx' in the words, 'fx is possible', as
Russell does.
The certainty, possibility, or impossibility of a situation is not expressed by a
proposition, but by an expression's being a tautology, a proposition with sense, or a
contradiction.
The precedent to which we are constantly inclined to appeal must reside in the symbol
itself.
'fx is possible' might be seen as a broad view
existential statements are very focused
a proposition asserts
and what is it to assert?
it is to say that the proposition covers a state of affairs
that something - exists -
it is to say nothing about the nature of the state of affairs -
just that - for whatever purpose it is being asserted
how is this different from an assertion of possibility
in a logical sense - I see no real difference
it's just that it comes with the rider that the state of affairs may not in fact be
why would we have such a qualification?
what point is served here?
does not such undermine the 'positive' character of the proposition?
possibility points to what?
it points to the question of existence
in a Platonic sense to its form -
in general existential statements as I understand them are definitive
and possibility statement are not - at the existential level
still you might say the possibility statement contains the existential - without the
commitment
an open existential statement?
perhaps this was Russell's point
and as I have put earlier on I do not go with the idea the a tautology is a statement of
possibility - or that a contradiction is a statement of impossibility
tautologies and contradictions I have argued are useless propositional strings
so I do not think the key to these notions is a propositional form -
the symbol is not the precedent
5.526. We can describe the world completely by means of fully generalized
propositions, i.e., without first correlating any name with a particular object.
Then, in order to arrive at the customary mode of expression, we simply need to add,
after an expression like, 'There is one and only one x such that...', the words, 'and that
x is a'.
(a)
describing the world completely -
the god delusion -
'a fully generalized proposition' is only functional if the domain of the generalization
is already set - that is determined for the argument
this means though that we must be able to think both sides of the definition - for the
definition to be put in place
and so the point is that all our conceptions are within domain
'the world' as such cannot be conceived - it is not a domain -
it is in fact the absence of domain
or if you like the place of domain
best described as the logical space of domains
it follows from this we cannot sensibly say 'we can describe the world completely'
(b)
'there is one and only one x and that x is a'
this is a definition - of definition
that is it is a theory of what a true definition looks like
it is a meta statement
the point is it is not a definition of anything as such
and really isn't this just exactly what logic is - the account - the theory of definition
the theory of forms - in the sense of - i.e.. this is what a true definition looks like or
this is what a proposition is etc.
5.5261. A fully generalized proposition, like every other proposition, is composite.
(This is shown by the fact that in '(Ex, o).ox' we have to mention 'o' and 'x' separately.
They both, independently, stand in signifying relations to the world, just as is the case
in ungeneralized propositions.)
It is a mark of a composite symbol that it has something in common with other
symbols.
what needs to appreciated is that a proposition in it's given mode reflects the analysis
that led to it
therefore a fully generalized proposition will reflect its composition
that is we can inspect it and see the separate mentions
this however I think is only one view of the proposition - legitimately definitely
however we can transcend this reading and regard the generalized proposition as just
that - generalized
the point of such a proposition is its universality -
this I would say is the sense - the true sense of the proposition
the fact that it points to - the non-composite view of reality
here though we see the great utility of the proposition -
it's structure reflects its making and goes beyond this
it really is not necessary to come down on one side or the other -
both possibilities are revealed
and what I say in general here is that the analysis / composition is a way of seeing the
proposition
in fact without the analytical view - what we have is an unknown reality
the analysis /composition of the proposition is the handle we have on it
5.5262. The truth or falsity of every proposition does make some alteration in the
general construction of the world. And the range that the totality of elementary
propositions leaves open for its construction is exactly the same as that which is
delimited by entirely general propositions.
(If an elementary proposition is true, that means, at any rate, one more true elementary
proposition.)
(a)
a proposition as a fact about the world - like any other fact -
and by 'fact' here I really mean an 'epistemological region' -
is like any other fact in itself - neither true or false
truth or falsity is a matter of action in terms of a proposition
the proposition is a focus for - 'veritable action'
that is in general we know the truth status of a proposition in terms of its use or not
this means of course that one in the same proposition can be true or false depending
on circumstances and use or not
the action in relation to the proposition alters the fact of the world
the proposition itself - but for its appearance - has no effect
and again - in itself - has no truth value
(b)
the construction of the world - the human world - is that construction that results from
the relation of consciousness and non-consciousness
that is how we construct in terms of this fundamental relation
the world (the relation of consciousness and non-consciousness) is simply the
primitive fact of human reality
such a world prior to any construction of it is essentially unknown
any construction is just the fact of the need for organization and structure - and this
need is best understood as a product of self-consciousness
(c)
there is no totality of elementary propositions
an elementary proposition is an expression of primary focus
primary focus has no unique place and time
therefore it is without number
(d)
a general or universal proposition is an expression of the absence of primary focus
that is it is not an elementary proposition - and its basis is the denial of the elementary
proposition
that is the connection - denial
though the denial is hidden in the assertion
it is strictly speaking the basis of it
and so it is the case that 'the range that the totality of elementary propositions leaves
open for its construction is exactly the same as that which is delimited by entirely
general propositions'
5.53. Identity of object I express by identity of sign, and not by using a sign of
identity. Difference of objects I express by difference of signs.
