what do you perceive?

when you perceive - and ask the question -
the philosophical question - what do I perceive? -
the answer is of course reflective - after the fact -
and is what?

the idea that we can speak of the image of an object
and the object itself (the ground
of the image)

what is - what is perceived

both these dimensions - are the result of reflection -

after the fact -

and this reflection is necessary for knowing - knowledge

is not all knowledge - reflective?

and my point here is that the awareness of x (as it were
pre-reflective) is pure and undefined - in that it is
non-reflective -

the experience is without knowledge - pre-knowledge

the awareness - I say is noumenal

this is not quite the Kantian sense - in that Kant
I think regarded the noumenal as analytical - or reflective -
and the phenomenal as the presentation

here I suggest the noumenal is the presentation

what is presented is the unknown

reflection - and the phenomenal?

do we want to say here that the phenomenal is reflective -
post presentation -

yes I think so -

my idea is that -

the connection of things - even persons and non-persons
(perceivers and their objects of perception) - would be
included here - is - purely existential - primitive -

any definition of this is after the fact and - reflective

so pure experience is of the unknown

is noumenal

mind - enables the reflection that is experience -
that is knowledge

the world reflects in mind

the mind reflects the world

it is not hard to conceive a world without this -
reflection

no experience - no knowledge

it is this world - the unknown that we are fundamentally
connected to

the mind is the reflection of this

the reflection - after the fact - of connection -

of - existence

so the philosopher's stone - the unknown

NB

it goes without saying that this argument is an
argument of reflection

it is - as it were a reflective return to the
non-reflective

paradoxically - if you like - a return to the
ground of reflection - the ground of mind

it is to say we can know - that the basis of the
known is the unknown

knowledge - knowing it's origin - its reason -
is not knowing the inside of itself - it is
knowing the outside of itself - what it is not -
the unknown

Spinoza's attributes

Spinoza's statement of attributes -

as I understand it - his argument is

we perceive (the essence of substance as manifested
in the attributes of extension and mind) what is -

our perception of what is - is determined by what is -
(substance)

therefore

there is - on this level - no room for doubt -
o margin for error

what is - is what is perceived - by what is
(a mode thereof)

tight argument - like a puzzle clicking into place

existence determines what can be known - what can
be known (on this most fundamental level) is what
is known

end of story

how do you crack this code?

if you begin with Spinoza's premises - the conclusion
follows

the knower is a mode of substance

and the knower - can know - the essence -

the essence - as revealed (to the knower) is -
just what the knower is - extension /mind

the argument here is really about the status of
philosophical / metaphysical thinking - theories

if the argument cannot be faulted - is it therefore -
true

as in trivial -

as in unfalsifiable

no content -

here though it seems we are

moving into the realm of empirical theory

OK

but still the question

what value - a metaphysics - that cannot be challenged -
on its own grounds?

here it seems to me the only way to go is to say

OK - here is a world view that is well worked out

it's one of a number

the world is richer for this creation

the rational way to go in the face of such -
the range of such views - is to appreciate

to adopt if - if circumstances (philosophical
circumstances) suggest

but at the end of the day

as far as commitment goes -

suspend judgement

epoche

p.s.

the status of philosophical discourse -
itself suggests an overriding metaphysics
- a meta philosophy - if you like -

a domain of possibility

possible ways of knowing and understanding

this range exists because there is no definite -
one view

this fact itself is - or becomes - paradoxically -
the fundamental position

it is the position of choice
nothing is demanded

and reason for adoption?

itself a study in possibility

contingency and empiricism

if we assume that all empirical knowledge is
observational knowledge and what is observed -
is a contingent reality

are we assuming that if x is contingent x is
observable?

and x is observable x is contingent?

here our notion of contingency is based on our
theory of knowledge and our theory of
knowledge based on contingency

an epistemology and an ontology that entail
each other

the problem with this though is that the world
is greater than its knowledge

so for such a marriage to work - it need be assumed
that empirical knowledge cannot cover all the ground

so - here a reason to doubt empiricism

the window of opportunity for - non-empirical knowledge -
the dreaded a priori - like a dictator's hand

or

what?

the recognition that empirical knowledge -
indeed that knowledge - whatever your
view is by its nature limited

that yes - in a sense we know (within certain
parameters) but beyond these - is what is not known -
in empirical terms - is not observed - or cannot
be observed

and this is just the nature of it

without such a limitation - the limitation of the
unknown - there is no knowledge - of any kind

