yes
the concept of concept
what are the logical characteristics of a concept -
when is a concept not a concept?
following on somewhat from Spinoza
a concept as an act of mind
and action of rather than an affect on
what is it to conceive?
I think of it as defining -
marking out
what?
a state of affairs -
my question is - can we conceive of marking out -
in thought - everything?
what about the idea of everything?
we seem to have it
the concept of God - substance - everything
what is it to conceive that which has no limit?
what I have in mind is that to define is to set limits
to mark out - to classify
so
conception is to set limits
so what of the concept that negates limits
is this truly a conception?
or is it rather to appear to conceive - but really to
deny conception?
is it the conception that denies conception?
I tend to think so
and if so -
it is a self-denying concept -
this is a little closer to what I was trying to get
at in the last post
that Spinoza's concept of substance - or for that matter
any such 'concept' - is false
it is the denial of the concept of conception
so on my analysis it is a meta argument
posing as a non-meta argument - let's say philosophical
argument
it is fundamentally wrong
logically impossible
to have a concept that denies the concept of concept
nothing is asserted
