P.XXIII. The mind does not know itself except in so far as it perceives the idea of the
affections of the body.
the ideas of the affections of the body - the ideas of the states of the body
if the mind is idea - what we have here is the argument that the mind perceives the
mind
the physical states of the body are also ideas
Spinoza thinks the mind perceives - both the affections - and the ideas
the perception of the affection is a perception of what?
presumably it is an awareness - but an awareness of what?
- an awareness of the body or of a state of the body -
and is this awareness not an idea?
how does the perception of the affectation differ from the perception of the idea of the
affectation
the idea of the affectation we can say is the thought of it
is this to suggest that the experience of it is something different to the thought of it
you could say one presupposes the other - the idea follows the experience of it
the experience though is an awareness - and in that sense an idea
so the idea of the awareness is the idea of what - the idea -
now the idea of the idea - if that is possible - has no content
so - the affection is irrelevant
so can Spinoza distinguish the perception of affections of the body and the perception
of the ideas of the body?
my argument is the states of the body are not known outside of consciousness
awareness makes an unknown known - and we may not know how this happens but it
happens - we can on the basis of awareness deal with what has occurred
so we have in this case the affections of the body as unknown - and the affections as
known -
when known we can say we then have an idea of the state of the body
the idea was not what was perceived - the idea is the result
OK
the mind does not know itself except in so far as it perceives the ideas of the
affections of the body
so can the result - as I have represented it - be perceived?
we can be aware and aware of our awareness
we can focus on an idea - hold an idea - and make it the subject of further thinking
would you call this perceiving ideas?
it is being aware of ideas - perception as I understand it is the focus outside of ideas
the focus outside of mind
so I wouldn't use the term 'perceiving' here
it seems to me that P.XXIII. amounts to saying that the mind's knowledge of itself is
knowledge of the body
what knowledge we have of the mind comes off the body
the mind's knowledge of itself -
it's a question what you want to include here
but I would say the fact of awareness is the mind's knowledge of itself
awareness includes itself
NB.
what is it for the mind to hold anything as object - be that an affection of the body or
an idea?
it is to say the mind is aware of -
the object is represented in the mind
consciousness is thus representation
and so consciousness is thus that which enables representation
and this representation?
it is the showing or the revelation of
that which is outside of mind is reflected in mind
and so consciousness and its object -
a relation -
the relation that is appearance
so this reflection -
of object to subject
what I am saying is that appearance only occurs because of consciousness
so consciousness enables appearance
enables the world to appear
as I argue consciousness is an internal dimension of reality
it is a dimension - that reveals the external -
the world has this feature of revelation
it is nature - the world seeing itself
consciousness enables the seeing
it is not a feature of the external world - it is an internal attribute - the internal
attribute
it is in what you might call meta-evolutionary terms the evolution of internality
with the emergence of internality we have life - life is the internal / extetrnal relation - it is what results
this emergence of internality - is in a logical sense the emergence of relation
prior to such an emergence - it makes no sense to speak of anything being related to
anything else
the fact of consciousness is the fact of relativity
in this sense - though the mind is not an external feature
it is nevertheless a natural fact
a fact of nature
and it is clear that appearance - the appearance of the world is predicated on the fact of
consciousness
therefore any account of the nature of the world - any science of nature
must reflect this fact
it is the fact that in any seeing there is a seer that is not seen
so any comprehensive understanding of the world must take into account this unseen
seer
this unseen seer is consciousness
and just because it is unseen - it remains in any scientific description
in any scientific theory - the invisible elephant in the room
the unknown that is at the heart of all knowledge
it is the set that is a member of itself
it is at least this
and for this reason it is the strangest of things
