23.2.08

Hegel 156

Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit:

156.


ARGUMENT:


thus this change is not yet a change of the thing itself - but presents as pure change
because the contents of the moments remain the same

this change becomes for the Understanding the law of the inner world

the understanding thus learns it is a law of appearance itself - that differences arise
that are no differences and the self same repels itself

and differences cancel themselves - thus what is not selfsame is self attractive

thus a second law - difference which remains selfsame - this expresses that like
becomes unlike and visa versa

the second law posits the permanence of impermanence

consequently the difference exhibits itself as a difference in the thing in itself or as an absolute difference

and this difference of the thing is thus the selfsame that has repelled itself from itself
and posits an antithesis that is none


COMMENTARY:


the relation of the conscious and the non-conscious is the reality we face

thus for consciousness the object of consciousness does not appear as the thing itself

the thing itself for all intents and purposes is an abstraction - if anything
an abstraction from the appearance

so any change in the object is a change only in the appearance - the object as
appearance

the thing in itself - on a phenomenal level is irrelevant

as a reflective argument it has a function in consciousness - but this is a theoretical
function

the thing in itself cannot be known - so the issue of change does not arise

the object as an appearance is what?

well strictly we don't know

however the function of consciousness is to describe

so the object is consciousness' description

we know consciousness does not remain still

so descriptions change

in a logical sense the object of consciousness as an objective reality is the sum of
possible descriptions

and this does not presume some fixed point that all possible descriptions refer to

the point of descriptions is itself up for argument

these epistemological issues are never resolved qua epistemology

'resolution is only a decision to move or proceed in relation to a conception that provisionally stabilizes the object of consciousness

here it must be understood that issues of 'change' and 'sameness' are arguments that are
never settled qua argument

rather they are acted upon and the action is as close to resolution as is required

finally any action is - despite its apparent determinateness - an argument that can be
opened up