as a noun - an attribute is a reification of a defining
characteristic (a perceived distinction) of a thing
('thing' here - 'a non-described entity') - and all in
all rather Platonic
is the fact that different objects (things) can be picked
out by the same description (attribute) a problem? the red
coat - the red apple - are we in using 'red' here -
committed to 'redness' in some sense - or less dramatically
to similarity - in this case a similarity of colour? -
(and 'colour' here a description of a visual field)
what is such a similarity but a fact of observation
(a fact of the world - specifically a relation between
a certain organism and it's field of stimulus) - so do
we really need to think in terms of attributes or properties
as in any sense distinct from their bearers - isn't it really
just a relation - not of sameness (I would argue there is
no such thing) - but again of likeness - a looser and indeed
a coherent concept
do we need to define attribute - beyond this -
as 'family resemblance' - to use a Wittgensteinian concept?
metaphysically speaking things are connected
we perceive similarities and differences
essence - what makes x - x and -y - can be tracked
down within limitations - we can give increasingly
approximate descriptions of x such that x is x and -y -
but all this will finally come down to making certain
philosophical / methodological decisions about how to
regard x and its descriptions
all finally (in terms of essence) arbitrary but -
nevertheless not without point or significance
individuation therefore is finally a decision -
and the journey to definition which is never complete -
prompted originally by veridical perception - another
fact of the world - and one that does not bear too much
scrutiny
seriously though - if I state - 'this apple is red' -
what I am doing is pointing and expressing
because of the way the world is structured - in this case -
a conscious observer in a given situation - we call such
an expression - a report of an observation
another observer will give assent to this statement if his
observation confirms my observation
the statement refers to the apple
now what the apple is - apart from the term 'apple' -
attached if you will to it - is another question -
as is the status of the observation and the attachment
various possibilities present - what we are talking
about here is explanation
we can therefore say that the statement and the terms
of the statement - 'this apple is red' - are at the time
of the statement - prior to analysis - explanation -
undefined
if so - it means - I can make such a statement -
and you can assent to it - but what is
known here - is not stated - not explicated
27.9.05
26.9.05
Quine: speaking of objects
how about this -
to assert x exists is to acknowledge x
isn't it just this
what x is - what the acknowledgment amounts to
perhaps - how we describe x and its acknowledgment -
is another matter
strictly speaking all bets are off - or can be
in section III of his essay Quine says:
'Now if objective reference is so inaccessible to
observation, who is to say on empirical grounds that
belief in objects of one or another description is
right or wrong? How can there ever be empirical
evidence against empirical statements?.....Grant that
a knowledge of the appropriate stimulatory conditions
of a sentence does not settle how to construe the
sentence in terms of objects. Still it does tend to
settle what is to count as empirical for or against
the truth of the sentence........by arbitrary
projection in the case of the heathen or as a matter
of course in our own, therefore what has already
been counting as empirical evidence for or against
the truth of the sentence comes to count as empirical
evidence for or against the existence of objects.'
a big jump here - or are we just switching horses
mid-race?
the truth of the sentence is the truth of what?
nothing has been resolved here
we can't be sure what the sentence refers to -
or what its assertion signifies -
so its truth is really out of the question at
this stage -
sameness of meaning (object-ontology or not) is assumed -
isn't it - under certain conditions - and of course
without empirical evidence?
its assumption - rather necessary - for getting on with it
perhaps we are dealing here - in human communication
with gross collective stupidity - that works?
in general here I think Quine is confusing theoretical
with non-theoretical categories
granted when I say 'there's a rabbit' - the term 'rabbit'
is an object term
but what does this mean?
isn't it that on reflection we describe such terms as
objective - and this is to classify - theoretically -
a particular term
pre such classification - such terms i.e. - 'rabbit' -
are without classification - hence non-theoretical
so really when Quine asks - is the native referring to
(what we understand as) 'rabbit' - he is asking - does
the native have such a meta conceptual scheme?
it is not about the happening - of the appearance of
the rabbit - or the utterance of the native -
isn't it to point to the fact? - much here is assumed -
even more unknown
nevertheless we manage - or at least move on
to assert x exists is to acknowledge x
isn't it just this
what x is - what the acknowledgment amounts to
perhaps - how we describe x and its acknowledgment -
is another matter
strictly speaking all bets are off - or can be
in section III of his essay Quine says:
'Now if objective reference is so inaccessible to
observation, who is to say on empirical grounds that
belief in objects of one or another description is
right or wrong? How can there ever be empirical
evidence against empirical statements?.....Grant that
a knowledge of the appropriate stimulatory conditions
of a sentence does not settle how to construe the
sentence in terms of objects. Still it does tend to
settle what is to count as empirical for or against
the truth of the sentence........by arbitrary
projection in the case of the heathen or as a matter
of course in our own, therefore what has already
been counting as empirical evidence for or against
the truth of the sentence comes to count as empirical
evidence for or against the existence of objects.'
a big jump here - or are we just switching horses
mid-race?
the truth of the sentence is the truth of what?
nothing has been resolved here
we can't be sure what the sentence refers to -
or what its assertion signifies -
so its truth is really out of the question at
this stage -
sameness of meaning (object-ontology or not) is assumed -
isn't it - under certain conditions - and of course
without empirical evidence?
its assumption - rather necessary - for getting on with it
perhaps we are dealing here - in human communication
with gross collective stupidity - that works?
in general here I think Quine is confusing theoretical
with non-theoretical categories
granted when I say 'there's a rabbit' - the term 'rabbit'
is an object term
but what does this mean?
isn't it that on reflection we describe such terms as
objective - and this is to classify - theoretically -
a particular term
pre such classification - such terms i.e. - 'rabbit' -
are without classification - hence non-theoretical
so really when Quine asks - is the native referring to
(what we understand as) 'rabbit' - he is asking - does
the native have such a meta conceptual scheme?
it is not about the happening - of the appearance of
the rabbit - or the utterance of the native -
isn't it to point to the fact? - much here is assumed -
even more unknown
nevertheless we manage - or at least move on
Santayana VII
nothing given exists
Santayana begins here with the argument that scepticism
is the doubting or denying ofthe existence of any object
everything he says turns on the meaning of existence
and he says to say something exists is to designate
such being as is in flux - determined by external
relations - and jostled by irrelevant events
further - it is only a name - a pointing out -
as if by gesture - what the word designates
in habits of speech
the object itself is indefinable but may be described
more particularly - by using other indicatives and
indefinable name
the whole realm of being might be described more
fully in physics and psychology
OK
the sceptic doubts
why is this in general?
can we say experience presents substantially -
but falls away to the insubstantial?
so - doubt from existential and epistemological
disappointment -
this is not a prelude to an argument for angst -
it strikes me as rather an argument about realism
in general a sceptic is a realist
and what I am trying to get to here is that it is
questionable to tie scepticism so closely to existence
such an argument - to doubt existence - as I think
Santayana is hinting at - is really the result of an
unfortunate reductio ad absurdum - i.e. - it can be
said if you take the sceptical view to its logical
(or a logical) conclusion you can end up doubting
existence - Descartes is really responsible for
these excesses
but if the sceptic is a realist is it existence
that is doubted?
I don't think so -
scepticism - is really about our explanations of -
what exists
a thorough going sceptic will take the view that
any descriptions of any thing - should
be - held in doubt
that is to say at the level of explanation -
one suspends judgement
the reality of living defeats such intellectual
purity at every turn - nevertheless there is
place and reason for the reflection that leads
to such a view
and such an outlook may well prove very useful
in the twists and turns of living - so it is not
without practical import
now we may conclude as a consequence of such an
outlook that - there is no definite description
of that which exists - and by implication say that
existence is - in terms of such - unknown
this though is a far cry from being a nihilist -
(if one can actually exist!)
for what is being doubted is not existence or
existents but comprehensive or final description
Santayana goes on to argue against the idea that
immediate experience is what we can depend on -
the data - of the senses
and I think he's right to question this view
but again I wonder about his argument - he seems
to think that such a view (sense data) is a view
about what exists
and my point is the same - the sense data argument
is an argument about explanation
that is the sense data theory is an explanation
of 'experience' - it is not - experience
- it is a theoretical reduction of experience
he goes on to suggest that we should confine our
use of the term 'existence' to the facts and events
of physical science - and see our experiences as
just stepping stones to such
OK
there is a lot of straight forward common sense here
if you want to know i.e. - about what caused what -
no sense in turning to a magical explanation
(different of course if you are a writer of magical
fiction and you are writing a story)
the world view of physical science will give you the
tools to sort it out
but if on the other hand you are wondering about
what such a world view is founded on
that is you are looking for an explanation of the
explanation - do not be surprised if it
is not as straightforward or as precise as A caused B
so you may come to the view that for certain practical
purposes it works to proceed with scientific explanation -
and you may i.e. - end up regarding the basic principles
of physics as being essentially arbitrary - and finally
perhaps not that much different to i.e. - 'the laws of
magic' (if we can speak of such)
the facts are never in doubt - only our descriptions
Santayana begins here with the argument that scepticism
is the doubting or denying ofthe existence of any object
everything he says turns on the meaning of existence
and he says to say something exists is to designate
such being as is in flux - determined by external
relations - and jostled by irrelevant events
further - it is only a name - a pointing out -
as if by gesture - what the word designates
in habits of speech
the object itself is indefinable but may be described
more particularly - by using other indicatives and
indefinable name
the whole realm of being might be described more
fully in physics and psychology
OK
the sceptic doubts
why is this in general?
can we say experience presents substantially -
but falls away to the insubstantial?
so - doubt from existential and epistemological
disappointment -
this is not a prelude to an argument for angst -
it strikes me as rather an argument about realism
in general a sceptic is a realist
and what I am trying to get to here is that it is
questionable to tie scepticism so closely to existence
such an argument - to doubt existence - as I think
Santayana is hinting at - is really the result of an
unfortunate reductio ad absurdum - i.e. - it can be
said if you take the sceptical view to its logical
(or a logical) conclusion you can end up doubting
existence - Descartes is really responsible for
these excesses
but if the sceptic is a realist is it existence
that is doubted?