OK

what this suggests is that some sanity is put into
the issue if we take a step back and have a think -

what does observational - empirical knowledge tell
us about the world?

well first up it tells us - what we observe

this though on the face of it is everything -
on reflection is in fact - nothing

what we see - that is the nature of it -
is strictly speaking another question

we can say the world is what is observable -

are you happy with this?

beyond this statement is just - what?

quite clearly the unknown

that is if you want to push it - to further define -
the observable - you as it were - have to start again -

either that - or bite down hard and assume you have
everything for the journey

what I think has happened in empiricism - is a switch -

we jump from epistemology to ontology -
as if we haven't moved

voila - what we are talking about now - is contingency

(has quite a solid ring to it)

however nothing is actually really gained -
just an impression of foundation -

foundation to observation

and ontology for your knowledge

thank you sir

my point is - yes - knowledge is knowledge of -

but in this case it is knowledge of the observable

but truly

again if you want to elaborate here - what is -
the observable

who is to say?

modes

and what of the nature of modes -

clearly everything is a mode

a modification of substance - that which is
something else - through which it is conceived

here a mode is a reality - a modification of substance

anything that cannot be conceived through itself
(i.e. - substance - the totality -)

therefore any expression of substance

that is conceived - in terms of another expression
of substance

so a mode is something that is not ontologically
independent

any particular - or anything that can be so conceived -

so modes - the world as is - without the abstraction
of substance? why not?

so yes - every thing can be seen in relation to another

must be - to be explained - accounted for

this is what science does

OK

but do you need substance?

i.e. - if you were to say modes are all there is

a nominalist argument?

wherefore substance?

except - as an idea of that which is (or may be)
common to all - to all modes

a concept - is it logically necessary or perhaps
rather psychologically necessary - comforting -
perhaps?

the idea of essence

perhaps we call this - 'existence'?

but here I am suggesting it as a pure idea -
a notion of commonality

an idea that has no real substance

except in terms of ongoing heuristic endeavours

a kind of goal - of scientific endeavour -
or a presupposition - that is not real - except
in a conceptual sense

NB

and just on the idea of essence

it presupposes omniscience -

for to have knowledge of the essence of all -
is in some sense to know all

(this is not possible from a modal point of view)

it is obviously - another reason for Spinoza's substance

but even accepting Spinoza's idea of substance -
can we make sense of omniscience -
of substance - knowing itself?

bluntly - self-knowledge - if self-knowledge -

is an outcome of consciousness - self-consciousness -

there seems to be no prime facie sense in the idea
of the totality - aware - of anything - let alone itself

the point is essence if it has any reality must be unknown

p.s.

modes -

we have the phenomenal reality

and it is the obvious - what presents to consciousness

clearly though for Spinoza - a mode is beyond this a
question of explanation

- what can be understood in terms of -

at this point we leave the obvious -

we go into scientific explanation -

and here the phenomenal world can be seen to dissolve

dissolve into the theoretical - and its world of entities -
always - necessarily - always sub-phenomenal

and here there is no concretness - no stability as such

all is fluid - all is up for grabs

science at this level - is strictly speaking in a constant
state of anarchy

so - in reality - from the point of view of theoretical
science - the individual - the particular is like - substance -
a concept - an idea - a category - a framework

the reality we come to with this framework is - unknown
(hence the framework)

substance and attribute

substance expresses itself - which is to say it exists -

as part of this we see - perceive - substance

from - substance - that is as modes of it -

(there is actually no other position - even God?

what can God see on this view?

one would think the totality sees nothing

for it is the total

only a part can see the whole - or see into it

God or nature simply exists

hence the point of view of eternity - is no point of
view at all

except perhaps - poetic)

we perceive the world from the world - in the world -
what we perceive is what is - though not all of what is

(on this view there is an argument that the totality
is not cannot be perceived)

what we perceive - are attributes of substance - existence -
characteristics

extension and mind

attributes - that make up - that are - the mode - we are

we perceive our own characteristics

the body is a form of matter

the mind - of thought

still a question -

does thought recognize thought?

do I perceive another mind - with my mind - as it were -
directly?

interesting -

I for one think this is so

but while space / matter is obviously everywhere

thought is not obviously so -

the problem for parallelism

God / nature - the totality - expresses itself in these
attributes

do we have any reason to think there are other attributes?

Spinoza says - yes otherwise God / nature is limited

but this is really no argument -

what if the world is just extension and thought?

it appears so at least -

and that these attributes are infinite?

still the limit of two attributes - expressions

yes

but saying there are an infinity of attributes -

does away with the limit of attributes

but to what consequence?

what is substance other than its attributes -

infinite number or not?

