my central question for Spinoza in relation to his account of the nature of mind is to
do with self-consciousness - what account does Spinoza give of self-consciousness?
to date his account of mind seems to simply be the act of conception -
that is the idea - and he defines it as mind
we can ask what is presupposed by idea - that is what is the ground for idea?
is there not in some sense a 'mind' behind the idea?
Spinoza defines mind initially as an attribute of substance - so it seems to have some
kind of substantial heritage -
that is it is not just an act - and as we have seen above his idea of the idea is that it is
active
the substance idea is that thought is an attribute of God or existence - and that
individual thoughts or thoughts of individuals are simply expressions of this attribute
God is infinite therefore the mind of God is the infinity of thought
perhaps too this means there is ultimately one idea and that idea is the idea of the
material world
but in so far as God is infinite - the idea is expressed infinitely
OK - the key point though is that for Spinoza mind is idea - the action of thought
what I find fascinating here is that on such a theory we can view mind as without
substance
that is there is just the act of thinking -
and there is nothing behind it - except the act of thinking
I don't think Spinoza sees it like this - but I do think his account can be legitimately
interpreted this way
especially when you understand - and this is definitely not Spinoza's understanding -
that his theory of substance fails - that what you really have - where he thinks there is
'substance' - is the unknown
the action of thought - of ideas - conceptions - in the unknown
rather elegant -
still there are questions -
what is this action - in what sense is it different from - distinguishable from external -
observable action?
I don't think Spinoza has an answer to this
he begins with the claim that thought is an attribute of substance - and proceeds as if
everything is now in place
that is the first premise is assumed
but the truth of it is we do not have a theory of mind from Spinoza
what we have is a juggling of terms - mind - thought - idea - conception etc.
I don't think Spinoza would have ever doubted the existence of mind
or for that matter anything -
in his own way he was very positive little fellow
if however we were to ask Spinoza - well what is this thing - the idea - or thought - or
mind - he would have to reflect
and what is this - reflection
what is it to reflect on the mind - what is happening when this occurs?
and this 'action' - is what we term 'self-consciousness'
mind reflecting on mind
what is the logic of this -
how can it be possible -
surely the object of mind is that which is outside of mind
how does mind - 'hold itself' as object?
can this actually happen - or is a mistaken analysis?
self-consciousness is not in doubt here - it is just how to explain it
the really complicating factor is that any explanation - any explanation at all - will be
an action of self-consciousness
self-consciousness - explaining self-consciousness
it's a bit like when the Victorian police had the job of policing themselves - you have
to wonder
it just occurred to me - the mind as an essentially corrupt entity -
perhaps some modern day post-deconstructionalist-nihilists might go for this
might make their day - put some hope into the nothingness
anyway enough with the laughs
proposition XXI might be a good place to get serious -
'P.XXI. This idea of the mind is united to the mind in the same way as the mind itself
is united to the body.
Demonstration. We have shown that the mind is united to the body because the body
is the object of the mind (Propositions XII and XIII, part II); therefore, by the same
reasoning, the idea of the mind must be united with its object, the mind itself, in the
same way as the mind itself is united to the body. Q.E.D.
Scholium. This proposition is to be understood much more clearly from what has been
said in the Scholium to Proposition VII, part II, for we have shown there that the idea
of the body and the body, that is to say (Proposition XIII, part II) the mind and the
body, are one in the same individual, which at one time is considered under the
attribute of thought, and another under the attribute of extension: the idea of the
mind, therefore and the mind itself are one and the same thing, which is considered
under one and the same attribute, that of thought. For, indeed, the idea of the mind,
that is to say, the idea of the idea, is nothing but the form of the idea in so far as it is
considered as a mode of thought and without relation to the object, just as a person
who knows anything, by the very fact that knows that he knows, and knows that he
knows that he knows, and so on ad infinitum. But more on this subject afterwards.'
