Spinoza on mind VIII

P.XXIV. The human mind does not involve an adequate knowledge of the parts
composing the human body.


simple awareness in the sense of acknowledgment of the states of the body - is no
more than brute awareness -

it is not knowledge - in fact it is the ground of not-knowing

such awareness is the awareness that we do not know -

we experience - but what is it we experience?

in order to deal with this awareness - to operate with it - we must give it definition -
give it character -

we never start from scratch here - always we begin with the given of accepted
knowledge

that is whatever constructions - whatever imaginations - are regarded as true

and true here is what is useful - what functions

what is clear is that with any awareness of the body comes the awareness of just what
is not known -

my point is that inadequate ideas - point not primarily to what we know - but rather to
what is not known

in fact any idea is an inadequate idea just by the fact that it will always be a partial
representation of what exists

and this is all an idea can be

we operate not in knowledge - but in ignorance -

ideas themselves have no real epistemological value unless they are placed in the form
of an argument

or in a context and in relation to other ideas

any such argument will depend for its currency on its validity and the truth of its
premises - and these matters are never settled in a conclusive manner -

so in effect what we have when we speak of knowledge is really different
characterizations of the unknown

different ideas of the unknown

the value of any such idea or system of ideas is never certain -

to understand why people believe what they do about the unknown - that is how they
characterize it and why they hold to any such characterization one really needs to go
outside of logic and epistemology

it is here that power is the issue - it is not a question of logic - logic in this context is only a tool of persuasion - one though that has the mark of respectability

we may never fully understand what forces operate on belief and therefore on action

but clearly we all come into a world ready made - there is not and never has been a
clean slate - the waters are always muddied - the definitions are in place

understanding what we are dealing with - what has been imposed on us and why is a
life's work

and the understandings are not fixed - the search for truth is never finished - and in an ultimate sense is quite hopeless

we in fact only engage in it out of the necessity to deal with and survive in this world

it gives us method

the issue of life is not the end point - rather the next point -

and how we get there is the problem of knowledge

no doubt we would get somewhere anyway - and some would argue this is in fact all
that occurs

nevertheless consciousness gives us a sense of purpose even if this is illusory

- the immediate forces of our lives place us in conflict - and the point of a conflict is
that it be resolved

here is the fact of choice - choice in necessity - and the reality is we don't know in any
clear sense what is the correct or proper choice - nevertheless we must decide -

and decide in what we regard at the time to be in our best interests -

this is just where not-knowing gives us possibility - it is the source of possibility

and the fact of this possibility - the possibility that comes with not-knowing is the fact
of human freedom - and the source of human dignity

so long as one can think one can never be ruled - one can never be conquered

the illusion of knowledge is the ground of power - it is the source of corruption

not-knowing is the mark of a free man - it is the sign of an open heart

Spinoza on mind VII

P.XXIII. The mind does not know itself except in so far as it perceives the idea of the
affections of the body.


the ideas of the affections of the body - the ideas of the states of the body

if the mind is idea - what we have here is the argument that the mind perceives the
mind

the physical states of the body are also ideas

Spinoza thinks the mind perceives - both the affections - and the ideas

the perception of the affection is a perception of what?

presumably it is an awareness - but an awareness of what?

- an awareness of the body or of a state of the body -

and is this awareness not an idea?

how does the perception of the affectation differ from the perception of the idea of the
affectation

the idea of the affectation we can say is the thought of it

is this to suggest that the experience of it is something different to the thought of it

you could say one presupposes the other - the idea follows the experience of it

the experience though is an awareness - and in that sense an idea

so the idea of the awareness is the idea of what - the idea -

now the idea of the idea - if that is possible - has no content

so - the affection is irrelevant

so can Spinoza distinguish the perception of affections of the body and the perception
of the ideas of the body?

my argument is the states of the body are not known outside of consciousness

awareness makes an unknown known - and we may not know how this happens but it
happens - we can on the basis of awareness deal with what has occurred

so we have in this case the affections of the body as unknown - and the affections as
known -

when known we can say we then have an idea of the state of the body

the idea was not what was perceived - the idea is the result

OK

the mind does not know itself except in so far as it perceives the ideas of the
affections of the body

so can the result - as I have represented it - be perceived?

we can be aware and aware of our awareness

we can focus on an idea - hold an idea - and make it the subject of further thinking

would you call this perceiving ideas?

it is being aware of ideas - perception as I understand it is the focus outside of ideas

the focus outside of mind

so I wouldn't use the term 'perceiving' here

it seems to me that P.XXIII. amounts to saying that the mind's knowledge of itself is
knowledge of the body

what knowledge we have of the mind comes off the body

the mind's knowledge of itself -

it's a question what you want to include here

but I would say the fact of awareness is the mind's knowledge of itself

awareness includes itself


NB.


what is it for the mind to hold anything as object - be that an affection of the body or
an idea?

it is to say the mind is aware of -

the object is represented in the mind

consciousness is thus representation

and so consciousness is thus that which enables representation

and this representation?

it is the showing or the revelation of

that which is outside of mind is reflected in mind

and so consciousness and its object -

a relation -

the relation that is appearance

so this reflection -

of object to subject

what I am saying is that appearance only occurs because of consciousness

so consciousness enables appearance

enables the world to appear

as I argue consciousness is an internal dimension of reality

it is a dimension - that reveals the external -

the world has this feature of revelation

it is nature - the world seeing itself

consciousness enables the seeing

it is not a feature of the external world - it is an internal attribute - the internal
attribute

it is in what you might call meta-evolutionary terms the evolution of internality

with the emergence of internality we have life - life is the internal / extetrnal relation - it is what results

this emergence of internality - is in a logical sense the emergence of relation

prior to such an emergence - it makes no sense to speak of anything being related to
anything else

the fact of consciousness is the fact of relativity

in this sense - though the mind is not an external feature

it is nevertheless a natural fact

a fact of nature

and it is clear that appearance - the appearance of the world is predicated on the fact of
consciousness

therefore any account of the nature of the world - any science of nature

must reflect this fact

it is the fact that in any seeing there is a seer that is not seen

so any comprehensive understanding of the world must take into account this unseen
seer

this unseen seer is consciousness

and just because it is unseen - it remains in any scientific description

in any scientific theory - the invisible elephant in the room

the unknown that is at the heart of all knowledge
it is the set that is a member of itself

it is at least this

and for this reason it is the strangest of things

Spinoza on mind VI

'P.XXII. the human mind not only perceives the affections of the body, but also the
ideas of the affectations.