Spinoza says attributes are perceived essences

attributes are thus what we know

beyond that is what we don't know

Spinoza of course would not have wished to concede to
scepticism

and it is his avoidance of this reality

that has led to his theory of substance

instead of accepting that we don't know what we don't know

Spinoza says - reality is infinite

for all intents and purposes -

the unknown

Spinoza's perception

on Spinoza's view the mind is both perceiver
and perception?

we perceive mind as an attribute of substance

we perceive with mind

now if all that is being asserted here is that
mind exists - OK

the thing is what kind of perception is this?

we can say that the mind is aware of itself -

but does it perceive itself?

how can the subject be its own object?

this of course is the problem of consciousness

still it's worth asking this kind of question

the mind's awareness of itself is

awareness of itself as subject

this it seems is contained in the concept of awareness

awareness here it seems cannot be further analyzed

mind is this

so

so does it make any sense to speak of mind as aware
of itself

awareness aware of awareness

is what -

awareness

so - an argument that

logically speaking

the mind - is not an object of awareness

whatever is the object of - awareness -
is outside the mind

so - the dichotomy - mind / matter

(matter as - whatever is outside)

and as to the nature of it all

we know mind
we know matter

and you could take an expressionist-metaphysical
line and say

mind and matter are expressions of -

the totality -

but as to the totality

we can't assume anything

we can talk about what we know

and beyond that (if there is a 'beyond that') -

is what we don't know -

clear cut

the world as expression

the world expresses itself as mind - as matter

these expressions - our reality

the limitation of our perspective - the modality -
of this perspective
entails - a tunnel vision -

we can reason - what we see is not all there is -

mind and matter

perceived perceptions of a reality of infinite -
(possible) perspectives

what can this mean though?

can it have any substance?

is it simply

an argument for

the idea of totality -

the lack of limitation?

it is not as if Spinoza is arguing for possible worlds

as if reality - finally - is just possibility

and it so happens

this world - here - put up its hand

that it is not necessary

for on such a view you might argue

the given world is contingent

it strikes me that Spinoza's argument here for
substance - is empty

no substance

and no possibility

it's a dead end - a null set

cosmologically - metaphysically speaking -

Spinoza's approach

if everything is an expression of the whole -
of existence

that is we come at the issue from the top down

and this is Spinoza's approach - starting point

we are proceeding not from experience - we cannot
experience the whole

rather from reasoning

the idea that a part cannot exist independent
of a whole

the particular - only has ontological reality
given a universal - for it to be a particular of -

we can say - that our basis for this ontological
assertion is epistemological

it is a function of the mind

at this point of course you can question whether we
have any basis for believing in anything other than
the mind

but this matter I suggest is already resolved

in the argument that the mind is a particular -
is an expression of a greater reality - a whole -
finally

as to the nature of this whole - again we can say

it is finally unknown - but no less real for that

we can at least assume a relation between the mind
and the world - even if again - we may not be able
to say - with any certainty - what it is

there is - at least logically speaking - the relation
of inclusion

- the mind - included in - the whole

- this we can say - cannot be otherwise

so we can speak of relations - and the relation here -
inclusion - is if you like - primitive - undefined

so we speculate as to the nature of the relationship

and to do this is to exercise nothing more than a
(higher?) function of consciousness

again it is the question of knowledge - what can we know
- of the unknown?

it is the making of metaphysics

and the success of any such a creation will be measured
by what?

what distinguishes one account of the relation of
particular to universal from another?

why should we prefer one against the other?

any account will live or die on its own assumptions

for built into any serious account will be its criterion
of truth

so finally no objective test - rather a question of
consistency - at least of premises and conclusion

so a deductive matter

OK - much to be said here - but I'll get back to Spinoza

what is it that distinguishes anything within a totality?

once we begin with the totality can we get down to the
individual?

clearly this is where we really begin - with individual
things

the whole is a real - but a logical abstraction -

Spinoza begins with the whole - the totality - existence
itself

what exists on this view must exist - and it's everything
- yes

but why does any thing exist?

can his philosophy address this question?

not really - for Spinoza such a question is really finally
the same as asking why existence itself?

and there can be no answer to this - in the sense of -
there is something outside of existence that is its cause -

for existence - substance is sui causa

the world expresses itself the way it does - why? -
there is no reason

it could not be otherwise -

the best we can do is understand this

so finally we are left with a vision of necessity

as to the status of this - now there's a question

is it knowledge?

or is it logic?

in the sense of - what it is possible to think?

