an attribute is a perceived essence of substance
how do we distinguish attributes?
thought is an attribute of God (P.1) - extension is an attribute of God (P.2)
as I have argued Spinoza's argument for the nature of attributes presupposes mind
that is his argument for attributes presupposes one of the attributes
you could well argue from this that the idea of attributes crashes - given this
circularity
and with that of course the idea of substance - at least in the terms that Spinoza puts it
so we are in the position where mind perceives itself - as an attribute -
in what sense can we then say the mind percieves - the body?
in what sense can the body or extension - be anything other than an aspect of mind?
if there is no answer to this question we are condemned to idealism and the argument
stops
what I think Spinoza missed is that mind in perceiving itself percieves itself as
internal
as inside extension
certainly the mind does not see itself as outside - as a feature of the extented world
so mind is seen as an internal form
the fact of this is important
for the conception of internality can only be maintained given externality
the internal only has any sense given its logical opposite - the external
and this logic is not contraversial -
our natural conception is that the mind is internal and that the external world is not
mind - whatever else it is
and what we describe it as - is matter - the physical world
this distinction of mind and matter is based firstly on the truth of self-consciousness
consciousness perceiving / conceiving itself
this conception of mind places mind inside the physical world
if so then the distinction between attributes that Spinoza needs to establish is a
distinction between internal and external attributes
the internal / external distinction gives the idea of attributes in this context some body
internality - in its self-awareness - recognizes its opposite - the external
the distinction I would say is finally based on logic
so indeed what we have is a conception - and the idea of its opposite
do we leave the internal in putting the external?
yes if we see this as a matter of logic - for the opposite of internality on this argument
- is the external - and this is to say that as a matter of logic the external by its nature
cannot be internal
that which the mind posits as being outside of itself cannot be itself
there is no sign in Spinoza of the internal / external argument
mind and matter are attributes - on his view this is enough
it is that reality has two percieved essences mind and extension - this is where he
begins
it is a clear starting point - but again this is all it is - there is no cogent argument as
to what the mind perceives as the difference between the attributes
if the argument is not about substance - but rather perception - intellectual perception -
we can rightly ask what is intellectually apprehended in the perception of essences
in D. II. we have -
'I say that to the essence of anything pertains that, which being given, the thing is
necessarily posited, and being taken away, the thing is necessarily taken; or, in other
words, that without which the thing can neither be nor be conceived, and in its turn
cannot be nor concieved without the thing'
as a definition of essence this is OK - but this 'thing' - that is essence - is left
undefined
now you can be mystical here or simply accept the fact that the logic of this argument
points to - results in skepticism
that the essence - if such exists or makes sense is unknown
these are the only two options open to Spinoza
and the first collapses into the second - so skepticism is unavoidable
so apprehending essences does not help us in identifying or distinguishing mind and
matter
by the way substance on this view is nothing more than the unknown writ large
how though do we approach the mind / matter issue if intellectual perception of
essences doesn't work?
my argument is a non-substance argument - a non-substantial argument
it is that mind and matter are dimensions of a single unknown reality
and as such mind and matter are in any essential sense - unknown
what we have though is the logic of internality and externality
it is to use a classical distinction - an argument of form - not substance
mind or consciousness is internality - matter or the physical world is externality
this is to describe reality in terms of its dimenssions - internal / external
and I should point out here that it doesn't follow from this that all reality is two dimensional
it is clear that two dimensional reality is in a quantitative sense - exceptional
as to why this is the case - is not the issue - it is simply how the matter stands
Spinoza does attempt to define mind in terms of action
he distinguishes active and passive modes of being -
and determines the idea as a conception and a conception as active as distinct from
passive in nature
we can ask though - how is the action of mind on Spinozas's view different in any way
to the action of the body - or of extension?
if action is the essence of conception is it also the essence of the non-conceptual?
it is clear that the idea of action is more of a unifying than distinguishing notion
an action is an action
and yes we can place it differently - we can refer to internal action and external action
the nature of the action as action is not distinguishable - only the place or the
dimension of the action
in proposition 1. of the second part of the Ethics - Spinoza puts that thought is an
attribute of God - or God is a thinking thing
the idea of the idea - as a conception as an action is essentially the same argument for
the nature of man - A.II. - man thinks
man thinks - thought is an attribute of God
presumably we can say therefore God thinks
how then is the idea of God or substance to be distinguished from that of man?
on the basis of thought - there is no distinction
a thinking thing conceives be it man or God
the action of thought does not distinguish man and God
as we have seen thought is a perceived essence of substance - or God
but mind must be presumed for this argument to go forth
therefore mind perceives itself as an essence of God
which means God is a conception of the mind's conception of itself
it is a secoindary or defining conception
the mind perceives itself - and this perception is a perception of the unknown
that is the mind perceives itself as unknown
this state of affairs cannot be left to stand
the world we live in - we operate in is a world of action -
the mind needs to characterize in order to create the pretense of knowlege - a pretense
necessary for rational - that is effective action
Spinoza's characterization is God
in general you can say - well anything will do here - so long as action is made possible
why not God?
the point is 'God' as put by Spinoza is a useless conception -
and the reason for this is that it distinguishes nothing
in fact you have to say right at the get go - it is not a valid concept
just simply becasuse it has no limits - and therefore no content
what Spinoza has done is what I think the ancient Jewish prophets did - give the
unknown a name
