Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit:
157.
ARGUMENT:
through this pronciple the first supersensible world of laws - the immediate copy of
the perceived world is changed into its opposite
the law was like its differences - that which remains selfsame - now it is posited that
each of the two worlds is really opposite itself
the selfsame really repels itself from itself - and what is not the selfsame posits itself
as selfsame
here the like is unlike itself and the unlike like itself
the second supersensible world is in this way the inverted world - the inversion of the
first
for the supersensible world was only the immediate raising of the perceived into the
universal element
it had its necessary counterpart in this perceived world which still retained for itself
the principle of change and alteration
the first realm of laws lackedc that principle but obtains it in the inverted world
COMMENTARY:
to account for the relation that is consciousness in relation with the non-conscious -
to account that is for the world that appears - a world that presents but is unknown -
it is necessary to abstract from the phenomenal - the world of appearance - to its relata
- consciousness - and its object
this is done quite instinctively - in fact it generally takes argument for us to see that
what we have -
what we are presented with is the unity -
that is to say appearance here is the unity of the conscious and non-conscious
and therefore these categories - conscious and non-conscious - are steps back from the
unity
the fact is though - and this is reality - we have no way of comprehending or dealing
with the unity - unless these steps are taken
so in practice - the analytical position is the working position - what we call the real
position -
and this is the division of the unity - into consciousness and non-consciousness -
this is the working posit - or the position of human beings
what I am arguing here is that we do not begin with consciousness as Descartes
argued
but rather that we begin with the unknown as the given reality that is appearance -
and that this appearance can only be analyzed if we see it in terms of the conscious
and non-conscious
it is in so doing that we apprehend the reality of a dimensional existence -
we see - we recognize consciousness as the internal dimension and - the non-
conscious as that which is external
so the reality of consciousness in the world - I'm suggesting is the actual state of
affairs - but it is also an analytical response to the unknown unity
consciousness recognizes itself - and its object - in response to the unknown
the unknown is where we begin
I hasten to add - the unknown is also where we end - but in the process we make a
world - which is to say we give the unknown a working character - many characters
the greatness of Hegel's work is in the fact that he doesn't flinch on the attempt to
give a comprehensive account of reality - he takes it on
and at the basis of this quite heroic endeavour is the assumption that we can know
I don't think he ever seriously questions this assumption
it strikes me that he attempts to begin in the midst of it all - that he has in mind the
relation of consciousness and the non-conscious as his central focus
for Hegel you might say it is then something of a juggling act - he has the two balls in
his hands
and what he argues for - what his juggling results in is the universal
the way I see it we begin with the unity and separate out to the categories of conscious
and non-conscious
my unity though it is 'appearance' - is in an epistemological sense - the unknown
Hegel's unity - the universal - is he thinks the unity of all opposites - the unity that is
knowledge and substance
my argument here is just that his universal is really no more than the unknown -
I am quite happy to accept that beyond appearance - and I mean this in the broadest
sense - is not what does not appear - but what is unknown
Hegel in my terms wants to make the unknown - substantial - a substance - the
universal substance
even if we were to begin with such a view - as Spinoza does - still the question - can
we even say of this (universal) that it is a substance?
to my mind - the granting of substance - though it may seem rather harmless is
nevertheless - without rational basis
by all means let the imagination run wild
Hegel's theory of inversion here - that what is perceived becomes its opposite in
conception is really his attempt to give some logical justification for his metaphysics
as a solution to his account of immediate perception
he can say here the world of conception is the real world - just inverted
if this is so - it is more than just a way of seeing things - Hegel wants to say it is in
fact a truer reality -
OK - but you can always ask - why?
if one is the inversion of the other - what is the essential difference - surely just a
matter of how it is seen?
and if indeed you can see the world in one of two ways - why go with the second - or
why the first?
also you can ask what grounds do we have for this inversion?
that is why ditch the standard view that consciousness is not an inversion of the non-conscious world - or visa versa?
on what grounds do we base this idea of the reversal of position of the internal and external positions?
in is in - out is out - the relationship is essentially logical
you could say here - Hegel has solved nothing - that he has tried to create the opposite
to his theory of perception - by just inverting it - and is then presenting this as the
solution
logically neat - but where is the world in all this?
I have deeper concerns with his account here
as I see it the world of change and alteration is a conceptual world
what we perceive immediately is the unknown - the undefined - the undescribed
reflective consciousness gives this world character - and yes you can define it in terms
of selfsameness and its opposite -
and you can theorize further and argue to something like the opposite of this - Hegel's
universal
all this is well and good - but be clear what you are doing at every stage is theorizing
the unknown