(and Spinoza's view at this)

yes - it is this

finally - the logic of substance

and Spinoza's view here depends on a form
of the ontological argument

that thinking - shall we say good thinking -
ogical thinking is always about what exists

thought - that is - reflects existence

(if you make this assumption - adopt this view -
Spinoza's theory can be seen to
follow)

to think about the totality is therefore to think
about what exists

when really all it is - is to give a logical setting -
that has no content - substance - to it - to the logical
reality of an individual - a particular

it is just to say a particular is - an instance
of a universal

we can say this without any reference to any actual
existing thing

it is a statement that tells us - how we think about
ourselves and the world - in a fundamental way -
it's a statement about the logic of this thinking

and finally there is no necessity in this thinking -
unless you adopt it

logic is a realm of possibility - not necessity

how we understand the world - and indeed whether we
understand it as a world is a matter of conjecture -

we can adopt a particular ontology - yes -

but where the necessity?

Spinoza's theory of substance

Spinoza's theory of substance

is monistic

what exists is a singularity

there is only one substance

now according to Spinoza

we perceive attributes of this substance

(we are attributes of this substance)

attributes are what is perceived - expressions

on Spinoza's theory - perceived or not

they are expressions of what is

characteristics of it

now with these attributes - where does the weight lie?

in perceiving or in what is perceived?

I think Spinoza would say - the weight is equal

OK

still there is a question of the essence of substance -

i.e. that which all attributes have in common

that which is - if you like - prior to

perceived expressions

that which must be for them to be perceived expressions?

i.e. - can we distinguish - does Spinoza need to
distinguish - attributes from substance?

now extension and mind on Spinoza's view are two attributes

two perceptions of essence?

yes - it can't be two essences - perceived

the definition - of substance requires that it has an
infinity of attributes -

now we can ask - in relation to the two attributes -
extension and mind - how are they to be distinguished?

- on Spinoza's view

are they just equivalent descriptions of one phenomenon
- i.e. - substance?

it would seem so

now according to Spinoza - we can only describe substance
under - two attributes - we can see it as extended -
or as mental -

and we do make a distinction

it is real -

if so what can it be based on?

i.e. - what distinguishes mind and matter?

this seems to be the direction Spinoza wants to avoid

on his view - it is not a question of distinguishing the two

- rather it is - how to understand 'them' as one?

and here it seems we can only talk of descriptions

different descriptions - languages of - the one

two descriptions - two of an infinite number of
possible descriptions

so to the question - what is to count as the one
description of the one substance?

prime facie - you would think that such is possible -
even necessary -

(how else would we know substance as one - if we
couldn't so describe it?)

what is clear though - is that we can only describe
it terms of attributes -

is this to say no singular description is possible?

unless we say - as Spinoza does -

that substance is existence

OK - yes

substance in all its manifestations exists -

the question though is - how meaningful is such a
statement?

to assert x is to - make an existential statement

x as such - (even once asserted is still x) -
has no epistemic content

to say substance exists - appears to be making -
a statement about substance

it is not

the existential assertion of substance tells us
only that x is x

the common characteristic of all of substance's
attributes - is existence

again - to say A1 exists - A2 exists etc.

is to say nothing

if so -

how are attributes distinguished on Spinoza's theory

and

how are they to be understood as different from -
what it is claimed they are attributes of -
that is substance?

I think finally with Spinoza we have a pure assertion
of existence -

the grand existential statement

x exists

(whatever x is - it exists)

but it is - over and above this oddly enough -
an empty statement

I'm not sure that the existential assertion - is an empty
statement or a meaningless statement -

but it is - rather - colourless

and

lacking - substance

it seems our knowledge is attribute bound

we know substance through its attributes

our knowledge therefore is attribute specific?

as to knowledge of substance as a singularity -

this seems not possible -

for it requires that our knowledge is infinite -

beyond our limited perception (extension and mind)
we have no knowledge

except that logical knowledge that substance is infinite

this though amounts to saying substance is unknowable
- in itself

and in terms of its appearance - only in an attribute
dependent manner -

and severely limited in this regard

what is thinking?

what is thinking?

in simple terms it is to reflect

and what is this - to reflect?

it is the action of mind -

this does not really give us an answer

and to cut to the chase -

the problem is we can only answer such a question
by thinking

that is we can only answer the question - thinking
poses - (its nature) by thinking

this suggest thinking can explore itself

OK - this thinking - is reflection on reflection

if you like a second order reflection

in which thinking (first order) becomes the subject
of thought

now I think this does happen in a clear way -

the question is though - what does this tell us of
thought - the mind - thinking

or more specifically - reflection

reflection it seems is not - what?

