Descartes says -
'I am certain I am a thinking thing. But do I thereby know also what is required to render me thus certain of anything? In the first knowledge there is indeed nothing save the clear and distinct apprehension of what I am affirming: yet this would not suffice to render me certain of its truth, if it could ever happen that anything that I apprehend thus clearly and distinctly should yet prove false; and accordingly I would now seem able to adopt as a general rule that everything I apprehend in a genuinely clear and distinct manner is true'
this is a very poor argument
Descartes asks - what makes me certain of anything?
he then acknowledges his criterion of truth - clarity and distinctness of idea
but makes the point - that if it could happen that a clear and distinct
apprehension proved false - then clarity and distinctness 'would not suffice'
for a moment it seems as though he is distinguishing between clear
apprehension and truth - and is aware that a clear and distinct idea -
could well be false
and if so truth is another matter
he goes on to say -
'and accordingly I would now seem to be able to adopt as a general rule that
everything I apprehend in a genuinely clear and distinct manner is true'
he is saying if any clear and distinct idea turned out to be false -
then he would not regard clarity and distinctness as the criteria of truth
but as this has not happened (at least I think this is his point) then he
will continue to operate with this criteria
how could it ever happen if by definition a clear and distinct idea is true
this is a circular argument
he defines clarity and distinctness as truth
and truth as clarity and distinctness
why should we regard a clear and distinct idea as true?
(and not just as clear and distinct)
as Descartes has already acknowledged - we can have clear and distinct
hallucinations - and clear and distinct perceptions that are not true?
the fact is we have no theory of truth from Descartes
clarity and distinctness may well be desirable properties of thought
but - even if so - all we are talking about here are features of idea
construction and presentation
there is no necessary connection to the world
we could imagine a man with clear and distinct ideas - in a world that is without
clarity or distinctness
that is no correspondence
Descartes in saying 'if it could ever happen that anything I apprehended
thus...yet prove false' seems to be suggesting that there is at least the possibility that a clear and distinct idea is false
as a mater of experience - possible experience
but he goes on to suggest he has not had this experience
but the thing is - he would not be able to identify it if he did
as again - he has no criterion of truth
there is a second matter here
the assumption it seems that certainty and truth are one in the same
there is no argument from Descartes for this view
and at the very least it seems unreasonable
empirical science - of course does not operate with such a standard
such a standard would bring science to an end
actually I think it fair to say certainty has nothing to do with the growth of knowledge
certainty has nothing to do with knowledge
Descartes here is importing theological concepts - into the epistemological realm
anyway
from Descartes we have no definition of certainty - apart from - again -
the clear and distinct argument
which at best is an argument about psychological style
and it is a style that we can see would be attractive to mathematicians
and logicians perhaps craftsmen too
some artists maybe - but certainly not all
sensualists might well be repelled by the notion
be that as it may
truth hasn't come down the catwalk
