Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit:
03/03/08
Hegel: Self-consciousness
B . Self-consciousness
IV. The truth of self-certainty
166.
ARGUMENT:
in the previous modes of certainty what is true for consciousness is other than itself -
but the Notion of this truth vanishes in the experience of it - what the object was
immediately in itself - turns out to be a mode in which the object is only for another
the Notion of the object is superseded in the actual object - immediate presentation of
the object is superseded in experience - certainty gives place to truth
but now certainty is identical with its truth - for certainty is to itself its own object -
and consciousness is to itself the truth
if we give the name of 'Notion' to the movement of knowing - and the name 'object' to
knowing as a passive unity - or as the 'I' - then the object corresponds to the Notion
for the in-itself is consciousness - but equally it is that for which another (the in itself)
is - and it is for consciousness the case that the in-itself of the object - and its being for
another - are one
the 'I' is the content of the connection and the connecting itself
opposed to an other the 'I' is its own self - as the other is the 'I' itself
COMMENTARY:
it is rather that the actual object is superseded in the notion of the object - the actual
object in its immediate presentation is unknown - the notion of the object is the
characterization of the object - a characterization that enables utility - action in
relation to
there is no certainty in the initial experience - presentation is not certainty - we reflect
because we don't know - reflection is the natural - animal response to uncertainty -
truth is an argument regarding description
quite clearly in identifying the object with the 'I' - Hegel demonstrates he has no
account of the external world as external - a very confused notion of self-
consciousness (the 'I') - and no account at all of object - his object has simply become
absorbed into the subject - and given the status of 'I' -
this whole approach is utterly unworkable
the notions of 'in-itself' and 'for an other' - here have no actual content - we can't say
they belong to the subject or the object - they are without metaphysical place -
at this point you can ask quite reasonably does Hegel know what he is talking about?
he says the 'I' is the content and the connection between the in-itself and the being for
an other
the fact a thing can be regarded as in relation to or not - is all that is being stated here
such a distinction exists in order for us to have options in relation to how we are to see
an entity and thus how we are to act in relation to it
so these distinctions are purely operational - they are categories that transform the
entity from an unknown into an operation
self-consciousness - which is just the awareness of awareness - and again this is just
awareness - (self-consciousness is really just an explanation of consciousness - or visa
versa) - is not at the centre of some metaphysical space - the end points of which are
'in-itself' and 'for an other' - self-consciousness creates such categories to engage the
external world
consciousness is the internal impacting on the external - (and the opposite of course
occurs) - self-consciousness is awareness of awareness
this is just the sense of internality that a conscious / self-conscious entity has - because
its unity is expressed in two dimensions