I don't think so -
scepticism - is really about our explanations of -
what exists
a thorough going sceptic will take the view that
any descriptions of any thing - should
be - held in doubt
that is to say at the level of explanation -
one suspends judgement
the reality of living defeats such intellectual
purity at every turn - nevertheless there is
place and reason for the reflection that leads
to such a view
and such an outlook may well prove very useful
in the twists and turns of living - so it is not
without practical import
now we may conclude as a consequence of such an
outlook that - there is no definite description
of that which exists - and by implication say that
existence is - in terms of such - unknown
this though is a far cry from being a nihilist -
(if one can actually exist!)
for what is being doubted is not existence or
existents but comprehensive or final description
Santayana goes on to argue against the idea that
immediate experience is what we can depend on -
the data - of the senses
and I think he's right to question this view
but again I wonder about his argument - he seems
to think that such a view (sense data) is a view
about what exists
and my point is the same - the sense data argument
is an argument about explanation
that is the sense data theory is an explanation
of 'experience' - it is not - experience
- it is a theoretical reduction of experience
he goes on to suggest that we should confine our
use of the term 'existence' to the facts and events
of physical science - and see our experiences as
just stepping stones to such
OK
there is a lot of straight forward common sense here
if you want to know i.e. - about what caused what -
no sense in turning to a magical explanation
(different of course if you are a writer of magical
fiction and you are writing a story)
the world view of physical science will give you the
tools to sort it out
but if on the other hand you are wondering about
what such a world view is founded on
that is you are looking for an explanation of the
explanation - do not be surprised if it
is not as straightforward or as precise as A caused B
so you may come to the view that for certain practical
purposes it works to proceed with scientific explanation -
and you may i.e. - end up regarding the basic principles
of physics as being essentially arbitrary - and finally
perhaps not that much different to i.e. - 'the laws of
magic' (if we can speak of such)
the facts are never in doubt - only our descriptions
20.9.05
sceptical monism
the reason the issue of the relationship of mind
to the physical world cannot be solved is
our window to the world - the physical world
cannot itself be included in our picture of the world
so where does this leave us?
just where we started
just where we are
we can as it were describe our dilemma (if so regarded)
what then - is the question?
what status - ontological do we give consciousness?
I understand the idea of anomalous monism -
but what does it amount to really?
we say consciousness is physical but cannot be
explained by physical law
but this is not satisfactory
it's really an ad hoc theory - the mind is rendered
ad hoc
I think we need to say consciousness is within the
physical conception - an unknown - unknown -
fair and square
it is also to recognize that physical theory operates
fine - given consciousness - but consciousness is not
included in the picture - in the theory
the mind here - consciousness - is a presupposition -
to physical theory - to our knowledge of the world
it is I would suggest - ontologically - an undefined
constant
so
we can't say what the mind is
we know though it is necessarily related to the
(physical) world
awareness - what I call reflectivity - (I know that
I know) is - if you like - the mind as it appears
(bear this in mind - and the point that we cannot
explain it in any final sense)
the question we can ask about the relationship
between thought and act is
could the physical world - be (ontologically) related -
connected to the non-physical?
on the face of it the answer is no
(short of a very interesting theory we would accept this)
on the other hand we cannot say that the mind -
consciousness is physical
we cannot say that it is -
but at the same time because we cannot say what the
mind is -
we cannot say - positively what it is not -
the unknown here - cuts both ways
what we have here is a sceptical monism
and back to awareness for a moment -
awareness may not be relevant in understanding the
relationship between thought and action
this is to say - to suggest i.e. - that awareness may
accompany - be a parallel dimension to the connection
between thought and act -
this is just a speculation based on the possibilities
of the sceptical monism thesis
to the physical world cannot be solved is
our window to the world - the physical world
cannot itself be included in our picture of the world
so where does this leave us?
just where we started
just where we are
we can as it were describe our dilemma (if so regarded)
what then - is the question?
what status - ontological do we give consciousness?
I understand the idea of anomalous monism -
but what does it amount to really?
we say consciousness is physical but cannot be
explained by physical law
but this is not satisfactory
it's really an ad hoc theory - the mind is rendered
ad hoc
I think we need to say consciousness is within the
physical conception - an unknown - unknown -
fair and square
it is also to recognize that physical theory operates
fine - given consciousness - but consciousness is not
included in the picture - in the theory
the mind here - consciousness - is a presupposition -
to physical theory - to our knowledge of the world
it is I would suggest - ontologically - an undefined
constant
so
we can't say what the mind is
we know though it is necessarily related to the
(physical) world
awareness - what I call reflectivity - (I know that
I know) is - if you like - the mind as it appears
(bear this in mind - and the point that we cannot
explain it in any final sense)
the question we can ask about the relationship
between thought and act is
could the physical world - be (ontologically) related -
connected to the non-physical?
on the face of it the answer is no
(short of a very interesting theory we would accept this)
on the other hand we cannot say that the mind -
consciousness is physical
we cannot say that it is -
but at the same time because we cannot say what the
mind is -
we cannot say - positively what it is not -
the unknown here - cuts both ways
what we have here is a sceptical monism
and back to awareness for a moment -
awareness may not be relevant in understanding the
relationship between thought and action
this is to say - to suggest i.e. - that awareness may
accompany - be a parallel dimension to the connection
between thought and act -
this is just a speculation based on the possibilities
of the sceptical monism thesis
19.9.05
internality and reflectivity
the problem of consciousness is to account for its
internality and its reflectivity
consciousness is embedded in the physical world
at least in a class of physical entities
can we account for consciousness with a physicalist
analysis?
it would seem not
consciousness it seems is not observable in a public
objective sense
so how then to account for the apparent ontological
unity of conscious entities?
is consciousness a special case of the physical?
if so we have to drop or modify the above definition
of physical
do we want to include the non-observable - private -
subjective within physicalist ontology?
if so what does 'physical' come to?
physicalist analysis is a way to suggest materialism
but what is materialism - but not-spiritualism -
as the idea of fundamental substance?
and what is difficult about regarding consciousness
as material?
only that - it doesn't present - and present in
a material way
and if material - still the question - perhaps now
more acute - how to distinguish conscious from
non-conscious matter?
internality and its reflectivity
consciousness is embedded in the physical world
at least in a class of physical entities
can we account for consciousness with a physicalist
analysis?
it would seem not
consciousness it seems is not observable in a public
objective sense
so how then to account for the apparent ontological
unity of conscious entities?
is consciousness a special case of the physical?
if so we have to drop or modify the above definition
of physical
do we want to include the non-observable - private -
subjective within physicalist ontology?
if so what does 'physical' come to?
physicalist analysis is a way to suggest materialism
but what is materialism - but not-spiritualism -
as the idea of fundamental substance?
and what is difficult about regarding consciousness
as material?
only that - it doesn't present - and present in
a material way
and if material - still the question - perhaps now
more acute - how to distinguish conscious from
non-conscious matter?
internality
as I see it
consciousness is the internaility of being
how far you want to extend this idea is a question
is all existence to be understood in terms of this
internal / external dimension?
do we say i.e. - that the inanimate has an inside -
as well as surface?
and of the status of this inside -
conscious?
do we say all the things with an outside have an inside?
you would think so
but if consciousness is this inside - it means everything
is conscious (in order to be whole) or
not everything is - some things are one-dimensional?
OK so there are issues here - ontological issues -
for the sake of the argument - let us accept this
internal / external account - and ask - its implications
for the mind-brain identity thesis -
on my view - consciousness is the inside dimension
of a human being
the physical - the body - is the external
one could argue if you take the view that consciousness
is physical - the internal / external distinction - as
a distinction of ontology - kinds of being - collapses -
(this assumes too that there is no sense to speaking
of the physical as being internal as well as external)
on the other hand - if you regard consciousness -
the internality - as qualitatively different to its
exterior - then if consciousness is a brain process -
it is the inside - of a brain process - yes the inside
it is not physical
and not observable
not public
and you could well ask - why locate it - in the brain -
does this dimension of a thing - of an entity -
have a specific location?
a specific location relative to externality?
surely it must be co-extensive?
consciousness is the internaility of being
how far you want to extend this idea is a question
is all existence to be understood in terms of this
internal / external dimension?
do we say i.e. - that the inanimate has an inside -
as well as surface?
and of the status of this inside -
conscious?
do we say all the things with an outside have an inside?
you would think so
but if consciousness is this inside - it means everything
is conscious (in order to be whole) or
not everything is - some things are one-dimensional?
OK so there are issues here - ontological issues -
for the sake of the argument - let us accept this
internal / external account - and ask - its implications
for the mind-brain identity thesis -
on my view - consciousness is the inside dimension
of a human being
the physical - the body - is the external
one could argue if you take the view that consciousness
is physical - the internal / external distinction - as
a distinction of ontology - kinds of being - collapses -
(this assumes too that there is no sense to speaking
of the physical as being internal as well as external)
on the other hand - if you regard consciousness -
the internality - as qualitatively different to its
exterior - then if consciousness is a brain process -
it is the inside - of a brain process - yes the inside
it is not physical
and not observable
not public
and you could well ask - why locate it - in the brain -
does this dimension of a thing - of an entity -
have a specific location?
a specific location relative to externality?
surely it must be co-extensive?
18.9.05
the mind-brain thesis
where do we get the idea of the mind-brain identity thesis?
I understand its irresistibility - but where does it come from?
what is the epistemological basis of this belief?
such an idea cannot be based on observation
it's not an empirical hypothesis
but it is a view that assumes that scientific theory
applies here -
yes
but why -
only - I think - because it is assumed it must -
if science is true
or to put the negative - because if there are entities
that are not physical - science misses the point -
or so it is thought
I don't think this is so - but one dimensional thinkers
might just get the heebie- jeebies
here
so in a sense - what we have is science as metaphysics
I mean - the argument that the physicalist view is not
just an empirical theory - but must also be -
a metaphysical theory -
anyway
apart from an emotional attachment to the brain (?) -
to physics - and an even stauncher belief that if x
exists it must be explainable - and in physical terms -
what do we have?
do we have any reason to hold the mind-brain
identity thesis -
to believe the mind is the brain?
no
the patriarch may include the prodigal son in his will -
for the sake of 'family' unity - it doesn't follow though
that the prodigal is a member - in anything but name -
at least from the point of view of the patriarch -
and perhaps even the prodigal
the mind - the brain
seems like it should be the right fit
certainly at this time in intellectual history
a comfortable fit -
frankly though - there seems no positive reason
to make the connection
perhaps the best approach at this juncture -
the rational approach is to keep an open
mind - or is that an 'open brain'?
otherwise - bite the bullet and say - we don't know
what the mind is
could be the new radicalism
I understand its irresistibility - but where does it come from?
what is the epistemological basis of this belief?