Demonstration. The ideas of the ideas of affections follow in God and are related to
God in the same way as the ideas themselves of affections. This is demonstrated like
Proposition XX, part II. But the ideas of the affections of the human body are in the
human mind (Proposition XII, part II) that is to say, in God (Proposition XI, part II,
Corollary), in so far as He constitutes the essence of the human mind; therefore, the
ideas of these ideas will be in God in so far as He has knowledge or idea of the human
mind; that is to say (Proposition 21, part II), they will be in the human mind itself,
which therefore, not only perceives the affections of the body, but also the idea of the
affections.'

the mind perceives the affections of the body but also the ideas of these affections

so a state of the body is perceived by the mind - which must mean the person is aware
of the state of the body

this awareness is an internalization of the surface event

on reflection the event has a double aspect - an internal and external dimension

a conscious - and as a matter of logic a non-conscious dimension

the experience of the affection though - is not divided -

the experience is unified

to say the event has an internal and external dimension is really to analyze it

and we do this in order to describe - so as to be able to understand it - and we have to
have some understanding of it in order to deal with it

prior to this analytical treatment the event - the unified event - is unknown

unknown in the sense that it is without character

the event is a result of the relation of consciousness and non-consciousness

underlying the unified event is this relation -

and the relation just is the meeting of mind and matter

characterization of the event is the reflective function of consciousness

you could argue from this that mind and matter are fundamentally explanatory
categories - whose function is to provide a basis on which the event of experience - in
itself unknown - can be tackled - and for all intents and purposes - be made 'known'

anyway such is a very radical view of things and it is not one I am going to pursue
right now

back to Spinoza

I would put that the awareness of the affection - just is the idea of it

Spinoza wants to say that the mind perceives the idea of the affection

and this is to say the affection has an ideational dimension to it - quite regardless of
whether the event is known

ideas - are conceptions of mind - and every thing - every event is thus a conception -
as well as an extended thing

so on this view - the mind - perceives conceptions - outside of itself

ideas are as objective as stones

this is quite a radical view of things

what it means is that for Spinoza - there is one dimension - what you would call the
outside -

everything is objective

mind is not as I have represented it an internal dimension

there is no internality for Spinoza

I can understand why his theory demands this - but I find it quite bizarre

it amounts to saying there is no inner life

everything is revealed

mind / matter - it's all out there -

if you are to argue such a view you must accept that as a consequence the idea of
internality and externality - must be abandoned

if there is no internality - then there is no externality

if there is no inside there is no outside - no surface

so where are you going to place your ideas or your stones?

Spinoza on mind V

my argument of the last post was that all we really get from Spinoza in relation to the
nature of mind is its assertion

back tracking it to God appears to give it some flesh - but it is a back tracking to the
unknown

the mind is idea - and Spinoza has precious little really to say about this

we know the object of the mind is the body

the mind is its idea -

and even though we have this tight fit of mind and body - there is from Spinoza no
sense of the internality of mind

in fact you could very well ask of Spinoza - where is it?

his answer is going to be that it is substance viewed under the attribute of thought

and his idea here is that substance or its modifications is just what is

and we can regard it as either thought or extension

in fact there is technically no difference - it is just a matter of how you read what is
before you

as to substance - independent of these attributes - substance in itself is infinite

this idea of substance I have argued in fact cannot be conceived - it is not a conception
- for a conception has form - infinity does not

so what we are actually talking about here is the unknown

Spinoza calls it God

mind though is an attribute of this God

that is it is a perceived essence

that is to say it is a conceived essence

so mind logically speaking pre-dates substance

for without mind there is no such conception

and this conception is interesting - it is supposed to go beyond - outside of the
conceiving mind - and yet include the conceiving mind

so the argument we have is that the mind in conceiving substance conceives itself -
and everything that it is not

this conception of itself is what?

the mind's identification of itself as an essence of substance

so at the very start mind conceives mind

that is for Spinoza self-consciousness is not a discovery

for mind to identify itself as an essence of substance

it must already have identified itself -

as - mind - what it is

OK -

so what does this amount to?

the idea that the beginning of any awareness is the awareness of self

- is self-consciousness -

the mind is aware of itself

when we think of awareness of that which is outside of mind - we think of a relation
of mind to object - or in Spinoza's terms idea to object

this occurs because the object of awareness is outside of mind

but what of the case when the object is inside - is mind

can we distinguish awareness and awareness of awareness?

can you be aware and not aware that you are aware?

I don't mean in practice - as in being absent minded - but I mean in principle?

I think not

it strikes me that the nature of awareness - of human awareness is that it - for want of
a better phrase - holds itself as object

this is to say there is no difference between awareness and self awareness

human consciousness is the awareness of awareness

so the mind is that which holds itself as subject and object

and the collapse of subject and object into a unity - just is awareness

and perhaps this awareness is not awareness of

it is just awareness

when we introduce object we are talking about something other than mind

so subjectivity is awareness without an object

Spinoza made this point

and thus it can only be awareness of the subject

perhaps the term to use is 'reflective' -

awareness is just reflecting on -

be it that which is internal - or that which is not - that which is external

in this case the object of awareness has no particular ontological status

it is just 'that'

and reflection can turn inward - or outward -

if it turns inward it is just the focus or the knowledge of awareness

of the fact of awareness

if outward it - it is the focus on the non-aware - that which it isn't

so awareness is the kind of thing that turns in on itself

we need a kind of meta-geometry here

it is a form - the internal is a form that can explore itself

and this distinguishes it from the external - the external is linear - it has no reflective
dimension

perhaps we can just say the mind conceives - and to conceive it must have a
conception of itself -

otherwise it has no concept of that which it is not - which is the primary object of
conception

and in that case it could not conceive

so on this view self-consciousness is a logically necessary condition for knowledge

if you have knowledge - you have self-consciousness

Spinoza on mind IV

my central question for Spinoza in relation to his account of the nature of mind is to
do with self-consciousness - what account does Spinoza give of self-consciousness?

to date his account of mind seems to simply be the act of conception -

that is the idea - and he defines it as mind

we can ask what is presupposed by idea - that is what is the ground for idea?

is there not in some sense a 'mind' behind the idea?

Spinoza defines mind initially as an attribute of substance - so it seems to have some
kind of substantial heritage -

that is it is not just an act - and as we have seen above his idea of the idea is that it is
active

the substance idea is that thought is an attribute of God or existence - and that
individual thoughts or thoughts of individuals are simply expressions of this attribute

God is infinite therefore the mind of God is the infinity of thought

perhaps too this means there is ultimately one idea and that idea is the idea of the
material world

but in so far as God is infinite - the idea is expressed infinitely

OK - the key point though is that for Spinoza mind is idea - the action of thought

what I find fascinating here is that on such a theory we can view mind as without
substance

that is there is just the act of thinking -

and there is nothing behind it - except the act of thinking

I don't think Spinoza sees it like this - but I do think his account can be legitimately
interpreted this way

especially when you understand - and this is definitely not Spinoza's understanding -
that his theory of substance fails - that what you really have - where he thinks there is
'substance' - is the unknown

the action of thought - of ideas - conceptions - in the unknown

rather elegant -

still there are questions -

what is this action - in what sense is it different from - distinguishable from external -
observable action?

I don't think Spinoza has an answer to this

he begins with the claim that thought is an attribute of substance - and proceeds as if
everything is now in place

that is the first premise is assumed

but the truth of it is we do not have a theory of mind from Spinoza

what we have is a juggling of terms - mind - thought - idea - conception etc.