identity of object - identity of sign -
tricky business -
logic does not identify object
a propositions refers to object
refers to the fact of object
and the fact of object in a state of affairs
it asserts the fact of object
therefore a proposition is an assertion of a state of affairs
the assertion of object is the base element of any proposition
identity -
we can have identical expressions in the sense that they assert the same thing in
different ways
identity of object?
there is no identity of object -
unless you think it makes sense to say an object is identical with itself
if x is an object and y is an object it follows x is not identical to y
or x and y are not objects
that is the essence of object is just that it is not identical with -
the concept of identity does not apply to object
two objects if they are objects - are - not one object
identity of sign is identity of reference - not identity of object
the point is we do not need to have different signs for different objects
objects just are different
different signs are different expressions
and yes it does follow from this that language does not identify
or propositional language does not identify
5.5301. It is self evident that identity is not a relation between objects. This becomes
clear if one considers, for example, the proposition '(x):fx.>.x =a'. What this
proposition says is simply that only a satisfies the function f, and not that only things
that have a certain relation to a satisfy the function f.
Of course it might then be said that only a did have a relation to a; but in order to
express that, we should need the identity sign itself.
the above proposition is really an exercise in substitution of symbols
it is to say that we can use the right hand side of the '=' sign for the left - or visa versa
the above proposition is really just a definition of signs - of usage
this has nothing at all to do with identity of objects
and as I have suggested above the notion of identity of objects itself is ridiculous
it really only has a place in the metaphysics of confusion
the '=' sign does not signify -
in the strict sense of signify something outside of the sign
what it does is define use of sign
5.5302. Russell's definition of '=' is inadequate, because according to it we cannot say
that two objects have all their properties in common. (Even if this proposition is never
correct, it still has sense.)
this is where Wittgenstein gives away the game
Russell is correct
and the point I argue is that the '=' signifies translation - and use
it is not objective
to say that we can still speak as if the '=' as object-ive - even though it is incorrect
that it still makes sense -
is just confused - sloppy thinking
and a little worrying
the real concern is what this says for sense
if sense is adrift from logic - it has no sense
we may as well just start again
5.5303. Roughly speaking, to say of two things that they are identical is nonsense, and
to say of one thing that it is identical with itself is to say nothing at all.
roughly speaking -
'roughly speaking' is not good enough for a logician
it might work fine in a bar room -
and really what is up here?
it looks like Wittgenstein wants to have it both ways -
to nod to the metaphysical reality that there are no identity relations
and yet still proceed as if identity relations are real
prime facie it all seems rather incredible
and at the very least without integrity
we will see -
5.531. Thus I do not write 'f(a,b).a = b', but 'f(a,a)' (or 'f(b,b)'); and not 'f(a,b). -a =b',
but 'f(a,b)'.
f(a,a) and f(b,b) -
the point is isn't if you have given up on identity - then there is no need for these
expressions at all - they are mistaken - and no amount of rewriting or translating will
change the fact -
5.532. And analogously I do not write 'F(Ex,y). f(x,y).x = y', but '(Ex).f(x,x)'; and not
'(Ex,y).f(x,y). -x = y', but '(Ex.y).f(x,y)'.
(So Russell's '(Ex,y). fxy' becomes '(Ex,y). f((x,y).v. (Ex).F(x,x)'.)
'(Ex).F(x,x)' seems unnecessary - that is the f(x,x)
and in the same way Russell's notation seems far more elegant and to the point - that
is without the fiction of f(x,x)
5.5321. Thus, for example, instead of '(x): fx.> x = a we write '(Ex).fx>.fa: -
(Ex,y).fx.fy'.
And the proposition, 'Only one x satisfies f( )', will read '(Ex). fx: -(Ex,y).fx.fy'.
yes I see no point in using the '=' sign - it can be successfully eliminated from notation
but the resultant notation is just as useless if the point is the same - that is if an
identity relation between objects is being posited -
5.533. The identity sign, therefore, is not an essential constituent of conceptual
notation.
perhaps matters can be made clear if we just make the point that the identity sign only
signifies - syntactical equivalence
that is - when used it says one expression can be translated into another
and this is not a proposal for translation - it states the fact that - given whatever
definitions - the expressions are translatable
what this means - if accepted is that the '-' sign would not have any dynamic role to
play
and it really makes clear that we are not in using the sign asserting identity relations
the '=' is a translation sign
5.534. And now we see that in a correct conceptual notation pseudo-propositions like
'a = a', 'a = b. b = c.> a =c', '(x). x = x', '(Ex).x = a', etc. cannot even be written
down.
so yes - what we say is that the '=' is not a propositional sign - therefore not correctly
used in propositions
its correct use I argue is as a translation sign
it is a sign for the manipulation of propositional expression
it is therefore outside of propositional logic
5.535. This also disposes of all the problems that were connected with such pseudo-
propositions.
All the problems that Russell's 'axiom of infinity' begins with it can be solved at this
point.