such an idea cannot be based on observation
it's not an empirical hypothesis
but it is a view that assumes that scientific theory
applies here -
yes
but why -
only - I think - because it is assumed it must -
if science is true
or to put the negative - because if there are entities
that are not physical - science misses the point -
or so it is thought
I don't think this is so - but one dimensional thinkers
might just get the heebie- jeebies
here
so in a sense - what we have is science as metaphysics
I mean - the argument that the physicalist view is not
just an empirical theory - but must also be -
a metaphysical theory -
anyway
apart from an emotional attachment to the brain (?) -
to physics - and an even stauncher belief that if x
exists it must be explainable - and in physical terms -
what do we have?
do we have any reason to hold the mind-brain
identity thesis -
to believe the mind is the brain?
no
the patriarch may include the prodigal son in his will -
for the sake of 'family' unity - it doesn't follow though
that the prodigal is a member - in anything but name -
at least from the point of view of the patriarch -
and perhaps even the prodigal
the mind - the brain
seems like it should be the right fit
certainly at this time in intellectual history
a comfortable fit -
frankly though - there seems no positive reason
to make the connection
perhaps the best approach at this juncture -
the rational approach is to keep an open
mind - or is that an 'open brain'?
otherwise - bite the bullet and say - we don't know
what the mind is
could be the new radicalism
Davidson V
Davidson goes with Brentano in defining the mental
as intentional - but clearly in the full flowering
of his argument it is the anomalous character of
mental events - that effectively defines them as
mental - or a special case of physical
I think this is ill-conceived
it is their ontology that is characteristic -
and by this I mean their categorical ontology
- which is that they belong to - are events of
a non-objective - i.e. - non-public - non-
observational realm - the dimension of
intentionality - if you like
mental events are in the world
the objective world is physical
the world from the point of view of consciousness -
given the existence of consciousness - is dimensional
we ask what is common to these dimensions?
in what sense are they 'one'?
or in what sense are they expressions of a unity
how to describe this unity?
I argue we can only come at the unity from the inside
that is - if there is a law to govern the physical
and the mental - an objective - or perhaps more precisely
a meta-objective law
we cannot know it
and as to the mental - specifically
it is not physical - do not imagine physical laws here
if you do you are just committing a fundamental category
mistake
are there laws to the mental life?
(given that by 'law' we generally mean the objective /
observational / physical - we may want to drop the term
in this context)
but if we continue with this terminology - they can only
be reflective laws -
laws - perhaps generalizations based on reflection
the conscious life human beings clearly operate -
is defined within certain parameters
it is in some sense common ground
conceptual psychology - theories of human nature and
behaviour - clearly have a place here - myth has always
been fundamental to the understanding of the inner life
and also we develop pictures profiles of the mental
life of man in our creative artistic expression
as intentional - but clearly in the full flowering
of his argument it is the anomalous character of
mental events - that effectively defines them as
mental - or a special case of physical
I think this is ill-conceived
it is their ontology that is characteristic -
and by this I mean their categorical ontology
- which is that they belong to - are events of
a non-objective - i.e. - non-public - non-
observational realm - the dimension of
intentionality - if you like
mental events are in the world
the objective world is physical
the world from the point of view of consciousness -
given the existence of consciousness - is dimensional
we ask what is common to these dimensions?
in what sense are they 'one'?
or in what sense are they expressions of a unity
how to describe this unity?
I argue we can only come at the unity from the inside
that is - if there is a law to govern the physical
and the mental - an objective - or perhaps more precisely
a meta-objective law
we cannot know it
and as to the mental - specifically
it is not physical - do not imagine physical laws here
if you do you are just committing a fundamental category
mistake
are there laws to the mental life?
(given that by 'law' we generally mean the objective /
observational / physical - we may want to drop the term
in this context)
but if we continue with this terminology - they can only
be reflective laws -
laws - perhaps generalizations based on reflection
the conscious life human beings clearly operate -
is defined within certain parameters
it is in some sense common ground
conceptual psychology - theories of human nature and
behaviour - clearly have a place here - myth has always
been fundamental to the understanding of the inner life
and also we develop pictures profiles of the mental
life of man in our creative artistic expression
Davidson IV
anomalous monism
Davidson is not a reductionist - he wants to give
the mental a fair shake
and he recognizes
'The principle of causal interaction deals with events
in extension and is therefore blind to the mental-physical
dichotomy.'
such is accurate - it makes clear what physicalism can
accommodate - can deal with
mental events are not public and observable - and therefore
not physical - they will not be covered by physical law
this observation - would be partly accepted by mind-brain
identity theorists
the argument being - so called mental events must be brain
sensations and therefore physical
such an argument is really just the assertion of physics
over this issue - the underlying reason being - we cannot
allow in the physical world exceptions to physical theory -
even if we can't actually explain them - in principle there
is an explanation
and he sees mental events as intentional
or as Russell referred here - propositional attitudes -
such events are not public or observable - I describe them
as internal - as distinct from the physical-observable that
is external
the distinction here is ontological - different dimensions
and the point is - to be sharp - if you are going to be
fair dinkim about the physical - (public-observable) you
have to be prepared to accept that physical theory applies
only in the external dimension - what happens outside of
consciousness
and to the Davidson argument - there are no anomalies -
out there - everything is covered -
so the mental is not physical or physical-anomalous
we are talking here about two distinct ontological
categories or realms
it won't do to try and foist the description of one
onto the other - for it cannot apply
(and just by the way - this is what I think happens
in the argument that the mental causes the physical -
or can - it's a misuse of an objective category -
causation
'causation' as it is used in physical theory only
applies to the objective
a physical event can be an expression - a manifestation -
of a mental event
and this is not to think in terms of causation
it is rather to refer to the action of both dimensions
and the reality of transference from one to the other
it can and does go both ways
the possibility of this is purely contingent
and only finally dependent on the existence of
consciousness
without consciousness
there is no mental -
no internal dimension
in fact a world without consciousness is dimensionless)
to describe the totality both realms exist in - are
expressions of - is of course a question
is there such a language?
I suspect not - I think what we know is the inside and
the outside of -
of what? - of whatever it is
(we think - we speak from the inside out
to have such an all embracing language we would have to
think and speak from the outside in)
and so I would speak here of an unknown
Davidson is not a reductionist - he wants to give
the mental a fair shake
and he recognizes
'The principle of causal interaction deals with events
in extension and is therefore blind to the mental-physical
dichotomy.'
such is accurate - it makes clear what physicalism can
accommodate - can deal with
mental events are not public and observable - and therefore
not physical - they will not be covered by physical law
this observation - would be partly accepted by mind-brain
identity theorists
the argument being - so called mental events must be brain
sensations and therefore physical
such an argument is really just the assertion of physics
over this issue - the underlying reason being - we cannot
allow in the physical world exceptions to physical theory -
even if we can't actually explain them - in principle there
is an explanation
and he sees mental events as intentional
or as Russell referred here - propositional attitudes -
such events are not public or observable - I describe them
as internal - as distinct from the physical-observable that
is external
the distinction here is ontological - different dimensions
and the point is - to be sharp - if you are going to be
fair dinkim about the physical - (public-observable) you
have to be prepared to accept that physical theory applies
only in the external dimension - what happens outside of
consciousness
and to the Davidson argument - there are no anomalies -
out there - everything is covered -
so the mental is not physical or physical-anomalous
we are talking here about two distinct ontological
categories or realms
it won't do to try and foist the description of one
onto the other - for it cannot apply
(and just by the way - this is what I think happens
in the argument that the mental causes the physical -
or can - it's a misuse of an objective category -
causation
'causation' as it is used in physical theory only
applies to the objective
a physical event can be an expression - a manifestation -
of a mental event
and this is not to think in terms of causation
it is rather to refer to the action of both dimensions
and the reality of transference from one to the other
it can and does go both ways
the possibility of this is purely contingent
and only finally dependent on the existence of
consciousness
without consciousness
there is no mental -
no internal dimension
in fact a world without consciousness is dimensionless)
to describe the totality both realms exist in - are
expressions of - is of course a question
is there such a language?
I suspect not - I think what we know is the inside and
the outside of -
of what? - of whatever it is
(we think - we speak from the inside out
to have such an all embracing language we would have to
think and speak from the outside in)
and so I would speak here of an unknown
17.9.05
positive uncertainty
empirical evidence for any hypothesis
is the only way to move with clarity
in practice it doesn't require any sophisticated
logistics - or theoretical frameworks
to assert that something is so - or is not so
requires evidence
evidence here is no mystery
it is empirical - i.e. - a happening in the world -
objective - and physical -
either in the sense of raw observation
or clear report
intuition may be a basis for hypothesis - fine
it is not evidence
we may well question whether we have good evidence -
enough evidence - for belief - for action - this is
healthy
and let us say we do not -
it is this straightforward - don't believe - don't move
on such a belief - on such a basis
there is no certainty at any point in this analysis
only uncertainty
uncertainty - as the basis for a reason to proceed
uncertainty as a basis for a reason not to proceed
a positive uncertainty
a negative uncertainty
positive or negative - finally a matter of what does
or does not exist
which is evidence or not for
assertion or not
is the only way to move with clarity
in practice it doesn't require any sophisticated
logistics - or theoretical frameworks
to assert that something is so - or is not so
requires evidence
evidence here is no mystery
it is empirical - i.e. - a happening in the world -
objective - and physical -
either in the sense of raw observation
or clear report
intuition may be a basis for hypothesis - fine
it is not evidence
we may well question whether we have good evidence -
enough evidence - for belief - for action - this is
healthy
and let us say we do not -
it is this straightforward - don't believe - don't move
on such a belief - on such a basis
there is no certainty at any point in this analysis
only uncertainty
uncertainty - as the basis for a reason to proceed
uncertainty as a basis for a reason not to proceed
a positive uncertainty
a negative uncertainty
positive or negative - finally a matter of what does
or does not exist
which is evidence or not for
assertion or not
mental and physical
objectification
subjectification
two events?
yes - Mi a thought that leads to Pi a physical event
and the argument Pi an expression of Mi
so two events
one subjective
one objective
i.e. the thought of reaching for a glass
the actual reaching
one an expression of the other
yes
two events
the thought the act
the connection -
brain activity?
both brain events
an explanation
yes
for a common ground
but different kinds of events still -
one an event of intention - whatever this comes to in
brain states
the other an event of action - of movement
and both events - known
the knowing - where does this fit in?
