even if we could establish a plausible case -
for how the mind apprehends other minds
- non-inferentially
we are not necessarily any closer to a Spinozistic -
pan-mentalism
for all we can thus argue is that a mind can recognize
another mind
and yes there are characteristics that are common -
difficult as it might be to specify what they are -
and yes - such characteristics would - could form
the basis of a theory of mind
still mind is only recognized in certain manifestations
of nature
it is not universally recognized
mind has only particular appearances - in any recognizable
sense
mind it seems is a characteristic of certain beings -
but not all existents - or existence
to say this is in a way an argument for epiphenomenalism -
a slight argument
if mind recognizes itself - in other forms and -
mind is everywhere
why only the partial recognition?
could that just be - that mind in it's human form is
limited in it's range?
yes - you could go down this track - but why -
how intuitively plausible is such a direction?
by the by I don't see how Spinoza could really avoid
such a track
and the limitation argument comes to what?
well not much - as there really isn't any argument
for saying - mind could be - more than it is
evolution - yes - but that is just the never never -
reaching beyond itself
not out of the question - but a bit flaky in this context
anyway the idea - would have to be that mind exists
in other contexts - (in all contexts)
but we can only know it - in the forms of sentient
creatures
so - what I am getting at here - is that - such a
pan-psychism - (is that the right term?) - as Spinoza's -
actually depends on scepticism to have any intellectual
basis at all