What the axiom of infinity is intended to say would express itself in language through
the existence of infinitely many names with different meanings.
yes it is correct to identify propositions that contain an objective identity sign ('-') as
pseudo
Russell's axiom of infinity is the argument that there is a set with infinitely many
individuals as members
this proposal depends on the definition of set
if a set is that which contains a plurality of members - and there cannot be a set of one
member only - you avoid the problem of the set of infinite sets
for such a concept renders set theory useless
the same is true of the null set
to propose such is to indulge in a theoretical excess that renders the notion of set as
pointless
at the same time is it not necessary within set theory to allow for a set of sets?
here sets are regarded as members
if so one could argue that we cannot properly distinguish sets and members of sets
if so the idea of the set is rendered valueless
set theory does avoid the issue of identity ('-') - with an argument of inclusion
what needs to be realized is that inclusion only works if it is understood that it -
inclusion cannot be included in the argument
which amounts to saying in mathematics you cannot have a complete theory
you can only operate with a hierarchy of theories -
which I think was the idea of Russell's theory of types
5.535. There are certain cases in which one is tempted to use expressions of the form
'a = a' or 'p>p' and the like. In fact this happens when one wants to talk about
prototypes, e.g. about proposition, thing, etc. Thus in Russell's Principles of
Mathematics 'p is a proposition' which is nonsense - was given the symbolic meaning
'p>p' and placed in an hypothesis in front of certain propositions in order to exclude
from their argument-places everything but propositions.
(It is nonsense to place the hypothesis 'p>p' in front of a proposition, in order to ensure
that its arguments shall have the right form, if only because with a non-proposition as
argument the hypothesis becomes not false but nonsensical, and because arguments of
the wrong kind make the proposition itself nonsensical, so that it preserves itself from
wrong arguments just as well, or as badly, as the hypothesis without sense that was
appended for that purpose.)
''p' represents a proposition in what follows' -
is a meta statement - a definition of how signs are to be used - what they signify
it is best if such statements - meta statements are not put in symbolic form -
at the very least it confuses
and if as Wittgenstein says in the Principles of Mathematics Russell does give his sign
definition in symbolic terms - then at the very least - we don't know what that
expression is to mean - it just appears
however the point is that 'p>p' signifies a relation between propositions - it doesn't tell
us that 'p' is to represent propositions
what we have here - surprisingly from Russell is a confusion of types
the more interesting question - and this might be at the core of Russell's idea is just
what status we are to give the statement 'p is a proposition'?
is this statement to be regarded as a proposition -
the answer is yes -
but for it to be 'yes' - we have to recognize we are talking about a different theory of
proposition to that of Wittgenstein
'p is a proposition' is a proposition that defines the logical sign of a proposition
it is a meta proposition
look the fact is you cannot just begin with symbolic logic -
there has to be translation rules
'p is a proposition' is on such rule
what Wittgenstein wants to avoid in this criticism is a hierarchy of languages
his whole effort is to establish one sparse pristine language as the basis of all
the dream is philosophically naive
(it is the naivety that is essential to genuine philosophical inquiry)
the - dare I say - 'bottom line' is that there is no language that is self justifying
no philosopher's stone here
yes we have to accept the logic of infinity here
just a fancy name for the lack of intellectual foundation
an important matter to understand
it is not a tragedy - it is the nature and origin of freedom
so why not despair that like Zeno we cannot move?
the thing is we do move despite the lack of logical foundation
and indeed I would argue - it is the deep reason for why we do move
action does not depend on a ground for consciousness
5.5352. In the same way people have wanted to express, 'There are no things', by
writing '-(Ex).x = x'. But even if this were a proposition, would it not be equally true if
in fact 'there were things', but they were not identical with themselves?
what counts as a thing?
- that which exists
if there are no things that exist - then there are no propositions - or whatever else you
want to call them - 'statements asserting' perhaps -
so yes the assertion - or that particular assertion is ridiculous - if only because if it is
true then it - the assertion does not exist - cannot exist -
the only other way to go is to put it like this:
Vx (Ex>-Ex)
and this is to assert a contradiction
or we can say a proposition is not a thing - rather that which asserts the existence of a
thing
on this view - if there are no things - there cannot be any propositions asserting the
fact
it seems to me the issue of identity is irrelevant to this matter
that is - whether a thing is identical to itself or not has nothing to do with whether it
exists or not
and I just make the point again that the notion of identity makes no sense
the idea of thing being identical with itself - is really just a fall back position once you
realize no thing is identical with another
what then of identity?
perhaps we can make sense of it by speaking of 'self-identity'?
but the problem with this is that identity - if it is to have any sense is identity between
unique entities - that is it is a relation between
there can be no sense in the idea of a thing being in a relation with itself
there is no relation
there is no relation between
there is no between - in the case of a unique entity
what all this points to is that propositional signs can only make sense if they reflect
reality - any use that attempts to show that reality is non-existent - is an invalid use of
propositional logic
(this is not to say of course that it is invalid to assert that particular entities do not
exist - rather that any wholesale rejection of reality is without sense)
logic is reflected in the proposition
the proposition itself - propositional logic - is not based on propositional logic
it is not self-justifying
propositional language reflects
the basis of propositional logic is outside of propositional logic
relative to propositional logic - its basis is meta logic
here we are dealing with pre-propositional logic
what we can say is that logic - however we characterize it is reflected in - whatever
forms are being presented
and I would suggest that pure logic cannot be stated outside of the forms it is
represented in
this is really to suggest that logic -
is really a given
the given before the given of presentation
we are that is faced with it in every experience
and how to characterize this?