fixed within bounds?

theoretically we can have a situation where there
is no end to reflecting on reflection

the capacity to reflect - 'regard' - is without limit

even so

what is happening - at any logical level is just
reflection

and so the question - what is this?

well it is consciousness - what it does -

and it is this (whatever it is) that distinguishes
mind from matter -

matter - as an object of mind - does not reflect -

the reflection is the mind - operating - internally -
on itself

p.s.

the idea of reflectivity and the mind as internality -

doesn't necessarily mean there is something other
than matter

what I have in mind is the view that by 'matter'
we mean 'what exists' - whatever it's attributes and
dimensions

on this view it would follow as a matter of definition
that the inside - (mind) is to be regarded as a form of -
a dimension of - matter
here we would have to say

that matter has a reflective and non-reflective
characteristic

the reflective is the internal of what is (mind) -

the non-reflective is the external - the surface of what
is (the physical world)

could we then regard mind as a function of matter?

perhaps

an internal function that is not - by definition -
a characteristic of the surface

anyway

still the question how to define - pin down

reflection - mind

no answer - except in terms of reflection

we never leave the farm

attributes and self-consciousness

Spinoza writes in his definitions on the attribute -

'By attribute I understand that which the intellect perceives of substance as
constituting its essence'

in so far as the intellect perceives mind it perceives itself -

therefore self-consciousness?

is this the way it goes?

still one could ask - is it my mind I perceive
or the mind -

and really where is the difference?

I perceive my body - I perceive matter -

I perceive my mind - I perceive mind

it is not an either / or proposition

you could say without these ontological categories -
there would be no perception

Spinoza and consciousness

Spinoza's theory of the equivalence of matter and mind

two aspects of the one substance

a prime facie difficulty - (perhaps not fatal - but
nevertheless worthy)

physical states - simply exist - exist - out there?

they are not 'had'

don't we say something like - thoughts are had

consciousness is had

that is - it doesn't exist 'out there'

it is possessed -

do we think of or speak of conscious states -
as being out there

rather I think the opposite - they are 'in' there

and for mine this is not just a verbal matter -
an ordinary language argument

it is a true characterization

consciousness - is in my view - the inside -
of the world

and such an argument is not necessarily an
argument against - a kind of Spinozistic
monism

but it is an argument against - one dimensionalism -

a one dimensional view of -

my view is - in this sense - dualistic - reality
has two dimensions - inside and outside - a surface
and an interior -

the interior - I say is consciousness - is mind -

the surface - the physical world

such a view - such as it is -

allows - one could say demands - as a matter of logic -
a form of monism

an inside is co-extensive with the outside -

this is a solution to the Spinozistic problem

Spinoza and subjectivity

I think Spinoza's model for the physical world -
is extension

one dimensional - (in the sense that it is not
reflective)

and for Spinoza - the mental is effectively no
different to the physical

the fact that 'I know' - on such a view is not
ontologically and different to 'x exists'

there is no real internal dimension to reality
for Spinoza

everything is objective

subjectivity - just a fact of the objective world

we would say a physical fact

his conception is I think in the same vein as modern
mind-brain identity theorists

Spinoza has no doubt about objectivity

the question for him is how best to describe it -

to account for its unfolding - its expression

for Spinoza the mind is a means to this end -

an instrument to be used in this enterprise -
and for him - finally - it is no different - in
the end to that which it is put to the service of -

it too has to be laid out - explained - described -

just as does the physical world and its features

it's as if the mind displays the world

it is all like an exhibition

how do you distinguish the exhibiting from what
is exhibited?

substance

the fact is substance cannot be seen from the outside

and yet we get such an impression from Spinoza -
re: sub specie aeternitatis

the whole - the totality - is a conception

a conception that comes from consciousness

consciousness sees outside itself (at least we can
begin with this idea)

consciousness distinguishes itself from what it is not -

what it is not - is the world

we can say it knows itself - as within - therefore
(at least) an outside

the totality - nature or God - is a conception
generated from the nature of consciousness

consciousness - distinguishes x from not-x

such is logic - the basis of it

and so substance - a conception generated by the logic
of consciousness - of thought

consciousness reflects in itself and places itself
within -

as to the nature of that which is outside of
consciousness - or greater than

we never get out of the realm of ideas -
whatever our conception

we never that is have a privileged position -
(not in reality - even if it is projected in
thought) - of being outside of the world

there is - that is no objective position

a position that is outside of consciousness

(such an idea makes no sense)