I know I intend
I know I move my arm
both events covered by -
instances of knowing
a third event?
the intentional state is known in its occurrence
it could not be intentional - and not known
the act of movement known too - in occurrence?
yes I think so
the knowing accompanies both events
knowing as a brain state - yes
how though do we characterize it? (brain state of not)
it is an open state
a general condition of any conscious act -
it is not ontologically confined
it doesn't just happen under specific conditions
it is a general condition
this knowing
and further
it is by its nature revelatory
we know - we know
which is to just say we know
such is knowing
it is knowing in a particular sense
but its basis is universal and unbounded
we know
and know that we know
and we know that we know that we know
etc.
knowing as an open state
all inclusive
of the object
of the subject
knowing - cannot be exhausted
there is no boundary
so knowing - or consciousness if a brain state -
is the brain state in which all specific acts of
knowing take place
the brain state idea - is really a metaphor for
grounding events
giving of common ground to all disparate conscious
(and by implication) non-conscious events
in a way it's rather quaint
for we only know 'in consciousness'
we do not observe it
if a brain state we could never know it as such
we could only place it - alongside some picture
of brain activity and argue a co-relation
this kind of knowledge is hypothesized
and frankly arbitrary - it can be no other way -
for we can't step out of consciousness to see it
it is the seeing
a world outside of this is by definition - unknown -
unknowable -
what we know is what we are conscious of
in this sense we can only be conscious of_________
we are not conscious of what consciousness is
only that it is
and to suggest otherwise is rather absurd
subjectification
two events?
yes - Mi a thought that leads to Pi a physical event
and the argument Pi an expression of Mi
so two events
one subjective
one objective
i.e. the thought of reaching for a glass
the actual reaching
one an expression of the other
yes
two events
the thought the act
the connection -
brain activity?
both brain events
an explanation
yes
for a common ground
but different kinds of events still -
one an event of intention - whatever this comes to in
brain states
the other an event of action - of movement
and both events - known
the knowing - where does this fit in?
I know I intend
I know I move my arm
both events covered by -
instances of knowing
a third event?
the intentional state is known in its occurrence
it could not be intentional - and not known
the act of movement known too - in occurrence?
yes I think so
the knowing accompanies both events
knowing as a brain state - yes
how though do we characterize it? (brain state of not)
it is an open state
a general condition of any conscious act -
it is not ontologically confined
it doesn't just happen under specific conditions
it is a general condition
this knowing
and further
it is by its nature revelatory
we know - we know
which is to just say we know
such is knowing
it is knowing in a particular sense
but its basis is universal and unbounded
we know
and know that we know
and we know that we know that we know
etc.
knowing as an open state
all inclusive
of the object
of the subject
knowing - cannot be exhausted
there is no boundary
so knowing - or consciousness if a brain state -
is the brain state in which all specific acts of
knowing take place
the brain state idea - is really a metaphor for
grounding events
giving of common ground to all disparate conscious
(and by implication) non-conscious events
in a way it's rather quaint
for we only know 'in consciousness'
we do not observe it
if a brain state we could never know it as such
we could only place it - alongside some picture
of brain activity and argue a co-relation
this kind of knowledge is hypothesized
and frankly arbitrary - it can be no other way -
for we can't step out of consciousness to see it
it is the seeing
a world outside of this is by definition - unknown -
unknowable -
what we know is what we are conscious of
in this sense we can only be conscious of_________
we are not conscious of what consciousness is
only that it is
and to suggest otherwise is rather absurd
15.9.05
following on
Pi - physical event
Mi - (mental event) - idea of Pi
?
Mi expresses Pi
Pi expression of Mi
Pi contained in Mi?
an outcome?
yes
Pi an expression of Mi -
in that Mi is translated to -
the outside of Mi
Pi the outside of Mi
and action here
the middle term
action - here - its status?
the action underlying - necessary to the expression of Mi to Pi?
expression = action
the expression is the action of transformation
changing - a mental event - to a physical event
is there a great mystery here?
is it not the organism functioning -
functioning - in the world?
a function anyway
fundamental though
Mi - (mental event) - idea of Pi
?
Mi expresses Pi
Pi expression of Mi
Pi contained in Mi?
an outcome?
yes
Pi an expression of Mi -
in that Mi is translated to -
the outside of Mi
Pi the outside of Mi
and action here
the middle term
action - here - its status?
the action underlying - necessary to the expression of Mi to Pi?
expression = action
the expression is the action of transformation
changing - a mental event - to a physical event
is there a great mystery here?
is it not the organism functioning -
functioning - in the world?
a function anyway
fundamental though
Davidson III
Davidson again (barely)
knowledge is not experience
if you forget for a moment - western science -
what would your experience be?
well this is to ask a theoretical question -
a reflective - question - it is to seek
explanation -
outside of explanation - or in the absence of it -
we can say quite - logically - we don't know
physical events -
are public - observable objective
mental 'events' (if we can still really use this term)
are not public or observable
there is a gulf here
the gulf is between the conscious and the non-conscious
now the thing is the conscious exists in the non-conscious
and I mean 'in' - inside
we could say here that consciousness only knows itself -
as the solipsist does -
but this cannot be maintained - for consciousness -
recognizes itself - and itself in the non-conscious
without this recognition there is no consciousness
even so consciousness divides - this is no theoretical
reflection - it is - a recognition of ontology - its
experience - into objective and subjective
objective - that which happens outside of consciousness
subjective that which happens in consciousness
the facility of consciousness to see its own categories
and functions -
i.e. regard its subjective and objective dimensions
is to say - to speak of its capacity for endless
reflection
consciousness in this sense - exists in a logical space
of which the subjective and objective are but possibilities
and as long as consciousness exists - real
consciousness recognizes physical events - as outside
itself (as existing independently of consciousness)
and mental events as inside itself - as subjective events
(although I'm not sure about the term 'events' - serious
young physicalists need events - 'figments' too suggestive
of a career on the stage - perhaps that's what happened to
Feyerabend - lost his bearings and found his boogie)
for consciousness (if I can be so bold as to speak on its
behalf)
the 'mental' and 'physical' are theoretical descriptions
of the inside and the outside
a mental event may precipitate a physical event
in that - the internal expresses itself externally -
the mental event expresses itself
the fact that its expression is a different form i.e.
physical - is that it is expressed in
another domain
the external -
(external to consciousness)
and if you wish to get metaphysical
and ask - well what is real?
the inside or the outside?
the answer clearly is neither -
a dimension is just that -
it is not that - of which it is a dimension
so the totality -
(formerly known as 'substance' - formerly known as
'essence')
will not be exhausted by its dimensions - or any
number of -
it can be defined in terms thereof -
but finally only in these terms -
we - recognize it - as a thing in itself - finally
on purely logical grounds - i.e. - it has to
be
however there can be no complete description
in terms of a total description -
the best we can get is the view from the inside
it may be a room with a view but there is no door out
knowledge is not experience
if you forget for a moment - western science -
what would your experience be?
well this is to ask a theoretical question -
a reflective - question - it is to seek
explanation -
outside of explanation - or in the absence of it -
we can say quite - logically - we don't know
physical events -
are public - observable objective
mental 'events' (if we can still really use this term)
are not public or observable
there is a gulf here
the gulf is between the conscious and the non-conscious
now the thing is the conscious exists in the non-conscious
and I mean 'in' - inside
we could say here that consciousness only knows itself -
as the solipsist does -
but this cannot be maintained - for consciousness -
recognizes itself - and itself in the non-conscious
without this recognition there is no consciousness
even so consciousness divides - this is no theoretical
reflection - it is - a recognition of ontology - its
experience - into objective and subjective
objective - that which happens outside of consciousness
subjective that which happens in consciousness
the facility of consciousness to see its own categories
and functions -
i.e. regard its subjective and objective dimensions
is to say - to speak of its capacity for endless
reflection
consciousness in this sense - exists in a logical space
of which the subjective and objective are but possibilities
and as long as consciousness exists - real
consciousness recognizes physical events - as outside
itself (as existing independently of consciousness)
and mental events as inside itself - as subjective events
(although I'm not sure about the term 'events' - serious
young physicalists need events - 'figments' too suggestive
of a career on the stage - perhaps that's what happened to
Feyerabend - lost his bearings and found his boogie)
for consciousness (if I can be so bold as to speak on its
behalf)
the 'mental' and 'physical' are theoretical descriptions
of the inside and the outside
a mental event may precipitate a physical event
in that - the internal expresses itself externally -
the mental event expresses itself
the fact that its expression is a different form i.e.
physical - is that it is expressed in
another domain
the external -
(external to consciousness)
and if you wish to get metaphysical
and ask - well what is real?
the inside or the outside?
the answer clearly is neither -
a dimension is just that -
it is not that - of which it is a dimension
so the totality -
(formerly known as 'substance' - formerly known as
'essence')
will not be exhausted by its dimensions - or any
number of -
it can be defined in terms thereof -
but finally only in these terms -
we - recognize it - as a thing in itself - finally
on purely logical grounds - i.e. - it has to
be
however there can be no complete description
in terms of a total description -
the best we can get is the view from the inside
it may be a room with a view but there is no door out
14.9.05
consciousness as sui generis
consciousness as a self-creating entity?
we think in terms of cause and effect in
trying to explain how things come to be
now I'm wondering if another conception might
work better for understanding the fact of
consciousness
namely - a sui generis model -
the idea - the act of consciousness - brings
consciousness into being
strange I know
a self-creating - what - entity - process - state?
and to explain - its - persistence and continuity -
posit - a function
a function - a brain function - that is constantly
triggered by?
interaction with the world -
we think in terms of cause and effect in
trying to explain how things come to be
now I'm wondering if another conception might
work better for understanding the fact of
consciousness
namely - a sui generis model -
the idea - the act of consciousness - brings
consciousness into being
strange I know
a self-creating - what - entity - process - state?
and to explain - its - persistence and continuity -
posit - a function
a function - a brain function - that is constantly
triggered by?
interaction with the world -
davidson II
consciousness is recognition of an event (RE) -
self-consciousness - recognition of the
recognition of RE (RRE)
now we call this 'self'-consciousness -
but there is no self here
recognition of recognition
recognition of an event E
knowledge of the recognition
is the recognition of (RE) - Ei?
and the recognition of RE (RRE) - Eii?
one event of two?
clearly they are not independent events
REE follows RE in human beings?
could RE exist without RRE
no
so two aspects to recognition?
RE
and?
