Concerning the nature and origin of the mind
(Ethics: second part)
D.III. idea - a conception of the mind
conception an action of the mind
A. II. - man thinks
A. III. - modes of thinking - such as love or desire - or any other name by which the
emotions of the mind may be designated - are not granted unless an idea in the same
individual is granted of the thing loved desired etc.
a mode is determined by an idea -
for a mode to exist - the idea must be in the individual who i.e. loves or desires
the idea is thus the necessary condition of the mode
A.V. we only perceive or feel bodies or modes of thinking
so it seems on this view ideas are not perceived or felt - what is perceived or felt are
(bodies and) modes of thinking
the idea determines the mode - but the idea is not felt or perceived
so if it is not felt or perceived - what is the idea?
it can only be an explanation of that which is felt or perceived - in this case the mode
of thinking
so the idea - for Spinoza is really an argument about the basis of the ground of modes
of thought - or simply thought
this doesn't sound too bad except that we have no idea on this view what an idea is
except that it is necessary to a mode - and this tells us literally nothing
we are no better informed about the nature of thinking through the introduction of
'idea' than we were before it was introduced
it is in this sense an empty concept
a mode (E. I. D.V) is that which is in something through which it can be understood
so a mode of thought is that which is in thought through which it can be understood -
it is thus a defining of thought - a characterization of thought - i.e. as love or as desire
etc.
first up can we define thought? - we speak of ways of thinking yes - but what is this?
isn't it just that we conceptualize behaviour and categorize it in an ideal fashion - i.e.
in terms of 'thought' - rather than in terms of action?
that is it presents action in a logical format - an ideational format
and in this sense it is really just to internalize the external - or present it in an internal
format -
so we conceptualize - and then refer to this conceptualization as 'thought' - that is give
it an object-like rendering
what I am saying here is that we make thought out of our conceptualizations - in a
crude sense we make a name -
and you might say - alright - something is going on in conceptualization that is different
to externally observable behaviour - so why not call it 'thought' or thinking etc.?
OK - so what is happening here is that in conceptualizing we define conceptualizing -
and out of this comes such notions as thought
but it is clear that the action of so defining occurs because we need to define
what we are presented with in conceptualizing without this definition of
conceptualizing is quite simply unknown
the act of defining gives us a basis on which to operate in a ideal or ideational form
so what we have really with this argument from Spinoza is just the adoption of the
conclusions of such a process
Spinoza begins at the end -
he does not seem to see that outside of the action of thought - there is no thought
thought is its act
and as such in the first instance - that is in its act - it is unknown
the act of thinking about thought - that is reflective thinking - is the act of
characterization
this action of characterization though is just the necessary response to the unknown
necessary in the sense of enabling action
and this is purely a contingent necessity
so all that comes from this has strictly speaking only ephemeral status - it just enables us
to get going - to act
therefore - any characterization of conceptualization - is as valid as any other
logic is just this possibility
in D.III. Spinoza says :
'By idea I understand a conception of the mind which the mind forms because it is a
thinking thing.
Explanation. I use the word conception rather than perception because the name
perception seems to indicate that the mind is passive in its relation to the object. But
the word conception seems to express the action of the mind.'
an idea is a conception - a conception an action of a thinking thing
can we say therefore the mind is the act of conception?
yes I think so - but it leaves unanswered the question - what is conception?
Spinoza will say the action of the mind
but this is a circular argument - it doesn't help -
what is the mind for Spinoza?
the answer he gives is in Proposition 1. -
'Thought is an attribute of God or God is a thinking thing'
and for attribute we must go back to E.I.D.4. -
'By attribute, I understand that which the intellect perceives of substance, as if
constituting its essence.'
the problem here is that in order to define attribute we have to presuppose mind - and
yet the very reason we looked to the question of attribute was to understand or define
mind
so it comes out like this - an attribute is a perceived essence of substance -
that is simply a description of the essence of substance by the mind
and here is the kicker -
one of the descriptions of the essence of substance (by the mind) is thought
and thought we know is an action of the mind
so - the mind conceives itself as an attribute of substance
so we have here a conception of mind by mind - as what?
the obvious answer here would be mind
in fact I wonder how this could be avoided
if the mind conceives itself as an attribute and an attribute is a conception of the mind
all you can say is the mind primarily conceives itself -
and therefore the idea of substance - or the idea of an attribute of substance - has to be
a further or secondary description that the mind gives itself
on this view substance or God is a conception of mind - and a description of mind
at this point we are clearly very tightly locked into Idealism
but we can take this a little further by asking - when mind conceives itself - what is it
conceiving?
we have already been told that conception is an action -
and in a straightforward sense this sounds good -
but now we are dealing with the idea of the mind conceiving itself
and we have to ask can the idea of conception as action hold up in this context?
that is can we say an act acts on an act - and the result is the mind conceiving itself?
the issue is really what is called self-consciousness
the idea that the mind conceives or is aware of itself
is this awareness an action?
yes - we might say
but will we here also say it is action on action
or is it rather that awareness is a unique kind of action?
if so - what can we say here?
we must remember that any thing we say here is an act of awareness itself
- which makes me think that awareness is just a phenomena that cannot be accounted
for
that it is essentially and necessarily - unknown
and that this is its defining characteristic
in any case Spinoza's notions of attribute and substance - cannot be used to explain his
idea of mind
for it is his very idea of mind out of which these notions take life
and I think this is pretty clear and uncontraversial - just from his definitions
strictly speaking - Spinoza - you could well argue leaves mind undefined -
and that even his minimal description of mind as the action of thought - tells us
nothing really
the question is - is this a good result or not?
from my point of view it is good -
but I don't think this is the conclusion Spinoza wanted to achieve or believed he had
achieved
