6.2.08

Hegel 136

Hegel's Pheneomenology of Spirit:

136.


ARGUMENT:


the unconditioned universal is simply and solely the plurality of the diverse universals

the universal an undivided unity with this plurality

these 'matters' mutually interpenetrate but are independent

their unity directly unfolds its diversity and once again reduces itself to unity

this movement is what is called Force

one of its movements - the dispersal of the independent matters in their immediate
being is the expression of Force

but force taken as that in which they have disappeared is Force proper - Force that has
been driven back into itself from its expression

Force exists only in thought

what has been posited is the Notion of force - not its reality

in fact Force is the unconditioned universal - which is equally in its own self what it is
for another - or which contains the difference in its own self

in order then that Force may in truth be - it must be set free from thought - it must be
posited as the substance of these differences

Force exists as an exclusive One - for which the unfolding of the different matters is
another subsisting essence - and thus two distinct independent aspects are set up

these differences are superficial vanishing moments

there would be no Force if it did not exist in these opposite ways

these two moments exist independently and supersede themselves

in general it is clear that the movement is nothing else than the movement of
perceiving

thus the movement which was the destruction of contradictory notions - has objective
form and is the movement of Force

the outcome of which is the unconditioned universal as something not objective but
rather the inner being of things


COMMENTARY:


the inner being of things - if indeed things have an inner being - is consciousness

the nature of consciousness is that it is inner - that it is internality

this is the essence of consciousness and effectively nothing more can be said of it

there are no substantial issues to the question of consciousness -

consciousness is not a substance - it is a dimension - the internal dimension that is
awareness

consciousness recognizes consciousness directly - which is to say internality
recognizes internality

or dimensional entities recognize dimensional entities - perhaps it is a recognition of
type

the point is not all entities have an internal dimension -

I would put it to you that from what we can see most of reality is one-dimensional

consciousness is thus exceptional

and what this amounts to is to say much of reality is one-dimensional - simply
externality

some of reality has an internal dimension

not very neat logically - somewhat skew-whiff - nevertheless - from what we can see
that's how it is -

such an argument would not sit well with Hegel - it is clear he does not want
exceptions in his universe

he has represented the object as an argument from consciousness - and
extended this description - as a matter of logic to everything

so the world of the universal and the universals within the universal - and the
movements of these universals - the movements of difference and unity - is for Hegel
not just a construction an invention an imagination of consciousness - but rather the
objective reality of the world outside of consciousness -

the hard and pure reality is that the world outside of consciousness is unknown

Hegel has indeed resisted this conclusion with every trick of the trade - and yes his
resistance has resulted in a rather magnificent work of art - one is often reminded of a
painter of grand scale and style when reading Hegel -

nevertheless the truth is any work that begins - only begins on a blank canvas

Hegel knows his grand picture is only a picture - and he has it mind for it to be the
reality - that is pictured - and for this picture and its reality to in some sense be one

for that to happen we need something to kick start it off the page - or out of the mind

enter force -

now the universal is force - and force of course will get everything moving

this jump from concept to reality here is reminiscent of the ontological argument of
Anselem