PXXI. - on this view the mind is or can be the object of the mind in the same way as
the body is the mind's object
there is definitely an in here for the materialist
for if the body is the object of the mind and the object is material (extension) - then if
the mind can have the mind as object - the mind itself must be material
on the other hand - it might be argued there is an obvious problem here with the
notion of object -
what is it - is it body or is it mind
how could it be both - unless both are something else
the argument could well be that Spinoza's theory of mind collapses here
and it collapses because he cannot give a cogent account of self-consciousness
he can only speak of mind as a one dimensional thing
when it comes to explaining reflection - the idea of the mind somehow holding itself
as object
his notion of object is not up to it - it buckles under the weight - or you could say it
doesn't know whether its Arthur or Martha
OK - what can we do here?
the object as metaphysically stateless -
that is the object as being neither body or soul
as just what - a category -
but a category of what?
this is the question -
on such a view you would have to say - well we don't know -
we don't know what the object of the mind is
and it is really just a look over your shoulder to realize the mind has disappeared too
so what else can we do?
Spinoza's theory of mind has by and large hinged on the concept of idea
and as he presents it - this is where object comes in
the object of the idea is something other than the idea - it is outside the idea
but the idea is what we mean by 'mind'
his problem comes straight up - when he has to explain how an idea can have an idea
as an object
you can ask well such an idea is an idea of what - what is the content of this idea -
or is this just an idea - a special kind that has no content?
that is has no reference - outside itself?
if so what does it refer to?
in the scholium Spinoza says - 'For indeed, the idea of the mind, that is to say the idea
of the idea, is nothing but the form of the idea in so far as it is considered as a mode of
thought and without relation to the object........'
so at least it is clear that - the idea of the mind is the form of the idea - and it is
considered without relation to the object
this doesn't deal with this issue - even though it is quite an ingenious attempt
what this amounts to is that the idea can hold the form of the idea as its object -
in the sense of that which it is considering
so the notion here is 'form of the idea'
neat - but what is this 'form of the idea'?
the idea without content -
what other option is there?
the idea of the idea -
this is as I said a very impressive move on Spinoza's part
what is an idea - outside if its content
the form of the idea - OK
in what sense then can this be the object of an idea?
the idea holds the form of the idea as object
the idea holds its form as object
this holding - this action presupposes the idea or mind is self aware
that it can hold itself as object
that it knows itself - as form
so the holding of itself as form can only occur if we have self consciousness -
Spinoza argues it holds itself as form
OK - but there seems to be no question in his mind that the idea can hold itself -
it is just a question of - as what?
his answer is 'as form'
but he has not explained how the mind or the idea can hold itself - never mind as
what
that is the form argument presupposes self-consciousness - it doesn't explain or
account for it
Spinoza's argument of the idea of the idea is an account that presumes self-
consciousness -
so at the heart of Spinoza's theory of mind is an unexplained - and it is an unexplained
- crucial
the nature of self consciousness
if you cannot explain self-consciousness - you have no theory of mind
it seems clear to me that Spinoza never grappled with self-consciousness
he basically wanted thought to be of the same kind of thing as extension
self-consciousness destroys the symmetry
he recognizes it - and gives it a description - the description of form
but the description clever as it is doesn't really work
if you say mind is idea - and notion of idea makes sense only in terms of it having an
object and an object that is outside of itself
the idea cannot be outside itself - even if you want to call it form
so I think the approach of equating mind with idea does not prove very fruitful in the
problem of self-consciousness
certainly it hasn't helped Spinoza
of course this does presume that Spinoza is finally explaining reality - or attempting to
perhaps not
perhaps what we have form Spinoza is a description of what is
his 'argument' on self-consciousness is '...just as a person who knows anything, by the
very fact that he knows, and knows that he knows that he knows, and so on ad
infinitum....'
it is clear that what precedes this not an argument about the origin and nature of self-
consciousness - it is a description - a description in terms of ideas of ideas
Spinoza is not troubled by self-consciousness - he just wants to include it into his system
of thought - to find a place for it