I don't think Spinoza would have ever doubted the existence of mind

or for that matter anything -

in his own way he was very positive little fellow

if however we were to ask Spinoza - well what is this thing - the idea - or thought - or
mind - he would have to reflect

and what is this - reflection

what is it to reflect on the mind - what is happening when this occurs?

and this 'action' - is what we term 'self-consciousness'

mind reflecting on mind

what is the logic of this -

how can it be possible -

surely the object of mind is that which is outside of mind

how does mind - 'hold itself' as object?

can this actually happen - or is a mistaken analysis?

self-consciousness is not in doubt here - it is just how to explain it

the really complicating factor is that any explanation - any explanation at all - will be
an action of self-consciousness

self-consciousness - explaining self-consciousness

it's a bit like when the Victorian police had the job of policing themselves - you have
to wonder

it just occurred to me - the mind as an essentially corrupt entity -

perhaps some modern day post-deconstructionalist-nihilists might go for this

might make their day - put some hope into the nothingness

anyway enough with the laughs

proposition XXI might be a good place to get serious -

'P.XXI. This idea of the mind is united to the mind in the same way as the mind itself
is united to the body.

Demonstration. We have shown that the mind is united to the body because the body
is the object of the mind (Propositions XII and XIII, part II); therefore, by the same
reasoning, the idea of the mind must be united with its object, the mind itself, in the
same way as the mind itself is united to the body. Q.E.D.

Scholium. This proposition is to be understood much more clearly from what has been
said in the Scholium to Proposition VII, part II, for we have shown there that the idea
of the body and the body, that is to say (Proposition XIII, part II) the mind and the
body, are one in the same individual, which at one time is considered under the
attribute of thought, and another under the attribute of extension: the idea of the
mind, therefore and the mind itself are one and the same thing, which is considered
under one and the same attribute, that of thought. For, indeed, the idea of the mind,
that is to say, the idea of the idea, is nothing but the form of the idea in so far as it is
considered as a mode of thought and without relation to the object, just as a person
who knows anything, by the very fact that knows that he knows, and knows that he
knows that he knows, and so on ad infinitum. But more on this subject afterwards.'

PXXI. - on this view the mind is or can be the object of the mind in the same way as
the body is the mind's object

there is definitely an in here for the materialist

for if the body is the object of the mind and the object is material (extension) - then if
the mind can have the mind as object - the mind itself must be material

on the other hand - it might be argued there is an obvious problem here with the
notion of object -

what is it - is it body or is it mind

how could it be both - unless both are something else

the argument could well be that Spinoza's theory of mind collapses here

and it collapses because he cannot give a cogent account of self-consciousness

he can only speak of mind as a one dimensional thing

when it comes to explaining reflection - the idea of the mind somehow holding itself
as object

his notion of object is not up to it - it buckles under the weight - or you could say it
doesn't know whether its Arthur or Martha

OK - what can we do here?

the object as metaphysically stateless -

that is the object as being neither body or soul

as just what - a category -

but a category of what?

this is the question -

on such a view you would have to say - well we don't know -

we don't know what the object of the mind is

and it is really just a look over your shoulder to realize the mind has disappeared too

so what else can we do?

Spinoza's theory of mind has by and large hinged on the concept of idea

and as he presents it - this is where object comes in

the object of the idea is something other than the idea - it is outside the idea

but the idea is what we mean by 'mind'

his problem comes straight up - when he has to explain how an idea can have an idea
as an object

you can ask well such an idea is an idea of what - what is the content of this idea -
or is this just an idea - a special kind that has no content?

that is has no reference - outside itself?

if so what does it refer to?

in the scholium Spinoza says - 'For indeed, the idea of the mind, that is to say the idea
of the idea, is nothing but the form of the idea in so far as it is considered as a mode of
thought and without relation to the object........'

so at least it is clear that - the idea of the mind is the form of the idea - and it is
considered without relation to the object

this doesn't deal with this issue - even though it is quite an ingenious attempt

what this amounts to is that the idea can hold the form of the idea as its object -
in the sense of that which it is considering

so the notion here is 'form of the idea'

neat - but what is this 'form of the idea'?

the idea without content -

what other option is there?

the idea of the idea -

this is as I said a very impressive move on Spinoza's part

what is an idea - outside if its content

the form of the idea - OK

in what sense then can this be the object of an idea?

the idea holds the form of the idea as object

the idea holds its form as object

this holding - this action presupposes the idea or mind is self aware

that it can hold itself as object

that it knows itself - as form

so the holding of itself as form can only occur if we have self consciousness -

Spinoza argues it holds itself as form

OK - but there seems to be no question in his mind that the idea can hold itself -
it is just a question of - as what?

his answer is 'as form'

but he has not explained how the mind or the idea can hold itself - never mind as
what

that is the form argument presupposes self-consciousness - it doesn't explain or
account for it

Spinoza's argument of the idea of the idea is an account that presumes self-
consciousness -

so at the heart of Spinoza's theory of mind is an unexplained - and it is an unexplained
- crucial

the nature of self consciousness

if you cannot explain self-consciousness - you have no theory of mind

it seems clear to me that Spinoza never grappled with self-consciousness

he basically wanted thought to be of the same kind of thing as extension

self-consciousness destroys the symmetry

he recognizes it - and gives it a description - the description of form

but the description clever as it is doesn't really work

if you say mind is idea - and notion of idea makes sense only in terms of it having an
object and an object that is outside of itself

the idea cannot be outside itself - even if you want to call it form

so I think the approach of equating mind with idea does not prove very fruitful in the
problem of self-consciousness

certainly it hasn't helped Spinoza

of course this does presume that Spinoza is finally explaining reality - or attempting to

perhaps not

perhaps what we have form Spinoza is a description of what is

his 'argument' on self-consciousness is '...just as a person who knows anything, by the
very fact that he knows, and knows that he knows that he knows, and so on ad
infinitum....'

it is clear that what precedes this not an argument about the origin and nature of self-
consciousness - it is a description - a description in terms of ideas of ideas

Spinoza is not troubled by self-consciousness - he just wants to include it into his system
of thought - to find a place for it

Spinoza on mind III

P. VII. The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of
things.

the argument in general is that there is an underlying unifying logic of all existing
forms

in Spinozistic terms - the logic of substance is manifested in the logic of attributes

which is to say the essential logic of mind is the essential logic of extension

we have from Spinoza the assertion of metaphysical unity

the basis of his argument is his definition of substance -

E.I.D.III. 'I understand SUBSTANCE (substantia) to be that which is in itself and is
conceived through itself; I mean that, the conception of which does not depend on
the conception of another thing from which it must be formed.'

that which is in itself and conceived through itself -

that which is in itself we can understand as that which is not in anything else

therefore it is that in which everything else is in -

so what do we say here - existence?

substance is existence as such

OK - now conceived through itself -

a conception in the normal use is a conception of -

that is there is an object of conception -

on such a view that which is conceived is other than the conceiving

so existence as such as an object is conceived by - what?

a subject

the subject cannot by definition be outside of existence - yes

but is this to say existence conceives itself?