REE - is just as much part of RE (as RE)
is just as necessary?
it is isn't it the knowing - the fact of RE
RE can only exist if known?
yes
so
recognition here is
event - and recognition
recognition
is knowing that E
and knowing that E entails - includes -
knowing that RE
(RRE)
recognition is just this -
RRE
E cannot be recognized unless RE - is recognized
knowing here is just knowing that you know
recognition is knowing that you know
so
it makes no sense to just speak of consciousness per se
consciousness is - 'awareness of the awareness of ____'
so
can we just speak of awareness here?
such is awareness
(a light that uncovers the light in uncovering the world)
and really here we are just speaking of states of
awareness
you can call this mind if you wish
but - awareness is not a thing
a 'series of awareness' is not a thing
if anything -
and I mean if anything
we are just talking here of events
and perhaps if confident -
'sequences'
we perceive the body as body - as an object
object here therefore is a function of perception
we don't perceive a mind (it is not out there)
we conceive perhaps - mental events
we witness mental events
and the 'we' here is what?
the witnessing is what?
the witness is just the event of recognition
just the event of a thought
recognition of the event is knowing - is all - all -
the self is
and so?
there is a self in every mental event
a mind in every thought
self-consciousness - recognition of the
recognition of RE (RRE)
now we call this 'self'-consciousness -
but there is no self here
recognition of recognition
recognition of an event E
knowledge of the recognition
is the recognition of (RE) - Ei?
and the recognition of RE (RRE) - Eii?
one event of two?
clearly they are not independent events
REE follows RE in human beings?
could RE exist without RRE
no
so two aspects to recognition?
RE
and?
REE - is just as much part of RE (as RE)
is just as necessary?
it is isn't it the knowing - the fact of RE
RE can only exist if known?
yes
so
recognition here is
event - and recognition
recognition
is knowing that E
and knowing that E entails - includes -
knowing that RE
(RRE)
recognition is just this -
RRE
E cannot be recognized unless RE - is recognized
knowing here is just knowing that you know
recognition is knowing that you know
so
it makes no sense to just speak of consciousness per se
consciousness is - 'awareness of the awareness of ____'
so
can we just speak of awareness here?
such is awareness
(a light that uncovers the light in uncovering the world)
and really here we are just speaking of states of
awareness
you can call this mind if you wish
but - awareness is not a thing
a 'series of awareness' is not a thing
if anything -
and I mean if anything
we are just talking here of events
and perhaps if confident -
'sequences'
we perceive the body as body - as an object
object here therefore is a function of perception
we don't perceive a mind (it is not out there)
we conceive perhaps - mental events
we witness mental events
and the 'we' here is what?
the witnessing is what?
the witness is just the event of recognition
just the event of a thought
recognition of the event is knowing - is all - all -
the self is
and so?
there is a self in every mental event
a mind in every thought
davidson
mental events
isn't it rather that from a causal nomological
point of view - mental events are finally irrelevant?
Davidson uses the example of the sinking of the Bismarck -
i.e.- the perpetrator's decisions - plans - perceptions -
judgments play a causal role in the act
it's a matter of point of view - in this sense
an alien creature watching the event - not knowing of
human consciousness - may well interpret - the event in
terms of a series of physical (observable) events - i.e. -
a straightforward cause and effect analysis - in physical
terms -
now a human observer of course sees the same thing - but
would be likely to hypothesize mental events - into -
or behind the physical
from a strictly - objective - observational point of view -
the straightforward physical cause and effect view - works
quite well - it doesn't require supplementation
and of this point of view - external - observational -
the postulation of mental events - is to propose -
the unobservable - into the equation
and for this reason - because such is - unscientific -
we (if we are scientists) do not do it - and presumably
feel no compunction to do so
mental events from this point of view - this stance -
are not anomalies - rather irrelevancies
(what is the problem with saying physical laws apply
only to what is observable?
mental events - are not observable therefore they are not -
recognized by physical law
it's not because they are necessarily a different kind
of event - rather they do not come up in a way - i.e. -
objective - observable - that science can recognize)
hence we are talking of an objective observer -
objective event
the bloke planing the sinking of Bismarck - picturing it -
in all its detail - thinking it out - is a man in thought
his status here is that of the subjective observer -
and he is 'observing' subjective events - a train of
thought
on the actual day of the sinking - the bloke who does it -
is we will say the complete observer -
he sees his act from the inside - knows what he is doing
and also observes its objective dimension
will he say that his mental events caused the physical
event(s)?
yes
why?
because he sees the act in terms of both dimensions -
thus completely - he is not restricted to either dimension -
subjective or objective
his place is central
so causal?
clearly from the central standpoint - not physical-objective -
for such analysis only applies to the position of the objective
observer
and causal - mental?
i.e. - in the subjective realm -
and what would we call this - causal?
perhaps - the sequence of thought?
however you wish to characterize it
again
from the point of view of the complete observer
it is more than just that
(though only this from the exclusive subjective position)
if you are accepting of this argument so far -
you would see that 'causation' here is an over wrought
term - if not thoroughly abused
causation is not the correct way of accounting for the
relation between thought and act
(hence - you could say - philosophy of mind - one wrong step
and you have a field of knowledge)
from the position of the complete observer -
what can we say?
only that - Mi expresses Pi
the expression of Mi is Pi
this complete observer I should mention is weighted to
the subjective side of things
that is he will see the act in the first instance as an
expression of the subject
(rather than - if weighted objectively - as an objective
event - primarily - as it were of God or nature)
and what might this tell us of mind and matter?
only I think that a complete view here will not be
subjective or objective - rather a neutral position
I want to say we can see both dimensions
and both dimensions as expressions of - or views from
another place - another space
such a position -
philosophers have made the mistake of thinking their
characterizations of the subjective and the objective
can be applied to this level
are we to say this base position is physical -
the world of matter - or rather mental - the world
of mind -
I don't think these characterizations apply to this
ground position
I prefer to leave this place this position -
uncharacterized -
it is as it were where mind meets matter - or matter
meets mind -
Mi = Pi
= X
so yes - in a sense this comes to a mind-brain
identity thesis
but here the physical and the mental - are regarded
as expressions of a more fundamental unity -
one that cannot be characterized
isn't it rather that from a causal nomological
point of view - mental events are finally irrelevant?
Davidson uses the example of the sinking of the Bismarck -
i.e.- the perpetrator's decisions - plans - perceptions -
judgments play a causal role in the act
it's a matter of point of view - in this sense
an alien creature watching the event - not knowing of
human consciousness - may well interpret - the event in
terms of a series of physical (observable) events - i.e. -
a straightforward cause and effect analysis - in physical
terms -
now a human observer of course sees the same thing - but
would be likely to hypothesize mental events - into -
or behind the physical
from a strictly - objective - observational point of view -
the straightforward physical cause and effect view - works
quite well - it doesn't require supplementation
and of this point of view - external - observational -
the postulation of mental events - is to propose -
the unobservable - into the equation
and for this reason - because such is - unscientific -
we (if we are scientists) do not do it - and presumably
feel no compunction to do so
mental events from this point of view - this stance -
are not anomalies - rather irrelevancies
(what is the problem with saying physical laws apply
only to what is observable?
mental events - are not observable therefore they are not -
recognized by physical law
it's not because they are necessarily a different kind
of event - rather they do not come up in a way - i.e. -
objective - observable - that science can recognize)
hence we are talking of an objective observer -
objective event
the bloke planing the sinking of Bismarck - picturing it -
in all its detail - thinking it out - is a man in thought
his status here is that of the subjective observer -
and he is 'observing' subjective events - a train of
thought
on the actual day of the sinking - the bloke who does it -
is we will say the complete observer -
he sees his act from the inside - knows what he is doing
and also observes its objective dimension
will he say that his mental events caused the physical
event(s)?
yes
why?
because he sees the act in terms of both dimensions -
thus completely - he is not restricted to either dimension -
subjective or objective
his place is central
so causal?
clearly from the central standpoint - not physical-objective -
for such analysis only applies to the position of the objective
observer
and causal - mental?
i.e. - in the subjective realm -
and what would we call this - causal?
perhaps - the sequence of thought?
however you wish to characterize it
again
from the point of view of the complete observer
it is more than just that
(though only this from the exclusive subjective position)
if you are accepting of this argument so far -
you would see that 'causation' here is an over wrought
term - if not thoroughly abused
causation is not the correct way of accounting for the
relation between thought and act
(hence - you could say - philosophy of mind - one wrong step
and you have a field of knowledge)
from the position of the complete observer -
what can we say?
only that - Mi expresses Pi
the expression of Mi is Pi
this complete observer I should mention is weighted to
the subjective side of things
that is he will see the act in the first instance as an
expression of the subject
(rather than - if weighted objectively - as an objective
event - primarily - as it were of God or nature)
and what might this tell us of mind and matter?
only I think that a complete view here will not be
subjective or objective - rather a neutral position
I want to say we can see both dimensions
and both dimensions as expressions of - or views from
another place - another space
such a position -
philosophers have made the mistake of thinking their
characterizations of the subjective and the objective
can be applied to this level
are we to say this base position is physical -
the world of matter - or rather mental - the world
of mind -
I don't think these characterizations apply to this
ground position
I prefer to leave this place this position -
uncharacterized -
it is as it were where mind meets matter - or matter
meets mind -
Mi = Pi
= X
so yes - in a sense this comes to a mind-brain
identity thesis
but here the physical and the mental - are regarded
as expressions of a more fundamental unity -
one that cannot be characterized
12.9.05
thought
what are we to say of thought?
what is a thought?
we might think at first sight - not much to this issue
a thought is a thought
yes
but it is only thinking - the determination of a thought -
that enables us to form this question
and what is such a determination?
a thought
so reflective thinking can only uncover itself
thinking is thinking
about thought
thought is all that is thought
when we reflect on this (think about it)
we are only thinking a schemata for thought -
thought in relation to other thoughts
it's as if the idea of the mind as an object -
won't do - won't work -
the mind is always within the object
reaching - exploring - deciding -
it's the action in the object - within
it operates in the object
but only knows itself
what the mind does is knowing
and knowing (in this sense) always - knowing (noun)
knowing (verb) knowing (known and verb)
it's the knowing
the so called self-knowledge that is hard
to get a hold on
we naturally think and speak in terms of
subject / object
but it's clear that such a logic really doesn't
cut through here
rather the real picture is
like light seeing light
where the (source - the object) is the vision
(the subject)
so to go here
is to go to a pre-language state
it is to point to - a state prior to how we
understand mind
language separates the source from the vision
this is to say the mind moves to this level
and can only know (express) itself in these terms -
in this form
we can go back - look back - from this level -
this platform (subject / object) but beyond this is -
non-differentiation
it is to say - the mind is knowing
that's it -
if we want to characterize it - further
the only option is contrast - that which is not mind
that which does not know
and such is - the body? - the world
or should I say the mind's conception of______
what is a thought?
