Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit:
97.
ARGUMENT:
we utter the universal in any sensuous content - i.e. the universal 'this'
we do not envisage the universal or being in general - but we utter the universal
we do not say in sense certainty what we mean to say - but language is more truthful
it is not possible to say or express in words - as a sensuous being - that we mean
COMMENTARY:
when I say 'this is red' - what 'this' is - is not defined
the statement - from a purely semantic point of view leaves 'this' as an unknown
we have no grounds to give it the status of a universal
but the point is that the statement's meaning is not just a semantic issue
in the face of such a statement - if you see what the speaker is pointing to you will understand the truth (or falsity) of the statement
outside of any context - just the bald statement as it were - the statement is virtually -
or practically - meaningless
while we may understand the words and their relationship in the statement - short of
being there or receiving some further explanation we cannot give or withhold assent
what the statement refers to 'in itself' - is unknown
the problem of meaning is the problem of definition
language is a means of giving definition
and whether or not a statement actually means what you say depends on where you
draw the line on definition
it could be argued that to explain any single event - you need to explain the totality
be that as it may in a logical sense in practice no-one does this in making statements
about the world
we know that definition has its limits
these limits are set really by the circumstances in which we operate