I think not -

clearly a conception is in existence -

what of the idea of existence in itself -

this is to say everything is the subject of this conception

but can this be?

can the conception itself be - both be a conception separate from its object - and inside
its object

can we hold the concept of - as of the object being conceived?

in simple terms - the conception if it is an object - is not a conception - it is that which
is conceived

so if conception is of the object - there is no conception in the sense of that which is
apart from the object

in such a view - yes you have unity - all that is - is the object

but there is no possibility of knowing this - there is no possibility of knowledge

therefore if substance conceives itself - there is no conception

so - we can't actually speak of substance conceiving itself - such is a misuse of terms

if this is what is being argued then there is no knowledge

another point to make is this -

a concept is a concept of -

a concept of something

and a something is that which it is not

that is it has definition

it is particular -

so the question must be asked - how can the idea of substance as Spinoza defines it
- as that which has no restriction - as that which is not something that it is not -
actually be formed?

my point is that there is no such concept

because no such concept can be formed

we can say the world is 'x' and '-x'

that is the world is an entity and all that the entity is not

the point is we can only make such a statement in the form of a conjunction

a conjunction based on a particularity - 'x'

the '-x' even if you are to say it refers - to all that 'x' is not - still is not the totality -

is not the idea of substance argued by Spinoza

the idea of unrestricted totality is a logical mistake

Spinoza's idea of substance is a logical mistake - it is a misuse of the notion of
conception

I began this discussion of substance to get to the idea of unifying logic that is
manifested in thought and extension - for this I suggest is the idea behind P.VII. that
the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things

my argument is that Spinoza's idea of substance does not provide a basis for arguing
that there is an underlying essential or existential unity

and the reason for it is that the notion of substance cannot be established in the first
place

so what of any holistic account?

the argument is clear - there is no conceptual basis for it

so just at this point we can say we must dismiss the proposal of P.VII - for it is a
species of the holistic argument - that we can conceive a totality or a complete picture
- or in this case a universal order?

the world impacts the body and this impact is internalized in the mind

that there is external impact is clear

therefore we can say the impact itself is the external internalized

the event of impact has an external and internal dimension

the event itself is the unity of these dimensions

but what sense can we make of the event itself?

in itself - it is unknown

and further it is only known via it's internalization

so the idea of it is all that is known-

can we go from here to speak of the event as it were outside of its internalization

we would need to if we were to speak of an order and connection that is outside of
thought

the point is we can't

but at the same time - because we can't we are always in a position of uncertainty

we may assume that how we are affected provides a true picture of the world outside of
our knowledge - outside of mind

but we have no way at all of being sure of this

we can for practical purposes proceed as if - and indeed we do all the time -

but this is pragmatics - not objective knowledge

some think this is where you sink into blissful solipsism

but that is not the case at all

as a matter of logic we know the external world exists

it is that which is not our internality

that which is not mind

and we understand as a matter of logic that the internal is affected by the external -

but we have no objective view of the relation - we cannot step outside of it and see it
for what it is

we are this relation

we can only operate with what it provides

and what it provides is an a two-dimensional world

and knowledge is just the arguments we make in relation to this world

there is no guarantee to these argument

they spring from necessity -

but are incurably contingent

the essence of our knowledge is uncertainty

we have no way of establishing in an objective sense if there is any order or lack of it
in this reality

we simply do not know

the other point to make is that the body is not the world

and that the clearest impressions the mind has - is of the body

things exist independently of the mind in the outside world

we can only know of these things via the body

their existence - their logic as things in themselves - is not anything we have access to
- if indeed it makes any sense to speak of them in such a manner

Spinoza on mind II

an attribute is a perceived essence of substance

how do we distinguish attributes?

thought is an attribute of God (P.1) - extension is an attribute of God (P.2)

as I have argued Spinoza's argument for the nature of attributes presupposes mind

that is his argument for attributes presupposes one of the attributes

you could well argue from this that the idea of attributes crashes - given this
circularity

and with that of course the idea of substance - at least in the terms that Spinoza puts it

so we are in the position where mind perceives itself - as an attribute -

in what sense can we then say the mind percieves - the body?

in what sense can the body or extension - be anything other than an aspect of mind?

if there is no answer to this question we are condemned to idealism and the argument
stops

what I think Spinoza missed is that mind in perceiving itself percieves itself as
internal

as inside extension

certainly the mind does not see itself as outside - as a feature of the extented world

so mind is seen as an internal form

the fact of this is important

for the conception of internality can only be maintained given externality

the internal only has any sense given its logical opposite - the external

and this logic is not contraversial -

our natural conception is that the mind is internal and that the external world is not
mind - whatever else it is

and what we describe it as - is matter - the physical world

this distinction of mind and matter is based firstly on the truth of self-consciousness

consciousness perceiving / conceiving itself

this conception of mind places mind inside the physical world

if so then the distinction between attributes that Spinoza needs to establish is a
distinction between internal and external attributes

the internal / external distinction gives the idea of attributes in this context some body

internality - in its self-awareness - recognizes its opposite - the external

the distinction I would say is finally based on logic

so indeed what we have is a conception - and the idea of its opposite

do we leave the internal in putting the external?

yes if we see this as a matter of logic - for the opposite of internality on this argument
- is the external - and this is to say that as a matter of logic the external by its nature
cannot be internal

that which the mind posits as being outside of itself cannot be itself

there is no sign in Spinoza of the internal / external argument

mind and matter are attributes - on his view this is enough

it is that reality has two percieved essences mind and extension - this is where he
begins

it is a clear starting point - but again this is all it is - there is no cogent argument as
to what the mind perceives as the difference between the attributes

if the argument is not about substance - but rather perception - intellectual perception -

we can rightly ask what is intellectually apprehended in the perception of essences

in D. II. we have -

'I say that to the essence of anything pertains that, which being given, the thing is
necessarily posited, and being taken away, the thing is necessarily taken; or, in other
words, that without which the thing can neither be nor be conceived, and in its turn
cannot be nor concieved without the thing'

as a definition of essence this is OK - but this 'thing' - that is essence - is left
undefined

now you can be mystical here or simply accept the fact that the logic of this argument
points to - results in skepticism

that the essence - if such exists or makes sense is unknown

these are the only two options open to Spinoza

and the first collapses into the second - so skepticism is unavoidable

so apprehending essences does not help us in identifying or distinguishing mind and
matter

by the way substance on this view is nothing more than the unknown writ large

how though do we approach the mind / matter issue if intellectual perception of
essences doesn't work?

my argument is a non-substance argument - a non-substantial argument

it is that mind and matter are dimensions of a single unknown reality

and as such mind and matter are in any essential sense - unknown

what we have though is the logic of internality and externality

it is to use a classical distinction - an argument of form - not substance

mind or consciousness is internality - matter or the physical world is externality

this is to describe reality in terms of its dimenssions - internal / external

and I should point out here that it doesn't follow from this that all reality is two dimensional

it is clear that two dimensional reality is in a quantitative sense - exceptional

as to why this is the case - is not the issue - it is simply how the matter stands

Spinoza does attempt to define mind in terms of action

he distinguishes active and passive modes of being -

and determines the idea as a conception and a conception as active as distinct from
passive in nature

we can ask though - how is the action of mind on Spinozas's view different in any way
to the action of the body - or of extension?