we might think at first sight - not much to this issue
a thought is a thought
yes
but it is only thinking - the determination of a thought -
that enables us to form this question
and what is such a determination?
a thought
so reflective thinking can only uncover itself
thinking is thinking
about thought
thought is all that is thought
when we reflect on this (think about it)
we are only thinking a schemata for thought -
thought in relation to other thoughts
it's as if the idea of the mind as an object -
won't do - won't work -
the mind is always within the object
reaching - exploring - deciding -
it's the action in the object - within
it operates in the object
but only knows itself
what the mind does is knowing
and knowing (in this sense) always - knowing (noun)
knowing (verb) knowing (known and verb)
it's the knowing
the so called self-knowledge that is hard
to get a hold on
we naturally think and speak in terms of
subject / object
but it's clear that such a logic really doesn't
cut through here
rather the real picture is
like light seeing light
where the (source - the object) is the vision
(the subject)
so to go here
is to go to a pre-language state
it is to point to - a state prior to how we
understand mind
language separates the source from the vision
this is to say the mind moves to this level
and can only know (express) itself in these terms -
in this form
we can go back - look back - from this level -
this platform (subject / object) but beyond this is -
non-differentiation
it is to say - the mind is knowing
that's it -
if we want to characterize it - further
the only option is contrast - that which is not mind
that which does not know
and such is - the body? - the world
or should I say the mind's conception of______
thought thinking thought
what is it to think about thinking?
on the face of it doesn't seem controversial
it is what happens isn't it?
and it's just what the mind is -
regardless of whatever ontological status we give it
it is - isn't it - in an essential sense - i.e.
regardless of whatever else mind does -
thought thinking itself?
or is this just a little too obscure -
can thought be the subject of thought -
and if so -
what does this tell us about the nature of thought?
it suggests - doesn't it - that our favourite
distinction between subject and object - at
this level - is not as clear cut - as it seems -
when for example speaking of the mind
(as subject) regarding (that outside itself )
the world (as object)
if thought can be the object of thought
are we here - collapsing the subject / object
distinction - altogether
or is it - hence - and thus - to be understood
differently?
if thought can be subject and object
what does this mean?
thought distinguishes itself into subject and object -
if so - thought per se or mind (and I know this is
anything but precise) is in itself neither subject
or object -
it is - in this sense - some kind of neutral -
(a blank unknown?)
that functions can function by positing these categories
yes -
in a sense
but isn't it just this that the mind does?
(i.e. it may be something beyond this - but so what -
how relevant is that?)
in any case - the thing is - the positing of subject
and object - is one thing - the point is
that the mind applies this to itself
it is - quite apart from the subject object issue -
the question of what self reference is -
how it can be - what it tells us - can it be explicated?
I thought the subject / object distinction might help here
it is just another way of stating or referring to self
reference
it is clear - I think - this is what the mind does
is this just the end of the matter - like it's the
unanalyzable essential characteristic of mind - ?
yes - it seems so
but I just can't be satisfied here
on the face of it doesn't seem controversial
it is what happens isn't it?
and it's just what the mind is -
regardless of whatever ontological status we give it
it is - isn't it - in an essential sense - i.e.
regardless of whatever else mind does -
thought thinking itself?
or is this just a little too obscure -
can thought be the subject of thought -
and if so -
what does this tell us about the nature of thought?
it suggests - doesn't it - that our favourite
distinction between subject and object - at
this level - is not as clear cut - as it seems -
when for example speaking of the mind
(as subject) regarding (that outside itself )
the world (as object)
if thought can be the object of thought
are we here - collapsing the subject / object
distinction - altogether
or is it - hence - and thus - to be understood
differently?
if thought can be subject and object
what does this mean?
thought distinguishes itself into subject and object -
if so - thought per se or mind (and I know this is
anything but precise) is in itself neither subject
or object -
it is - in this sense - some kind of neutral -
(a blank unknown?)
that functions can function by positing these categories
yes -
in a sense
but isn't it just this that the mind does?
(i.e. it may be something beyond this - but so what -
how relevant is that?)
in any case - the thing is - the positing of subject
and object - is one thing - the point is
that the mind applies this to itself
it is - quite apart from the subject object issue -
the question of what self reference is -
how it can be - what it tells us - can it be explicated?
I thought the subject / object distinction might help here
it is just another way of stating or referring to self
reference
it is clear - I think - this is what the mind does
is this just the end of the matter - like it's the
unanalyzable essential characteristic of mind - ?
yes - it seems so
but I just can't be satisfied here
11.9.05
knowing that
what is it to know 'that'?
to know that such is the case
I know that 2+2=4
I know that it is raining
I know that 'it is raining and it is not raining'
is a contradiction
indicative -
existential -
statemental -
assertive -
what though does it point to?
it points to a fact
but not in the sense of empirical fact
(though empirical facts are here included)
rather to a fact per se
I would call it - a logical fact
in that what we make of any such fact in epistemological
or ontological terms - i.e. - empirical or ideal -
is a secondary matter
whatever the character of any such fact is
to state 'that' - is to assert - what?
a logical space
(already filled but that is not the point)
it is to give place to what is being asserted
and the asserting is the giving - the making of place -
and its recognition
its content - what is being asserted - is -
a substantial issue -
so - 'to know that' in this logical sense
is to recognize the space of a fact
to know that such is the case
I know that 2+2=4
I know that it is raining
I know that 'it is raining and it is not raining'
is a contradiction
indicative -
existential -
statemental -
assertive -
what though does it point to?
it points to a fact
but not in the sense of empirical fact
(though empirical facts are here included)
rather to a fact per se
I would call it - a logical fact
in that what we make of any such fact in epistemological
or ontological terms - i.e. - empirical or ideal -
is a secondary matter
whatever the character of any such fact is
to state 'that' - is to assert - what?
a logical space
(already filled but that is not the point)
it is to give place to what is being asserted
and the asserting is the giving - the making of place -
and its recognition
its content - what is being asserted - is -
a substantial issue -
so - 'to know that' in this logical sense
is to recognize the space of a fact
10.9.05
the problem of consciousness
the problem of consciousness - understanding it -
is only a problem of conscious - self-conscious beings
and why a problem at all?
only because - reflection - a conscious function
reveals nothing -
nothing that is but the fact of reflection
so there is a sense in which the mind cannot
know itself -
(and given that knowing is what the mind does this
is puzzling if not maddening)
if by knowledge we mean what?
being able to step out of the process in some way
see it as an object
we can of course objectify here -
but it is of no help - for we only and simply
remain within
knowledge is a relation between subject and object -
the difficulty here is that knowledge of the mind
can only be the subject describing itself -
and in a very limited way
in terms of it's capacity to reflect
and this is just a logical function with no content
to speak of - if knowledge - it is not substantial
and the crux is - when we come to speak - to think of
- to try to understand reflection
what is it?
the dilemma is - to answer this - any answer to this
- can only be - a reflection
therefore no movement
we have no possible explication
where to from here?
forget the issue?
take the view that self-knowledge - self-consciousness
- is only to be explicated in terms of - what it does -
that is - its objective expression
what it produces
what it expresses
the thing in itself - for all intents and purposes -
does not exist
certainly in terms of the above analysis -
it cannot be known
beyond its - function
the function of reflection
which simply is what the mind is
nothing more
there is no internal to this
we can understand the mind as an internality
but we cannot go into this internality
we cannot go beyond - deeper into reflection
to find something else
and for this reason it is quite reasonable
to give up the idea
is only a problem of conscious - self-conscious beings
and why a problem at all?
only because - reflection - a conscious function
reveals nothing -
nothing that is but the fact of reflection
so there is a sense in which the mind cannot
know itself -
(and given that knowing is what the mind does this
is puzzling if not maddening)
if by knowledge we mean what?
being able to step out of the process in some way
see it as an object
we can of course objectify here -
but it is of no help - for we only and simply
remain within
knowledge is a relation between subject and object -
the difficulty here is that knowledge of the mind
can only be the subject describing itself -
and in a very limited way
in terms of it's capacity to reflect
and this is just a logical function with no content
to speak of - if knowledge - it is not substantial
and the crux is - when we come to speak - to think of
- to try to understand reflection
what is it?
the dilemma is - to answer this - any answer to this
- can only be - a reflection
therefore no movement
we have no possible explication
where to from here?
forget the issue?
take the view that self-knowledge - self-consciousness
- is only to be explicated in terms of - what it does -
that is - its objective expression
what it produces
what it expresses
the thing in itself - for all intents and purposes -
does not exist
certainly in terms of the above analysis -
it cannot be known
beyond its - function
the function of reflection
which simply is what the mind is
nothing more
there is no internal to this
we can understand the mind as an internality
but we cannot go into this internality
we cannot go beyond - deeper into reflection
to find something else
and for this reason it is quite reasonable
to give up the idea
Santayana VI
ultimate scepticism
'Scepticism may thus be carried to the point of denying
change and memory, and the reality of all facts. Such a
sceptical dogma would certainly be false, because this
dogma would have to be entertained, and that event would
be a fact and an existence: and the sceptic in framing
that dogma discourses, vacillates, and lives in the act
of contrasting one assertion with another - all of which
is to exist with a vengeance. Yet this false dogma that
nothing exists is tenable intuitively and, while it
prevails, is irrefutable. There are certain motives
(to be discussed later) which render ultimate scepticism
precious to a spiritual mind, as a sanctuary from grosser
illusions. for the wayward sceptic who regards it as no
more truer than any other view, it also has some utility;
it accustoms him to discard the dogma which an introspective
critic might be tempted to think self evident, namely that
he himself lives and thinks. That he does so is true;
but to establish that truth he must appeal to animal faith.
