Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit:
139.
ARGUMENT:
the interplay of the two Forces thus consists in their being determined as mutually
opposed
the soliciting Force e.g. is posited as a universal medium and the one solicited on the
other hand - as Force driven back into itself
the first Force has its determinateness only through the other and solicits only in so far
as the other solicits it to be a soliciting force - and its determinateness passes over to
the other
the solicited Force gives the other its character as a universal medium - it gives
the soliciting Force this character because this determination is essential to it -
because this is its own self
COMMENTARY:
first up we have no explanation of force here -
what we have at best is simply an account of its 'logic' - its soliciting and its being
driven back into itself - there is an attempt to present a description of force as a
dynamic
this is all verbalism
in the first place Hegel just simply introduced force as a category and then did his
thing on it
his argument equally applies to 'x' - or any number of similar terms - i.e. 'essence'
OK - let's say Hegel just does want to introduce force - and say something about it -
because it is an important concept for him -
that is he is setting up his view - and force is in there
nothing wrong with this as such
the point is though we can read these paragraphs on force and really be none the wiser
yes we have various metaphors for its nature and action - but still it has no content
Hegel's description of force is a possible description of reality
that is a particular focus or slant on the workings of consciousness and the world
the term force has for us to begin with wide enough applicability -
from the seventeenth century at least the idea of force as a universal has been part of
the common understanding -
OK - what we need from Hegel is more than just the use of this concept - for it to have
(excuse the pun) 'force' - we need a compelling reason as to why such a notion is to
have a central importance - and a compelling reason is not just common parlance
as it stand all Hegel has done here is give the unknown - a name and some
characterization
there is nothing wrong with this - it is just what we do - but for the characterization to
be of value it needs to be operable - that is it needs to do work - to issue results
as it is with Hegel all we have at this stage is an empty name
this is not to say it might not amount to something - but at the present all we are
getting from Hegel is hot air - without force