it will depend on other considerations
but we can say that in general any characterization will point to the reality of assertion
and denial
(the ancient Greeks used the notion of opposites as the universal characterization)
and embedded in this is the law of the excluded middle
and even deeper - the law of non-contradiction
my point though is that whatever characterization is used
the truth of logic is finally what is given
and as to its origin - its source - this is not a matter we can know
we can of course speculate and create around the fact of it
and this is indeed a fruitful enterprise
but is ultimately characterized by freedom
that is the absence of finality
this fact allows for the expression of the manifestation of this 'given' in such forms as
propositional logic
5.54. In the general propositional form propositions occur in other propositions only
as bases of truth-operations.
complex propositions can contain other propositions - other complex propositions
as stated propositions
of course analysis will always reveal other proposals that give or can give sense to the
propositions displayed
internal analysis of what is presented can reveal the world
in practice we do not proceed to totality - not that in fact the limit is ever reached -
however much can be discovered if you look and look with specific purposes in mind
in fact such a venture may reveal other purposes
there has to be a point - no matter how artistic one's temperament - when you need to
stop
you stop not because you come up against some logical wall
but rather the day is coming to an end and a neat black Jack (on ice) comes to mind
p.s.
the question of the foundation of thought - the foundation of logic
is not settled by thought
thought is not its own foundation
the issue of foundation is settled by non -thought
it is settled by action
action is the foundation of a thought process
that is the decision to stop analysis and proceed
action is without foundation
action does not require foundation
5.541. At first sight it looks as if it were also possible for one proposition to occur in
another in a different way.
Particularly with certain forms of proposition in psychology, such as 'A believes p is
the case' and 'A has the thought p', etc.
For if these are considered superficially, it looks as if the proposition p stood in some
kind of relation to an object A.
(And in modern theory of knowledge (Russell, Moore, etc.) these propositions have
actually been construed in this way.)
a proposition standing in a relation to an object -
the relation is the question here
the link between a proposition and an object
how is this set up?
well we as it were translate the object into a proposition
that is represent the object propositionally
and then the matter is straightforward
but in a general sense - the proposition in common use is 'placed against an object or
state of affairs'
what this amounts to is that a relation has been asserted
though the assertion of the relation is rarely made explicit
this happens in propositional analysis
and is the point in a way of propositional analysis
'A believes p' - is a proposition within a proposition
'A has the thought p' - is a proposition correlating objects - or - depending on your
ontology - correlating mental states
('A has the thought p' is in logical terms rather primitive)
we can give complete propositional analyses of these statements - but it requires some
sophistication
this is the only issue
5.542. It is clear, however that 'A believes that p', 'A has the thought p', and 'A has the
thought p', and 'A says p' are of the form '"p" says p': and this does not involve a
correlation of a fact with an object, but rather a correlation of facts by means of the
correlation of their objects.
'"p" says p' - that is the proposition 'asserts' a proposition -
'A believes that p' etc. - asserts that the proposition 'p' is held
it asserts a fact about the proposition - that it is believed
'p' here is a proposition 'encased' in a proposition
'A believes that p' is a proposition asserting a proposition about a proposition
'that p is 'held''
correct it does not assert a correlation of a fact with an object
unless we regard - and why not - the proposition held - as object?
5.5421. This shows too that there is no such thing as the soul - the subject, etc. as it is
conceived in the superficial psychology of the present day.
Indeed a composite soul could no longer be a soul.
what 'A believes that p' is on my analysis a proposition that contains a proposition
what this reflects is internality
you can if you like use this as a metaphor for consciousness 'in' the world
the world 'containing' consciousness - as all this suits me fine
but it is only a metaphor
and my argument is that consciousness is contained in the world - is in fact the 'inside'
of the world
however in saying this I am not arguing that consciousness is simple entity or a
complex entity
my view in fact is that we cannot say what it is
and I would advance this view against Wittgenstein's strange view that the soul - the
subject - consciousness - which he is arguing does not exist - must be a simple - non-
complex entity -
an each way bet I guess
5.5422. The correct explanation of the proposition, 'A makes the judgement p', must
show that it is impossible for a judgement to be a piece of nonsense.
(Russell's theory does not satisfy this requirement.)
the correct explanation of the proposition 'p' must show that 'p' makes sense
judgement is a question of place
of placing the proposition
a sensible judgement shows that the proposition can be placed in the place (the meta
place) chosen
that is to say a sensible judgement does not place a proposition regarding e.g. musical
theory - in the context of - let us say geological theory
whether the proposition proves to be useful in its appropriate context is another
question
that is the question of its truth value
a piece of nonsense -
would be statement that masquerades as a genuine proposition and is placed in the
wrong context to boot
such a proposition would not necessarily be rendered valueless
again it becomes a question of placement
in a nonsense rime it may give delight
that is the invalid 'proposition' and its incorrect original proposition
are placed in another context - replaced
and this context - let us say the context of the absurd is a context that gives the
'proposition' sense
this replacing is a judgement that results in sense
5.5423. To perceive a complex means to perceive that its constituents are related to
one another in such a way.