If he is too proud for that, and simply stares at the datum,
the last thing he will see is himself.'
the datum here is a construction or at least the result
of a reflection upon - what?
well the point is we cannot say until we reflect -
to describe is to express a reflection
and by that I mean (and we can only say this in reflection)
consciousness defining perhaps even objectify in some sense
this is just what the mind does -
so - yes - if he just stares at (posits) the datum
the last thing he will see is himself
but the very positing of it entails - the self -
the positer - crude - I know - but I doubt
there is any precision to be found here
for we are at this stage - reflecting reflection -
it is a meta activity of the mind
the act asserting the actor?
reason - it seems demands this procedure -
somewhat backward in coming forward
so we begin somewhere - and build up a picture -
a strange theoretical structure - to live in
and animal faith - well - here I suspect Santayana
is having a bet each way -
the idea of animal faith I would say is -
like any conception - an ideal construction -
an idea - a reflection
but if he has in mind some pre-reflective state -
well I am not convinced that there actually is such -
but even so - if we were to accept such an idea -
we'd be speaking of consciousness - that is not
self-conscious - some would suggest this as a pure
form of consciousness - in any case we are not thus
speaking of an epistemic state or condition - so by
definition - it would seem to be - not something we
could know
and that I suppose would be a picture of ultimate
scepticism
what this highlights though is that scepticism -
is a theory of knowledge
so the idea that it cannot be asserted without
contradiction falls away - once this is
understood
you might be thus disappointed and lament its
diminishing
but it's really about placing scepticism correctly
any denial of knowledge (in a total sense)
is itself defeated in its assertion
so let's leave it at that
and begin again - and start with the idea that
a theory of doubt must -
to get off the ground begin in a context of
assertion
and further understand that whatever its slant -
it never leaves this context
scepticism - to have any significance at all
must be - and is - positive
it asserts
this is the point of it - the reason of it -
to assert doubt - the rationality of doubt
in fact the reality of doubt
it is about what we can know
and the conditions of that knowledge
to say we can know nothing
is not to make an epistemic claim at all
and further it is to misplace and confuse
existence as the object of consciousness
when it is the presupposition of knowledge
any theory of knowledge presupposes existence
the final task for the epistemologist is to
characterize - describe that which is
presupposed
this - if it can be achieved - is a consequence
of the understanding of the internal and external
dimensions of existence - a synthesis if you
like of the subject and object - some characterization -
a reflection that can accommodate both aspects
in a unified theory - that's the idea -
to say my theory of knowledge tells me nothing exists
is to mistake philosophy for bungee jumping
it's to think you are doing one thing -
when you are doing another
it is a confusion
'Scepticism may thus be carried to the point of denying
change and memory, and the reality of all facts. Such a
sceptical dogma would certainly be false, because this
dogma would have to be entertained, and that event would
be a fact and an existence: and the sceptic in framing
that dogma discourses, vacillates, and lives in the act
of contrasting one assertion with another - all of which
is to exist with a vengeance. Yet this false dogma that
nothing exists is tenable intuitively and, while it
prevails, is irrefutable. There are certain motives
(to be discussed later) which render ultimate scepticism
precious to a spiritual mind, as a sanctuary from grosser
illusions. for the wayward sceptic who regards it as no
more truer than any other view, it also has some utility;
it accustoms him to discard the dogma which an introspective
critic might be tempted to think self evident, namely that
he himself lives and thinks. That he does so is true;
but to establish that truth he must appeal to animal faith.
If he is too proud for that, and simply stares at the datum,
the last thing he will see is himself.'
the datum here is a construction or at least the result
of a reflection upon - what?
well the point is we cannot say until we reflect -
to describe is to express a reflection
and by that I mean (and we can only say this in reflection)
consciousness defining perhaps even objectify in some sense
this is just what the mind does -
so - yes - if he just stares at (posits) the datum
the last thing he will see is himself
but the very positing of it entails - the self -
the positer - crude - I know - but I doubt
there is any precision to be found here
for we are at this stage - reflecting reflection -
it is a meta activity of the mind
the act asserting the actor?
reason - it seems demands this procedure -
somewhat backward in coming forward
so we begin somewhere - and build up a picture -
a strange theoretical structure - to live in
and animal faith - well - here I suspect Santayana
is having a bet each way -
the idea of animal faith I would say is -
like any conception - an ideal construction -
an idea - a reflection
but if he has in mind some pre-reflective state -
well I am not convinced that there actually is such -
but even so - if we were to accept such an idea -
we'd be speaking of consciousness - that is not
self-conscious - some would suggest this as a pure
form of consciousness - in any case we are not thus
speaking of an epistemic state or condition - so by
definition - it would seem to be - not something we
could know
and that I suppose would be a picture of ultimate
scepticism
what this highlights though is that scepticism -
is a theory of knowledge
so the idea that it cannot be asserted without
contradiction falls away - once this is
understood
you might be thus disappointed and lament its
diminishing
but it's really about placing scepticism correctly
any denial of knowledge (in a total sense)
is itself defeated in its assertion
so let's leave it at that
and begin again - and start with the idea that
a theory of doubt must -
to get off the ground begin in a context of
assertion
and further understand that whatever its slant -
it never leaves this context
scepticism - to have any significance at all
must be - and is - positive
it asserts
this is the point of it - the reason of it -
to assert doubt - the rationality of doubt
in fact the reality of doubt
it is about what we can know
and the conditions of that knowledge
to say we can know nothing
is not to make an epistemic claim at all
and further it is to misplace and confuse
existence as the object of consciousness
when it is the presupposition of knowledge
any theory of knowledge presupposes existence
the final task for the epistemologist is to
characterize - describe that which is
presupposed
this - if it can be achieved - is a consequence
of the understanding of the internal and external
dimensions of existence - a synthesis if you
like of the subject and object - some characterization -
a reflection that can accommodate both aspects
in a unified theory - that's the idea -
to say my theory of knowledge tells me nothing exists
is to mistake philosophy for bungee jumping
it's to think you are doing one thing -
when you are doing another
it is a confusion
9.9.05
no commitment
to what extent is it possible to speak of - the world -
to speak of things - without ontological commitment?
it depends here what commitment comes to
one would think it is a belief system - underlying
thought and action - and one - at the least accepted -
for all intents and purposes
so ontological commitment is thus - in any action -
presumed
clearly though - we can see that the same set of events -
could well be underpinned by any number of belief systems
and be clear here - 'belief systems' is a description -
that may not refer to anything at all systematic -
systematic belief is not the common way of things
any ontology - as in theory of what exists is clearly
a reflection - if you like a theoretical account of
experience
how necessary it is to have such at all is debatable -
could one live without a theory of the nature of things?
- I think so
still the question what does commitment come to?
I suspect - not much
it is more like the shadow of a body -
than the body itself
my overall feeling is that people do what they do
and explain it as they have to or chose to -
that there is no real commitment
in the main just operating with what is available
we don't know what exists beyond the shadows
Plato got that much right
to speak of things - without ontological commitment?
it depends here what commitment comes to
one would think it is a belief system - underlying
thought and action - and one - at the least accepted -
for all intents and purposes
so ontological commitment is thus - in any action -
presumed
clearly though - we can see that the same set of events -
could well be underpinned by any number of belief systems
and be clear here - 'belief systems' is a description -
that may not refer to anything at all systematic -
systematic belief is not the common way of things
any ontology - as in theory of what exists is clearly
a reflection - if you like a theoretical account of
experience
how necessary it is to have such at all is debatable -
could one live without a theory of the nature of things?
- I think so
still the question what does commitment come to?
I suspect - not much
it is more like the shadow of a body -
than the body itself
my overall feeling is that people do what they do
and explain it as they have to or chose to -
that there is no real commitment
in the main just operating with what is available
we don't know what exists beyond the shadows
Plato got that much right
veridical experience
veridical experience
shows us particulars in universals -
the instability or the relativism of this leads to
a search for foundation - for stability
the mega Platonic Form
or
the final atom
the search for such is not I think based on some
knowledge (perhaps in a Platonic sense of recollection)
of the existence of such a state
but rather it is a consequence of
'seeing what is not'
that is - regarding existence - as is - as pointing
to something - other than itself
now you can regard this as being the source of all
knowledge - or as a sign of the essential (metaphysical)
perversity of human consciousness
on the latter view - knowledge (of whatever kind) -
is in fact the affirmation of the negative
shows us particulars in universals -
the instability or the relativism of this leads to
a search for foundation - for stability
the mega Platonic Form
or
the final atom
the search for such is not I think based on some
knowledge (perhaps in a Platonic sense of recollection)
of the existence of such a state
but rather it is a consequence of
'seeing what is not'
that is - regarding existence - as is - as pointing
to something - other than itself
now you can regard this as being the source of all
knowledge - or as a sign of the essential (metaphysical)
perversity of human consciousness
on the latter view - knowledge (of whatever kind) -
is in fact the affirmation of the negative
5.9.05
consciousness is indeterminate
consciousness is indeterminate by its nature -
hence the question of choice at the level
of action - the veridical level -
when faced with nature - and its determinism
consciousness creates its own reality - an ideal
realm - which accommodates indeterminism - choice
this realm is not extra-natural - i.e. spiritual -
it is rather - a concept of indeterminism
that transcends within the natural realm
so concepts like 'goodness' and 'beauty' are not
to be analyzed in scientific terms
they are - on this view - better understood as
(natural) 'spaces' for possibility
concepts that allow for the indeterminacy of
consciousness - they are expressions of
consciousness
consciousness brings these concepts to the
non-conscious world - as a matter of
necessity
hence the question of choice at the level
of action - the veridical level -
when faced with nature - and its determinism
consciousness creates its own reality - an ideal
realm - which accommodates indeterminism - choice
this realm is not extra-natural - i.e. spiritual -
it is rather - a concept of indeterminism
that transcends within the natural realm
so concepts like 'goodness' and 'beauty' are not
to be analyzed in scientific terms
they are - on this view - better understood as
(natural) 'spaces' for possibility
concepts that allow for the indeterminacy of
consciousness - they are expressions of
consciousness
consciousness brings these concepts to the
non-conscious world - as a matter of
necessity
4.9.05
Epicurus
as I understand it - Epicurus argued for the moral life
and the search for truth but did not regard such pursuits
as holding any value in themselves
now this view can be seen - and Epicurus I imagine saw it
this way - as an argument for pragmatism - practical
philosophy - in particular - ethics
it could also be seen as an argument regarding self
reference
self referential statements
a perennial problem of metaphysics
and - anti-metaphysics
and I think the central problem of rationality
Karl Popper - used it ruthlessly against everyone
but himself
Wittgenstein used it ruthlessly - against himself
anyway
let's say meta statements
statements about the status of other statements -
can only be regarded as having the status they predicate -
of other statements
if they are covered by - their own meta statements -
a higher order statement - that states their status
and we go into an infinite regress
if - we want to keep determining the status of our
status statements
of course we don't do this
we stop - pretty much where we started
well mathematicians don't -
and as a result - to keep from going mad they think
of themselves as artists
anyway
what is the problem with infinite regress?
only that it suggests that the argument we start with
about the status of a statement - (whatever that
statement is)
finally does not have the status - we thought
we were ascribing to it
and so - you might ask - what then can be said?