if action is the essence of conception is it also the essence of the non-conceptual?

it is clear that the idea of action is more of a unifying than distinguishing notion

an action is an action

and yes we can place it differently - we can refer to internal action and external action

the nature of the action as action is not distinguishable - only the place or the
dimension of the action

in proposition 1. of the second part of the Ethics - Spinoza puts that thought is an
attribute of God - or God is a thinking thing

the idea of the idea - as a conception as an action is essentially the same argument for
the nature of man - A.II. - man thinks

man thinks - thought is an attribute of God

presumably we can say therefore God thinks

how then is the idea of God or substance to be distinguished from that of man?

on the basis of thought - there is no distinction

a thinking thing conceives be it man or God

the action of thought does not distinguish man and God

as we have seen thought is a perceived essence of substance - or God

but mind must be presumed for this argument to go forth

therefore mind perceives itself as an essence of God

which means God is a conception of the mind's conception of itself

it is a secoindary or defining conception

the mind perceives itself - and this perception is a perception of the unknown

that is the mind perceives itself as unknown

this state of affairs cannot be left to stand

the world we live in - we operate in is a world of action -

the mind needs to characterize in order to create the pretense of knowlege - a pretense
necessary for rational - that is effective action

Spinoza's characterization is God

in general you can say - well anything will do here - so long as action is made possible

why not God?

the point is 'God' as put by Spinoza is a useless conception -

and the reason for this is that it distinguishes nothing

in fact you have to say right at the get go - it is not a valid concept

just simply becasuse it has no limits - and therefore no content

what Spinoza has done is what I think the ancient Jewish prophets did - give the
unknown a name

Spinoza on mind

Concerning the nature and origin of the mind

(Ethics: second part)

D.III. idea - a conception of the mind

conception an action of the mind

A. II. - man thinks

A. III. - modes of thinking - such as love or desire - or any other name by which the
emotions of the mind may be designated - are not granted unless an idea in the same
individual is granted of the thing loved desired etc.

a mode is determined by an idea -

for a mode to exist - the idea must be in the individual who i.e. loves or desires

the idea is thus the necessary condition of the mode

A.V. we only perceive or feel bodies or modes of thinking

so it seems on this view ideas are not perceived or felt - what is perceived or felt are
(bodies and) modes of thinking

the idea determines the mode - but the idea is not felt or perceived

so if it is not felt or perceived - what is the idea?

it can only be an explanation of that which is felt or perceived - in this case the mode
of thinking

so the idea - for Spinoza is really an argument about the basis of the ground of modes
of thought - or simply thought

this doesn't sound too bad except that we have no idea on this view what an idea is
except that it is necessary to a mode - and this tells us literally nothing

we are no better informed about the nature of thinking through the introduction of
'idea' than we were before it was introduced

it is in this sense an empty concept

a mode (E. I. D.V) is that which is in something through which it can be understood

so a mode of thought is that which is in thought through which it can be understood -
it is thus a defining of thought - a characterization of thought - i.e. as love or as desire
etc.

first up can we define thought? - we speak of ways of thinking yes - but what is this?

isn't it just that we conceptualize behaviour and categorize it in an ideal fashion - i.e.
in terms of 'thought' - rather than in terms of action?

that is it presents action in a logical format - an ideational format

and in this sense it is really just to internalize the external - or present it in an internal
format -

so we conceptualize - and then refer to this conceptualization as 'thought' - that is give
it an object-like rendering

what I am saying here is that we make thought out of our conceptualizations - in a
crude sense we make a name -

and you might say - alright - something is going on in conceptualization that is different
to externally observable behaviour - so why not call it 'thought' or thinking etc.?

OK - so what is happening here is that in conceptualizing we define conceptualizing -
and out of this comes such notions as thought

but it is clear that the action of so defining occurs because we need to define

what we are presented with in conceptualizing without this definition of
conceptualizing is quite simply unknown

the act of defining gives us a basis on which to operate in a ideal or ideational form

so what we have really with this argument from Spinoza is just the adoption of the
conclusions of such a process

Spinoza begins at the end -

he does not seem to see that outside of the action of thought - there is no thought

thought is its act

and as such in the first instance - that is in its act - it is unknown

the act of thinking about thought - that is reflective thinking - is the act of
characterization

this action of characterization though is just the necessary response to the unknown

necessary in the sense of enabling action

and this is purely a contingent necessity

so all that comes from this has strictly speaking only ephemeral status - it just enables us
to get going - to act

therefore - any characterization of conceptualization - is as valid as any other

logic is just this possibility

in D.III. Spinoza says :

'By idea I understand a conception of the mind which the mind forms because it is a
thinking thing.

Explanation. I use the word conception rather than perception because the name
perception seems to indicate that the mind is passive in its relation to the object. But
the word conception seems to express the action of the mind.'

an idea is a conception - a conception an action of a thinking thing

can we say therefore the mind is the act of conception?

yes I think so - but it leaves unanswered the question - what is conception?

Spinoza will say the action of the mind

but this is a circular argument - it doesn't help -

what is the mind for Spinoza?

the answer he gives is in Proposition 1. -

'Thought is an attribute of God or God is a thinking thing'

and for attribute we must go back to E.I.D.4. -

'By attribute, I understand that which the intellect perceives of substance, as if
constituting its essence.'

the problem here is that in order to define attribute we have to presuppose mind - and
yet the very reason we looked to the question of attribute was to understand or define
mind

so it comes out like this - an attribute is a perceived essence of substance -

that is simply a description of the essence of substance by the mind

and here is the kicker -

one of the descriptions of the essence of substance (by the mind) is thought

and thought we know is an action of the mind

so - the mind conceives itself as an attribute of substance

so we have here a conception of mind by mind - as what?

the obvious answer here would be mind

in fact I wonder how this could be avoided

if the mind conceives itself as an attribute and an attribute is a conception of the mind

all you can say is the mind primarily conceives itself -

and therefore the idea of substance - or the idea of an attribute of substance - has to be
a further or secondary description that the mind gives itself

on this view substance or God is a conception of mind - and a description of mind

at this point we are clearly very tightly locked into Idealism

but we can take this a little further by asking - when mind conceives itself - what is it
conceiving?

we have already been told that conception is an action -

and in a straightforward sense this sounds good -

but now we are dealing with the idea of the mind conceiving itself

and we have to ask can the idea of conception as action hold up in this context?

that is can we say an act acts on an act - and the result is the mind conceiving itself?

the issue is really what is called self-consciousness

the idea that the mind conceives or is aware of itself

is this awareness an action?

yes - we might say

but will we here also say it is action on action

or is it rather that awareness is a unique kind of action?

if so - what can we say here?

we must remember that any thing we say here is an act of awareness itself

- which makes me think that awareness is just a phenomena that cannot be accounted
for

that it is essentially and necessarily - unknown

and that this is its defining characteristic

in any case Spinoza's notions of attribute and substance - cannot be used to explain his
idea of mind

for it is his very idea of mind out of which these notions take life

and I think this is pretty clear and uncontraversial - just from his definitions

strictly speaking - Spinoza - you could well argue leaves mind undefined -

and that even his minimal description of mind as the action of thought - tells us
nothing really

the question is - is this a good result or not?

from my point of view it is good -

but I don't think this is the conclusion Spinoza wanted to achieve or believed he had
achieved

Hegel 169

Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit:

169.


