1.8.06

Spinoza would argue

Spinoza would argue that his concept of substance -
is not just a theory about the idea of concept

he might well agree that you cannot have a concept of
'no concept' - or a concept that denies concept -

he would say this is not what he is on about

his argument? - that the idea of substance is not an idea
about the logic of concept - but rather about the nature
of reality -

that the real question is about the object of the concept -

it is the object that is limitless - not the concept -

so perhaps here for Spinoza a distinction between the
concept of substance and substance
but how does Spinoza establish the existence of the object
of the concept -

how does Spinoza establish the existence of substance?

his argument is that substance is conceived through itself -
a conception that is not dependent on any other conception

so what is its basis - and how does it come about?

my point is - in terms of Spinoza's definition of substance -

there is no object of consciousness

that which is outside of it -

Spinoza states just this

so it is a conception conceived through itself

if this - I say it is a theory about concept

and then my argument of the previous post follows

but it is true Spinoza is not just - putting a theory
of concept here

in fact I think he thinks he is not doing this at all

in this he is mistaken

he thinks he is making a substantial claim

a claim of substance

that his concept - of substance - just does - correspond to
- a non-conceptual reality

that this concept - when understood - is understood to refer
to - what it refers to -

in fact Spinoza argues that the concept itself entails
existence

so if you have a concept of limitlessness and it is well
formed - logical

what it refers to - must as a 'fact of logic' - exist

so there is a confusion here - in Spinoza between logic
and existence

logical statements do not refer to what exists -

they are statements of the relations of ideas

Spinoza comes back here and says -

yes but ideas exist -

yes but do they exist as Spinoza would have it -

as extended things do - out there - objectively -

or are they rather just the way we think about -
what is out there - objectively?