Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit:
142.
ARGUMENT:
the first universal is the Understanding's Notion in which force is not yet for itself
the second is now Force's essence as it exhibits itself for and in itself
the first universal would be Force driven back into itself or Force as Substance
the second is the inner being of things qua inner - which is the same as the Notion of
Force qua Notion
COMMENTARY:
Hegel's method is to propose a general term i.e. 'force' - and to then argue that this
name applies to reality
granted we seek and need description of reality - without description we are simply
faced with the unknown - and while this may be a philosophically pure position - in
practice it is of no use -
language focuses and defines -
language is essentially a decision to act -
and for this to be the unknown is effectively disregarded
and to it - or onto it consciousness brings its frameworks
there is no one set of structures that can be applied here
the making of the known is a creative and ultimately baseless exercise
language is the assertion of coverage
so
indeed Hegel's method is essentially what does happen
where it falls down is that Hegel has not understood that the object of consciousness is
the unknown
and that whatever is proposed as its operational alternative - the unknown remains
untouched -
it is not transformed it is simply covered for practical purposes
therefore he is committed to holding that his argument is the truth
in philosophy this charge generally applies across the board
the best any of us can do is present a comprehensive and interesting perspective on
how the world is
what is in fact of most interest in a philosophical theory is ingenuity
what I say of my own view of things is that it's the best I have been able to come up
with so far - that it requires a lot more work - and as to its value in a public sense -
well that is finally a matter of sophistry and chicanery i.e. persuasion
but back to Hegel -
one other thing I would say here is that the idea of taking a term - and then showing or
arguing that it applies in all circumstances - that is the metaphysical argument - is
nothing from nothing
Hegel may well have used any term to have the function that 'force' has in his
argument
in the end he has simply resolved all description into one term
the result paradoxically is that the term has no content
the reason for this is that for a term to have content it must exclude
for this is what definition amounts to
you could ask well what meaning does language as whole have?
it has none
a statement has meaning relative to other statements
there is nothing that language as a whole is relative to
all the relations of language are internal
another thing to consider is the status of universals
here Hegel is speaking of the first and second universals
we must remember his universal argument was his solution to the problem of the
fleeting nature of experience - the problem of here and now
it strikes me that his multiplicity of universals simply is the same problem in different
terms - without his recognition of the problem -
what was the problem for him - now is the solution
it seems metaphysics is often just a matter of packaging
finally I want to say here that Hegel is quite confused about what is in and what is out
the 'inner being' of things is not the 'notion' of things
a notion is an idea had by a concious human being
if a thing has inner being it is a conscious thing
consciousness is internality
and the uncomfortable fact for metaphysicians is that not everything has an inner
being
non-conscious entities have only (relative to conscious entities) a surface dimension
that is they are pure externality
one's notions about things is consciousness' reflection
we make notions in order to effect action
our idea of a thing is simply a theoretical construction designed to facilitate action
the thing itself is mercifully free of our vanities