ARGUMENT:


the determination of life as it has issued from the Notion is sufficient to characterize it
without having to further develop its nature

its sphere is completely determined in the following moments - essence is infinity as
the suppression of all distinctions - the pure moment of axial rotation - its self-repose
being an absolutely restless infinity - independence itself in which the differences of
the movement are resolved - the simple essence of Time has stable shape of Space

the differences are present in this universal medium - for this universal flux has its
negative nature - only in being the suppression of them - but it cannot supersede the
different moments if they do not have an enduring existence

it is the very flux as a self-identical independence which is itself an enduring existence
- in which the different moments are present as distinct members and parts

Being no longer has the significance of an abstract universality - nor has the essence of the different moments the significance of abstract universality - on the contrary their being is the simple fluid substance of pure movement within itself

the difference of these members is just the moments of infinity - or the pure
movement itself


COMMENTARY:


I think Hegel missed his calling - he should have been a classical composer - he has
created a masterful and beautiful - quite exquisite music - and its most stunning
feature is that it is soundless

what we face is what we don't know -

the result of such is anxiety - anxiety is just the experience of not-knowing - with the
belief that knowing is possible - anxiety is this conflict -

out of this anxiety - in response to it we create explanations - pictures - myths
the point of which is to dispel the unknown

strictly speaking it is to just cover it -

our posits - our 'descriptions' are the platforms we create in order to act with some
bearing - some coordinates - in a world that is essentially unknown

we conquer the unknown in our imaginations

here I will leave Hegel for the present

Hegel 168

Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit:

168.


ARGUMENT:


for us the object which for self-consciousness is the negative element has returned
into itself just as on the other side consciousness has -

through this reflection into itself the object has become Life

what self-consciousness distinguishes from itself as having being - is being reflected
into itself - and the object of immediate desire is a living thing

for the in-itself or the universal the result of the relation of the Understanding to the
inwardness of things is the distinguishing of what is not to be distinguished - or the
unity of what is distinguished

to the extent that consciousness is independent so too is its object - but only implicitly

self-consciousness which is simply for itself - and directly characterizes its object as a
negative element - or is primarily desire - will therefore on the contrary learn through
experience that the object is independent


COMMENTARY:


self-consciousness - recognizes what it is not -

this recognition is a direct logical result of the nature of self-consciousness

self-consciousness recognizes itself as conscious - that which it is not - as not-conscious

that which is outside of it (the outside of essential internality) is the object - for the
subject

the recognition of internality - is the key - this recognition just is self-consciousness

if 'x' knows what 'x' is - it follows 'x' knows what it is not

if this is not the case - then we do not in fact have an 'x' - that is we have an undefined
entity

internality is defined - and self-aware - therefore it knows that what it is not - is not
aware

for consciousness the object is the result of a logical operation

this knowledge which recognizes the object - the external - the world outside of
consciousness - is no grand metaphysical scheme - it is a simple logical operation

substance is not the issue - it is an issue of form - logical form

substance comes later as a posit of consciousness

consciousness' recognition of the obeject has nothing at all to do with experience -

experience is predicated on this logic


NB.


desire I think is the ground or the reason for action

we only know of desire in any determinate sense in terms of the object desired

and if we reflect here we are forced to ask why - why this?

so the issue is not settled - on the contrary it brings into sharp focus the fact that we
do not know

that is we do not know what desire is

and this I would suggest is the origin of and the force of desire

desire is not knowing

Hegel 167

Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit:

167.


ARGUMENT:


we have now to see how the shape of self-consciousness first makes its appearance

if we consider this new shape of knowing - the knowing of itself - in relation to that
which preceded - the knowing of an other - then we see that though this other has
indeed vanished - its moments have been preserved - and here they are present as they
are in themselves

self-consciousness is the reflection out of the being of the world of sense and
perception - and is essentially the return from otherness

hence otherness is for it in the form of a being - or as a distinct moment - but there is
also for consciousness the unity of itself - with this difference as a second distinct
moment

with that first moment self-consciousness is in the form of consciousness - and the
whole expanse of the sensuous world is preserved for it - but only as connected with
the second moment - the unity of self-consciousness with itself - and hence the
sensuous world is for it an enduring existence

the unity of self-consciousness with itself is essential to self-consciousness

self consciousness is Desire in general

consciousness as self-consciousness has a double object - one is the immediate object
- that of sense certainty and perception - the second - itself - the true essence - and is
present in the first instance only as opposed to the first object


COMMENTARY:


the idea that consciousness recognizes - or as it were has the concept of the other -
and incorporates this into itself - is an attempt to give self-consciousness an analysis

also - self consciousness as the reflection out and return from the non-conscious - of
the reflection

my view is reflection is the act of consciousness -

self-consciousness is just this act

there is nothing behind this reflective act - no 'self' - no essence - no nothing

self-consciousness is reflectivity

it gets interesting when you try to say what this is - what reflectivity is

the point is I think is - we can only recognize the action - that's all -

and as to explaining it -

it needs to be understood that any account of reflection will be reflective

there is no other action we can perform as conscious beings

reflection is to the internal dimension - what reflex is to the external

and the thing is - you never leave reflection

one reflection can be the subject of another

this is the best you can say

and perhaps there is a law of diminishing returns in any such process

anyway the point is that any explanation of reflection - of self-consciousness - will be
a reflective argument - a reflective action -

so - there is no explanation of that which explains

and what this amounts to is that consciousness / self-consciousness - is not
accountable

we have no knowledge of it - we can only witness its action

and the witnessing itself - is this action

Hegel 166

Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit:

03/03/08
Hegel: Self-consciousness


B . Self-consciousness

IV. The truth of self-certainty


166.