this though is only one view of infinite regress
perhaps the infinite regress - is not - a strange result -
that leads us astray - but rather - a clearer picture
of just how it is
and the original quest for the logical - rational status
of the statements in question - is in fact the flaw
in the glass
at this point I think we can go back to Epicurus -
and see the point of it -
as incurably practical
needing to get a hold on how to proceed - to act
it's fishing - with a net
and do we need a net for the net?
and the search for truth but did not regard such pursuits
as holding any value in themselves
now this view can be seen - and Epicurus I imagine saw it
this way - as an argument for pragmatism - practical
philosophy - in particular - ethics
it could also be seen as an argument regarding self
reference
self referential statements
a perennial problem of metaphysics
and - anti-metaphysics
and I think the central problem of rationality
Karl Popper - used it ruthlessly against everyone
but himself
Wittgenstein used it ruthlessly - against himself
anyway
let's say meta statements
statements about the status of other statements -
can only be regarded as having the status they predicate -
of other statements
if they are covered by - their own meta statements -
a higher order statement - that states their status
and we go into an infinite regress
if - we want to keep determining the status of our
status statements
of course we don't do this
we stop - pretty much where we started
well mathematicians don't -
and as a result - to keep from going mad they think
of themselves as artists
anyway
what is the problem with infinite regress?
only that it suggests that the argument we start with
about the status of a statement - (whatever that
statement is)
finally does not have the status - we thought
we were ascribing to it
and so - you might ask - what then can be said?
this though is only one view of infinite regress
perhaps the infinite regress - is not - a strange result -
that leads us astray - but rather - a clearer picture
of just how it is
and the original quest for the logical - rational status
of the statements in question - is in fact the flaw
in the glass
at this point I think we can go back to Epicurus -
and see the point of it -
as incurably practical
needing to get a hold on how to proceed - to act
it's fishing - with a net
and do we need a net for the net?
3.9.05
experience
the problem with experience
are we to think of experience as an objective reality?
yes - we certainly refer to it as so
and are we to think of it as subjective?
of course
it's my experience
and are we to speak of it as knowledge?
what do you know if not what you experience?
on the other hand - is not experience always
in a state of flux?
how can we call such the basis for knowledge?
so
experience - subjective and objective - knowledge -
and at the same time just what we cannot regard as
knowledge -
so the problem with experience is that it is everything
and comes to nothing
a quick idea here -
the problem here comes with thinking of experience as
either substance - or process
and prime facie it seems to be both
the thing is it can't be - in any meaningful sense -
and yet if one - there must be a place for - the other
so perhaps
we should - drop these ways of thinking
that is - to not view experience as substance or process
alright
what then?
I want to float the idea of seeing experience as a relation
that is to say it is a relation - a relation between
and between?
between subject - and object
that is consciousness and the world -
experience - is - if you will - 'the middle term'
that which is - exists - is brought into being
if such a relation holds - exists
OK -
so what then do we say about this -
this middle term?
how do we characterize it?
to cut right to it
I say the middle term is undefined
undefined - that is beyond - the characterizations
we bring to it -
clearly - that which results from the relation (experience)
can be regarded in a number of ways
I do speak - and think of it - in substantive objective
terms
and again - in subjective - substantive
also - in terms of objective process and subjective process
as a foundation for knowledge
as the absence of foundation
so - I wish to suggest there is a way we can maintain our
common intuitions regarding experience
if we know - understand - that none of these characterizations
is a characterization of experience - per se - as such
rather they are ways of defining - giving definition to an
essentially open relationship between consciousness
and the world
our needs are connected but diverse - we require different
conceptual schemes - languages - to deal with the fundamental
state - of being - that is - consciousness in the world
it is this relationship that is the ground of need and its
possibilities
experience is this relationship
are we to think of experience as an objective reality?
yes - we certainly refer to it as so
and are we to think of it as subjective?
of course
it's my experience
and are we to speak of it as knowledge?
what do you know if not what you experience?
on the other hand - is not experience always
in a state of flux?
how can we call such the basis for knowledge?
so
experience - subjective and objective - knowledge -
and at the same time just what we cannot regard as
knowledge -
so the problem with experience is that it is everything
and comes to nothing
a quick idea here -
the problem here comes with thinking of experience as
either substance - or process
and prime facie it seems to be both
the thing is it can't be - in any meaningful sense -
and yet if one - there must be a place for - the other
so perhaps
we should - drop these ways of thinking
that is - to not view experience as substance or process
alright
what then?
I want to float the idea of seeing experience as a relation
that is to say it is a relation - a relation between
and between?
between subject - and object
that is consciousness and the world -
experience - is - if you will - 'the middle term'
that which is - exists - is brought into being
if such a relation holds - exists
OK -
so what then do we say about this -
this middle term?
how do we characterize it?
to cut right to it
I say the middle term is undefined
undefined - that is beyond - the characterizations
we bring to it -
clearly - that which results from the relation (experience)
can be regarded in a number of ways
I do speak - and think of it - in substantive objective
terms
and again - in subjective - substantive
also - in terms of objective process and subjective process
as a foundation for knowledge
as the absence of foundation
so - I wish to suggest there is a way we can maintain our
common intuitions regarding experience
if we know - understand - that none of these characterizations
is a characterization of experience - per se - as such
rather they are ways of defining - giving definition to an
essentially open relationship between consciousness
and the world
our needs are connected but diverse - we require different
conceptual schemes - languages - to deal with the fundamental
state - of being - that is - consciousness in the world
it is this relationship that is the ground of need and its
possibilities
experience is this relationship
2.9.05
knowledge and existence
any theory of knowledge - presupposes a theory of
existence - at least for knowledge
could we begin an epistemological inquiry without
assuming the existence of knowledge - and characterizing
it - in some way - i.e. - as experience - as reason?
and the same applies with any ontological inquiry -
to begin the question of the nature of existence -
one must assume a theory of knowledge -
i.e. - we must assume that we know and know in a
certain way to say anything about what may or
may not exist
so what does this tell us?
we can approach epistemological and ontological issues -
but never without presupposition
it is just a question of perspective - you can begin
with either perspective - emphasis -
but you do not begin from a neutral ground
rather you begin - in the issues
and what you do then is explicate - expand the
perception
it is working in logical space - giving it form and
content
it may even be just recovering presuppositions -
again giving them explication - bringing them to
the fore - re-evaluating and stating their logical
status
it's possible too that in such an inquiry -
quite different understandings emerge
perhaps too
what this tells us is that knowledge and existence -
are - two aspects of a single - unified reality
that our understanding - is of two dimensions
knowing and existence
one thing I think this points to is that we cannot
conflate knowledge and existence
in the way that the solipsist argues - or the nihilist
that one can be reduced exclusively to the other
and the reason being just that any theory of knowing -
presupposes existence
any theory of existence - presupposes knowledge
either discussion - epistemological or ontological -
cannot begin in the absence of the other - this is to
also argue against reduction -
does it make sense to understand knowledge and existence
as separate poles - or end points of being?
I have used this image before - but it is like building
a house from the inside
the thing is the foundations (ontology) cannot be decided
independently of the aspect (epistemology) and the aspect
is not decided without reference to the foundations
but this is no ordinary construction - for it is never
finally determined - changes to the aspect - entail
changing the make up of the foundation
and the building goes on - from the inside - there are
constant additions and subtractions
what once was a cottage becomes a village - a village
a city - and then the city stripped back to a village
(of different design) perhaps back to a single room -
and possibly this is dismantled - to just foundations -
an open aspect - or indeed the foundations themselves
are removed
and then just as an aspect (solipsism) - but one that
has no definition no place -
perhaps this leads to rebuilding - a search for
foundations - and idea about aspect
perhaps there are no foundations - and so a structure
that is not permanently located with ever changing
aspect
and the point of all this - reason - who's building
the house and why?
the thing is - there is no answer outside of what
is going on - if there are any reasons(and in fact there
are many - and many changing reasons) they can only be
found inside - inside the structure as it is built
and destroyed and built again -
if you hope for a reason - from the outside - take stock
of yourself - there is no reason outside - reason is a
property of the inside - of logical space -
existence - at least for knowledge
could we begin an epistemological inquiry without
assuming the existence of knowledge - and characterizing
it - in some way - i.e. - as experience - as reason?
and the same applies with any ontological inquiry -
to begin the question of the nature of existence -
one must assume a theory of knowledge -
i.e. - we must assume that we know and know in a
certain way to say anything about what may or
may not exist
so what does this tell us?
we can approach epistemological and ontological issues -
but never without presupposition
it is just a question of perspective - you can begin
with either perspective - emphasis -
but you do not begin from a neutral ground
rather you begin - in the issues
and what you do then is explicate - expand the
perception
it is working in logical space - giving it form and
content
it may even be just recovering presuppositions -
again giving them explication - bringing them to
the fore - re-evaluating and stating their logical
status
it's possible too that in such an inquiry -
quite different understandings emerge
perhaps too
what this tells us is that knowledge and existence -
are - two aspects of a single - unified reality
that our understanding - is of two dimensions
knowing and existence
one thing I think this points to is that we cannot
conflate knowledge and existence
in the way that the solipsist argues - or the nihilist
that one can be reduced exclusively to the other
and the reason being just that any theory of knowing -
presupposes existence
any theory of existence - presupposes knowledge
either discussion - epistemological or ontological -
cannot begin in the absence of the other - this is to
also argue against reduction -
does it make sense to understand knowledge and existence
as separate poles - or end points of being?
I have used this image before - but it is like building
a house from the inside
the thing is the foundations (ontology) cannot be decided
independently of the aspect (epistemology) and the aspect
is not decided without reference to the foundations
but this is no ordinary construction - for it is never
finally determined - changes to the aspect - entail
changing the make up of the foundation
and the building goes on - from the inside - there are
constant additions and subtractions
what once was a cottage becomes a village - a village
a city - and then the city stripped back to a village
(of different design) perhaps back to a single room -
and possibly this is dismantled - to just foundations -
an open aspect - or indeed the foundations themselves
are removed
and then just as an aspect (solipsism) - but one that
has no definition no place -
perhaps this leads to rebuilding - a search for
foundations - and idea about aspect
perhaps there are no foundations - and so a structure
that is not permanently located with ever changing
aspect
and the point of all this - reason - who's building
the house and why?
the thing is - there is no answer outside of what
is going on - if there are any reasons(and in fact there
are many - and many changing reasons) they can only be
found inside - inside the structure as it is built
and destroyed and built again -
if you hope for a reason - from the outside - take stock
of yourself - there is no reason outside - reason is a
property of the inside - of logical space -
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