This no doubt also explains why there are two possible ways of seeing the figure
b b
a a
b b
a a
as a cube; and all similar phenomena. for we really see two different facts.
(If I look in the first place at the corners marked a and only glance at the b's, then the
a's appear to be in front, and via versa).
what this illustrates is the indeterminateness of form
the fact that an apparently defined state of affairs is open to perspective
and if we were to ask what is the true analysis of the form?
we have to say - well if there is such - it is unknown
the form structures possibilities - that is all
5.55. We now have to answer a priori the question about all possible forms of
elementary propositions.
Elementary propositions consists of names. Since, however, we are unable to give the
number of names with different meanings, we are also unable to give the composition
of elementary propositions
the question of meaning is not an a priori matter -
therefore it cannot be settled a priori
to say elementary propositions consist of names - is an a priori argument
I would have thought the question of composition is settled by such a claim
and that the issue of meaning is an issue of practice of utility
5.551. Our fundamental principle is that whenever a question can be decided by logic
at all it must be possible to decide it without more ado.
(And if we get into a position where we have to look at the world for an answer to
such a problem, that shows that we are on a completely wrong track.
a priori is what?
knowledge given prior to experience
consciousness reflects on consciousness and its relation to the world
this kind of reflection can reveal the limits of (conscious) knowledge
that is what is possible and what is not
it is not as if we work both sides of the fence
it is rather that in logic we define useful and useless conjunctions
a useful conjunction asserts and does not in its assertion deny itself
a useless assertion does
it's a question of whether you indeed have a tool or not to take to experience
a contradiction is not open to experience - it closes off experience
we therefore adopt the rule that a contraction is useless
we can recognize a contradiction in purely formal terms
it does not - in fact cannot - depend on experience
an a priori proposition thus asserts the possibility of experience
and so when all goes as it should the a priori is not to be seen
it only appears on the question of possibility
and in normal circumstances that is a slam dunk
5.552. The 'experience' that we need in order to understand logic is not that something
or other is the state of things, but that something is: that, however is not an
experience.
Logic is prior to every experience - that something is so.
It is prior to the question 'How?', not prior to the question 'What?'
'...but that something is: that, however, is not an experience.'
yes - but it is not really that something is - but that something can be
'something' of course seems to presuppose what 'can be' or in Wittgenstein's terms 'is'
let us say any assertion presupposes the world
and this is really just a condition of assertion - but one need not get too excited here -
we are just making the point that an assertion is of and in the world
(and for it to go forward to get off the ground it cannot block itself by denying itself or
what amounts to the same thing - it's ground - the world)
logic prior to experience?
well I think I would prefer to say logic is embedded in experience
logic is the assertion of the possibility of experience
the assertion only has any sense if seen as inside experience
the idea of 'prior to' is really just a trick of reflection
the reflection is of the object reflected - and yet we can view as apart from
this is what happens with the a priori - we step back - more for organizational
purposes than anything else
so perhaps there is reason to drop the term 'a priori' altogether
and instead think of the principles in experience that articulate its possibility
5.5521. And if this were not so, how could we apply logic? We might put it in this
way: if there would be a logic even if there were no world, how then could there be a
logic given that there is a world?
the world is not experience
the world is not logic
the world is revealed in experience
the world is revealed in logic
experience is the world represented
logic is the world represented
the unity of experience and logic is the known world
experience and logic are related to each other in terms of depth
experience is the surface of the known world
logic its heart
5.553. Russell said there were simple relations between different numbers of things
(individuals). But between what numbers? And how is this supposed to be decided? -
By experience.
(There is no pre-eminent number.)
there is no pre-eminence per se
nothing is distinguished unless we distinguish it
and any metaphysical theory or world view will have its favorites
clearly in different mathematical theories and traditions different numbers may be
given different status - and this will be determined by the goal or function of the
theory
if by different numbers of things is meant different classes of things - then there are
simple relations obtaining if the different classes are placed in relation to each other
so too with things - they are related by act
the act of placement
i.e. 'a' may be included in X and not in Y - thus what defines X in relation to Y is 'a' -
where it is placed
if 'a' is a member of both X and Y - there is no dicstinction - there is only one class - that which 'a' is a member of
'experience' or utility - action - in short - will determine membership -
however the concept of membership is given in logic
we can say experience has no form without logic
and logic no content without experience
logic and experience define reality and enable us to work with it
they are concepts of utility - meta concepts
without these concepts it is not that reality is unknown (it always remains so) it is
rather that it is unworkable - non-negotiable
human consciousness in the world brings these categories - logic and experience to
reality
the logic of experience is the human world
5.554. It would be completely arbitrary to give any specific form.
yes it would be completely arbitrary
and the reason is we straight out face the unknown
any form given is relative to this knowledge base - arbitrary
the arbitrariness is mitigated - and in fact disappears in the face of necessity
the necessity to act -
requires the decision to determine in a manner that defies arbitrariness
of course it never does
and here lies the truth of acting
5.5541. It is supposed to be possible to answer a priori the question whether I can get
into a position in which I need the sign for a 27-termed relation in order to signify
something.