ARGUMENT:


in the previous modes of certainty what is true for consciousness is other than itself -
but the Notion of this truth vanishes in the experience of it - what the object was
immediately in itself - turns out to be a mode in which the object is only for another

the Notion of the object is superseded in the actual object - immediate presentation of
the object is superseded in experience - certainty gives place to truth

but now certainty is identical with its truth - for certainty is to itself its own object -
and consciousness is to itself the truth

if we give the name of 'Notion' to the movement of knowing - and the name 'object' to
knowing as a passive unity - or as the 'I' - then the object corresponds to the Notion

for the in-itself is consciousness - but equally it is that for which another (the in itself)
is - and it is for consciousness the case that the in-itself of the object - and its being for
another - are one

the 'I' is the content of the connection and the connecting itself

opposed to an other the 'I' is its own self - as the other is the 'I' itself


COMMENTARY:


it is rather that the actual object is superseded in the notion of the object - the actual
object in its immediate presentation is unknown - the notion of the object is the
characterization of the object - a characterization that enables utility - action in
relation to

there is no certainty in the initial experience - presentation is not certainty - we reflect
because we don't know - reflection is the natural - animal response to uncertainty -

truth is an argument regarding description

quite clearly in identifying the object with the 'I' - Hegel demonstrates he has no
account of the external world as external - a very confused notion of self-
consciousness (the 'I') - and no account at all of object - his object has simply become
absorbed into the subject - and given the status of 'I' -

this whole approach is utterly unworkable

the notions of 'in-itself' and 'for an other' - here have no actual content - we can't say
they belong to the subject or the object - they are without metaphysical place -

at this point you can ask quite reasonably does Hegel know what he is talking about?

he says the 'I' is the content and the connection between the in-itself and the being for
an other

the fact a thing can be regarded as in relation to or not - is all that is being stated here

such a distinction exists in order for us to have options in relation to how we are to see
an entity and thus how we are to act in relation to it

so these distinctions are purely operational - they are categories that transform the
entity from an unknown into an operation

self-consciousness - which is just the awareness of awareness - and again this is just
awareness - (self-consciousness is really just an explanation of consciousness - or visa
versa) - is not at the centre of some metaphysical space - the end points of which are
'in-itself' and 'for an other' - self-consciousness creates such categories to engage the
external world

consciousness is the internal impacting on the external - (and the opposite of course
occurs) - self-consciousness is awareness of awareness

this is just the sense of internality that a conscious / self-conscious entity has - because
its unity is expressed in two dimensions

Hegel 165

Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit:

165.


ARGUMENT:


we see that in the inner world of appearance the Understanding comes to know
nothing else but appearance - not in shape of a play of forces - but rather that play of forces in its absolutely universal moments - in fact the Understanding experiences only itself

raised above perception consciousness exhibits itself closed in a unity with the
supersensible world through the mediating term of appearance - through which it
gazes into this background lying behind appearance

the two extremes - the one of the pure inner world - the other that of the inner being
gazing into this pure world - have now coincided - and have vanished - so too the
middle term as something other than these two extremes

this curtain of appearance hanging before the inner world is therefore drawn away -
and we have the inner being gazing into the inner world - self-consciousness

it is manifest that behind the so called curtain which is supposed to conceal the inner
world - there is nothing to be seen unless we go behind it ourselves - as much in order
to see - as that there may be something that can be seen

it is nevertheless evident that we cannot go behind appearance

for this knowledge of appearance and of its inner being - is a result of a complex
movement whereby the modes of consciousness 'meaning' perceiving and
Understanding vanish

and it will be equally evident that the cognition of what consciousness knows in
knowing itself - requires a still more complex movement


COMMENTARY:


appearance as I have argued is the relation between the inner and outer worlds -
between consciousness and non-consciousness

so appearance as such is neither of the inner or outer worlds - and for this reason I say
it is clearly unknown - if not inner or outer - what is it - the answer quite clearly is that
which is not known

the relation nevertheless exists and the object in the sense of the goal of consciousness
is to make it 'known' - it becomes clear that this goal is not reached - but the
endeavour results in the capacity to deal with what is presented and what is unknown

so yes I would agree the understanding comes to know nothing but appearance - and
that this knowledge qua knowledge is an illusion - a ruse - a con

Hegel has no account of the external world - as external - and so for him - the
'knowledge' that results is a knowledge that has no basis outside of consciousness

he does speak a lot of the inner world - but strictly speaking he has no inner world to
refer to - for an inner reality only has any sense and definition if it is the inner of an
outer - and so for Hegel it is true the Understanding only experiences itself - but here's
the twist - there is no self in Hegel that can do the experiencing -

consciousness is not raised above perception - perception is a function of
consciousness -

and yes consciousness is a closed unity - the inside dimension is defined - and
determined by the unity it is the inside of -

however there is no background to consciousness - there is no background to the
inside - there is relative to the inside - only the outside - and the outside is just the
external dimension of the unity

appearance is a 'mediating term' in the sense that appearance is that which results from
the relation of consciousness and its object -

this relation is given - it is natural - there are no holes in it - it is simply the world we
inhabit - in all its fullness

the inner world is pure - and but the inner world just is the inner being - there is no
differentiation between inner world and inner being -

and from the inside there is no 'gazing in' - there is no inside - in the inside -

the gazing is gazing out - and what is reflected into consciousness is the world
conceived

the relation that is consciousness and the non-conscious does not vanish - but equally
it is not seen - the unity that is the human being in the world can only be approached
in terms of consciousness and what is outside of consciousness - the unity per se is
ever present - but unknown

there is no curtain of appearance - appearance covers nothing - there is nothing to
cover

the relation of the inside and the outside is the creation that is appearance - appearance
is an effect

Hegel 164

Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit:

164.


ARGUMENT:


infinity becomes the object of the Understanding - but the Understanding falls short of
infinity as such - since it apportions to two worlds - that which is a difference in itself
- the self-repulsion of the selfsame and the self-attraction of the unlike

to the Understanding the movement as it is found in experience is a mere happening -
and the selfsame and the unlike are predicates whose essence is an inert substrate

what is for the Understanding an object in a sensuous covering - is for us a pure
Notion

the exposition of its Notion belongs to science - consciousness immediately has this
Notion - and the notion comes onto the scene as a form belonging to consciousness
itself - or as a new shape of consciousness

since this object of infinity is an object for consciousness - the latter is consciousness
of a difference that is no less immediately canceled

consciousness is for its own self - it is a distinguishing of that which contains no
difference - or self-consciousness

I distinguish myself from myself - and in doing so I am directly aware that what is
distinguished from myself is not different from me

I - the selfsame being repel myself from myself - but what is posited as distinct from
me or as unlike me - is immediately in being so distinguished - not a distinction for
me

it is true that consciousness of an 'other' - of an object in general - is itself necessarily
self-consciousness - a reflectedness-into-self - consciousness of itself - in its otherness

the necessary advance from the previous shapes of consciousness for which their truth
was a Thing - an 'other' than themselves - expresses just this - that not only is
consciousness of a thing possible only for a self-consciousness - but that self-
consciousness alone is the truth of those shapes

but it is only for us that this truth exists - not yet for consciousness

but self-consciousness has become simply for itself - not yet as a unity with
consciousness in general


COMMENTARY:


infinity in the sense of a conception of the endless or the boundless is a pseudo
conception in that a concept is a concept because it is bound or defined - that is if this
infinity makes some kind of existential sense - it cannot be conceived - what you have
here is the mistake that the non-concept refers or signifies - an example of the general
logical error that the negative refers - or is a sign of a kind of reality - when in fact all
the negative is - is a sign of decision - the decision not to proceed -

beyond what is conceived - is relative to the conception - that which is not known -
this is the best that can be made of this 'infinity theory'

the 'mere happening' Hegel refers to is just a description of the fact of consciousness
facing the unknown - this unknown or 'mere happening' is the object of consciousness
- it is just what consciousness must and does make something of

the 'object in a sensuous covering' is the world of appearance - that is the relation of
consciousness and the non-conscious - the ground which consciousness reflectively
interprets - for us it is a pure notion in the sense that it is the unknown - this is its
'purity' - if you want to go down the poetic track

science is indeed a tool for the exposition of the world of appearance as it is given as
an unknown - and yes consciousness immediately has this notion - it is what is given
to consciousness - just in the act of consciousness' relation to the non-conscious - and
yes the notion as any notion does belong to consciousness - the notion is a creation of
consciousness - and notions do give consciousness a characterization - but in so far as
consciousness is a dimension - the internal dimension - what you will have is the play
of shapes within this space

