Hegel's Phenemenology of Spirit:
160.
ARGUMENT:
from the idea of inversion - which constitutes the essential nature of one aspect of the
supersensible world - we must eliminate the idea of fixing the differences in a
different sustaining element
and this absolute Notion of the difference must be represented and understood purely
as inner difference - a repulsion of the selfsame from itself and likeness of the unlike
as an unlike
we have to think contradiction
for in the difference which is an inner difference the opposite is not merely one of two
- if it were it would simply be without being an opposite - but it is the opposite of an
opposite - or the other is immediately present in it
certainly I put the 'opposite' here - and the other of which it is the opposite there
thus the supersensible world which is the inverted world has at the same time
overarched the other world and has it within it
it is for itself the inverted world - i.e. - the inversion of itself - it is itself and its
opposite in one unity
only thus is it difference as an inner difference - or difference in its own self - or
difference as an infinity
COMMENTARY:
the internality and externality of thing are its dimensions -
which is to say the formal characteristics of its structure
now Hegel describes the relation of the sensible to the supersensible as inversion
do we say the inside of an entity is the inversion of the outside?
this is to give the relation a definite characterization
the idea is neat in a logical sense - i.e. it does preserve the unity of the entity and yet
define the difference in terms of perspective
and it seems to acknowledge the inside-ness of consciousness
and yes we could just say the inside of a thing is the outside - inverted
why I resist this characterization is that it seems to carry with it much metaphysical
baggage - i.e. the sensible world is in a state of flux - the supersensible the home of
the universal -
this preserves the inversion but it is clear that the idea of inversion is not the simple
geometrical one - it is metaphysically loaded
I think this is a mistake
I think we can give a simple and elegant characterization of mind and body that can be
stated in terms that shows we do not need to fill it up with extraneous metaphysical
issues and properties
that is we can say an entity has an inside and an outside - and we understand this just
as stated - the notion of inversion is not necessary to the idea of inside - to the idea of
the relation of inside to outside
what do we say of this relation?
that one is the opposite of the other?
'opposite' is easy - but like 'inversion' it seems to imply more than just an essential
relation
internality and externality are essential qualities of a thing
these qualities are distinct - internality cannot be changed into externality or visa versa
the space of these qualities is distinct - they exist in different spaces
so I would argue it is not just a matter of a different perspective in the same space -
which is the inversion argument
mind and matter are different dimensions regardless of perspective
furthermore perspective is a function of internality - internality is not a function of
perspective
the internality of a thing is awareness
awareness is not the inversion of its absence
the absence of awareness is its non-existence
the non-existence of a thing cannot be inverted
there is nothing to invert