we cannot answer this question
for as stated it leaves the experience (the situation) as an unknown
you cannot know what you would do in an unknown situation
(in such a circumstance you could very well whistle Dixie as use a 27 termed relation)
the question makes no sense
it is asking can I know a a priori what I would do in an unknown circumstance
one could not give an answer a posteriori to such a question
is it possible to get into a situation?
yes
that is the best we can say here
if you wish to speculate on what you might do in a situation you have to have
something in mind
that is you have to have before you a description of a possible state of affairs
then you can hypothesize responses
to talk of a response to an unknown situation is ridiculous
it is a case of the grin without the Cheshire cat
a consequent without an antecedent
bad logic though inspired fantasy
5.5542. But is it really legitimate to ask such a question? can we set up a form of a
sign without knowing whether anything can correspond to it?
Does it make sense to ask what there must be in order that something can be the case?
it is possible to have a sign for the unknown - but this does not alter the argument
above - as in such a case we do know what it corresponds to
does it make sense to ask what there must be in order that something is the case?
it is not that such a postulation does not make sense - the question is in what context
does it make sense?
clearly such a postulation has no value for dealing with what is - for in this case we do
not know what is - and therefore nothing follows
however such a postulation is indeed a principle of imaginative fiction - and so it's
appropriate use is imaginative
this point bears only on the question sense - just what is to count as sensible?
does the imagination have a place in Wittgenstein's world?
5.555. Clearly we have some concept of elementary propositions quite apart from their
logical forms.
But when there is a system by which we can create symbols, the system is what is
important for logic and not the individual symbols.
And anyway, is it really possible that in logic I should have to deal with forms that I
can invent? What I have to deal with is that which makes it possible for me to invent
them.
'a concept of elementary propositions' is a form - a form in which other forms will be
found - can be generated
the distinction between symbol and system can only be a organizational distinction
a system has no content without symbol
a symbol has no value without system
one is the expression of the other
that which makes it possible to invent forms -
this is not the issue
it is rather what is invented
the ground of forms
what makes forms possible
is fair and square unknown
being reminded of this is for the better
makes for a healthy outlook and life
it is the origin of sense and humility
5.536. There cannot be a hierarchy of forms of elementary propositions. We can
foresee only what we ourselves can construct.
the construction of form is not an empirical matter
that is it is not a surface awareness
it is an internal exploration
the objective world is not altered one iota by formal construction
our understanding of the world is
5.5561. Empirical reality is limited by the totality of objects. The limit also makes
itself manifest in the totality of elementary propositions.
Hierarchies are and must be independent of reality.
objects are a function of the relation of the conscious and non-conscious dimensions
of reality
objects are therefore experienced -
the limit of experience cannot be set except by fiat - arbitrarily
to suggest that the empirical world is only the world of objects is without justification
what appears in the phenomenal realm has as much reality - as much status as what
does not
what appears is not to be equated with what is experienced
the ground of appearance - though not object-like - is experienced
nothing is independent of reality
there is no sense in the notion of the totality of experience
therefore - elementary propositions - however we construe them - cannot be added up
propositions do not stand outside of experience
they are experienced
they are reflections of experience - and in this sense constructions of experience
even so they may be regarded as data - in as much as anything is data
and everything is
propositions are functions of the relation of human consciousness and its relation to
non-conscious reality
it is to be remembered that 'reality as such' has no characterization -
outside of consciousness and particularly human consciousness reality is unknown
5.5562. If we know on purely logical grounds that there must be elementary
propositions, then everyone who understands propositions in their unanalyzed form
must know it.
what we know is that if you have a certain conception of the structure of the
proposition - and that conception involves the idea of elementary propositions then
anyone who understands that conception will understand the idea of elementary
propositions
the argument that one's theory is the only account possible and therefore everyone
must know it - must - as a fact of nature - is epistemological totalitarianism and the
philosophical origin of fascism
5.5563. In fact all propositions of our everyday language, just as they stand are in
perfect logical order. - That utterly simple thing, which we have to formulate here, is
not a likeness of the truth, but the truth itself in its entirety.
(Our problems are not abstract, but perhaps the most concrete that there are.)
logic as a theory of what actually happens
this suggests there is no reason at all for logic - apart from having a description of
what goes on
on such a view the truth is just what happens
and I would think that it follows no theory of truth can really be formulated
for any such theory is in the mix and therefore cannot account for itself - there is no
stepping out of reality
therefore no so called universal account is possible
what we can do is describe - if required - what we do -
and recognize that any description is as ephemeral as our actions
the idea that we can determine the truth in its entirety is logically ridiculous
unfortunately though it is not innocent or without consequence
such a view is a description of the logical origin of insanity
it is pathological
5.557. The application of logic describes what elementary propositions there are.
What belongs to its application, logic cannot anticipate.