Hegel defines self-consciousness as that which contains no difference - all this
amounts to is the idea that self-consciousness is a unity - which in my terms is to say
it is the internal dimension of a thing -

now I happen to think that all consciousness is self consciousness - and that therefore
any distinction between consciousness and non-consciousness is a false distinction -
but for Hegel consciousness is not self-consciousness - self-consciousness is some
kind of development of consciousness

therefore to say that self-consciousness is that with no difference - is really to say
nothing -

we have no theory of self-consciousness from Hegel

he says I distinguish myself from myself - this makes no sense - there is no proper use
of logic here - that which is may be distinguished from that which is not - that which is
therefore outside of itself - consciousness may distinguish that which it is not i.e. - the
external world - but 'itself' - is not - external to consciousness

his idea that I repel myself from myself suggests the beginning of some kind of theory
of how consciousness can create 'itself' - strange as this idea might be - but this line of
inquiry ends quickly with the realization that any such distinction is 'not a distinction
for me'

but the real kicker comes next - the argument that the 'other' is itself necessarily self-
consciousness

as they say you can run but you can't hide - and this is the position Hegel is in - he has
no where to go -

his failure to understand that consciousness / self-consciousness is internality - and
that its object is externality - his failure that is to recognize and or establish the
external world - as external - has left him only with consciousness - we cannot even
say - 'the internal' - for Hegel does not understand that the essence of consciousness is
internality - therefore his 'consciousness' - is nothing - literally nothing - the term has
no meaning as a result of his deliberations -

he can't even retreat into solipsism - there is literally nowhere to go - for to this point
he hasn't managed to establish the self - let alone the self as everything

what you have from Hegel is like an archeological expedition that covers all the
ground and uses every tool available - and even makes a number of new tools -

but in the end after all the blood and sweat - all the high hopes and grand endeavours -
finds nothing -

and leaves nothing but a hole where once there was a serene landscape

Hegel 163

Hegel's Phenemenology of Spirit:

163.


ARGUMENT:


infinity or this absolute unrest of pure movement - is being - is the soul of all that has
gone before -

it is in the inner world that it has freely and clearly shown itself

appearance or the play of forces displays it - but it is as explanation that it first freely
stands forth

and in being finally an object of consciousness - as that which it is - consciousness is
thus self-consciousness

the Understanding's 'explanation' is primarily the only description of what self-
consciousness is

the reason why 'explaining' affords so much satisfaction is just because in it
consciousness is so to speak communing directly with itself - enjoying only itself -
although it seems to be busy with something else - it is in fact occupied only with
itself


COMMENTARY:


it is very disappointing to finally get to self-consciousness in Hegel's argument - and
to get nothing from him

it appears that he does not see that the question of how the inner world of
consciousness becomes an object of consciousness - is the question that must be
answered in any theory of consciousness

it is not even on his radar - as if there is no question here

and this is the central issue of consciousness - the nature of self-consciousness -

how does the subject hold itself as object - how can the subject be object?

what kind of thing can be subject and object - how can we explain or comprehend
this?

to simply say - consciousness exists as 'object consciousness' - and thus consciousness
is self-consciousness - is at the best breathtakingly naive

in what sense - how - does consciousness exist as an object?

we have no account form Hegel on this issue

his next point is that the understanding's explanation of consciousness is the only
description of what self-consciousness is -

so on this view - the understanding is something other than consciousness

to be cruel here you could say therefore the understanding is by definition - non-
conscious - and this of course is ridiculous

or the alternative is - that the understanding is consciousness - and therefore
consciousness' explanation of itself is the only description of self consciousness

OK - so how does consciousness 'describe itself" - what is being described?

and again - how is that consciousness can regard itself as the object of consciousness?

these are all questions Hegel's seems not to have recognized - or if recognized decided
not to address

and everything depends on the answers here

finally it's clear that he has put all this in the too hard basket - and just taken the
apparently easy way out - an unexplained solipsism -

'it is in fact only occupied with itself'

as I said this is a sad chapter in Hegel's discussion

I was really hoping he would take this issue on - instead he has just sidestepped it

I am going to jump in here and put some conclusions -

consciousness is self-consciousness -

to be aware one must be aware that one is aware

so this is just the nature of consciousness - of awareness

by its nature consciousness is 'self-illuminating' - and this is where we begin

if so consciousness - does not become self-conscious

the categories of subject and object - of knower and known are constructs of
consciousness deigned to give some logical foundation to our dealings with the
unknown that is appearance

consciousness recognizes itself as internality - it is thus aware of its meta place

the world outside of consciousness is the external world

the external world is the object of consciousness

consciousness recognizes itself as knower -

the idea that consciousness is known - that you can know yourself - is to confuse
subject and object

consciousness does not - cannot know itself

'itself' is internal - the known is external -

consciousness is not external to itself

consciousness is aware of itself - aware of itself as unknown

this is the essential nature of consciousness - that it recognizes itself as unknown

in fact it sees itself as unknowable

the category of knowability does not apply to consciousness - only to that which is
outside of consciousness

awareness of self is simply and only the awareness of internality

and this awareness is not an awareness of something - of substance - it is an awareness
of dimension -

which is simply to say it is an awareness of logic - of logical form

that is consciousness' awareness of 'itself'

my view is that the world of appearance is the relation of consciousness and its object

that this relation is the common ground of conscious and non-conscious being - it is
the working reality

and so it is the case that consciousness reflects on what is given in this working reality

and what is it that is given?

I am going to put something quite radical in answer to this -

my view is that the relation of consciousness and the non-conscious is the common
reality that is image -

the relation of mind to its object results in image

the ground that consciousness comes to in the second moment is the world of image

I say this here to get to the fact that image is not a characteristic of the internal - and it
is not a characteristic of the external - not that such a view would generally need to be
argued

image is the relation

image is the reality of the relation of the conscious and non-conscious

therefore as object the image is reflected on by consciousness

it is this reflective action that transfers the image as reflection to consciousness

so it will be asked - if so what is the internality of consciousness?

most would say it is the world of image - at the very least

the internality of consciousness is thought

and thought is without image

imagination is the action of thought in the world of image

it is consciousness' dealing with the world of image

and what can we say of the nature of the this relational world - this unity of the
conscious and non-conscious?

it is not to be confused with the internal or with the external -

so how is it to be characterized?

my answer is both ways -

it's really the Blues Brother's joke - "what kind of music have you got here?" "we got
both kinds - country and western"

the point is - we can only explain the unity in terms of thought or non-thought

in terms of mind or matter

the unity that is the unity of mind and matter is not definable - it is unknown