Hegel: Phenomenology of Spirit:
91.
ARGUMENT:
there appears to be no bounds to sense knowledge
sense-certainty appears to be the truest kind of knowledge for it corresponds completely with its object
this certainty the poorest of truth - in the end it amounts only to an existential
statement
consciousness' certainty here is just the 'I'
and the I in this sense certainty a pure 'This' as is the object
I this particular I is certain of this particular thing
neither I or the thing has the significance of a complex process of mediation
the 'I' does not have the significance of a manifold imagining or thinking
nor does the thing signify something that has a host of qualities
the thing is merely because it is
it is - this is the essential point of sense knowledge
pure being or simple immediacy constitutes its truth
certainty as a connection is an immediate pure connection
consciousness is a pure 'This'
the singular consciousness knows a pure 'This', or the single term
COMMENTARY:
what is given (in 'sense certainty') is prior to reflection - prior to analysis of even the
most primitive or basic kind - and is hence without description
reflection enables characterization
it is on reflection that the description of 'sense certainty' is given
you could here say, 'well what other description is possible' - this is I think what is
behind Hegel's argument
the idea being - there really is no question here at all - it is just a matter of realization -
of seeing what is before your eyes so to speak
what I say here is that 'seeing what is before your eyes' is just what reflection gives
the immediacy of the experience is the unknown
knowledge is not given
and not even given in the act of consciousness per se
it is an act of consciousness -
that is an act upon the unknown
and further we need to understand the 'immediacy' is a category of description
it is an account of - what is given
Hegel says of consciousness - consciousness is 'I' - nothing more
and the fact is - his 'nothing more' - just is no more than nothing -
and this is the problem
the consciousness is 'I' argument is a theory of consciousness - it is a description
now there is the fact of consciousness -
but it is strictly speaking an open fact -
which is to say we do not 'know' what consciousness is prior to reflection on it - on it
and its relations
my 'it' here or Hegel's 'I' are dummy terms whose function is to signify or point to an
as yet unknown - undescribed entity
even 'entity' here is just a functional term
what all this amounts to is that there is no certainty - far from it - everything in an
epistemological sense is in suspension
if by a pure 'This' Hegel is referring to consciousness as a pure unknown - OK
it also has the sense of just a logical sign
a sign that is that signifies but is without content
from a logical - and epistemological point of view - this is a good start
consciousness you might joke is left intact