It is clear that logic must not clash with it application.
But logic has to be in contact with its application.
Therefore logic and its application must not overlap.
the application of logic is an empirical event
logic is applied to a state of affairs
logic cannot clash with anything -
logic is its application
logic and its application cannot overlap
5.5571. If I cannot say a priori what elementary propositions there are then the attempt
to do so must lead to obvious nonsense.
of course the whole concept is up the creek
we cannot say independently of experience anything about experience
so called a priori statements are mis-named
any statement that makes any sense is a statement of experience
the propositions of logic are simply accounts of what is possible in experience
experience gives us these propositions
they come as a result of reflection on our action - on our practice
descriptions of experience i.e. 'this is red' are surface descriptions
the law of the excluded middle is an internal description
it tells us reflectively (internally) what is possible on the surface
it is a proposal for the structure of experience
experience has depth - the so called a priori indicates this
the a priori is description of experience beneath its surface
experience - human reality has an internal and external dimension
consciousness reflects this reality
the unity of the internal and external is only revealed in these dimensions
it underlies and is expressed in these dimensions
'in itself' - it is unknown
5.6. The limits of my language mean the limits of my world.
the limits of my world are the limits of human consciousness
that is the limits of my awareness
consciousness exists in the world
the concept of limit (or limitlessness) does not in fact apply to the world outside of
consciousness
consciousness imposes limits - requires limits
language is such an imposition
5.61. Logic pervades the world; the limits of the world are also its limits.
So we cannot say in logic, 'The world has this in it, and this, but not that.'
for that would appear to presuppose that we were excluding certain possibilities, and
this cannot be the case, since it would require that logic should go beyond the limits of
the world; for only in that way could it view those limits from the other side as well.
We cannot think what we cannot think; so we cannot say what we cannot say either.
(a)
the non-conscious world (that is here - the non-human world) would be just as it is
without logic
logic is just a theoretical construction of consciousness
consciousness pervades the human world - the limits of the human world are the limits
of consciousness
human consciousness is in the world - that is in the non-conscious world
consciousness is the internal dimension of this world - the non-conscious the external
dimension
we can only see what we see from the inside - there is no outside view
limits are a construction of consciousness
consciousness requires the idea of limits to function in the world
our world - as such - cannot be objectively view - that is from the outside
there is no such view - no such place to view from
all limits are rightly placed inside - all limits are internal
that is any idea of the limits of the world is a construction of consciousness
the limits of consciousness are the limits of function
logic describes these limits
logic is the description of the domain of possible function
(b)
logical knowledge is not surface empirical knowledge
it does not describe what exists n the external world
what exists in the external world exists or does not exist independently of logic
logic describes how we can think about the world
in this sense it is about the world
that is it is an empirical inquiry - but one that is internal to the empirical world
our world is two dimensional - conscious and non-conscious - internal and external
what is thought and what is thought about
for human beings there is only the experienced world
experience is unified
experience is two-dimensional -
we only know the unity through its dimensions
the internal and the external
logic defines how we can think about the outside world
that is it is a theory of unity - of the unity
logic prescribes a domain of reason for consciousness
the domain is the ground of human function
it prescribes the limits of human function within human existence
p.s.
a theory of logic is quite unnecessary really
we can't do what we can't do
and that is the essence of logic
and
we do what we do
therefore
whatever we do is logical
the activity of logic is intellectual delight
delight is its only content
it is simply a pleasure - but most exquisite
(c)
we cannot think what we cannot think
we cannot say what we cannot say
and
we cannot do what we cannot do
that's it
that is all there is to logic
logic therefore is simply the statement of the obvious
the obvious of human experience
it does not state limits
but it recognizes them
a new born child can do this
5.62. This remark provides the key to the problem, how much truth there is in
solipsism.
For what the solipsist means is quite correct; only it cannot be said, but makes itself
manifest.
The world is my world; this is manifest in the fact that the limits of language (of that
language of that language which alone I understand) means the limits of my world.
(a)
manifest to whom?
the solipsist makes himself manifest to himself?
good argument
consciousness does manifest itself
it manifests outside of itself
if there is manifestation of the self - a non-self exists
the self as experienced - is experienced
it is not made manifest in itself
consciousness manifests itself in the reality outside of itself
without a reality outside of consciousness there can be no self-consciousness
self - is defined by what it is not
that is by the non-conscious reality
so the paradox of solipsism is that without a non-self it cannot even be formulated
its garbage -
sad really - for it is clear that it is a theory designed to defend against the world
the impact of the world
it is the source of psychological denial - the philosophical basis of withdrawal
(b)
we can ask though what is the function of such an argument?
if I am right about its psychological status - the argument for withdrawal
we can ask is it just a mis-application of the '-' sign -
that is a mis-application of negation -
that is the application of negation - outside of the logical / propositional context?