Spinoza does not understand consciousness - its logic -
its dynamic - its limits

the world outside of consciousness cannot be objectively
known -

cannot be directly known

if direct means - in some way - knowledge that is not
finally a processing of - what - data?

and this data is not known

its character is not given -

it is made - constructed

the construction goes on - on a number of levels -

(a divine comedy)

and however simple or complex

it is a function of consciousness

no real substance here either

as it is up to consciousness - its reflection on itself
- to come up with a conception - of its own functioning

it is clear - the knowing of consciousness is an illusion
- inside or out

consciousness is a metaphysical point (there are many)
on a metaphysical map

a focus - (whatever in the end this means) - that stands
in the world

simply - a point - that is substanceless - the unknown

Spinoza's extreme objectivism

from Spinoza's point of view - mind and matter -
two attributes of God - two expressions of substance

to speak this way is to adopt an objective stance

a kind of scientific view - a Spinoza science -
the world is made of the physical and mental -

or to be more precise - we can approach the world
from a physical point of view - and get a complete
picture - and / or from a mental point of view -
and - this too gives us a total picture

the idea of two ways of knowing the one thing

but really isn't this just one way of knowing -
via the mind

(are we to say the physical (i.e. the body)
'knows' the mental (the mind) ?)

and further - is not the physical world still
object - to the subject of knowing?

a question too - is the mind in knowing the
physical world - knowing itself - or to
scale it down - is knowledge of the body -
knowledge of the mind?

Spinoza's view would be fine - if we didn't
have to account for the 'self' of self-
consciousness

the mind knowing itself -

the mind as an object of consciousness

in the same way as the physical world is -

ideas and physical states - we can see -
as being a symmetry -

but once you bring in self - a symmetry is broken

the mind is not just a reflection of the body

it is a reflection of itself

and so - the mind (itself) and / or its contents -
are object - of the mind - (this just is self-consciousness)
AND the physical world - too - is object of the mind

what do we say of this mind - that holds itself and the
physical world - as object?

at the least - that it is two-dimensional?

the mind that views - whatever - is if you like
a level of mind -

and the mind that is (with the physical world) -
an object of this view

(the mind as subject and object - there goes the
neighbourhood - and the heap of rubble on the lawn -
the great home of Western logic - Aristotle Russell
Frege - walking the streets)

I think for Spinoza - the idea is that the mind is -
like the physical world - one dimensional - not of
course that it can be - but this is his objective
picture - his 'scientific view'

and I am not here trying to argue for the privilege
of the self in all this -

the thing is you can't discount it - and any objective
view (just as any subjective view) must give account
of the relation of mind to mind -

for without such no account of mind / body will be
successful

Spinoza's concept of substance

Spinoza's concept of substance -

'in itself and conceived through itself' -

'that the conception of which does not depend upon the
conception of another thing through which it must be formed'

in short - existence per se

it is to say - existence exists

and it cannot be otherwise

(how could it be?)

the question though - what is this existence

- apart from itself?

is there anything to be said?

yes -

we know it expresses itself - as the material world -
and as mind

how do we know this?

we see - reflect - this - primarily in ourselves

(expression of existence)

in mind and body

the seeing is only possible - given consciousness

but mind on this view is no accident - no epiphenomenon

it is existence

on this view - mind - one of an infinite number of
possible expressions of existence

as is matter - the material world

could things be so constituted that existence was not
known via these expressions matter and mind?

yes

it would seem

the reality is of course that such is not the case

but on Spinoza's view is it necessary that existence
reveals itself in these attributes?

good question

perhaps not - given that there are an infinite number
of attributes we don't see

(this though is not to take away from the reality
of what we do see - it is real - not illusory)

the expression of existence in matter and mind

why?

is it some accident of necessity?

could the world be otherwise?

it is not - true

but there is some sense - (the infinite attributes
of substance) - in which there is possibility

not so much possible worlds as possible expressions

it seems though without mind we could not know this -
unless there are within this
range of infinite attributes - something like other
ways of knowing)

the idea of the infinity of attributes in a sense
destroys the idea of substance

be careful what you wish for

for what does infinity come to - in any substantial
sense?

that is where is the substance in infinity?

to say x is infinite defines x formally or
mathematically - not in terms of content - its
reality - its substance - what does an infinite
thing come to - anything?

such seems to be a contentless notion