also
we might suggest that solipsism is really the origin of the concept of denial
that is the idea out of which negation emerges
(c)
the world is the world
I exist in the world
'my world' is really just my existence and experience in the world
(d)
my use of language is the best we can do here
it is possible that my use of language may only be understood - by me
that is it is possible that when I speak I have a different understanding of what I say to
the understanding that those who hear my words have of my words
(any married man will know what I am talking about here)
so it may be that no one knows what anyone else is talking about
nevertheless language functions
its function is not understanding
its function is use
and use -is a public matter
I can know how something is used without having access to the understanding of the
user
that is all that matters
and that is the point of language - its utility - what it enables us to do
knowledge is really an after thought - a luxury - an irrelevance
a maybe it is and maybe it aint
at the heart of all so called knowledge is uncertainty
5.621. The world and life are one.
the unknown and life are one
5.63. I am my world. (The microcosm)
I am aware of the world
and aware of my awareness
5.631. There is no such thing as the subject that thinks or entertains ideas.
If I were to write a book called The World as I found it, I should have to include a
report of my body, and should have to say which parts are subordinate to my will, and
which were not, etc., this being a method of isolating the subject, or rather of showing
that in an important sense there is no subject; for it alone could not be mentioned in
that book.-
true The World as I found it - if this prescription was followed to the letter - only that
which is outside of the self would be mentioned
and if Wittgenstein was being very strict (and really how else can you imagine him) he
could not coherently claim ownership of such a work
and furthermore
would not be able to recognize it
Wittgenstein it seems has no concept of the inner life
he regards only what is outside of himself as real
very Platonic really - perhaps even more Platonic than Plato
he is right in this respect - there is no such thing as the subject that thinks or entertains
ideas in the world of objects - the surface world
that is correct
however it is a great mistake to think that the surface world contains all that there is
to deny consciousness - self consciousness is a self contradiction
and a failure to understand the world has an inside
5.632. The subject does not belong to the world; rather it is the limit of the world.
again Wittgenstein's lopsided view of reality - his view that the world is surface - that
there is only an externality and no internality
if he had said the self does not belong to the surface of the world he would be correct
the idea of limit is an action of consciousness - it is ideal
if the self does not belong to the world we cannot speak of it or of the idea of limit (or
limitlessness)
what is clear also is that consciousness is in the world
and this dimension I argue is not co-extensive with the objective surface of the world
consciousness exists as a point
individual consciousness' exist as points in the world
the idea of limit is a construction of consciousness necessary for it's relation to the
outside world
the external world is neither limited or limitless
it does not have ideal properties
so let's speak of dimensions of the world - and the world as such as the unknown
5.633 Where in the world is the metaphysical subject to be found?
You will say that this is exactly like the case of the eye and the visual field. But really
you do not see the eye.
And nothing in the visual field allows you to infer that it is seen by an eye.
it is in the world that the metaphysical subject is to be found
it is not to be found on the surface of the world
that is the whole point
the eye is a feature of the surface of the world
the visual field is a function of the surface of the world
the eye can see itself in reflection
a surface reflection
consciousness is the inside of the world
the internal dimension of the world
consciousness is aware of itself
as being in the world
awareness is reflective
which is to say awareness is aware of awareness
in this respect all awareness is essentially the same
your awareness - my awareness
what dististinguishes one point of awareness from another is its place in space and
time
that is all
5.6331. For the form of the visual field is surely not like this
Eye -
the argument here is that the eye is not included in the visual field
strangely enough Wittgenstein doesn't seem to understand mirrors
5.6344. This is connected with the fact that no part of our experience is at the same
time a priori.
Whatever we see could be other than it is.
Whatever we could describe at all could be other than is.
There is no a priori order of things
there is an order of things prior to experience
knowledge of this is not prior to experience
knowledge of this is experience
experience reveals the necessity of conditions prior to experience
having experienced we know experience depends on conditions
that are not experienced
these conditions - conditions of experience - are the ground of experience
the ground of experience is what is not revealed in experience
it is the unknown at the heart of every experience
the unknown that is necessary for any experience
5.64. Here it can be seen that solipsism, when its implications are followed out
strictly, coincides with pure realism. The self of solipsism shrinks to a point without
extension, and then remains the reality co-ordinated with it.
while experience is had it is also given
solipsism confuses the gift with the possession
the possession as possessed is known
the gift as given is not known
experience is only possible given consciousness
consciousness is the ground of experience
the world as given (pure realism) is only given in consciousness
that is it is the internal reflection of the external reality
the self is inside the external world
there can be no self unless there is a non-self
the external world - the world of the surface
is the non- self - the non-conscious reality
thus the self is best understood as the condition for experience
the ground of experience
it is the unrevealed (as in non-external) dimension of experience
consciousness exits in extension
it is thus intension -
that which is inside extended reality -
and thus that which is the inside of extension
the inside co-ordinates with the outside
points of consciousness reflect the world outside
the outside world reflected is reflected in a point of consciousness
the reality beyond such a reflection is unknown
5.641. Thus there really is a sense in which philosophy can talk about the self in a
non-psychological way.
What brings the self into philosophy is the fact that 'the world is my world'.
The philosophical self is not the human being, not the human body, or the human
soul, with which psychology deals, but rather the metaphysical subject, the limit of the
world - not part of it
my consciousness is the internality of my world
it is an internality (among the countless) of the world
the world that contains consciousness
the world that contains consciousnesses
consciousness only has existence in the world
